I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet

He said that the Army anti‑aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action in about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 522). The main Army anti‑aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in place

"To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3‑inch anti‑aircraft guns, about 20 37‑millimeter guns, and about 100 50‑calibre machine guns‑all of these for anti‑aircraft use. Of the 3‑inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one‑half or two‑thirds of this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other 3‑inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3‑inch guns; all of the 37‑millimeter guns and 50‑calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army."

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti‑aircraft guns; he did not consider mounting anti‑aircraft or machine guns on buildings in Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places (page 416). The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned tasks under JCD‑42 (page 387).
According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar with the terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti‑aircraft guns of the Fleet. (p. 78)

Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the Army's prepara­tions for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought Admiral Kimmel had been concerned over the anti‑aircraft defenses and had talked with the Commanding General on the subject.
Colonel Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was, he said, a shortage of anti‑aircraft guns (page 479).

General Marshall said that for Hawaii—110 30‑mm., 144 37‑mm., and 516 50 ­calibre AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four‑fifths of the 30‑mm were complete, and one‑fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).

Admiral Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between ship and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and so notified ships in their sectors (page 418).

Colonel Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinating the Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-­Navy Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met last prior to December 7th (page 481).

General Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire from the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).

Admiral Kimmel testified that ComFOURTEEN had had many drills for co­ordinating the fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL‑41 and an order requiring two 5‑inch guns and two 50‑caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one‑fourth of their anti‑aircraft to be mapped at all times (page 278). He said that he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circumstances (page 279).

Admiral Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which he could move on short notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTEEN was to advise the Senior Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to maintain and that the Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of setting the condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know whether Admiral Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain (page 279).

The condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not changed after November 27th because full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect (page 303).

The court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the alert would it have done any more than man a few anti‑aircraft guns (page 1124). He said, at best, it might have done so and it might, have enabled the intercepting fighters to come into action a little better.

Admiral Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months had been, in effect for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments and aircraft was determined by each commanding officer, but there was none in effect on December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 390).

Admiral Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent in effect in port (page 513). He said that the condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL‑4 1, dealing with Port Security (page 523).

Admiral Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency (page 548).

Admiral Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL‑41 (page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.

As to Navy personnel, Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the Court did not seem to share), the withdrawal of men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased the efficiency of the Fleet (page 560) The ship did have the crews that they had normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85 per, cent basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they received a letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of Personnel, refusing to give them further men, and stating that the war was in the Atlantic.

Admiral Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been intensively trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been conducted (page 496).

Admiral Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the efficiency of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest state ever reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of 50-calibre ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this connection, the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 518). He said, however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest; subject to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).

Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th‑7th, and saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of personnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page 526).

Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December, was satisfactory (page 443). Their behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the state of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of material (page 444).
Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained. (p. 149)

Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive drinking on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the morning of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberty provisions over the week‑end. (p. 226)
No instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral Bloch (page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were fit for duty and they performed their duty well (page 508). According to Captain Ramsey, all men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander Rochefort testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent (page 476). Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as to sobriety was normal on December 6th‑7th. All the men he came in contact with on December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494‑5).
E. THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE
General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October, 1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were not expert: In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for training and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job (pages 223‑225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100 coast artillery stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously manned, and were not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect (page 225). No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu were so small as to make them valueless (page 227).

General Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if higher station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 228). The system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so (page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he estimated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy were going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning after November 27th on a 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. in. basis daily, although the Interceptor Command was not established by written order until December 17th.

General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on November 24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not recall whether they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander CURTISS as Liaison Officer the day after the request was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he wanted a liaison officer actually working in the Information Center. and not a general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the aircraft warning system (pages 261‑2).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 543
Colonel Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first stage of organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but a mobile station was operating (page 487) Ultimately this command included an information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th. The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th until December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page 487), but it was in the morning.

General Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft warning service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the radar set‑up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel had been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was in operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289‑290). He said that he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page 290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed polishing in order to make it effective (page 304).
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army radar station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known it. (p.41)

Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)
Admiral Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations which he had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short never requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation of Army radar on Oahu, and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of the Commandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in July, who was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not in fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have been supplied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander Taylor to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle radar matters with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that the Navy liaison officer who was supposed to be supplied to the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be supplied as well by the Army (page 1146). A Navy liaison officer was not there on December 7th because the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they asked the Navy to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not actually established until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy liaison officer for the Army Interceptor Command, for the evaluation and relay of information, was not sent until after December 7th, as the system was not set up before then, although the agreement had required this.