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Link – US Exports Offset Russia (Ukraine)



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Link – US Exports Offset Russia (Ukraine)

Approving export terminals k2 solve Russian control of Ukraine and Europe – congress k2 solve


Driessen 6/20

Paul, 14, senior policy analyst for the Committee For A Constructive Tomorrow, “DRIESSEN: Fighting Russia with U.S. natural gas exports” Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jun/20/driessen-a-shale-gale-to-blow-away-russias-energy-/?page=all#pagebreak



Russia’s decision last week to cut off natural gas shipments to Ukraine is adding urgency to discussions on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers are considering legislation to speed approval of U.S. natural gas exports. After the announcement was made, the House Energy and Commerce Committee noted, “For decades, Russia has been wielding its energy resources as a weapon to exert power over our allies, but the U.S. now has the opportunity to fight back against this Russian aggression with our own emerging energy prowess.” Fighting Russian aggression by providing U.S. energy supplies to our allies is a new concept. For more than 40 years, the United States watched in frustration as its oil and natural gas output declined, oil imports climbed, and payments to foreign suppliers skyrocketed. The nation’s ethanol, wind and solar programs all had their roots in our perceived inability to find more petroleum within our borders. In reality, though, America’s dependence on foreign petroleum was never due to a lack of oil and natural gas deposits. It arose because the United States lacked the political willpower to find and produce them on federal lands, and did not have the technology to develop them in state and private areas. The advent of directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing changed that dramatically. The technologies made the United States the world’s largest producer of natural gas and greatly increased domestic oil production. By enabling us to extract energy from vast shale formations, they put the nation well on its way to again being a global energy powerhouse. Imagine what could happen if these new technologies could be employed on those still-closed onshore and offshore federal lands. America could easily have ample hydrocarbons to meet domestic needs, export natural gas and even some oil and refined products to allies, and keep oil prices manageable even in the midst of renewed Russian aggression and Middle East turmoil. The United States now has more than a 100-year supply of natural gas — and could support its allies by shipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tanker to foreign ports. That would counter Russian cutoffs and threatened price hikes or supply disruptions, and give our allies time to deploy fracking technologies in their own extensive shale deposits, as some European countries are now doing or contemplating seriously. The Department of Energy has given conditional approval to seven LNG export plans, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has been reviewing 14 proposals submitted by terminals that need to make modifications for export operations. On the East Coast, the list includes Dominion’s facility at Cove Point, Md., and the LNG plant operated by Southern LNG Company at Elba Island, Ga. With approvals needed from both agencies, the requirement that gas-exporting terminals ship LNG only to countries holding free-trade agreements with the United States, and with the entire process facing various delays, congressional action is required to streamline the process.

US LNG exports will immediately Russian influence in Ukraine and the rest of Europe


Barrasso 14 (John, U.S. Senator for Wyoming, “Washington: SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF UKRAINE--MOTION TO PROCEED—Continued”, US Official News, March 26, 2014, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T20127185604&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T20127185608&cisb=22_T20127185607&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=400469&docNo=4

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.¶ The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.¶ The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.¶ Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order ¶ for the quorum call be rescinded.¶ The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.¶ Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to talk about ¶ an issue that has been in the news quite a bit, and quite a bit on the ¶ minds of people, I think, all around the Capitol, which is what is ¶ happening with, specifically, Vladimir Putin and Russia and the ¶ invasion and takeover of Crimea and the activities in Ukraine.¶ On March 15 Russian forces seized a natural gas distribution station ¶ in a Ukrainian village. I think this is key because this was right at ¶ the time they were getting ready to have a vote on Crimea leaving ¶ Ukraine, joining Russia, and I was in Ukraine at the time. I was there ¶ with a bipartisan group. We had eight Senators--Republicans and ¶ Democrats from across the aisle and across the broad spectrum of ¶ politics in America. What we saw at the time, right before the vote, ¶ was the helicopters heading in to take over the gas plant. To me that ¶ showed how Vladimir Putin thinks of energy, thinks of politics, and ¶ thinks of power.¶ In the Washington Post that Sunday morning, the day of the vote in ¶ Crimea: ``Ukraine decries Russian Invasion, Natural Gas Facility ¶ Seized.'' Their first action before the vote even occurred, the ¶ Russians came in and seized a natural gas facility. It showed his ¶ willingness, his desire, to use energy as a weapon. It is also a ¶ reminder that energy for us can be a powerful weapon to counter Russian ¶ aggression.¶ President Putin has repeatedly made it clear that he does not care ¶ about democracy, about freedom or about the Ukrainian people. What he ¶ does care about is money and power. As the United States considers how ¶ to help the Ukrainian people, as we are doing right now on the floor of ¶ the Senate with sanctions and aid, I think we need to make sure we take ¶ steps to hit Putin exactly where it hurts, which is in his wallet, in ¶ his power. Right now some may say: How does this matter? How important ¶ is this? Right now about half of Russia's revenue comes from oil and ¶ natural gas.¶ We heard it today in the energy committee. The chairman of the ¶ committee stated that in her remarks before hearing testimony. Fifty-¶ two percent, she said, of Russia's revenue comes from oil and natural ¶ gas. I think Senator John McCain was exactly right when he said this ¶ past Sunday on CNN that ``Russia is a gas station masquerading as a ¶ country.'' He was part of that group of eight Senators who went to ¶ Ukraine, went to Kiev, went and saw where the massacres occurred and ¶ visited with the new Prime Minister and the new President.¶ That is why I believe my amendment to this sanctions bill, this aid ¶ bill on the floor of the Senate, is so very important not just to us as ¶ a Nation but to the people of Ukraine, the people of Europe, those who ¶ are trying to regain some freedom from the yoke and the tyranny of what ¶ Russia is doing by charging outrageous energy prices to people across ¶ Europe and across the Ukraine. We have an opportunity right now to make ¶ it easier for the United States to export our own gas to NATO countries ¶ and Ukraine. That is what my amendment will do. It is simple. It is two ¶ pages. By expediting the approval of facilities to export liquefied ¶ natural gas, we can send a very powerful signal to European markets ¶ that alternative supplies will be available soon. We can undermine ¶ Russia's leverage with its European customers today and undercut ¶ Russia's ability to make so much money off gas exports in the future.¶ Some Washington Democrats continue to act as though the conflict in ¶ Ukraine has nothing to do with energy. Other Democrats see it ¶ differently. The Obama administration claims that speeding up LNG ¶ exports to Europe would not have an immediate effect. That is not what ¶ we heard today in the energy committee. That is not what a bipartisan ¶ group of Senators has heard and believes.¶ We cannot ignore Russia's economic dependence on energy and the ¶ reality about how energy markets work. Remember, half of Russia's ¶ revenue comes from oil and natural gas. That is why the United States ¶ shale gas revolution is already undermining Russia's negotiating ¶ position with its European neighbors.¶ This all has come about in the last decade--new techniques of ¶ horizontal drilling, directional drilling, all of which makes energy in ¶ the United States easier, cheaper to get, and then more available so it ¶ can then be more easily exported. By reducing U.S. demand, that frees ¶ up supply that can be bought on European markets. Because there is more ¶ supply, that forces Russia's state-owned gas companies to adjust their ¶ prices. Every molecule of American gas that can get anywhere else in ¶ the world is going to be a molecule that those in Europe and those in ¶ Ukraine cannot be held hostage to buy from Russia.

