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XT – Mass Surveillance Key
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- NSA surveillance of meta-data is critical --- PATRIOT Act authorities are key.
- XT – Executive Flexibility I/L
- Intel is key to preventing WMD terrorism --- compromising secrecy risks attacks.
- Intel gathering is key to execute a divide and conquer strategy --- that’s key to preventing WMD terrorism.
- Complete elimination of terrorism impossible --- intel key to prevent attacks.
- 2NC – Deterrence/Perception I/L
- Deterrence works against terrorism --- AQ expects high reliability levels for operations --- they will wait for weakness.
- Deterrence works in this context --- terrorists might not care about death, but they are risk-averse in terms of executing their plots.
- 2NC – AT: Intel Cooperation Turn
- Intelligence cooperation is inevitable despite any political disputes over surveillance.
- XT – Intel Cooperation High
XT – Mass Surveillance KeyMass surveillance is critical to find actionable intelligence.John Yoo, 6/12/2013. Emanuel Heller professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former official in the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice. “John Yoo: NSA activities shouldn't be aired in public,” http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/12/nsa-surveillance-john-yoo-editorials-debates/2417377/. But fear should not provoke a rush to harm our war against al-Qaeda. Surveillance of enemy communications not only has a long history in the annals of American arms, but it is also the most effective means for gaining actionable intelligence on terrorists. President Obama has discarded superior tools: He has stopped the interrogation of al-Qaeda leaders, and his leak-loving staff has blown the penetrations of al-Qaeda cells by intelligence agencies. By combining telephone call records (but not the content of calls) and foreigners' e-mails abroad — neither of which is protected by the Fourth Amendment — the NSA can at least create the data necessary to quickly identify and frustrate terrorist plans. Of course, the NSA should not receive a blank check. But it is unnecessary, and even harmful, to air its activities in public. Al-Qaeda closely monitors our government affairs and reacts quickly. In the 1990s, for example, Osama bin Laden stopped using his personal cellphone only 48 hours after the White House leaked that it was tapped. Instead of risking the loss of intelligence sources and methods, we should continue to follow the constitutional design. A time-tested system has promoted legislative oversight of classified activities without losing the virtues of speed and secrecy abroad. American intelligence agencies regularly disclose their most sensitive covert operations to congressional leaders, who can exercise their power of the purse to stop bad ideas. The Framers recognized that our elected representatives would need such secrecy to protect the national security, which is why the Constitution allows for closed congressional proceedings. We should allow the system of representative democracy to decide intelligence policy, rather than sacrifice a critical advantage to satisfy the whims of those who do not understand that we are still a nation at war. NSA surveillance of meta-data is critical --- PATRIOT Act authorities are key.John Yoo, 5/15/2015. Emanuel Heller professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former official in the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice. “The USA Freedom Act Would Take Us Back to the Pre-9/11 Security Status Quo,” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/418462/usa-freedom-act-would-take-us-back-pre-911-security-status-quo-john-yoo. I worry that the representatives who voted to pass the USA Freedom Act in the House do not understand its full import in terms of our national security. The bill practically repeals Section 215 of the Patriot Act, but makes it appear as if those who voted for the bill advanced security in some way. The result of the legislation’s enactment, however, would not be significantly different than if Section 215 were simply allowed to expire. Even before the Patriot Act, the government could get a warrant from a judge to get call metadata from a phone company. The Freedom Act requires phone companies to keep the calling records, but of course they do that already in order to bill customers. So the Freedom Act eliminates the advantages of Section 215 and practically restores the system that existed before. It is politically superficial but also substantively destructive. As we saw on 9/11, that previous system failed. The reason why is that it slowed everything down (as would the Freedom Act). If our intelligence agencies have a lead — say they capture a terrorist leader or intercept his calls — they will have to act quickly to see what other phone numbers and e-mail addresses that the leader contacted to discover the broader network. The other terrorists, of course, will be switching to other numbers and addresses as soon as they suspect that one of their number has been compromised. Taking the time to (a) prepare a request for a warrant; (b) get it approved by a judge; and then (c) search through multiple phone company databases, will give the terrorists time to hide and cover their tracks. Speed is of the greatest essence exactly when we are trying to find the links in the U.S., where the terrorists will be closest to their targets and our defenses at their weakest. If this program had been in effect before 9/11, the government could have quickly searched the databases to discover the links between the two hijackers known to the CIA to have entered the U.S. That could have quickly led the government to the rest of the hijackers (just as those calling, e-mail, and financial records allowed the FBI to reconstruct the 9/11 terror cells within a day or so after the attacks). Another problem is that having the database dispersed among the different phone companies means our government cannot be sure that it has searched thoroughly for all of the possible links. The value of these metadata searches is reduced if the database is not as complete as possible. The databases will also be in private hands, where they might easily be open to invasions of privacy