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- Approving export terminals k2 solve Russian control of Ukraine and Europe – congress k2 solve
- US LNG exports will offset harmful Russian influence – perception k2 reassure
- Scenario 1) European War
- Russia will go nuclear
- Scenario 2) Prolif
- Unchecked prolif leads to extinction
Europe AdvEurope AdvRussian LNG exports to European nations increasing – further reliance leads to Ukrainian instabilityGaub 14 (Florence, Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, “Gas crisis in Europe and the alternative Qatari role”: The current energy crisis in Europe following the ongoing crisis between Russia and Ukraine, May 18, 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/05/20145665624846681.htm) Russia and Europe, who are more often at odds when it comes to politics, have entertained an energy relationship which began during the Cold War. Russia is the largest exporter of oil and gas to the European Union; in 2012, more than 25% of European gas imports came from Russia – which make up 60% of Russian gas exports. More than half of these exports are channeled through the five Ukraine pipelines (eight remaining pipelines are through Belarus to Poland and Lithuania or directly to Germany, Finland, Estonia and Latvia). Almost half of European gas imports go to Germany and Italy, while France, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria and Slovakia also import more than 5 billion cubic meters per year.¶ Until now, this link has weathered several storms, but Europe’s energy dependency on Russia has made policy-makers uneasy on a regular basis. In 2000, the European Commission issued a Green Paper drawing attention to the high European dependency levels of gas imports;(1) in 2004, the European Council adopted a directive whose goals were “ensuring an adequate level for the security of gas supply, in particular in the event of a major supply disruption," and "contributing to the proper functioning of the internal gas market”.(2) Russian-Ukrainian clashes in 2006 and 2009 led to the first disruptions in European gas supply, and re-launched the debate on European energy security. But since then, Europe’s dependency on gas imports has not decreased – rather, it is expected to rise from 40% to 70% of current imports.(3)¶ The crisis in Ukraine has served as an important wake-up call for European decision makers - 49% of Russian gas exports go through Ukraine, who is currently experiencing a gas shortage themselves. Following the conflict over the Ukrainian Crimea region Russia has not only increased the price of its gas exports to Ukraine, it has also threatened to cease the delivery of gas altogether if debt payments remain unsettled. Perhaps more importantly, three other regions in eastern Ukraine are also likely to secede by mid-May. The four regions account for one-third of Ukraine’s exports. These developments have stirred a crucial energy debate in Europe. As European Council President Herman Van Rompuy has declared right after the referendum on Crimea’s secession from Russia: “Today we sent a clear signal that Europe is stepping up a gear to reduce energy dependency, especially with Russia: by reducing our energy demand, with more energy efficiency; by diversifying our supply routes to and within Europe, and expanding energy sources, in particular renewables; by energy security on our border and security of supply for our neighbours”.(4) Several European decision-makers have come forward in support of such initiatives, and are looking into immediate options to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports. Approving export terminals k2 solve Russian control of Ukraine and Europe – congress k2 solveDriessen 6/20 Paul, 14, senior policy analyst for the Committee For A Constructive Tomorrow, “DRIESSEN: Fighting Russia with U.S. natural gas exports” Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jun/20/driessen-a-shale-gale-to-blow-away-russias-energy-/?page=all#pagebreak Russia’s decision last week to cut off natural gas shipments to Ukraine is adding urgency to discussions on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers are considering legislation to speed approval of U.S. natural gas exports. After the announcement was made, the House Energy and Commerce Committee noted, “For decades, Russia has been wielding its energy resources as a weapon to exert power over our allies, but the U.S. now has the opportunity to fight back against this Russian aggression with our own emerging energy prowess.” Fighting Russian aggression by providing U.S. energy supplies to our allies is a new concept. For more than 40 years, the United States watched in frustration as its oil and natural gas output declined, oil imports climbed, and payments to foreign suppliers skyrocketed. The nation’s ethanol, wind and solar programs all had their roots in our perceived inability to find more petroleum within our borders. In reality, though, America’s dependence on foreign petroleum was never due to a lack of oil and natural gas deposits. It arose because the United States lacked the political willpower to find and produce them on federal lands, and did not have the technology to develop them in state and private areas. The advent of directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing changed that dramatically. The technologies made the United States the world’s largest producer of natural gas and greatly increased domestic oil production. By enabling us to extract energy from vast shale formations, they put the nation well on its way to again being a global energy powerhouse. Imagine what could happen if these new technologies could be employed on those still-closed onshore and offshore federal lands. America could easily have ample hydrocarbons to meet domestic needs, export natural gas and even some oil and refined products to allies, and keep oil prices manageable even in the midst of renewed Russian aggression and Middle East turmoil. The United States now has more than a 100-year supply of natural gas — and could support its allies by shipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tanker to foreign ports. That would counter Russian cutoffs and threatened price hikes or supply disruptions, and give our allies time to deploy fracking technologies in their own extensive shale deposits, as some European countries are now doing or contemplating seriously. The Department of Energy has given conditional approval to seven LNG export plans, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has been reviewing 14 proposals submitted by terminals that need to make modifications for export operations. On the East Coast, the list includes Dominion’s facility at Cove Point, Md., and the LNG plant operated by Southern LNG Company at Elba Island, Ga. With approvals needed from both agencies, the requirement that gas-exporting terminals ship LNG only to countries holding free-trade agreements with the United States, and with the entire process facing various delays, congressional action is required to streamline the process. US LNG exports will offset harmful Russian influence – perception k2 reassureUpton 14 (Fred, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman, “Upton: U.S. LNG Exports Can Weaken Russian Influence,” March 3, 2014, http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/upton-us-lng-exports-can-weaken-russian-influence) WASHINGTON, DC – House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) today released the following statement on the potential for U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to weaken Russian influence. The committee has been actively engaged on the benefits of LNG exports. In October of 2013, the committee held a forum on “The Geopolitical Implications and Mutual Benefits of U.S. LNG Exports” with numerous diplomats and energy advisors, including representatives from the Eastern European countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania.¶ “Expanding U.S. LNG exports is an opportunity to combat Russian influence and power, and we have an energy diplomacy responsibility to act quickly. The Department of Energy's approval process for LNG exports is unnecessarily putting our allies at the mercy of Vladimir Putin. Now is the time to send the signal to our global allies that U.S. natural gas will be an available and viable alternative to meet their energy needs. Based on the committee's work and input from multiple stakeholders, we will continue to advance legislation and develop new proposals that allow market forces and technology to help expand Eastern Europe's access to affordable energy beyond Russia," said Upton. ¶ BACKGROUND: The Energy and Commerce Committee released a report last month entitled “Prosperity at Home and Strengthened Allies Abroad – A Global Perspective on Natural Gas Exports,” which detailed the economic and geopolitical benefits of U.S. LNG exports and outlined the actions necessary to realize them. The report found, “In a geopolitical context, the benefits of diversity apply to suppliers as well as supplies, and the added option of U.S. LNG enhances both kinds of diversity. This is especially important to Central and Eastern European nations heavily reliant on Russia for natural gas. This dependence has not only led to higher prices, but also to the ability of Russia to exert political pressure on these nations.” Scenario 1) European WarRussian aggression draws in Baltic states – leads to nuclear warEconomist 3-29 (“All for one,” Editorial staff, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21599771-alliance-must-banish-suspicion-it-would-not-always-defend-its-eastern-flank-all) Instead, the West should forcefully reassert NATO’s willingness to defend itself and make it clear that all members of the alliance share its complete protection (see article). In particular, that means other NATO members sending at least a few troops, missiles and aircraft to the Baltics (or to neighbouring Poland), and making clear that bigger forces will follow if there is any continued aggression from Mr Putin.¶ Why go that far? Plenty of people in the West would prefer to “wait and see”. The Balts have the promise of protection, they point out, so there is only danger in provoking Mr Putin. Wishful thinkers say that having made his point in Crimea, he will probably stop while he is still ahead. Instead of ratcheting up tension, the West should provide “off-ramps” that steer Russia towards détente. Other hard-nosed foreign-policy “realists” argue that Russia has legitimate interests in its near-abroad. It is madness, they say, to pick a fight when Russia and the West have other business to be getting on with—Syria’s civil war, Iran’s nuclear programme and China’s growing power.¶ Hot foot from the cold war¶ In fact the opposite is true. The greatest provocation to Mr Putin is to fail to stand up to him, and the least costly time to resist him is now. Emboldened, Mr Putin could test NATO’s resolve by changing the facts on the ground (grabbing a slice of Russian-speaking Latvia, say, or creating a corridor through Lithuania to Kaliningrad) and daring the alliance to risk nuclear war. More likely he would try destabilisation—the sabotage of Baltic railways; the killing of Russians by agents provocateurs; strikes, protests and anonymous economy-wide cyber-attacks. That would make life intolerable for the Balts, without necessarily eliciting a response from the West.¶ Either way, if the Balts begin to disintegrate, it would leave the West with a much less palatable choice than it has today: NATO would have to walk away from its main premise, that aggression against one is aggression on all, or it would have to respond—and to restore deterrence, NATO’s response would have to be commensurately greater. That in turn would pose the immediate threat of escalation