Expediting US LNG exports will alleviate Russian pressure on Ukraine


Barrasso 14 (John, U.S. Senator for Wyoming, “Washington: SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF UKRAINE--MOTION TO PROCEED—Continued”, US Official News, March 26, 2014, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T20127185604&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T20127185608&cisb=22_T20127185607&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=400469&docNo=4
The more supply ¶ there is, then Russia's state-owned gas company will have to adjust its ¶ prices. It¶ [[Page S1716]]¶ ran an article on European efforts to reduce the control Russia has had ¶ over gas prices. We can immediately apply more pressure to the region's ¶ gas prices and further erode Russia's revenues by approving additional ¶ liquefied natural gas export capacity.¶ I think about that hearing earlier today in the energy Committee, ¶ when every witness endorsed LNG exports to undercut Russia. So what is ¶ stopping us? Some Washington Democrats have denied any need to act more ¶ quickly. The administration has approved just seven applications for ¶ LNG export facilities over many years. It spent an average of 697 days ¶ processing each of them. The Energy Department has still not processed ¶ another 24 applications that are waiting and waiting and waiting.¶ My amendment would speed up that process, force the administration to ¶ act on applications to be able to allow energy to be sent to our NATO ¶ allies and to the Ukraine. We don't need more hearings to tell us what ¶ we already know. Natural gas and the pricing continues to be a boot on ¶ the neck of the Ukrainian people and in Europe.¶ Majority Leader Reid needs to allow a vote on my amendment. To me, it ¶ strengthens the Ukrainian relief package. It strengthens the economics ¶ in terms of money going from the United States. It strengthens aid, and ¶ it strengthens sanctions because it actually works to specifically ¶ undercut, undermine Russia's ability to hold others hostage. Plus, it ¶ has bipartisan support. There are a number of Democrats who would vote ¶ to support it. I think it is time to send a signal to Russia that we ¶ are finally ready to use energy to help stop their aggression.¶ I will point out that I am not alone in this, and there is ¶ significant across-the-board support. It is interesting, the number of ¶ headlines in the past week or so from papers with various different ¶ approaches, including the New York Times: ``U.S. Hopes Boom In Natural ¶ Gas Can Curb Putin,'' directly tying natural gas to the Russian ¶ President. That is the New York Times.¶ The Wall Street Journal: ``West Tries To Loosen Russia's Gas Grip.''¶ Investor's Business Daily: ``Bold Energy Policy Best Response To ¶ Russia In Ukraine.''¶ The Wall Street Journal: ``Energy Exports as Foreign-Policy Tool'' ¶ and ``Moscow Tightens Squeeze on Ukraine Over Energy.''¶ It is evident the export of liquefied natural gas from the United ¶ States will help us as a Nation. It will help us in terms of our ¶ foreign policy, and it can be used and should be used and must be used ¶ to undermine the Russian economy at a time when they are--with Putin on ¶ the move, Putin on a daily basis evaluating the consequences of his ¶ actions to decide what he is going to do, planning to do, with the ¶ possibility of additional incursions into Ukraine. He continues with ¶ troops along the border between Russia and the Ukraine ready to act, ¶ ready to go in, ready to cross the border. All he understands is ¶ strength and power, and the way to undercut that is by undercutting his ¶ economic strength and power, by exporting liquefied natural gas.¶ So I come to the floor asking that Senator Reid allow an amendment ¶ that would strengthen the bill we are discussing right now and making ¶ it better for the people in Ukraine, better for the people here at ¶ home, and actually doing something significant about the problem we see ¶ existing with the additional use of power by Vladimir Putin.¶ I thank the Chair. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a ¶ quorum.