and penetration by foreign intelligence services. XT – Executive Flexibility I/LFlexibility is key to counter-terrorism --- executive must react quickly to intel --- deliberation in Court or Congress risks leaks and undermines rapid reaction.Glenn Sulmasy 9, law faculty of the United States Coast Guard Academy, , Anniversary Contributions: Use of Force: Executive Power: the Last Thirty Years, 30 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 1355 Since the attacks of 9/11, the original concerns noted by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison have been heightened. Never before in the young history of the United States has the need for an energetic executive been more vital to its national security. The need for quick action in this arena requires an executive response - particularly when fighting a shadowy enemy like al Qaeda - not the deliberative bodies opining on what and how to conduct warfare or determining how and when to respond. The threats from non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, make the need for dispatch and rapid response even greater. Jefferson's concerns about the slow and deliberative institution of Congress being prone to informational leaks are even more relevant in the twenty-first century. The advent of the twenty-four hour media only leads to an increased need for retaining enhanced levels of executive [*1362] control of foreign policy. This is particularly true in modern warfare. In the war on international terror, intelligence is vital to ongoing operations and successful prevention of attacks. Al Qaeda now has both the will and the ability to strike with the equivalent force and might of a nation's armed forces. The need to identify these individuals before they can operationalize an attack is vital. Often international terror cells consist of only a small number of individuals - making intelligence that much more difficult to obtain and even more vital than in previous conflicts. The normal movements of tanks, ships, and aircrafts that, in traditional armed conflict are indicia of a pending attack are not the case in the current "fourth generation" war. Thus, the need for intelligence becomes an even greater concern for the commanders in the field as well as the Commander-in-Chief.¶ Supporting a strong executive in foreign affairs does not necessarily mean the legislature has no role at all. In fact, their dominance in domestic affairs remains strong. Additionally, besides the traditional roles identified in the Constitution for the legislature in foreign affairs - declaring war, ratifying treaties, overseeing appointments of ambassadors, etc. - this growth of executive power now, more than ever, necessitates an enhanced, professional, and apolitical oversight of the executive. An active, aggressive oversight of foreign affairs, and warfare in particular, by the legislature is now critical. Unfortunately, the United States - particularly over the past decade - has witnessed a legislature unable to muster the political will necessary to adequately oversee, let alone check, the executive branch's growing power. Examples are abundant: lack of enforcement of the War Powers Resolution abound the executive's unchecked invasions of Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo, and such assertions as the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the USA Patriot Act, military commissions, and the updated Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). There have been numerous grand-standing complaints registered in the media and hearings over most, if not all, of these issues. However, in each case, the legislature has all but abdicated their constitutionally mandated role and allowed the judicial branch to serve as the only real check on alleged excesses of the executive branch. This deference is particularly dangerous and, in the current environment of foreign affairs and warfare, tends to unintentionally politicize the Court.¶ The Founders clearly intended the political branches to best serve the citizenry by functioning as the dominant forces in [*1363] guiding the nation's foreign affairs. They had anticipated the political branches to struggle over who has primacy in this arena. In doing so, they had hoped neither branch would become too strong. The common theme articulated by Madison, ambition counters ambition, n17 intended foreign affairs to be a "give and take" between the executive and legislative branches. However, inaction by the legislative branch on myriad policy and legal issues surrounding the "war on terror" has forced the judiciary to fulfill the function of questioning, disagreeing, and "checking" the executive in areas such as wartime policy, detentions at Guantanamo Bay, and tactics and strategy of intelligence collection. The unique nature of the conflict against international terror creates many areas where law and policy are mixed. The actions by the Bush administration, in particular, led to outcries from many on the left about his intentions and desire to unconstitutionally increase the power of the Presidency. Yet, the Congress never firmly exercised the "check" on the executive in any formal manner whatsoever.¶ For example, many policymakers disagreed with the power given to the President within the Authorization to Use Military Force ("AUMF"). n18 Arguably, this legislation was broad in scope, and potentially granted sweeping powers to the President to wage the "war on terror." However, Congress could have amended or withdrawn significant portions of the powers it gave to the executive branch. This lack of withdrawal or amendment may have been understandable when Republicans controlled Congress, but as of November 2006, the Democrats gained control of both houses of the Congress. Still, other than arguing strongly against the President, the legislature did not necessarily or aggressively act on its concerns. Presumably this inaction was out of concern for being labeled "soft on terror" or "weak on national security" and thereby potentially suffering at the ballot box. This virtual paralysis is understandable but again, the political branches were, and remain, the truest voice of the people and provide the means to best represent the country's beliefs, interests, and national will in the arena of foreign affairs. It has been this way in the past but the more recent (certainly over the past thirty years and even more so in the past decade) intrusions of the judicial branch into what [*1364] was intended to be a "tug and pull" between the political branches can properly be labeled as an unintended consequence of the lack of any real legislative oversight of the executive branch.