Inherency- obama has already Solved 3 Harms- other things cause homelessness 5
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- Conditions key to solvency
Conditions CP 1NCText: The United States congress should pass a modified version of SEVRA which stipulates that all residents who receive vouchers under the plan are subject to regulation under a federal version of New York’s Operation Safe House rules. We’ll clearify. Counter plan solve all of case: Almost everyone who would recive help under the plan would receive help under the coutnerplan We just put conditions on behavior to ensure that only people who truly deserve help will get it, preventing people from abusing the system. Net benefits: the Counterplan preserves peoples dignity, making all out arguments about stigmatization a net benefit. It also avoid politics because passing the plan with conditions helps Obama preserve his political capital. Also- the net benefit is superior solvency and quality of life- failure to remove bad apples form public housing creates the kind of ghettoization their Aff ostensibly solves. Peter H. Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser- Analysts for the Brookings institution- 2006- Targeting in Social Programs Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples – page- 88 Criminal activity and ruffianism seriously impair the quality of life of a large number of public housing residents.46 Some residents, who are already disadvantaged and disproportionately members of minority groups, live in constant fear; they are prisoners in their own homes. Two separate studies by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Depart- ment of Justice compare the high crime rates in public housing with crime rates in surrounding areas (which also tend to be high). These studies confirm that criminal activity in public housing projects is a very serious problem. In 1998 an estimated 360 gun-related homicides occurred in sixty-six of the nation’s hundred largest public housing authorities—an average of one such homicide per day.47 This problem extends from smaller public housing projects to those in cities of all sizes.48 But gun-related homicides are only the tip of the iceberg. Data for a sixmonth period drawn from HUD’s Public Housing Drug Elimination Program, based on a sample of 559 public housing authorities, reported 423 homicides, 1,610 rapes, 8,382 robberies, 20,776 aggravated assaults, 28,777 burglaries, and 19,254 auto thefts.49 Although public housing accounted for less than 10 percent of the nation’s housing in 1999, more than twice the surrounding communities’ share of crime occurred in and around public housing.50 From 1990 through 1999, public housing authorities spent over $4 billion to reduce and prevent crime. As HUD acknowledges, these costs divert funds from the programs’ principal mission of providing shelter for lowincome families. Indeed, only one in four income-eligible families now receives this housing assistance.51 How much of the crime in and around public housing projects is committed by resident bad apples is unknown.52 When these malefactors can be identified, the most straightforward remedy for the housing authority is to evict them. Unfortunately, this process is much harder and slower than one might expect, especially when evicting the bad apples means evicting family members as well, be they innocents, enablers, or fellow malefactors. Solvency- Only by putting conditions on who receives help from the plan and the plan ever achiever any long term solvency Peter H. Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser- Analysts for the Brookings institution- 2006- Targeting in Social Programs Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples – page- 32-3 Although bad apples and bad bets both waste scarce program resources, bad apples undermine a program’s substantive policy goals in other ways, which we discuss in chapter 5. There, we explain how bad apples directly hurt good apples and also impose indirect harms on them and on others. We also present data on particularly troubling, widespread, and persistent examples in three kinds of social programs: chronically disruptive public school students who interfere with the learning opportunities of their already deprived classmates; chronically disruptive public housing residents who impair their neighbors’ quality of life; and residents of homeless shelters whose rulebreaking make difficult living conditions in the shelters significantly worse Misallocating program resources to bad apples and bad bets squanders the political capital needed to sustain programs for good apples and good bets. Misallocation provides powerful political ammunition to a program’s enemies while weakening support among its friends. (As we explain at the end of this chapter, however, the effects of misallocation on bad bets are not identical to the effects on bad apples.) Conditions key to solvencyWelfare proves that screening applicants and building restrictions into the programs is the only way to make them effective long term Peter H. Schuck and Richard J. Zeckhauser- Analysts for the Brookings institution- 2006- Targeting in Social Programs Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples – page- 33 If voters’ altruism is indeed limited, as suggested in chapter 2, then programs that effectively screen out or remove bad apples will tend to increase their political legitimacy, which in turn can enhance their long-run public support and even increase their funding (at least by making more funds available per good apple). Voters and legislators may not know how many bad apples a program contains and may accept that a few in a program are probably inevitable. However, they can more readily distinguish between programs that earnestly strive to weed out bad apples and those that do not, and they will give more support to those programs that make a strong effort to do so while withdrawing support from those that do not. Leading examples of this effect of improved targeting on public support are the 1996 welfare reform law, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Food Stamp program. We also discuss this effect in chapter 5. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), passed by Congress in 1996, imposed a stiff work requirement designed to prevent welfare recipients who are deemed capable of work from remaining on the rolls indefinitely (which would make them bad apples).19 The new program (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF]) maintained federal funding at the pre-reform level in nominal terms, when one includes the additional funds that were appropriated for child care and other work support services. Because the number of those who remained on the rolls (relatively good apples) was much lower, TANF and these other work support programs produced significantly increased funding to aid good apple working poor families.20 This development continued even after the election of a much more conservative president and a somewhat more Republican Congress. Subsidies to low-income families for child care provided outside TANF, but directly related to TANF’s goal of work promotion, also increased substantially after welfare reform, as did funding for job training.21 Congress provided these additional funds with the hope and expectation that welfare reform would enable wage incomes to replace transfer payments. Another provision of the reform, which limited noncitizens’ access to federally funded public benefits, has had a similar political effect, weakening an argument— immigrant dependency on welfare—that restrictionists traditionally used to press for lower immigration to the United States. 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