Expanding US LNG exports would help the crisis in Ukraine


Goldenberg 14 (Suzanne, environment correspondent for The Guardian, “US expands gas exports in bid to punish Putin for Crimea”, The Guardian, March 25, 2014,

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/25/us-expands-gas-exports-in-bid-to-punish-putin-for-crimea)


Congress moved to punish Vladimir Putin for the annexation of Crimea on Tuesday by expanding America’s exports of natural gas to challenge Russia’s energy dominance.¶ In the first of three hearings on natural gas exports this week, the Senate energy committee was told repeatedly that exporting US gas to Europe - or even Asia - would end Putin’s “energy blackmail” by lowering prices and providing an alternative to Russia as Europe’s big energy supplier.¶ “America should be an energy superpower,” Mary Landrieu, the Louisiana Democrat who chairs the Senate energy committee said. “The last thing Putin and his cronies want is competition from America in the energy race.”¶ The full Senate was due later on Tuesday to debate a $1bn aid package for Ukraine that could also bring more calls for expanding exports of liquified natural gas (LNG).¶ Landrieu was one of nine US officials sanctioned by Putin last week. She continued in Tuesday’s hearing to push for America to open up exports of LNG.¶ “We should use our energy prowess to break the tyrants who use their energy stockpiles to crush hopes of freedom and democracy,” Landrieu told the committee.¶ Lithuania’s energy minister, Jaroslav Neverovič, agreed. “Accelerating America’s entry into the global natural gas market is a win-win,” he said.¶ The crisis in Ukraine gave new momentum to the oil and gas industry - and members of Congress from energy states - to expand fossil fuel exports.

I/L Expansionism through Nat Gas (Ukraine)

Russian LNG exports to European nations increasing – further reliance leads to Ukrainian instability


Gaub 14 (Florence, Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, “Gas crisis in Europe and the alternative Qatari role”: The current energy crisis in Europe following the ongoing crisis between Russia and Ukraine, May 18, 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/05/20145665624846681.htm)

Russia and Europe, who are more often at odds when it comes to politics, have entertained an energy relationship which began during the Cold War. Russia is the largest exporter of oil and gas to the European Union; in 2012, more than 25% of European gas imports came from Russia – which make up 60% of Russian gas exports. More than half of these exports are channeled through the five Ukraine pipelines (eight remaining pipelines are through Belarus to Poland and Lithuania or directly to Germany, Finland, Estonia and Latvia). Almost half of European gas imports go to Germany and Italy, while France, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria and Slovakia also import more than 5 billion cubic meters per year.¶ Until now, this link has weathered several storms, but Europe’s energy dependency on Russia has made policy-makers uneasy on a regular basis. In 2000, the European Commission issued a Green Paper drawing attention to the high European dependency levels of gas imports;(1) in 2004, the European Council adopted a directive whose goals were “ensuring an adequate level for the security of gas supply, in particular in the event of a major supply disruption," and "contributing to the proper functioning of the internal gas market”.(2) Russian-Ukrainian clashes in 2006 and 2009 led to the first disruptions in European gas supply, and re-launched the debate on European energy security. But since then, Europe’s dependency on gas imports has not decreased – rather, it is expected to rise from 40% to 70% of current imports.(3)¶ The crisis in Ukraine has served as an important wake-up call for European decision makers - 49% of Russian gas exports go through Ukraine, who is currently experiencing a gas shortage themselves. Following the conflict over the Ukrainian Crimea region Russia has not only increased the price of its gas exports to Ukraine, it has also threatened to cease the delivery of gas altogether if debt payments remain unsettled. Perhaps more importantly, three other regions in eastern Ukraine are also likely to secede by mid-May. The four regions account for one-third of Ukraine’s exports. These developments have stirred a crucial energy debate in Europe. As European Council President Herman Van Rompuy has declared right after the referendum on Crimea’s secession from Russia: “Today we sent a clear signal that Europe is stepping up a gear to reduce energy dependency, especially with Russia: by reducing our energy demand, with more energy efficiency; by diversifying our supply routes to and within Europe, and expanding energy sources, in particular renewables; by energy security on our border and security of supply for our neighbours”.(4) Several European decision-makers have come forward in support of such initiatives, and are looking into immediate options to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports.

Russia uses natural gas to manipulate countries


Cunningham 13

Nick, policy analyst at the American Security Project, a non-profit, non partisan public policy and research organization dedicated to fostering knowledge and understanding of a range of national security issues, March, “The Geopolitical Implications of U.S. Natural Gas Exports” https://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200116%20-%20The%20Geopolitical%20Implications%20of%20U.S.%20Natural%20Gas%20Exports.pdf

European Allies Europe remains highly dependent on Russia for natural gas, which supplies 34% of its total natural gas imports.18 For countries in Central and Eastern Europe (like Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece), that share is much higher. 19 Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use energy as a political tool, cutting off natural gas supplies to European consumers several times over the last decade – with Eastern European countries most harmed by Russian manipulations.20 The reasons for such actions are disputed by the Russian government and Gazprom, but the timing of these events seem created to maximize Russia’s political influence. The result is that European countries are vulnerable to a supplier that can be described as unreliable at best. There has been moderate progress to date in loosening Russia’s grip over European energy, and the role of LNG has been instrumental. Rising LNG purchases has allowed Europe to find new suppliers for its energy needs, including Nigeria, Egypt, Trinidad and Qatar. This has led to a diversification of natural gas imports, allowing Europe to cut its dependence on Russia for natural gas from 75% in 1990 down to only 34% today.21 The U.S. has already contributed to this trend, albeit unwittingly. The shale gas revolution in the U.S. has freed up LNG imports that were once destined for American ports. LNG shipments were essentially rerouted to Europe. This has allowed LNG supplies around the world to grow, pushing down prices.22

I/L – Russian Expansionism through Nat Gas

Russian oil and gas export revenues key to its political control


Aron 13 (Leon, for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas”, Spring 2013, p. 6-7, http://www.aei.org/files/2013/05/29/-the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas_083506286519.pdf)