¶ Unfortunately, now nine unelected, life-tenured justices are deeply involved in wartime policy decision making. Examples of judicial policy involvement in foreign affairs are abundant including Rasul v. Bush; n19 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld; n20 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld; n21 as well as last June's Boumediene v. Bush n22 decision by the Supreme Court, all impacting war policy and interpretation of U. S. treaty obligations. Simply, judges should not presumptively impact warfare operations or policies nor should this become acceptable practice. Without question, over the past thirty years, this is the most dramatic change in executive power. It is not necessarily the strength of the Presidency that is the change we should be concerned about - the institutional search for enhanced power was anticipated by the Founders - but they intended for Congress to check this executive tendency whenever appropriate. Unfortunately, this simply is not occurring in twenty-first century politics. Thus, the danger does not necessarily lie with the natural desire for Presidents to increase their power. The real danger is the judicial branch being forced, or compelled, to fulfill the constitutionally mandated role of the Congress in checking the executive.¶ 4. PRESIDENT OBAMA AND EXECUTIVE POWER¶ The Bush presidency was, and continues to be, criticized for having a standing agenda of increasing the power of the executive branch during its eight-year tenure. Numerous articles and books have been dedicated to discussing these allegations. n23 However, as argued earlier, the reality is that it is a natural bureaucratic tendency, and one of the Founders presciently anticipated, that each branch would seek greater powers whenever and wherever possible. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, technology and armament become more sophisticated, and with [*1365] the rise of twenty-first century non-state actors, the need for strong executive power is not only preferred, but also necessary. Executive power in the current world dynamic is something, regardless of policy preference or political persuasions, that the new President must maintain in order to best fulfill his constitutional role of providing for the nation's security. This is simply part of the reality of executive power in the twenty-first century. n24 2NC – Intel KeyIntel is key to preventing WMD terrorism --- compromising secrecy risks attacks.John Yoo, 2004. Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003. “War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism,” UC-Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=johnyoo. Third, the nature of warfare against such unconventional enemies may well be different from the set-piece battlefield matches between nation-states. Gathering intelligence, from both electronic and human sources, about the future plans of terrorist groups may be the only way to prevent September 11-style attacks from occurring again. Covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency or unconventional measures by special forces may prove to be the most effective tool for acting on that intelligence. Similarly, the least dangerous means for preventing rogue nations from acquiring WMD may depend on secret intelligence gathering and covert action, rather than open military intervention. A public revelation of the means of gathering intelligence, or the discussion of the nature of covert actions taken to forestall the threat by terrorist organizations or rogue nations, could render the use of force ineffectual or sources of information useless. Suppose, for example, that American intelligence agencies detected through intercepted phone calls that a terrorist group had built headquarters and training facilities in Yemen. A public discussion in Congress about a resolution to use force against Yemeni territory and how Yemen was identified could tip-off the group, allowing terrorists to disperse and to prevent further interception of their communications. Intel gathering is key to execute a divide and conquer strategy --- that’s key to preventing WMD terrorism.Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz, September 2006. PhD International Relations @ Oxford, Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security, and Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; and PhD Political Science @ Harvard, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of Hudson Institute’s Center for Future Security Strategies. “Non-Military Strategies For Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned From Past Counterinsurgencies,” The Princeton Project Papers, https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/counterinsurgency.pdf. In both counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns, a divide-and-conquer strategy can have three dimensions: exploiting divisions within the adversary’s camp, separating the operatives from their domestic supporters, and isolating them from their foreign sponsors. Past insurgencies show how divisions among the guerrillas, or the people they seek to influence, can assist the counterinsurgency. In Malaya, the existence of a disaffected Chinese ethnic minority made the insurgency possible, but the fact that the majority of Malays identified the guerrillas as predominately ethnic Chinese limited their influence. In Algeria, Vietnam, and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, however, the authorities could not persuasively depict the insurgents as an unrepresentative minority, particularly given their own dependence on non-native troops, which allowed the guerrillas to characterize the war as a “liberation” insurgency. 