SMIL Bad --- Satellite Attack 1NC Space weaponization bad – it encourages ASATs which make satellites more vulnerable
Blazejewski 8 – Kenneth S. Blazejewski, master's degree in public affairs from Princeton, JD degree from the New York University School of Law, Spring 2008, "Space Weaponization and US-China Relation" www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf
I argue that the United States should take a proactive role in developing international rules for the military use of outer space. The United States can use its significant international influence to shape rules that preserve its national interests, such as deploying a limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) system but placing a ban on the testing of ASAT weapons. To maximize US long-term security, however, I would argue that the United States not deploy space weapons as part of a multilayered BMD shield or otherwise. Space weapons would not contribute to US security in the way that many proponents suggest. Ultimately, space weapons deployment is likely to expose US satellites to greater threat by encouraging foreign states to develop more advanced ASAT technology and expedite nuclear proliferation. Even when considered in isolation, the decision to forgo space weaponization is a wise one; when considered within the larger context of arms control negotiations, it clearly presents an opportunity to advance US long-term security. The United States should concede to negotiate on space weaponization with China in return for Chinese cooperation in other more critical areas of counterproliferation, such as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Proliferation Security. Finally, the United States should continue to push for increased transparency in China’s military and space programs.
A satellite attack would cause massive debris and nuclear war
Krepon 5 – Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Prior to co-founding Stimson, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks. Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt. 2005, "Space Security or Space Weapons?" www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson_Space_brief.pdf
One reason is that satellites serve as the eyes and ears of nations that have nuclear weapons. An attack on satellites could therefore trigger a nuclear war. Second, satellites are very vulnerable. The nation that starts a space war would have great difficulty protecting its satellites. Third, space warfare would cause debris, and debris lingers and kills indiscriminately in space. Fourth, satellites support global business and commerce. Every nation would be harmed by a space war. Lastly, space is widely viewed as a global commons that should remain a sanctuary blessedly free from the disputes that plague us on planet Earth.
SMIL Bad --- Satellite Industry 1NC Space weapons would destroy the US satellite industry
Hitchens 2 – Theresa Hitchens is Director of the Center for Defense Information, and leads its Space Security Project, in cooperation with the SecureWorld Foundation. Editor of Defense News from 1998 to 2000, Hitchens has had a long career in journalism, with a focus on military, defense industry and NATO affairs. She also was director of research at the British American Security Information Council. Hitchens serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. April 18th, 2002, "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons," www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
The 15-nation European Union already is moving forward on plans to buy a European version of the U.S. Global Positioning System navigation satellite network, called Galileo, in part due to fears that future access might be denied or downgraded by the U.S. military. "Europe cannot accept reliance on a military system which has the possibility of being cut off," Rene Oosterlinck, head of the European Space Agency's navigation department, was quoted by the New York Times.48
Some international customers also already are questioning the reliability of U.S. suppliers (and government-supplied products). After the 1998 change in export-licensing authority, German-controlled Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace announced it would no longer purchase U.S.-made satellite components.
The competitive and cost challenges the U.S. satellite industry faces could be increased if the United States moved to make space a battlefield. Up to now, the threat that commercial satellites could become direct wartime casualties has been negligible. But an aggressive U.S. pursuit of ASATs would likely encourage others to do the same, thus potentially heightening the threat to U.S. satellites. Space industry executives, whose companies often are working at the margins of profitability, are concerned about U.S. commercial satellites and their operations becoming targets, especially because current commercial satellites have little protection (electronic hardening, for example, has been considered too expensive). There would be costs to commercial providers for increasing protection, and it is highly unclear whether the U.S. government would cover all those costs.
The global economy runs on satellites
Gydesen 6 – Paul W. Gydesen, Lieutenant Colonel of USAF, February 2006, “What Is The Impact To National Security Without Commercial Space Applications?” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/gydesen.pdf
The world economy runs off the United States economy. Any country or business that wants to successfully sell products to a large population with disposable income needs to penetrate the United States market. The amount of disposable income available to an American family cannot be equaled. If American consumers pull back due to failed networks or panic, this would immediately impact global markets starting in two particular areas: telecommunication services and the international stock markets. Satellite telecommunication is enabling worldwide globalization. The ability of satellites to deliver services to remote regions without great amounts of land-based infrastructure has created new entrepreneurs. India has a large population of highly educated technicians. Indian entrepreneurs want to complete your taxes, read x-rays, trace lost luggage, and write new software, all from Bangalore, India.35 Satellite communications have made India a leading country in handling technical service call centers for computer equipment and software. This is providing jobs and wages to areas previously struggling to provide employment for an educated under utilized work force. These workers, with money in their pockets, are demanding additional services thus creating more employment within their region. These inroads will evaporate without satellite telecommunications capability. Further consideration must be given to the type of information affected by the satellite loss. While the Galaxy 4 outage was an inconvenience, the service outage was not catastrophic. The international stock markets depend on both secure computer networks and tele-communications. Without the ability to post transactions and conduct trades, companies cannot capitalize or provide returns to shareholders. If the outage affected the world’s financial markets such as transmission of stock exchange information, International Monetary Fund or World Bank transactions, or Federal Reserve Bank settlements, the impact could be profound. The world financial community is interwoven; investor confidence and speculation rule the day. If that confidence is shaken and investors pull back, the world economy can be impacted. To understand this point, one only needs to look at the impact of the World Trade Center attacks on the New York financial district. When New York Stock Exchange computers went down, exchanges around the world could not open or were very limited in their trading. It took several days to restart the markets. Once the markets reopened, investors were nervous and stock prices declined. The same scenario is possible with a sudden loss of numerous communication satellites. This makes space superiority a vital interest.
Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support---their defense doesn’t account for global crises properly
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Thus, the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between interdependence and economic crises. What then about the second question? Is there a correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state level are intuitive and well-documented (see, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 1997b), among others, argues that instability in the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict. Social unrest, regime change and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration.3 Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
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