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- Attack on an LNG tanker would be devastating
- AT: Security Solves
- The Coast Guard is not capable of providing terminals with adequate protection from terrorist attacks
SolvencyRegs Hurt LNG ExportsFuture regs take out exportsEbinger 12 Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502_lng_exports While several studies are ongoing into the effects of shale gas production on the environment, there has been no conclusive evidence found to date that links the practice of fracking to ground water contamination or increased seismic activity. As long as the current regulatory environment remains, shale gas development is likely to continue to produce the volumes that will make LNG ex- ports feasible. However, a change in the regulatory landscape that imposes additional costs on producers could make marginal shale gas prospects uneconomic, reducing the size of the economically recoverable resource, thereby negatively affecting the feasibility of LNG exports. Conversely, well developed regulations, possibly based on sustainable best practice, could provide benefit to the public, the environment and industry. The recent announcement by the Obama Adminis- tration—in which it allocated $45 million to an interagency research and development program between the Department of Energy, Interior, and the EPA to identify ways to reduce the environ- mental impact of shale gas production—suggests that the Administration supports the sustainable development of shale gas resources.
Pipes k2 LNG exportsEbinger 12 Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502_lng_exports The feasibility of U.S. LNG exports depends upon the ability of the country’s natural gas infrastruc- ture to support the production, transportation, storage, and shipment of natural gas. Pipeline and Storage Capacity The development of shale gas plays is likely to have a profound effect on the regional dynamics of the U.S. natural gas market. Increased produc- tion from the Marcellus Shale is likely to displace some supplies from the Gulf Coast and other regions that currently serve the large Northeast market.29 Moreover, if significantly increased LNG exports from the Gulf Coast go ahead, there may be a need to reverse the pipelines to allow gas to flow toward the Gulf Coast. To maximize the economic potential of the U.S. shale gas endowment, whether for exports or for domestic use, there will be a requirement for significant expansion in the nation’s continental natural gas pipeline network, particularly in the vicinity of the Marcellus Shale. In 2010, Marcel- lus producers predicted that fewer than half of the 1,100 wells drilled had pipeline access.30 ICF Inter- national, a consultancy, estimates that 3,300 addi- tional miles of pipeline will be built in the North- east between 2009 and 2035.31 There is currently 6 bcf/day of FERC-approved proposed pipeline capacity that will deliver gas from the Marcellus to demand centers. More than 2 bcf/day of this capacity is scheduled to be completed by the sum- mer of 2012.32 Another concern is whether a gas pipeline infrastructure network will be developed quickly enough in liquid-rich plays, such as the Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and Utica Shales, to fully capture the natural gas being produced. As out lined above, vast quantities of natural gas are cur- rently being flared at some shale sites in the U.S. mid-continent. One way to reduce such flaring is being considered by Wyoming’s Office of State Lands and Investments, which has proposed a policy through which royalties payments would be required from operators of wells on state lands that continue to be flared for more than 15 days after completion. Absent strong state action on flaring, it is possible that the federal government will seek to regulate flaring at oil and natural gas wells. In addition to constraints on pipeline ca- pacity, there are also concerns about the adequacy of natural gas storage infrastructure, particularly in the Northeast, although the investments in pipeline capacity should prompt similar invest- ments in increased storage capacity.33 Terrorism DANegI/L – LNG Exports Vulnerable TargetsLNG ships and terminals are terrorist targetsKaplan, 6 (Eben Kaplan, Liquefied Natural Gas: A Potential Terrorist Target?, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Feb. 2006, http://www.cfr.org/natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas-potential-terrorist-target/p9810#p2, HH) Yes, because of LNG's explosive potential, experts say. Al-Qaeda, for example, has specifically cited LNG as a desirable target, says Rob Knake, senior associate at Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, a homeland-security private consulting firm. Pipelines are not as attractive because the flow of gas can quickly be cut off and an explosion easily contained. Terminals make better