49 French, American, and Soviet policy makers also had very little success in exploiting divisions among the insurgent leaders. Furthermore, they proved unable to cultivate a viable “third force” of moderate nationalists that could stand up to the insurgents without extensive foreign backing – something that remains an issue in Afghanistan and Iraq today. The value of amnesty programs in weakening insurgencies is less clear. Their purpose is to encourage defections by less dedicated or otherwise dissatisfied guerrillas. If successful, their direct effect is to reduce the insurgents’ ranks; their indirect impact is to provide additional intelligence sources as well as visible signs that the counterinsurgency is succeeding. In Malaya, the British amnesty program yielded important tactical and strategic intelligence and encouraged further defections. Financial rewards proved especially fruitful. One senior communist leader’s own bodyguards murdered him so they could collect a $200,000 reward. 50 Other surrendered enemy personnel frequently led the military or police to their former guerrilla units. 51 In the Philippines, offers of free land and basic supporting infrastructure (i.e., roads, housing, and liberal loans) induced some Huk guerrillas to surrender. Similar programs proved far less successful in Algeria or Vietnam. Although the South Vietnamese government began offering amnesty and “rehabilitation” (job training, welfare services, and resettlement assistance) to Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese defectors as early as 196, the program encountered several problems. Former Prime Minister Nguyen Ky lamented: “Often the Vietcong used the program to get medical attention, decent food, and a few weeks’ vacation from the war. Once they were rested, they re-defected to the communists and continued to fight us.” 52 Low-level VC or even fake guerillas participated for the free food, shelter, and other material benefits. Monetary awards for South Vietnamese responsible for a defection (under the “third-party inducement plan”) led to phony defectors who split the reward money with corrupt officials. 54 Defectors also encountered suspicion and other resistance when they genuinely sought to reintegrate into South Vietnamese society. The various amnesty programs introduced recently in Afghanistan also have experienced only modest success. 55 Pursuing a “divide-and-conquer” strategy in the GWOT would mean attempting to undo al Qaeda’s most important achievement – its success in combining terrorist foot-soldiers from many different ethnic groups and nationalities into a single, eclectic but cohesive movement with operations in more than sixty countries. 56 Bin Laden has managed to get antagonistic rivals – such as Egypt’s two main terrorist groups, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group – to set aside years of mutual hostility to cooperate against common enemies. 57 In the GWOT, logical fissures to exploit include divisions within al Qaeda, between al Qaeda and its affiliate terrorist groups, and between the terrorists and their active network of supporters. 58 At a minimum, U.S. policies should aim to counter al Qaeda’s strategy of subsuming all local conflicts under a war of civilizations between the Muslim world on the one hand, and the United States and its non-Muslim allies on the other. Left to themselves, local groups will give priority to local concerns. Most Islamist terrorists in Palestine, Xinjiang, and Chechnya want to focus on their immediate enemies (Israel, China, and Russia, respectively) and will seek to avoid becoming entangled in a direct conflict with the United States unless given cause to do so. Tensions between Shiite and Sunni extremists offer another opportunity for dividing the adversary. Many Shia Muslims in Iraq have declined to join the insurgency because some Sunni Muslim terrorists – influenced by Takfiri ideology, which depicts Shia Muslims as apostates – have attacked Shias. Some Sunni terrorist groups in Pakistan also have designated Shia Muslims as explicit targets. Bin Laden’s strengthened ties with Shiite-hater Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, especially his designation of him as al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, provided additional opportunities for the United States to cultivate Shiite support against Sunni terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. A further division within the global Islamist terrorist movement might be emerging between the Arab members of al Qaeda and its Central Asian allies. During the late 1990s, these two groups worked in harmony under the auspices of the IMU, which developed extensive connections with al Qaeda and the Taliban. In May 2001, Taliban authorities even appointed IMU military leader Juma Namangani head of a sort of Islamic foreign legion. Consisting of a variety of non-Afghan Islamic fighters, including Pakistanis, Turks, Uighurs, and Uzbeks, the brigade fought against the Afghani Northern Alliance until U.S. forces destroyed it after September 11, 2001. 59 Pakistan’s recent crackdown on the terrorist operatives who subsequently fled to North and South Waziristan has led to friction between the Arabs and Central Asians there. The two groups compete for hideouts and the affiliation of the local tribes. They also have different priorities, with the Central Asians focused on overthrowing the region’s secular governments rather than attacking Americans, which could draw the U.S. military further into their region. According to media reports, this rivalry has seen captured Chechen, Tajik, and Uzbek suspects divulging information to Pakistani intelligence about the identity and whereabouts of senior Arab members of al Qaeda – including the arrested Libyan operative, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, described as al Qaeda’s third-highest leader. 60 Another way to counter the extremists is to empower Islamic moderates. Just as Social Democrats represented one of the strongest bulwarks against Soviet-allied Communist Parties in Western Europe during the Cold War, so Islamic moderates can drain support and legitimacy from jihadi extremists. Even some otherwise radical Islamist groups could, whatever their subjective views, objectively assist the United States to counter jihadi terrorism. Some of these groups opposed al Qaeda’s 9/11 operation on the grounds that the timing was inappropriate. In particular, they maintained that the strikes should not have occurred until Muslims were more united and better prepared to resist U.S. retaliation. 