Space Weaponization – 4 Week



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a2: Miscalculation



Space situational awareness solves miscalculation

Rendleman and Ryals 11 [Col James D., retired USAF, study director for The National Academies study of the US Aerospace Infrastructure and Aerospace Engineering Disciplines, member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics’ Legal Aspects Aero and Astro Technical Committee and International Activities Committee, an elected member of the International Institute of Space Law, and Col Robert E., retired USAF, Professor at the Space Innovation and Development Center’s Advanced Space Operations School, dean of students at the Air Command and Staff College, director of the Commander’s Action Group for US Space Command, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Air Force Space Command and the vice commander of the Space Warfare Center, “The New National Space Policy: More is Needed,” High Frontier, Vol 7, No 2, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]
A space assurance strategy depends on four mutually supportive elements, or pillars: (1) deterrence and defense; (2) global engagement to include bi-lateral and multilateral TCBMs; (3) situational awareness; and (4) responsive infrastructure. 17 Employing these four pillars should enable US and friendly space-faring nations to continue to perform their missions for the short-term and long-term. The yin and yang of space deterrence and protection will always be an important pillar of space assurance. 18 Global engagement leverages long-standing approaches to secure and protect the space domain through recognized international law, policy, and diplomacy. Situational awareness employs the monitoring of environmental and intelligence factors, and prediction of threats essential to decision making to assure mission success. It enhances global engagement by enhancing transparency. This allows a policy maker or commander to differentiate between purposeful attacks and natural environmental hazards; to anticipate space events and clarify intentions; to reduce the potential for misperception or miscalculation; and to enhance opportunities to avoid disruptive or destructive events. A robust infrastructure enables agile responses to changes in the space environment, to threats, and to assure viability of its systems.

a2: Need to protect commercial satellites



Economic Interdependence prevents another country from attacking our satellites

Lowery 09 (Scott, Systems Engineer at Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company Greater Denver Area “Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued”, 6/17/2009 http://www.colorado.edu/pwr/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, SamH)

The third argument for inevitability is that the expanding influence space has on the economy will precipitate an attack on space systems. Pro-weaponizers see the economic dependence on space as a vulnerability waiting to be exploited. However, the logic behind such an attack is lacking. It is unreasonable for another nation state to attack US space assets for the sole purpose of economic disruption. Because the US is a superpower, its economy is interlinked with the rest of the world, so that if another nation—for instance, China—damaged US space assets, it would most likely feel the economic effects of the attack itself, namely through the loss of the $200 billion (Trade) of goods it exports to the United States.



a2: Need to protect military satellites



If another country wanted to mess with our space power, it would be easier and cheaper for them to attack the land-based portion

Lowery 09 (Scott, Systems Engineer at Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company Greater Denver Area “Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued”, 6/17/2009 http://www.colorado.edu/pwr/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, SamH)

The final and most solid case for inevitability rests on the fact that space assets are an excellent military target, and attacking them would be an effective precursor to terrestrial warfare. The argument has some merit, as it has been shown that space plays a key role in the abilities of the US military. The argument states that if the US does not develop space weapons, someone else will, placing the US at a disadvantage. This is reasonable but not conclusive. If an enemy did want to disrupt US space power, it would not necessarily need to weaponize space. The earth-based portions of space systems, such as ground control stations and communication dishes, are equally vulnerable and can be destroyed with existing, far cheaper systems: a few men with bombs can disable a satellite network just as well as a ballistic missile. In summary, the arguments for inevitability fall short of being substantive, relying on little more than the “sky is falling mentality” (Belote).



***Aff Answers




BMD No Link




BMD solves weaponization of space

May 11 [Clifford, "MAD in the 21st Century," 7-7, http://www.aina.org/news/20110707100144.htm]
The president's advisers oppose space-based missile defense. They charge that deploying such a system would "militarize" space. I think they have it exactly backwards: Such a system would be like posting a "Weapons Prohibited" sign in space. It would prevent missiles from passing through space on the way to their intended victims. Isn't that the definition of de-militarizing space? Indeed, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) recently conducted a study and concluded that these concerns -- cost, the fear of violating international agreements, and creating space debris (another objection voiced by opponents) -- are without merit. The House of Representatives recently passed the National Defense Authorization bill and included a provision that requires the Missile Defense Agency to build on this study by analyzing the operational and technical aspects of developing and deploying SBI. The Senate would be wise to follow suit. If we don't utilize space to protect lives, do we really think that others -- the Iranians, the North Koreans, the Chinese, the Russians -- will not eventually develop the means to use space for their own, less benevolent ends?

Deployment of BMD will be countered by dialogue and cooperation – not space races

Lister 11 [Charles R., “US Missile Defence and Space Security: a Security Dilemma for China?” 3-18, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7712]
Within the political sphere, the Chinese reaction to U.S. BMD and space security policy has been, on the whole, remarkably different in that it has emphasized the crucial importance of dialogue and economic engagement. Conscious of history’s rising powers being profoundly threatening and violent, China has been keen to stress its ‘peaceful rise’ as a ‘responsible great power.’ The Chinese notion of the ‘new security concept’ (xin anquan guandian[80]) – where economic engagement and trade relations are deemed more important for national security than competition within conflicting and antagonistic ideological blocs – now largely directs Chinese foreign policy. This points to a wider trend of constructivist influence in Chinese foreign policy. There seems to be a strong belief, reinforced by traditional Confucian teaching, that through effective public diplomacy and soft power, China can attract its regional neighbours towards a Chinese perspective and establish a stable and cooperative peripheral security environment governed by the notions of comprehensive security (zonghe anquan[81]) and harmony. From an external frame of reference, such a policy ironically seems to be a more subtle version of what China has perceived as a U.S. policy of “containment plus engagement!”




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