Yet, everyone also seemed in agreement that such a¶ transformation is at least as much a political problem as an economic one. Oil and gas dependence renders political¶ and social institutions all but impervious to modernization.¶ Modernization and diversification, watchwords in Moscow,¶ are impossible without enormous and potentially short-term¶ destabilizing institutional change. Diversification¶ requires “good political institutions,” argued Sergei Guriev:¶ property-rights protection, independent, competent and¶ fair courts and good financial markets69—none of which¶ Russia has today at even a minimally sufficient level.¶ At least in the short run, reducing dependence on oil and gas revenue will mean sweeping and politically fraught reforms in welfare and pension systems and cutting back on subsidies to Russia’s poorer regions, the monotowns, and unprofitable industries. It would also mean a sharp reduction in military expenditures, instead of embarking on the $770 billion, 10-year “rearmament” program announced by Putin last year.70 Moving away from gas and oil must also entail overhauling the taxation system, filled with ad hoc tax breaks for the state’s¶ “pet projects,” and replacing it with a predictable “profit-based”¶ system,71 which will assure potential foreign and,¶ most importantly, domestic investors, who last year took¶ over $56 billion out of the country.72 If fully implemented,¶ such reforms will erode the Kremlin’s control over the economy, courts, and, inevitably, politics.


Russian nat gas control leads to manipulating European countries – countries have no recourse


Ebinger 12

Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502_lng_exports



A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy in- terests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geo- graphical proximity and political relations be- tween producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which re- lies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previ- ous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagree- ments between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern Eu- ropean states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy se- curity concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Rus- sian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gaz- prom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evi- dent in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demand- ing exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015.112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several fac- tors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reac- tors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emis- sions—codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconven- tional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas produc- tion, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconven- tional-gas exploration have generally seen disap- pointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim.

Impact – Russian Expansionism Bad (Corruption)

Russian Influence leads to corruption and organized crime


Marschal, 07

[Miklós Marschall ( 1953) is currently the European and Central Asian Regional Director of Transparency International, a Berlin-based transnational NGO fighting against corruption. He is responsible for TI’s European and Central Asian operations. Between 1994-98, Dr.Marschall was the (founding) executive director of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.; June 24th, 2014;”Russian Influence Bad for Corruption in Ex-Soviet Era”; http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078798.html-EW]

That's the view of Miklos Marschal, regional director for Europe and Central Asia at Transparency International. Marschall was talking to RFE/RL about the global corruption watchdog's new report issued today, The Corruption Index, which ranks 180 countries on their degree of corruption as seen by business people and experts. Marschall said there was no improvement overall in the region partly because there was less political will for reforms. "Wherever there is a stronger influence of the European Union, you see improvement," he said. "Wherever Russian influence is growing, the corruption situation is worsening." Uzbekistan was the worst performer in the region, sinking to 175th place, and one of five countries perceived as the world's most corrupt. At the other end of the scale, Marschall pointed to the progress made by the three Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- on their road to joining the EU in 2004. "Successful reforms of the public administration and opening up the economy can change the situation. And of course this is because of European accession, which was a very powerful external force that pushed reforms in those countries," he said. He also noted one bright spot in the former Soviet area -- Georgia, which has moved up twenty places on the list to 79th spot. "It is clear that [Mikheil] Saakashvili’s government brought about significant changes and that is being reflected in the opinion of the international business community, and that is reflected by our score," he said. Russia itself ranks 143 on the list, a slide of more than 20 since last year, a position Marschall called "a great embarrassment for Russia" as it meant corruption was getting worse despite government pledges and commitments.


Impact – Russian Expansion in Ukraine Bad

Crimean war escalates – causes extinction


Fick 3/5

Angela, resident current affairs and news analyst at eNCA. He has twenty years’ experience teaching and researching across a variety of disciplines at universities in South Africa and Europe, Russia in the Crimea: The Thin Red Line of Sanity, 3/5/14, http://www.enca.com/opinion/russia-crimea-thin-red-line-sanity