61 (Bin Laden anticipated that the attacks would further such unity by rallying Muslims against the expected harsh and indiscriminate U.S. response. 62 ) A salient if controversial target for such a strategy might be the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (“Party of Islamic Liberation”), an international Islamic movement with as many as one hundred thousand adherents concentrated in Eurasia. Although its followers seek to replace the existing regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia with a multinational Caliphate governed by the Islamic laws and practices that existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, they insist that such change must occur through non-violent means and dismiss the violent tactics of IMU and al Qaeda as ineffective. Despite the Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s anti-American rhetoric and some of its adherents’ conversion to violent terrorism, the U.S. government has persistently refused to designate it a Foreign Terrorist Organization like al Qaeda. Keeping such “café Islamists” preoccupied with theocratic debates and their never-ending project of writing the perfect constitution for their envisaged state should become an important goal. The presence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other nonviolent Islamic movements, notwithstanding their immoderate rhetoric, provides a non-violent means of expression for many Muslims. Its elimination would likely result in many of its adherents joining radical Islamist terrorist groups. On the other hand, the United States should continue to exert pressure on violent Islamist extremists to exacerbate differences among them – just as the firm U.S. stand against the Sino-Soviet alliance during the 1950s helped divide rather than unite them. In essence, the Soviets feared that the Chinese communists would drag them into a conflict with Washington over Taiwan. Similarly, al Qaeda’s affiliate organizations might break with the radical Islamist network to avoid the fate of the Taliban if, for example, al Qaeda operatives sought to attack a U.S. target in their geographic area of operations notwithstanding the heightened American antiterrorist response that would ensue. Exploiting such differences also could enhance U.S. deterrence against WMD attacks. 64 U.S. policies must make clear to all terrorist groups that joining al Qaeda’s violently anti-American network would result in their becoming targets of an exceptionally robust U.S. response. Intelligence Requirements Conducting an effective divide-and-conquer strategy requires excellent intelligence regarding policy disputes, ideological differences, and private vendettas between the terrorist leaders. For example, the United States needs to know more about the relationships between al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, between Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and between bin Laden and other regional leaders. 65 As the global network of radical terrorist groups continues to fragment – seen most saliently in the rise of the “lone wolf” individual inspired by, but not connected with, a specific terrorist group – intelligence analysts will find it increasingly challenging to keep abreast of the network’s evolving components, diverse goals, strategies, and tactics. 66 Complete elimination of terrorism impossible --- intel key to prevent attacks.John Yoo, 2005. Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003. “Enemy Combatants and Judicial Competence,” in Terrorism, the Laws of War, and the Constitution, ed. Peter Berkowitz, 83-84, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817946225_69.pdf. Add to these concerns the important military interest, only made more acute by the unconventional nature of the war with al Qaeda, of interrogating enemy combatants for information about coming attacks. Unlike previous wars, the current enemy is a stateless network of religious extremists who do not obey the laws of war, who hide among peaceful populations, and who seek to launch surprise attacks on civilian targets with the aim of causing massive casualties. They have no armed forces to target, no territory to defend, no people to protect, and no fear of killing themselves in their attacks. The front line is not solely a traditional battlefield, and the primary means of conducting the war includes the efforts of military, law enforcement, and intelligence officers to stop attacks before they occur. Information is the primary weapon in the conflict against this new kind of enemy, and intelligence gathered from captured operatives is perhaps the most effective means of preventing future terrorist attacks upon U.S. territory. 2NC – Deterrence/Perception I/LExpiration of NSA authority is a massive signal of weakness --- terrorist groups are looking to exploit any vulnerability.Daily Mail, 5/31/2015. “Head of CIA warns that US is at risk of lone wolf terror attack after NSA powers to monitor all phone calls expired – as Isis ‘watch carefully’ for security gaps,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3105089/Senate-makes-ditch-bid-extend-NSA-s-bulk-collection-phone-records-Rand-Paul-swears-block-legislation-let-Patriot-Act-expire.html. The head of the CIA has warned that Americans are now at risk after the Senate was unable to extend laws giving authorities special powers to fight terrorists. Politicians in the upper house were unable to come to an agreement to extend key parts of the Patriot Act - that legalize controversial methods of surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) - which expired on Sunday. Attempts were frustrated by Presidential candidate Rand Paul, who has taken a firm stance against the extension of powers allowing the mass collection of phone records, wire taps and warrants without evidence. But the Head of the CIA John Brennan claims ordinary Americans, who expect the NSA to do their jobs, have been put at risk by 'political grandstanding and crusading for ideological causes' that fueled the debate. Speaking on CBS show Face The Nation, he warned that the US - and Europe - is now in danger from technologically 'sophisticated' terrorists who are watching developments carefully and 'looking for the seams to operate' within.