GREENE: So what you're essentially saying though is that Russia likes to remind the world that it is indeed a nuclear power.¶ HILL: Indeed it does. And the Russian government has been prioritizing the nuclear arsenal. It's really been putting a lot of emphasis on the refurbishment of the weapon systems and also of making sure that everybody else is well aware that it still has this deterrent capability and that it is prepared to use it in extreme circumstances. So it's always part of exercises and of the long-term military strategy. Scenario 2) ProlifFurther instability in Ukraine tarnishes credibility of NPT security guarantees globally. Specifically, it would make Iran negotiations impossible.Pifer 3-4 – a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine (Steven, “Ukraine crisis' impact on nuclear weapons,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/04/opinion/pifer-ukraine-budapest-memorandum/index.html) Russia's military occupation of Ukrainian territory on the Crimean peninsula constitutes a blatant violation of the commitments that Moscow undertook in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine. The United States and United Kingdom, the other two signatories, now have an obligation to support Ukraine and penalize Russia.¶ When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine found itself holding the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, including some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads that had been designed to attack the United States. Working in a trilateral dialogue with Ukrainian and Russian negotiators, American diplomats helped to broker a deal —the January 1994 Trilateral Statement — under which Ukraine agreed to transfer all of the strategic nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination and to dismantle all of the strategic delivery systems on its territory.¶ Kiev did this on the condition that it receive security guarantees or assurances. The Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 5, 1994, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom (the latter three being the depositary states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that is, the states that receive the accession documents of other countries that join the treaty) ) laid out a set of assurances for Ukraine. These included commitments to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and existing borders; to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence; and to refrain from economic coercion against Ukraine.¶ The memorandum bundled together a set of assurances that Ukraine already held from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act, United Nations Charter and Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Ukrainian government nevertheless found it politically valuable to have these assurances in a Ukraine-specific document.¶ Words matter, and a big question at the time arose over whether to use the term "guarantees" or "assurances" in the memorandum. The United States provides guarantees to allies, such as NATO member states; the term implies a military commitment. In the early 1990s, neither the George H. W. Bush administration nor the Clinton administration was prepared to extend a military commitment to Ukraine— and both felt that, even if they wanted to, the Senate would not produce the needed two-thirds vote for consent to ratification of such a treaty.¶ The Budapest Memorandum thus was negotiated as a political agreement. It refers to assurances, not defined, but less than a military guarantee. U.S. negotiators —myself among them — discussed this point in detail with Ukrainian counterparts so that there would be no misunderstanding.¶ What is taking place today in Crimea can only be described as a Russian military occupation. The Russian Black Sea Fleet and its associated units have had bases in Crimea since 1991, by agreement with Ukraine. But the agreement does not allow for the Russian military, which has poured thousands of additional troops onto the peninsula over the past several days, to take control of Crimea.¶ These Russian actions are in blatant violation of the Budapest Memorandum, as well as Russia's commitments under the CSCE Final Act and a 1997 bilateral Ukraine-Russia treaty. As signatories, the United States and United Kingdom have an obligation to respond, even if they are not obligated to respond with military force.¶ Washington and London should act in two ways. First, they should work with other European Union member states to support Ukraine. That means political engagement, such as Secretary of State John Kerry's visit today to Kiev. They should also assemble a financial package with the International Monetary Fund to extend credits to Ukraine. That can give the country some breathing room as it undertakes critical reforms to put its economic house in order.¶ Second, Washington and London should work with the European Union and others to impose political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on Moscow unless and until Russia ceases its violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has begun. On Sunday, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan announced they were suspending preparations to take part in the G8 summit to be hosted in June in Sochi by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Other steps have been taken, and still others are being planned.¶ The West should aim to impose significant costs on Russia that will lead Putin to rethink his actions. That likely will prove difficult, but there can be no business as usual with Moscow.¶ A strong response is important for settling Ukraine's current crisis. It also matters for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. Security assurances were key to bringing Kiev to agree to get rid of its nuclear arms. If Washington and London do not stand by the Budapest Memorandum now, it would discredit the idea of such assurances. That would be unfortunate, as security assurances could play a role in defusing nuclear proliferation cases, such as Iran. Unchecked prolif leads to extinctionUtgoff 2 —Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces and Resources @Institute for Defense Analysis [Victor A., Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Survival, v. 44 n. 2, Summer 2002]. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
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