One does not want to sound like a latter-day Cassandra, but it is beginning to feel a lot like long night’s journey into Judgement Day. Could that be Vera Lynn, crooning about meeting again, don’t know where, don’t know when, as she did over the montage of mushroom clouds at the end of Kubrick’s dystopian warning?¶ The events in Ukraine over the last few months, if not years, must be and have been cause for grave concern. The name of the country translates as ‘borderlands’, and in some senses the region has been at the crossroads of historical conflicts and contests between its neighbours for centuries. ¶ But the latest fracas – and that understatement may be an attempt to dispel the cognitive dissonance which comes from contemplating nuclear powers in a stand-off in which reason (or its grandiose reification, Reason) seems tragically absent – recalls another from the nineteenth century.The presence of Russian armed forces in the Crimean peninsula in 2014 is only the latest in a millennium long history of foreign occupation, invasion, and attempts at domination Ukrainians endured and resisted. Vladimir Putin, the president of the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s powerful neighbour, insists these manoeuvres do not constitute an ‘invasion’ or an attempt to annex territory or to compromise the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state or the control of its government over its territory. ¶ Nevertheless, in the wake of the instability in the Ukrainian state following the spectacular unrest in Kyiv (its Russian spelling is Kiev) and the flight of the president, Viktor Yanukovych, alarm bells sounded across western Europe and in the United States. ¶ Ukraine declared its independence in 1990 during the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Cold War superpower antagonist of the West dominated by the United States of America (USA) and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) partners. ¶ Since the peaceful ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004, the political troubles of Ukraine were ongoing, power shifting between Yanukovych and his antagonist, Yulia Tymoshenko.¶ Whereas such machinations in other states may have continued with only lip-service concern from the international community of states, Ukraine occupies important territory between the vast fossil fuel resources of Putin’s Russian Federation and the energy-hungry consumer base of what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranks as the largest economy in the world, the European Union. ¶ The internal conflict in Ukraine between Yanukovych’s government and some of the citizens cannot be simplified or reduced, but the importance of looking to the ‘west’ or to the ‘east’ played a significant role. Yanukovych was seen to favour continued close relations with Russia; the citizens in revolt seemed keen to look ‘west’. ¶ Competing interests had to be balanced, and far from being solely interested in the welfare of Ukrainians, western European leaders also have concerns about continued access to crucial resources to fuel a standard of living unprecedented in human history on that scale.¶ In the wake of Putin’s manoeuvres in the Crimean peninsula, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations all have a stake in stabilising the situation in Ukraine before the conflict spreads. ¶ One analyst believes that Russian military operations in eastern Ukraine could elicit similar incursions into Siberia by China. A development of that kind would repeat events from the middle of the nineteenth century. “Crimean” and “war” recall the messy and brutal conflict which gave us Florence Nightingale and modern nursing, the “Charge of the Light Brigade” (the military manoeuvres by a combat unit as well as the poem), Balaclava (the town, the battle, the headgear), and other such keywords from high school history essays. ¶ But as awful a stain as the nineteenth century Crimean War was on imperial Britain specifically and western Europe more generally (and its impact on the fortunes of Czarist Russia must also be borne in mind), humanity cannot afford another Crimean War. And despite its name, that conflict spread across much of the northern hemisphere, as far as the Pacific Ocean, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic coast.¶ In the 150 years since the charge of the Light Brigade during the Battle of Balaclava gave us the phrase “the thin red line” to describe the plucky and courageous efforts of outnumbered military personnel nevertheless holding out against the odds, humanity has unlocked the terrible secret of the split atom. Then the military conflict between Russia and an alliance of western European powers involved what are now crude weapons hardly ever used in war; these days it is the stuff of historical re-enactment and backdrop in costume drama. The conflict today involves nuclear powers. And ironically, the decisions Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt made at Yalta, a town on the Crimean peninsula, in 1945, contributed to making the landscape we observe.¶ Once again Russia is in a stand-off against western European powers, and again, the conflict centres on resources: this time the fossil fuels which keep western European economies going, and ensure the high standard of living the citizens in those countries have grown accustomed if not addicted to.¶ What powers the technologised First World lives of people in Germany, among other places, is the gas exported by Russia and transported across Ukrainian territory. If the ordinary people of Europe remain mostly unaware of this fact, their governments are only too keenly aware of it. ¶ Re-election depends on western powers’ ability to guarantee their citizens’ good lives. This is partly why the United States went to war in the Middle East. But war with a nuclear power headed by man whose hyper-masculine posturing may be symptomatic of his approach to conflict is not something humanity can afford.¶ No Florence Nightingale or Mary Seacole can nurse the wounded and the dying of a nuclear conflict. And Ukraine is intimately familiar with nuclear fall-out. Until the accident at Japan’s Fukushima power station (and the horrific irony of that incident on a population which had experienced Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be understated; the Japanese are the only people acknowledged to have been subjected to nuclear weapons in war), Ukraine recorded the worst nuclear disaster in history: the 1986 meltdown of the reactor at Chernobyl. ¶ The site is still the centre of a 2,600 km2 exclusion zone from which 120 000 people had to be removed. A nuclear conflict ignited by the events in the Ukraine would have catastrophic results in an order of magnitude much larger, much more tragic, and infinitely more devastating.¶ The security and insecurity of the citizens of Ukraine may be metonymic of humanity’s. Madness must be tamed. That thin red line of sanity and survival of the many must prevail against the madness of the nuclear-weapons toting few. The alternative is extinction.

Failure to stand up to Russia results in nuclear war


Argus Leader 3/24

U.S. must stand strong against Putin, 3/24/14, http://www.argusleader.com/story/opinion/2014/03/25/letter-us-must-stand-strong-against-putin/6857291/



As Russian soldiers continue to occupy Crimea and now even parts of mainland Ukraine, many commentators on the airwaves and in print media have advocated a hands-off response by the United States and European Union. They say that preserving Crimea as a part of Ukraine is not worth the effort, and that the U.S. has no interest in it. What they fail to see is that while this armed occupation by Russia may be happening in Crimea, this is not about just a peninsula in the Black Sea or even the nation of Ukraine that owns it.¶ Vladimir Putin is an authoritarian dictator. He has said, as Ian Brzezinski mentioned on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe,” that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the single worst event of his lifetime. He is a former colonel of the KGB, the organization that was the right arm of Soviet oppression and totalitarianism.¶ It is no accident that he marched his troops into Crimea as soon as his pro-Russian puppet president, Viktor Yanukovych, was removed from office. The claim that Russian troops are peacekeepers sent to protect the lives and property of Russian citizens and ethnic Russians is absurd. Apart from Yanukovych and his closest cronies, the current government in Kiev is made up of the same MPs that were in parliament before the Euromaidan protests began. There is no threat to ethnic Russians from the new government.¶ Meanwhile, the Crimean parliament has voted to hold a referendum with only the options of integration into Russia or greater autonomy within Ukraine. Whatever the result of this referendum, it cannot be recognized by the West. It is in direct violation of the Ukrainian constitution and international law. A vote conducted under occupation of a foreign army cannot be legitimate. These people have lived peacefully as Ukrainians for 22 years. There is no reason to believe that Ukraine cannot remain united.¶ Amid all these events, one question remains: What should the U.S. do? Some advocate a Pontius Pilate routine, showing that same spinelessness that Putin was counting on to make his invasion possible. We are obligated to stare Putin down and force him to blink first. In 1994, the U.S., the United Kingdom, Russia and Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal, then the third-largest in the world, in return for the assurance that the other three nations would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia clearly has violated this agreement. For the sake of our own diplomatic credibility and for the sake of nuclear peace, we must uphold our end of it. We cannot allow a major nuclear nonproliferation agreement and the memories of almost a hundred protesters who died for the cause of their nation’s sovereignty to be trampled by a bullying dictator merely because we have economic ties. It is time for Western powers to immediately implement economic sanctions and to escalate them every day Russian troops remain outside of their designated base. Also, as we did when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the 1970s, we must be prepared to send military aid to Ukraine if the occasion demands it.¶ As Brzezinski mentioned, the former KGB colonel in Putin understands force. His show of it cannot be met with weakness on our part.