'And this is something that we can't afford to do right now, because if you look at the horrific terrorist attacks and violence that is being perpetrated around the globe, we need to keep our country safe. And our oceans are not keeping us safe the way they did a century ago.' The Patriot Act was passed in 2001 in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. Now that the provisions have expired, government agents will need to subpoena phone companies for the records. The White House previously justified collecting the records because of the Patriot Act's Section 215, which expired on Sunday. Two other provisions, added in 2011, also expired with it. The first is a 'roving wiretap' provision which allows government agencies to keep tracking suspects as they switch devices. The second is a 'lone wolf' clause which allows warrants to be granted without any evidence linking a suspect to a foreign power or terrorist group. Political struggles over the NSA and its data collection have become a national issue since whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed the extent of government programs in 2013. The senate's efforts to pass a replacement bill were frustrated by Kentucky's junior senator Rand Paul, who has spoken at length against the NSA's activities, which he has excoriated as illegal and unconstitutional. Paul, a Republican who is running for president, came up against members of his own party, as well as the Obama administration. With his presidential campaign waning, he has been accused of irresponsible political opportunism by opponents, by fighting a bill on ideological grounds that may put ordinary people at risk. He was criticized by the White House Sunday night, which called the Patriot Act expiration an 'irresponsible lapse'. While Brennan didn't mention Paul by name, he said on Face The Nation: 'Unfortunately I think there is a little too much political grandstanding and crusading for ideological causes that have really fuelled the debate on this issue. He added: 'These are authorities that have been used by the government to make sure that we're able to safeguard Americans. And the sad irony is that most Americans expect the government to protect them. And so although there's a lot of debate that goes on, on the Congress and the Hill on this issue, I think, when you go out to Boise or Tampa or Louisville, Americans are expecting their law enforcement and homeland security and intelligence professionals to do their work. And these authorities are important.' Paul argued 'there must be another way' but even he agrees that the lapse in these powers are likely to be temporary as politicians work on the USA Freedom Act, which is expected to pass within the next week. Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell called a rare Sunday session to try to pass the replacement law, but was unable to push it through in time. And although the replacement is set to pass this week, Paul said the expiration was 'a victory no matter how you look at it'. In a statement, he said: 'It might be short lived, but I hope that it provides a road for a robust debate, which will strengthen our intelligence community, while also respecting our Constitution. He added: 'The expiration of the NSA's sweeping, all-encompassing and ineffectual powers will not relinquish functions necessary for protecting national security. The expiration will instead do what we should have done all along - rely on the Constitution for these powers.' According to a top lawmaker, as of 8pm Sunday no NSA employee could access their enormous phone records database, which holds metadata on millions of phone conversations handed over by telecoms companies like Verizon and AT&T. Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Richard Burr said on Sunday: 'There is no way to get any type of agreement tonight -- either an extension or passage of a bill. So at 8pm tonight, NSA employees can not query the database'. In a statement issued Sunday night, Obama's press secretary Josh Earnest, urged action to pass the USA Freedom Act as quickly as possible. He said: 'The Senate took an important - if late - step forward tonight. We call on the Senate to ensure this irresponsible lapse in authorities is as short-lived as possible. 'On a matter as critical as our national security, individual Senators must put aside their partisan motivations and act swiftly. The American people deserve nothing less.' Some lawmakers have said the lapse raises alarming questions about how US authorities can keep the homeland safe with a diminished security toolbox. 'I think it's very very unfortunate that we're in this position,' said Senator Mike Lee, a conservative Republican who supports the reform bill. 'We've known this date was coming for four years. Four years. And I think it's inexcusable that we adjourned' for a weeklong break last week without resolving the issue. Lee, too, conceded that the reform bill would most likely pass in the coming week. With the clock ticking, CIA chief John Brennan warned Sunday that allowing vital surveillance programs to lapse could increase terror threats, and argued that the phone metadata dragnet has not abused civil liberties and only serves to safeguard citizens. 'This is something that we can't afford to do right now,' Brennan said of allowing the counterterrorism provisions to expire. 'Because if you look at the horrific terrorist attacks and violence being perpetrated around the globe, we need to keep our country safe, and our oceans are not keeping us safe the way they did century ago,' he said on CBS talk show Face the Nation.
'And what we see, they're also using the Internet as a way to incite and encourage individuals to carry out acts of violence. 'So as the director of FBI says, you know, this use of these websites and their Internet capabilities is something of great concern. So yes, I think ISIS is a threat not just in the Middle East and South Asia and African regions but also to Europe as well as to the United States.' Deterrence works against terrorism --- AQ expects high reliability levels for operations --- they will wait for weakness.Gordon Woo, 2002. Dr. Gordon Woo was trained in mathematical physics at Cambridge, MIT and Harvard, and has made his career as a calculator of catastrophes. His diverse experience includes consulting for IAEA on the seismic safety of nuclear plants and for BP on offshore oil well drilling. As a catastrophist at Risk Management Solutions, he has advanced the insurance modelling of catastrophes, including designing a model for terrorism risk. “Quantitative Terrorism Risk Assessment,” http://isc.temple.edu/economics/wkpapers/Homeland/Quantitative_Terrorism_Risk_Assessment.pdf. The term macroterrorism has been coined to describe a spectacular act of terrorism, (which may be a multiple strike at several locations), which causes more than $1 billion of loss, or 500 deaths. Minor (micro) terrorist acts, such as house bombing, may occur haphazardly, but not signify a change in the terrorism environment. However, this is not the case with macroterrorism. Following an act of macroterrorism, security and border controls are inevitably strengthened, and emergency government funding made available for improving protective measures. Civil liberties may be temporarily curtailed as suspects are detained without trial, and minority communities