PARTISANSHIP SPILLS OVER ON SECURITY POLICY SPECIFICALLY.
COHEN 1. [WILLIAM, counselor @ CSIS and former Secretary of Defense, Washington Quarterly -- Spring -- lexis]
Finally, a more bipartisan approach to the formulation of national security policy specifically can only occur with a less partisan approach to political discourse generally. Social and political observers alike have chronicled an absence of civility in the public sphere and increasing hostility in the political sphere. Debate too often gives us a way to diatribe, and practical problem-solving to rhetorical finger-pointing. At times – such as the Desert Fox strikes – the enmity has become so intense that some openly question the motivations of the leaders on the opposite side of the aisle. At other times – such as during the national debate on the CTBT – incendiary rhetoric is used to inflame core constituencies, gain political advantage, or to humiliate or embarrass one’s opponents. Such scorched earth tactics may be chauvinistically satisfying, but they only diminish the trust and respect among policymakers that is essential to responsible and reason compromise.
CONCESSIONS KEY -- GENERIC
CONCESSIONS TO REPUBLICANS KEY TO THE AGENDA.
Nicholas 8 (Peter, Tribune Washington Bureau, published in the Baltimore Sun, December 18, Lexis)
But Republicans in the Senate, even with their ranks diminished, still possess leverage to tailor a package that fits certain specifications. They want public hearings on the stimulus, even if it thwarts Democratic ambitions to present the bill to Obama for his signature when he is sworn into office Jan. 20. And they insist the bill be scrubbed of projects that, in their view, are aimed more at appeasing interest groups than creating jobs. When the new Congress convenes on Jan. 6, Senate Democrats will still lack the 60-vote majority needed to stave off Republican delaying tactics - a reality that gives Republicans some confidence that they can win concessions.
CONCESSIONS ARE KEY TO THE AGENDA -- BREAKS GRIDLOCK.
BRADY AND VOLDEN 6. [David W. Brady, professor of political science and business, and Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University and Craig Volden, assistant professor of political science at the Ohio State University “Revolving Gridlock : Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush,” Pg 35]
More often, however, gridlock is maintained through members from divorce districts who are very responsive to the electorate and thus at odds with their fellow legislators. In these cases, gridlock can be overcome only through legislative compromise, and only when status quo policies are outside the gridlock region. When a policy advocate suggests a change so major that supermajorities are difficult to achieve, the change will be stopped by a filibuster or veto. To build the needed coalition for cloture or a vet override, compromises will need to be struck, often taking one of two forms. First, the policy itself could be watered down. This was the main way that President Clinton overcame Republican filibusters in 1993 on issues like the job stimulus package, voter registration, and family and medical leave. A smaller change was more acceptable to moderate Senators. A second possible compromise with these pivotal members needed to build a supermajority involves concessions not on the ideological position of the bill at hand, but on other issues. Often these include distributive budgetary items, like roads, bridges, research labs, and targeted tax cuts. Riders attached to budget bills add these benefits needed to smooth out compromises on earlier bills. Quite clearly, to the extent that budget concessions are needed to build coalitions on all sorts of issues, gridlock is more likely when congress is confronting deficits than when it is ignoring them or facing surpluses.
CONCESSIONS ARE KEY TO THE AGENDA -- COMPARATIVELY THE BEST FORM OF POLITICAL WRANGLING.
PIKA & MALTESE 4. [Joseph A., Professor of Political Science & International Relations at U of Delaware & John Anthony, Prof of Political Science at University of Georgia, The Politics of the Presidency, p. 199-200]
On their relations with Congress, presidents follow certain modes or patterns of behavior: bargaining, arm-twisting, and confrontation. Bargaining is the predominant mode, and occasionally the president bargains directly with members whose support is deemed essential to a bill's passage. In May 1981, for example, the Reagan administration agreed to revive a costly program to support the price of sugar in exchange for the votes of four Democratic representatives from Louisiana (where sugar is a key crop) on a comprehensive budget reduction bill. 78 Presidents usually try to avoid such explicit bargains because they have limited resources for trading, and the desire among members for these resources is keen. Moreover, Congress is so large and its Power so decentralized that presidents cannot bargain extensively over most bills. In some instances, the president may be unable or unwilling to bargain. Fortunately, rather than a quid pro quo exchange of favors for votes, much presidential-congressional bargaining is implicit, generalized trading in which tacit exchanges of support and favors occur. If bargaining does not result in the approval of their proposals, presidents may resort to stronger methods, such as arm-twisting, which involves intense, even extraordinary, pressure and threats. In one sense, it is an intensified extension of bargaining, but it entails something more - a direct threat of punishment if the member's opposition continues. Among modern presidents, Johnson was perhaps the most frequent practitioner of arm-twisting. When gentler effort failed, or when a once-supportive member opposed him on an important issue, Johnson resorted to tactics such as deliberate embarrassment, threats, and reprisals. In contrast, Eisenhower was most reluctant to pressure Congress. Arm twisting is understandably an unpopular tactic and, if used often, creates resentment and hostility. Still, judicious demonstration that sustained opposition or desertion by normal supporters will exact costs strengthens a president's bargaining position
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