Russia will go nuclear


Greene and Hill 3-3 – NPR Host and senior fellow with the Brookings Institution and a former national intelligence officer specializing in Russia and co-author of the book "Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin." (David and Fiona, “What Costs Can U.S. And Its Allies Impose On Russia?,” http://www.npr.org/2014/03/03/285119906/what-costs-can-u-s-and-its-allies-impose-on-russia)

GREENE: So what you're essentially saying though is that Russia likes to remind the world that it is indeed a nuclear power. HILL: Indeed it does. And the Russian government has been prioritizing the nuclear arsenal. It's really been putting a lot of emphasis on the refurbishment of the weapon systems and also of making sure that everybody else is well aware that it still has this deterrent capability and that it is prepared to use it in extreme circumstances. So it's always part of exercises and of the long-term military strategy.


Link – Nat Gas k2 Coop

US LNG exports would reduce Russian dominance over dependent nations and lower prices


Landrieu 14 (Mary L., Chair of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, “Landrieu: Natural Gas Exports Will Create Thousands of High-Paying Jobs, Support U.S. Allies,” First hearing under Landrieu’s leadership, March 25, 2014, http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/3/landrieu-natural-gas-exports-will-create-thousands-of-high-paying-jobs-support-u-s-allies

Average annual U.S. natural gas prices have remained relatively low over the past several years as a result of the availability of abundant domestic resources and the application of improved production technologies,” Mr. Sieminski testified. ¶ “Accelerating America’s entry into the global natural gas market is a win–win–win situation. America wins through job creation, economic growth, more revenues for government. Customers across Europe win by access to more competitive, clean-burning U.S. natural gas. And, strategic cooperation of NATO allies would be strengthened—consequently stability on the European continent wins when monopolistic levers of influence are reduced or eliminated,” Minister Neverovi? testified. “The present situation in Ukraine has taught us all one lesson—no nation should be able to use its monopolistic energy supplies to punish any other nation. So, in conclusion, my message to you is simple. Let’s work together to let competition in, push the monopolists out, and bring natural gas prices down in Europe as they have come down in America.”¶ “LNG exports from the U.S. could reduce Russia’s stranglehold on energy supplies to Europe. Immediate announcement of a policy of allowing unlimited LNG exports would signal potential competition that Russia would have to meet by offering lower natural gas prices as it renegotiates its supply contracts with Europe,” Dr. Montgomery testified. “The power of this signal will depend on whether it is accompanied by effective action to accelerate the shale gas revolution by avoiding or removing unreasonable regulations, costs, and constraints on natural gas exploration and production.”


I/L – Coop Solves Balkans Conflict

Cooperation solves Balkan stability


Rehn,05

[European Commissioner for Enlargement 2005; “Regional cooperation in the western Balkans. A policy priority for the European Union”;http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf-EW]


Regional cooperation is a principle of the highest importance for the political stability, the security and economic development of the western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo, under the auspices of the United Nations, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999). Many of the challenges facing the western Balkan countries are not only common to them but also have a cross-border dimension, which involves their regional neighbours. Since the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the EU and the western Balkans have become even closer neighbours, and so the situation in the western Balkan countries, their progress on the road to European integration and their present and future relations with the EU really are of immediate concern to the EU itself. When Bulgaria and Romania become EU members, the entire western Balkan region will be surrounded by Member States of the European Union. This will have important repercussions for both the countries of the region and the EU in a number of areas, in particular where the free circulation of goods, services and persons are concerned. These challenges have to be addressed in the broader context of south-eastern Europe. The different set of reasonspolitical, economic and security — for which regional cooperation in the western Balkans is crucial, are closely interlinked: for instance, regional stability and security are needed for economic development, which in turn favours stability and security in the region.

Impact – Prolif Bad

Widespread prolif risks nuclear war—escalates ongoing disputes and risk of terrorist acquisition


Blechman '08

Barry, PhD in International Relations, Co-Founder/Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, "Nuclear Proliferation: Avoiding a Pandemic," 9/29/08 www.stimson.org/books-reports/nuclear-proliferation-avoiding-a-pandemic/ AD 9/19/12

The world has been spared the detonation of a nuclear device in anger for more than 60 years. It’s not clear that this remarkable restraint can be sustained indefinitely, particularly in the event of wide-spread proliferation. The East-West conflict during the Cold War was an abstract, ideological struggle. Even then, we came perilously close to nuclear exchanges during the Berlin Crises in the 1950s, the Cuba Crisis in 1962, and at several other times. If nuclear weapons come into the hands of nations with histories of hatred and warfare and on-going disputes, deterrence becomes a far more risky proposition and the likelihood of nuclear warfare far greater. Just think of nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel and Iran in the context of a war between Israel and Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon. Alternatively, think how unstable Northeast Asia might become if China, Japan, Korea, and Russia all have nuclear weapons. Moreover, every additional nuclear weapon state means a greater risk that nuclear devices come into the hands of terrorist organizations. America’s security depends on the next administration placing the highest priority on reining in the nuclear danger.

Widespread prolif risks nuclear war, shifts traditional interstate relations


Sokolski '09

Henry D., Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center; Former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former Chairmen of the DoD's Prolif Countermeasures Working Group, adjunct professor at The Institute of World Politics "Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd," 6/1/09, Hoover Institution at Stanford Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5534 AD 9/19/12

Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.