potentially supporting sleeper cells are placed under tight surveillance. Although copycat attacks may be attempted in the aftermath of a successful strike, they are likely to fail due to the heightened security. In the harsher security regime soon after a successful strike, terrorists may rationally decide to lie low, and delay any further action until security is relaxed, border controls are eased, civil liberties lawyers intervene, and public risk awareness fades: circumstances which would give a later attack a higher chance of success. There are other reasons favoring a delay. Logistically, resources may need to be replenished after a macroterror attack. Furthermore, once a terrorist’s message has been delivered across the media through a spectacular macroterrorism event, (perhaps after a series of failures), a publicity reminder may not be needed for a while. The change in system state following a sucessful macroterrorism event implies that, rather like great earthquakes, such events do not satisfy the prerequisites of a Poisson process. Although it would require an elaborate Monte Carlo simulation to realize the temporal pattern of successful al-Qaeda macroterror attacks, the simplest representation is a two-state Markov process. In the first state, security is comparatively relaxed, and conducive to a successful macroterror attack. In the second state, security is comparatively strict, and not conducive to a successful macroterror attack. With the almost infinite payoff of paradise promised to martyrs, patience in waiting for security weaknesses is an optimal strategy. Indeed, it is known that Osama bin Laden has expected very high reliability levels for martyrdom operations. As a didactic illustration, consider the binary situation where successful macroterror attacks only take place during the relaxed security state. If the rate of successful macroterror attacks in this first state is U, and the erosion rate of security in the second state is V, then, assuming a successful macroterror attack causes a state transition from 1 to 2, the limiting proportion of time spent in state 1 is V/(U+V), and the limiting frequency of successful macroterror attacks is UV/(U+V). The effect of maintaining security measures is to keep V low, and hence suppress the limiting frequency of successful macroterror attacks. XT – Deterrence WorksDeterrence works in this context --- terrorists might not care about death, but they are risk-averse in terms of executing their plots.Robert Anthony, May 2003. Institute for Defense Analyses. “Deterrence and the 911 Terrorists,” http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA430351. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon using hijacked commercial aircraft as weapons provide a chilling example of a failure to thwart committed suicide terrorists. This paper argues that it should be possible to deter even suicide terrorists, and analyzes why our security protections failed to achieve the conditions necessary to deter the 9-11 attacks. Based on our current understanding and mathematical model of the psychology of deterrence, analysis of the 9-11 attacks shows that the terrorists were cautious and risk averse, yet we as a nation failed to challenge them at the threshold levels necessary to deter their attack. While publicly available empirical data is insufficient to support a complete analysis, both qualitative and quantitative techniques indicate wide gaps between where we were on September 10th and where we need to be to deter such terrorists. B. BACKGROUND: DETERRENCE AND AVIATION SECURITY One would expect that as the chances of being caught, imprisoned, killed, or humiliated increase, many terrorists would quit, put off their attack, or chose different, less protected targets. Even suicide terrorists do not want to waste their lives on a futile attack and exhibit extreme caution in all of their preparations. In addition, they probably do not wish to appear as powerless or inept, embarrass their cause, reveal larger plans, or bring shame on their families and supporters. 2NC – AT: Intel Cooperation TurnIntelligence cooperation is robust despite NSA surveillance.Defense One, 2/11/2015. Patrick Tucker. “‘Dramatic Improvement’ in US and European Intel Sharing Because of ISIS,” http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/dramatic-improvement-us-and-european-intel-sharing-because-isis/105120/. More than ever, European countries are voluntarily providing the United States with large amounts of information about their citizens, particularly as those citizens attempt to travel, the nation’s top counterterrorism official said. Compared to the summer of 2013, U.S.intelligence professionals have seen a “pendulum swing” in the willingness of European law enforcement to share information with the U.S. on European citizens, said Nicholas J. Rasmussen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, on Wednesday. Things have turned around since summer 2013, when NSA contractor Edward Snowden first disclosed some of the nation’s most closely kept secrets on surveillance capabilities. Rasmussen said that “the politics are difficult for some of our European partners” but tracking Islamic State fighters, or ISIS, has become a priority. Rasmussen, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, said that European partners continue to differ fromU.S. counterparts on the issue of bulk metadata collection. But European reservations about data sharing in more targeted investigations had “seen a dramatic improvement,” particularly in populating the NCTC’s database, called the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or TIDE. It is one of the key person-of-interest watch lists that the U.S. and other countries use to track potential or suspected terrorists. Intelligence cooperation is inevitable despite any political disputes over surveillance.PBS, 10/25/2013. Ray Suarez, PBS; P.J. Crowley, former assistant secretary of state for public affairs, now a professor at George Washington University; and Philip Mudd, senior research fellow at the New America foundation, and held senior positions at the CIA, FBI and the National Security Council. “What are the diplomatic costs of the NSA surveillance revelations for the U.S.?” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/government_programs-july-dec13-snowden2_10-25/ RAY SUAREZ: What impact have the revelations had on U.S. interests abroad and intelligence operations? P.J. Crowley is a former assistant secretary of state for public affairs, now a professor at George Washington University. And Philip Mudd is a senior research fellow at the New America foundation, and held senior positions at the CIA, FBI and the National Security Council. P.J. Crowley, these latest revelations of the surveillance of the communication of heads of state and heads of government, is that a serious breach, serious diplomatic problem for the United States now? P.J. CROWLEY, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs: It is a serious and awkward diplomatic problem for the United States. You know, that said, at the end of the day, interests drive relationship. Politics matters. It animates those relationships and the willingness of leaders to stand together in common cause and do whatever needs to be done to keep their respective countries safe, you know, those relationships also matter.