targets because an attack could result in a massive fire that could potentially kill scores of people. They are also good targets because "if you take out those terminals, you could have a significant disruption [in the U.S. gas supply,]" Knake says. But an attack on an LNG terminal might not be so damaging. Terminals are equipped with emergency fire detection mechanisms designed to minimize the impact of fires resulting from terrorist attacks or accidents. The most attractive targets are the boats: 1,000-foot tankers with double hulls and specially constructed storage tanks that keep the LNG cold. A report, put out by Good Harbor Consulting assessing the risk of a proposed LNG terminal in Providence, Rhode Island, concluded that a successful terrorist attack on a tanker could result in as many as 8,000 deaths and upwards of 20,000 injuries. It is important to keep in mind that this is the worst case scenario. A report on LNG safety and security by the University of Texas' Center for Energy and Economics explains LNG "tanks require exceptionally large amounts of force to cause damage. Because the amount of energy required to breach containment is so large, in almost all cases the major hazard presented by terrorists is a fire, not an explosion." The Sandia National Laboratories report assesses four potential ways terrorists may target an LNG tanker and the worst potential outcomes: Ramming: Terrorists may attempt to drive another vessel into an LNG tanker or to divert a tanker into a stationary object. Unless the tanker is struck at a very high speed or the object striking it is very sharp, it is unlikely that a breach of the hull will occur. However, if such a breach did occur, there is a chance LNG would spill out and cause a massive fire.¶ Triggered Explosion: Explosives, such as mines, may be placed in the path of an LNG tanker or on the tanker itself. If powerful enough, such an explosion could cause the cargo to spill and ignite.¶ External Attack: There are several ways terrorists may attempt to assault an LNG tanker. The 2000 U.S.S. Cole attack, in which terrorists detonated explosives after pulling alongside the warship in a small vessel, is often cited as an example of such an attack. Other possible methods of attack include firing missiles or rocket-propelled grenades at a tanker and or air strikes. Tankers are particularly vulnerable as they traverse inland waterways en route to their destinations. The impact of an assault would vary depending on the size and location of the attack, the worst-case scenario being a massive explosion.¶ Hijacking: The most catastrophic scenario involving an LNG tanker involves terrorists taking control of an LNG tanker, sailing it toward a major population area and detonating the cargo.¶ Because of its low cost and high impact, a U.S.S. Cole-style attack remains an important security concern for defense planners. "It's not a difficult thing to do if you're determined to do it," Fay ( James Fay, professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT].) says. "It doesn't require trained experts to evade the Coast Guard." When a passenger jet enters restricted airspace over a nuclear plant, it is the U.S. president, Knake says, who must decide whether to repel the plane with force. Yet when a private craft drifts too close to an LNG tanker, "you could have a petty officer in the Coast Guard making this call," he says. Attack on an LNG tanker would be devastatingThe Associated Press, 04 (The Associated Press, 12/20/2004, “Attack on gas vessel could cause big damage”, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6739436/ns/us_news-security/t/attack-gas-vessel-could-cause-big-damage/#.U6dAfhCh_zs, LL) A terror attack on a tanker delivering liquefied natural gas at a U.S. port could set off a fire so hot it would burn skin and damage buildings nearly a mile away, government scientists say in a report expected to influence where new multibillion-dollar terminals will be built. ¶ The report from a government nuclear weapons lab, a 160-page unclassified version of which was obtained Monday by The Associated Press, characterizes an LNG tanker spill from a terror attack as a low probability. If successful, however, it would become “a high consequence event” that could produce massive injuries and property damage, the report said.¶ The yearlong study by scientists at Sandia National Laboratory, a premier federal research facility, provides the most detailed analysis to date of the potential public safety impact of a terrorist attack on an LNG transport tanker.¶ While the report does not recommend prohibiting tankers from carrying LNG through heavily populated areas, it says those shipments should occur only after “the most rigorous deterrent measures” are in place to reduce the probability of an attack.