Impact – Balkans Conflict Escalates

Baltic conflict escalates to global nuclear war


Starr 3-11 - associate of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and senior scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility

(Steven, “Ukraine + NATO = Nuclear War,” http://www.truth-out.org/speakout/item/22397-ukraine-nato-nuclear-war)



The greatest single mistake that the US can make now is to pledge that US/NATO forces will provide military cover, assistance, or support to Ukrainian military forces. This would set up the situation where, in the event of a Ukrainian civil war, US/NATO forces could come into direct military conflict with Russian forces.¶ Furthermore, US/NATO naval forces should not be deployed in the Black Sea, where they would be in close proximity to Russian naval forces. In the event of a war in which Russian forces were actively engaged, the presence of US forces nearby would create a significant chance for a mistake in which US or Russian forces would fire upon each other. Supersonic fighters traveling at more than 1,000 mph can easily overfly national boundaries or "hostile" military forces.¶ If NATO and Russian forces to come into direct military conflict, then the possibility of nuclear conflict increases exponentially. NATO cannot send in its 25,000 man Response Force and expect to defeat 150,000 Russian troops (or more) in a fight at the Russian border. In a NATO-Russian conventional conflict, in which Russian forces were prevailing, NATO would have the choice of withdrawing, calling for a ceasefire, or using its nuclear weapons against Russian forces.¶ NATO has at least a couple hundred US B61 nuclear weapons forward deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The B61 is a "variable yield" weapon; the two models currently forward-based in Europe, the B61-3 and B61-4 both can be set to have an explosive yield of 300 tons of TNT (0.3 kilotons).¶ In other words, the B61 is designed to be "useable" nuclear weapon, beginning with a "small" detonation that is roughly 20-30 times larger than our largest conventional weapon. However, the B61-4 can also be set to have an explosive power as much as 50,000 tons of TNT (50 kilotons), and the B61-3 as much as 170,000 tons of TNT (170 kilotons) – which is 70% greater than many of the strategic nuclear warheads carried by US nuclear subs.¶ Even if NATO could manage to use its conventional forces to defeat Russian conventional forces, Russia would *not* allow such a defeat upon its very border. Russia would certainly use nuclear weapons to stop NATO.¶ Russia has for some time adopted the policy of "nuclear de-escalation":¶ "In order to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence effect under the conditions of a regional war, Russia believes it should not rely on strategic nuclear forces, or on them only, but must maintain a range of options for the limited or selective use of nuclear weapons in order to be able to inflict a precisely set level of damage to the enemy sufficient to convince him to terminate military confrontation by exposing him to the danger of further nuclear escalation¶ . . . When introducing the concept of "nuclear de-escalation" in the late 1990s, the Russian defence establishment was obsessed with the possibility of a Kosovo-type US/NATO intervention in the war ("armed conflict") in Chechnya, which resumed in 1999. It did not exclude the possibility that, in the event of such a case, Russia would be forced to resort to nuclear weapons." ¶ In a NATO-Russian conflict, in which Russia introduced nuclear weapons, NATO would be fully capable of responding in a tit-for-tat fashion. This would be the same pattern as was seen in the NATO war games of the Cold War. Once the nuclear "firebreak" is crossed, once nuclear weapons are introduced into a military conflict in which *both sides have nuclear weapons*, there would likely be an almost inevitable escalation of conflict, a progressive use of nuclear weapons by both sides, with progressively larger targets being taken out.¶ Peer-reviewed scientific studies predict that a war fought with hundreds or thousands of US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite nuclear firestorms over tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires would produce between 50 million to 150 million tons of smoke, which would quickly rise above cloud level in to the stratosphere, where winds would carry it around the Earth. In a matter of weeks or months, a global stratospheric smoke layer would form, which would block up to 70% of warming sunlight, quickly producing Ice Age weather conditions in the Northern Hemisphere.¶ The scientists predict that temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for about three years. The smoke, the darkness, and extreme cold weather would last for ten years or longer, eliminating growing seasons, making it impossible to grow food. Most people and animals would perish from nuclear famine. Nuclear war is suicide for the human raceTherefore, it is imperative that NATO does *not* come into support Ukraine or enter into any Ukrainian conflict. Should it do so, it would risk coming into a direct military conflict with Russia. A US/NATO-Russian battle in Ukraine could easily become a nuclear war that could destroy all nations and peoples.

Russian aggression draws in Baltic states – leads to nuclear war


Economist 3-29

(“All for one,” Editorial staff, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21599771-alliance-must-banish-suspicion-it-would-not-always-defend-its-eastern-flank-all)

Instead, the West should forcefully reassert NATO’s willingness to defend itself and make it clear that all members of the alliance share its complete protection (see article). In particular, that means other NATO members sending at least a few troops, missiles and aircraft to the Baltics (or to neighbouring Poland), and making clear that bigger forces will follow if there is any continued aggression from Mr Putin.¶ Why go that far? Plenty of people in the West would prefer to “wait and see”. The Balts have the promise of protection, they point out, so there is only danger in provoking Mr Putin. Wishful thinkers say that having made his point in Crimea, he will probably stop while he is still ahead. Instead of ratcheting up tension, the West should provide “off-ramps” that steer Russia towards détente. Other hard-nosed foreign-policy “realists” argue that Russia has legitimate interests in its near-abroad. It is madness, they say, to pick a fight when Russia and the West have other business to be getting on with—Syria’s civil war, Iran’s nuclear programme and China’s growing power.¶ Hot foot from the cold war¶ In fact the opposite is true. The greatest provocation to Mr Putin is to fail to stand up to him, and the least costly time to resist him is now. Emboldened, Mr Putin could test NATO’s resolve by changing the facts on the ground (grabbing a slice of Russian-speaking Latvia, say, or creating a corridor through Lithuania to Kaliningrad) and daring the alliance to risk nuclear war. More likely he would try destabilisation—the sabotage of Baltic railways; the killing of Russians by agents provocateurs; strikes, protests and anonymous economy-wide cyber-attacks. That would make life intolerable for the Balts, without necessarily eliciting a response from the West.¶ Either way, if the Balts begin to disintegrate, it would leave the West with a much less palatable choice than it has today: NATO would have to walk away from its main premise, that aggression against one is aggression on all, or it would have to respond—and to restore deterrence, NATO’s response would have to be commensurately greater. That in turn would pose the immediate threat of escalation