RAY SUAREZ: Philip Mudd, how seriously should we take the fury coming from Europe today? PHILIP MUDD, New America Foundation: I think this is a short-term problem. As P.J. suggested, I’m not sure it is a long-term issue. The issue here though really is not just these revelations in isolation. It is this cascade through the summer and into the fall about spying on Americans, spying on citizens in Europe, spying on foreign leaders. This cascade is going to, I think, lead to months, maybe a little longer of tension. These political leaders have to respond. But when security services feel a threat, for example, a threat from terror cells, they will continue to cooperate, regardless of what we’re seeing at the political level. XT – Intel Cooperation HighThe perceived threat of terrorism is driving greater EU collaboration on surveillance --- objections to the NSA haven’t undermined cooperation.AP, 5/20/2015. Associated Press. Lori Hinnant and Ken Dilanian. “For US allies, paradigm shift in intelligence collection,” http://hosted2.ap.org/WVLOG/f0fb39ba210e4705b63f4a0f168573df/Article_2015-05-20-EU--Rethinking%20Intel/id-e41396bf63a04689a4daaabc3fc48651. PARIS (AP) — Fearful of an expanding extremist threat, countries that for years have relied heavily on U.S. intelligence are quickly building up their own capabilities with new technology, new laws and — in at least one case — a searing debate on how much the American government should be allowed to spy on their own citizens. Responding to a jihadi movement that is successfully recruiting people from around the world, France and Canada are both passing laws that would dramatically ramp up their intelligence apparatus. In France, lawmakers are on the verge of approving a bill that would let the government install "black boxes" to collect metadata from every major phone and Internet company. Canada's measures were rushed through after a two separate attacks in October 2014 on Canadian soldiers — including one that ended when the gunman stormed Parliament and was shot to death by guards and police. France's law went into high gear after the January terror attacks on the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket that left 20 dead, including the gunmen. Analysts say it's not so much a question of diminishing cooperation with the U.S. — the revelations of Edward Snowden have ultimately done little to harm relationships between allies — as a push to increase domestic capacities ill-equipped to face the rising threat of Islamic State and other jihadi groups. "These are not people coming from the outside, these are not people who are taking plane trips, they are not people who attracted notice outside our countries. These are people who come from the heart of our society," said Alain Chouet, a former French intelligence official who recently returned from an extended trip to Canada where he debated the measures in both countries. "International cooperation in this area isn't hugely useful." Technologically, France goes the furthest with the planned creation of a 'Made in France' mass collection of metadata that has the potential to go beyond a National Security Agency program. Where the NSA collected landline metadata for nearly every U.S. citizen but never really got into scooping up cell data, France is pushing to essentially vacuum up and analyze everything — landline, mobile and Internet metadata. The law authorizing that NSA program is set to expire June 1, but the U.S. House of Representatives last week (if it moves Sunday) passed legislation ending the collection by the government and only allowing the NSA to ask telephone companies for the metadata on a case-by-case basis. That bill may still face changes in the U.S. Senate. The Canadian proposals are more measured, but would dramatically expand domestic intelligence capabilities, including disrupting terrorist on-line communications and propaganda, expanding the no-fly list and allowing agencies to share more information, according to Wesley Wark, a Canadian security and intelligence expert. Unlike the French proposals, the Canadian measures began coming under strong public opposition as time went on, including an open letter from 60 executives and a Twitter campaign n that included a dire warning this month from author Margaret Atwood: "See you in the slammer, kids." France and Canada are likely to have new laws before summer. In Germany, the debate is just starting. The German weekly Der Spiegel reported that the Federal Intelligence Service for years monitored telecoms traffic using filters provided by the NSA because it lacked the capacity — and the legal authority — to do so itself. By 2008, German intelligence agents discovered that some of the filters — known as selectors — related to European arms companies and French authorities.
"There is a lot of caution as to the role of intelligence and in a way, I think, for Germans over the decades it had always been a comforting situation to know we are doing this in cooperation with our allies. Because we had this sort of internal dimension of abuse of secret services," said Daniela Schwarzer, the Berlin-based head of the Europe Program, German Marshall Fund think tank. "So it's a huge thing and we're just only starting this debate," she said.
In France, he said, he sees "the law and policy catching up to what they have already been doing." In Germany, where many are deeply opposed to government surveillance, he noted that the German government is not foreswearing cooperation with the NSA. And Canada's role as a vital part of the "Five Eyes" intelligence-sharing program joining the U.S., Australia, Britain and New Zealand has not been called into question. "I do not think we are seeing a trend of Europeans seeking to break away from America as much as a reaction to the increasingly global threat of domestic extremists and returning foreign fighters," said Raj De, who retired as NSA general counsel this year and is now a partner at the Mayer Brown law firm in Washington. "Europeans are having to openly confront the notion that their governments must protect their homeland independently or in continued cooperation with the U.S." Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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