I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet
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- Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL‑46 represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic.
- No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain Glover. (p.174)
- PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 397
- Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part was as follows
- Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.
Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army concerning the use of aircraft was effective from the date of signature and would be put in execution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. (P. 7) B. TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENERAL Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operating twenty‑four hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Reconnaissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in. the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent drills (p. 510). It appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the Navy was to assist the Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at Pearl Harbor was one of joint cooperation between the Army and Navy and not unity of command; (4) that the principal mission which had been assigned to the Pacific Fleet was to train for war with Japan; and (5) that the war plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the fleet technically mobilized. (1) The decisive theatre the Atlantic; defensive strategy in the Pacific. Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow I" contemplated the United States at war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any assistance except perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based on that plan; "Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis nations, including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow 5" were about the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to the Fourteenth Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had certain offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by "Rainbow 5." (P 23) Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, and was under then Captain McMorris. He was responsible for the preparation of the written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that duty on February 1, 1941. (p 66) Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific Fleet for the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan, in general were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less indefensible; to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by 396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communications east of longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed of combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use of a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of the Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase. (p. 66‑7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available around December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral Kimmel intended to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were then available. The operating schedules were more or less built around the war plans insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned. (p. 67) Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was completed in May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. (p. 161) According to Captain Glover, the plan gave the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to divert the enemy strength from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the attitude of the Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had mentioned were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and he considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids. (p. 173) Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL‑46 represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic. Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 3941, to the Plans Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged with preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice might be given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan. No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain Glover. (p.174) Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL-46, known as Rainbow 5. (p. 251‑2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory plan of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the Navy Department in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of the war plan, Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific." (p. 252) Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally the officers concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic. (p 383‑4) Concerning the concept that Germany was the principal enemy to be first disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 397 entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort would be made in ode ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representation made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL‑46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan." (p. 422) Admiral Stark testified that the over‑all military strategy which regarded the Atlantic as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 80-1). Despite this, however, he said, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific, and he did not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic (page 794). Admiral Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more important than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two squadrons of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529‑30). Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN, Battleship Division Three, Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of destroyers were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped with all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they were attached to the Pacific Fleet. (p. 38) (2) Testimony concerning the primary responsibility for defense. Both Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified that the basic responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's. The Army, Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army. The Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist. Under the joint plan, the Army operated ail pursuit planes and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes (page 295). Admiral Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438). Admiral Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and that the Army's task under JCD‑42 was to hold Oahu against attack and support the naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7); the Navy's task was to patrol and control the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).
Admiral Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When ships wire in port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command through the Base Defense Officer (page 521). Admiral McMorris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense while in Pearl Harbor.
Colonel Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the island, but that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479). (3) Command by joint cooperation, not unity of command. Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of the air agreement and of the air organizations was the provision requiring agreement between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer that a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set‑up that existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the Army of the Navy; there was no unity of command or control. (p. 119‑120) He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an emergency situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated in any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special arrangement with the Army. (p. 120) Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with Admiral Kimmel the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the wording of his estimate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel knew, of course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the organization's setup because it was based on too much cooperation and on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and that no such organization is any good unless it functions on a 24‑hour basis. There were, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning on that basis. (p. 122‑3) Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the Pacific grew more tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier raid came back to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of war and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional facilities and equipment. (p. 123) Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint plan based on cooperation alone would or could function properly in an emergency and he mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general set‑up of this air defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy. (p. 124) PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 399 Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part was as follows: "Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non‑existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty‑four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more, in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134) Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action. Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the attack, he felt that there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for more than a year before the attack, he had advised several Commanders‑in‑Chief that coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officers on their staff so that it would be better arranged at least. (p. 168) Concerning the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that thought had been given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no satisfactory solution had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command in effect. Admiral Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval, he said, of the Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done so by agreement. Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently of Admiral Kimmel (page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when directed by OPNAV or on "M" day (page 41). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability of invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations easier. ComFOURTEEN could not, he said, have invoked unity of command without reference to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy Department (page 296). Admiral Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at the Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848). Admiral Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion of unity of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009). Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL‑46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore." (p.271) (4) The principal mission which had been assigned was training for war. Admiral Ingersoll said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific Fleet in 1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and until war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820). Admiral Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during 1941 was training for war with Japan (page 529). And this was not changed prior to December 7th (page 539). (5) The plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet technically mobilized. Admiral Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL‑46 (page 102) . Admiral Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440. 400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Admiral Smith's testimony concerning WPL‑46 and the assigned tasks of the Pacific Fleet appears at pages 541‑2. He said that the War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561). Admiral Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (page 505). He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in men and material. Admiral McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed provided that the greater part of the patrol planes of the Fleet were to be advanced to Midway and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea frontier, based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901‑2). Admiral Bloch also said that no parts of JCD‑42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to agreements for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386). Admiral Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their development; WPL‑46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said, is not practical in a democracy as the authority of Congress to mobilize is tantamount to a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the only thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant shipping which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL‑46 would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the plan was put in to provide for war with Germany without war with Japan (page 1012). Admiral Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4). Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was in effect already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization is always an act preliminary to war (page 845). Admiral McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL‑46 was necessary, he thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a war footing (page 895). It may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November and early in December, that WPL‑46 was not yet in effect and that one of the first steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken in the event of American-Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising that WPL‑46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B). C. ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS Admiral Stark testified that certain, units were detached from the Pacific Fleet during 1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred in June were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and, one DesRon, which amounted to about 25 per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100‑101). He stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL‑46 (pages 23, 25); and later testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient men and material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800). Directory: pha pha -> Security Education Narrative Database Patterns of Professional Education pha -> Northern health centers, inc pha -> Pharmacy Section II pha -> Pprd east Programme Final Conference and 3rd Steering Committee Meeting Brussels, 13 June 2014 pha -> Correct Answer c chlorothiazide D pha -> Document Number: V1/C/alc2/7 Submission by: United States, Government pha -> When to submit to the dna database pha -> Gordon L. Amidon Download 1.58 Mb. Share with your friends:
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