Balkan conflict escalates to bitter front- empirics prove


Sontag,92

[Foreign Affairs editor for the New York Times with a Bachelor’s Degree in Human Geography from Harvard University; “War in the Balkans Creates a Bitter U.S. Front”; June 11th, 1992; http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/11/nyregion/war-in-the-balkans-creates-a-bitter-us-front.html-EW]


With a cigarette dangling from his lips, Vladimir Radojicic, a 34-year-old photographer, projected an unflappable cool during a late-night gathering of Yugoslav immigrants in Manhattan. But when the evening's video began, a taped tour of downtown Belgrade, the tears rolled quietly down his face. Mr. Radojicic, son of a Croatian mother and a Serbian father, is caught quite personally between the warring ethnic factions in his native land. Drafted by both the Serbian and the Croatian armies last fall, he fled instead to the United States. Here, the tensions causing the Balkans to implode have revived Old World rivalries among the more than one million Americans of Balkan descent. Outside Detroit, rival Yugoslav and Albanian youth gangs, the "Yugos" and "Albos," have traded fists and sticks in mall parking lots. In Cleveland, Serbian and Croatian soccer teams have canceled matches because violence during games was escalating. In the Chicago area, a Serbian monastery was defaced with anti-Serbian vulgarities, while a Croatian cultural center was spray-painted with anti-Croatian slogans. The Chicago Commission on Human Rights reported death threats and bomb threats to Serbian community leaders. So Mr. Radojicic did not exactly escape the war he tried to leave behind. "I could not choose to go fight the family of my mother or to go fight the family of my father, so I chose out," Mr. Radojicic (pronounced rah-DOE-yeh-cheech) said. "But now I watch on television as my country falls apart -- everybody guilty and nobody guilty." For Mr. Radojicic and his fellow immigrants, the strife in the Balkans -- which has caused an estimated 16,000 deaths so far -- is more than a war that most Americans can't quite follow. Monitored by short-wave radio, it is their daily obsession, a conflict tearing up not only their relatives' lives back home but their lives here as well. "My phone is constantly bombarded, like Sarajevo," said the Rev. Slavko Soldo, of the Croatian Roman Catholic Church of St. Cyril and St. Methodus in Manhattan. Following the collapse of Communism in Yugoslavia, relations between Serbs and Croats and Albanians and Slovenes here, generally distant, have turned hostile, but, on the whole, in subtle ways. When Vlade Divac, a Serbian center for the Los Angeles Lakers, met Drazen Petrovic, a Croatian guard for the New Jersey Nets, on the court at the Forum in Inglewood, Calif., he was snubbed publicly by his former teammate on the Yugoslav National Team. "Hate begets hate," said Darlene Gakovich, a Serbian-American who lives in Madison, Wis. "We have a longtime friend, a Croatian-American, who will not so much as say hello to us now." In New York, car tires have been punctured, and a war of threats has been waged over fax machines. But the hostilities are defused, and diffused, by the relatively small size of the Serbian and Croatian communities in the ethnic expanse of the metropolitan region. In New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, the 1990 Census counted about 85,000 people of Balkan ancestry, adding together those who identify themselves as Yugoslav, Croat, Serb, Slovene, Bosnian and Herzegovinian. The Serbs and Croats themselves, however, estimate a population of more than 150,000. Concentrated in Queens, particularly in Astoria and Ridgewood, their religious and social lives radiate around two churches in Manhattan -- the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral of St. Sava, at 16 West 26th Street, and the Croatian Roman Catholic Church, at 502 West 41st Street. Shifting Power Of Local Factions Following the United Nations' recognition of Croatia as an independent republic at the end of May and the economic sanctions it imposed on Yugoslavia, the balance of power, so to speak, between local Serbs and Croats has shifted. For years, the Croatian-Americans in the New York area, who outnumber the Serbian-Americans, have felt like outsiders to the official Yugoslav presence here. (Some Serbs who fled Communism did, too.) What they had was a grassy area for soccer and picnicking in northern New Jersey called Croatian Land -- "two acres where we could be free and independent," said Josip Kristic (pronounced YOH-seep KREE-steech), director of the Croatian Information Center, in Queens. But at the end of May, things changed. Thousands of Croats gathered to watch the red, white and blue flag of Croatia hoisted over the United Nations. And last week, Croatia's first ambassador arrived to open a mission. At the same time, the Yugoslav consulate, the national airline offices, and the Yugoslav cultural center in New York were closed. A Serbian lawyer employed by JAT, the national airline, said agents of the Treasury Department, who were instructed to seize all Yugoslav assets in this country, arrived without notice last week -- "like a scene from 'The Untouchables,' " she said. "I was so scared," she said. "All of a sudden I was an enemy of the people." Many Croats used to say that news organizations in the United States favored the Serbs, but Serbs are now outraged at what they see as a bias against them. Angry about what he called the "lack of realism" in recent coverage of the war, which followed declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia a year ago, the pastor of the Serbian church in Manhattan declined to be interviewed. "In the media, the Serbs have been demonized beyond recognition," said Nadja Tesich, a Serbian-American writer in Manhattan.


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