¶ The tankers, each of which carries up to 30 million gallons of LNG, arrive every few days at four U.S. terminals: Everett, Mass.; Cove Point, Md.; Elba Island, Ga., and Lake Charles, La. All are expanding as regulators weigh the merits of putting more than three dozen more such facilities at U.S. ports, many in urban areas.¶ In its minus-260 degrees liquid state, LNG cannot explode and is not flammable. If a missile or explosive should tear a hole in a tanker or a storage tank, however, the escaping liquid would be transformed instantaneously into a gas and probably would ignite in a massive fire.¶ The Sandia report said terrorists, using readily available weapons and technology, could blast a 10-foot hole into the side of an LNG tanker. AT: Security SolvesAES’s efforts to improve safety for terminals are not sufficient Hare 9 (Mary Gail Hare, Terrorism Expert Is Critical Of Lng Terminal Security For Sparrows Point, 88-mile Pipeline Inadequate, Former Cia Official Warns, The Baltimore Sun, May 27, 2009, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-05-27/news/0905260055_1_liquefied-natural-gas-faddis-terrorism, HH) Opponents of a liquefied natural gas terminal in eastern Baltimore County stepped up their attacks Tuesday, hosting an appearance by a former CIA officer who said the $400 million project lacks critical safeguards and raises the specter of terrorism and piracy."The more I looked into this project, the more I thought the company building it does not care about the safety implications," said Charles S. Faddis, who retired a year ago as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's anti-terrorism unit and is a security consultant, based in Davidsonville, and a writer who has published two books on security issues.Faddis spoke yesterday at a news conference, organized by the LNG Opposition Team, that was attended by several dozen residents, many of whom live near the Sparrows Point location where the terminal would be built. The team is battling AES Corp., the Arlington, Va.-based gas company that plans to build the terminal and an 88-mile pipeline from it through Maryland to Pennsylvania.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission gave AES conditional approval in January, but it has yet to reply to the dozen appeals of that decision and demands for a rehearing."We are still fighting this thing," said Russell Donnelly, team leader, who organized the news conference at the Fleming Center, a community activities building in Turners Station. "We could lose more than we would ever gain from this project."While researching a book on liquefied natural gas, Faddis met Donnelly and volunteered to help his cause. Faddis said he visited the proposed site, near where the Patapsco River meets the Chesapeake Bay, and pored over hundreds of pages of documents.FERC, which placed 169 conditions, mostly related to safety and environment, on its approval of the project, accepted Faddis' testimony on securing the ships, the terminal and the pipeline from the threat of terrorism. AES, which unsuccessfully opposed adding Faddis' testimony to the record, said Tuesday that it would have no comment. "AES wants to build this facility without putting in meaningful safeguards to stand up to terrorist threats," The Coast Guard is not capable of providing terminals with adequate protection from terrorist attacksHare 9 (Mary Gail Hare, Terrorism Expert Is Critical Of Lng Terminal Security For Sparrows Point, 88-mile Pipeline Inadequate, Former Cia Official Warns, The Baltimore Sun, May 27, 2009, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-05-27/news/0905260055_1_liquefied-natural-gas-faddis-terrorism, HH) Simply put, more LNG means more targets, which require more security. Rising demand and economies of scale are likely to put larger quantities of LNG in a single place. Fay expects the size of LNG tankers to double in the coming years, which could make an attack even more catastrophic. As the number of incoming tankers continues to rise, experts question whether the Coast Guard can continue the intimidating display of force it currently provides for all incoming shipments. According to Stephen Flynn, CFR Senior Fellow for National Security Studies and a retired Coast Guard Officer, the service's fleet of vessels and aircraft ranks among the oldest in the world and have been operating at a far higher tempo since 9/11. The number of emergency repairs and the cost of maintaining this fleet are growing significantly, yet the program to replace them will take an estimated twenty-five years to complete based on the current acquisition budget model. Flynn adds that the time to detect and intercept a rapidly moving small boat in a harbor could be as little as two to three minutes. "A 'bolt-out-of-the-blue' fast boat loaded with explosives and suicide bombers is likely to evade most small Coast Guard patrol crafts, which were designed primarily for safety patrols, not armed combat," he says. 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