Terror Defense No Al Qaida Terror

Can’t Solve Terror

Hard power can’t solve terror – alienates other countries and can’t destroy terrorists’ underlying goals.

Nearly a decade and a half after the 9/11 attacks, there remains a key flaw in the ongoing U.S.-led "War on Terror:" Washington's response has been hyper-militarized, dominated by counter-terrorism and security, while other soft power instruments like public diplomacy have been under-invested in.

To be sure, even this badly unbalanced strategy has secured some key successes, including the unseating of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. But an overwhelming emphasis on hard power has fueled significant controversy and alienated many across the world.

Obama recognizes this much more so than his predecessor George W. Bush, but the fact remains that American policy is still viewed internationally as overly military and security-focused. Since Obama assumed office, there has been a huge increase in drone attacks and this is controversial both domestically and overseas.

Kerry's argument is that while military power can degrade terrorist groups like ISIS, it can't defeat or destroy the ideology behind it. For that, a much wider, holistic effort is needed. And with the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War approaching, Kerry compared this forthcoming challenge with what Washington and its international allies faced in tackling fascism in that previous generation.

Obama summit aims to battle extremists, Islamic and otherwise

In numerous key countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan, polls show that positive opinions toward the United States have fallen off a cliff in the last decade and a half. Just 10%, 12%, and 14% of the populations in these three countries, respectively, have a positive image of America, according to the latest Pew Global Research.

This is key because the anti-terrorism contest is, in essence, one whose outcome is related to a battle between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilizations. And unless this fundamental is better recognized and addressed, with soft power dialled up significantly, the U.S.-led international strategy will continue to face serious setbacks, if not outright failure.

In the context of the campaign against terrorism, soft power represents the capacity of Washington and its allies to persuade others (both states and individuals) without brute force -- in other words, the ability to attract others by legitimacy of policies and the values that underpin them.

The roadmap for what is needed is relatively clear. Seizing the moment requires the United States and international partners to give much higher priority to non-military, civilian instruments of national power such as public diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign aid and development assistance, and exchange programs.

Military power can’t solve terrorism – it’s a short-term solution that doesn’t confront ideologies driving terrorism – only soft power solves.

Both the European Union and the UN long recognised the futility of a purely military approach as a solution to violent extremism. Therefore, the 2005 European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy and the 2006 United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy viewed terrorism as a process and tactic, and thus called for a better understanding of the "conditions conducive to radicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism" as a prerequisite for developing effective counter terrorism policies.

Although the EU and UN’s “soft” approaches, which called for “addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” in the first place, held great potential, they were watered down by the continued prevalence of hard military approach worldwide. The United States, for instance, has never bought into the “soft” approach and continued to follow a military strategy, despite noticeable change in terminology. As a report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group concluded in 2001, the US government has shown little interest in “soft” counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies.

This is despite the fact that home-grown terrorism has become more prominent in America. The American government has also ironically been active in promoting “soft” de-radicalisation programmes abroad (such as in Afghanistan and Iraq), as well as the establishment of several regional centres and forums allegedly aimed at countering the global rise in violent extremism through “soft” power. This contradiction has undermined the credibility of the US as a genuine leader of, and believer in, the role of “soft” power in countering violent extremism, including the upholding of the rule of law, freedom of expression, and respect for human rights.

Even globally, the “soft” power approach remains the exception, not the rule. A report by the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force in late 2009 showed that no more than 30 out of 192 UN Member States injected some form of “soft” powers into their counter terrorism strategies. The rest continue to rely on a kinetic approach that is only capable of creating more hostilities and antagonism. Many of those countries are close allies of the US in its so-called war on terror.

Neither in Europe nor in North America did de-radicalisation (an extensive form of rehabilitation of violent extremist detainees) receive sufficient attention. The practice has been either to “deport” the “terrorists” or to detain them “forever” in individual cells. The value of rehabilitating the detainees to prepare them for peaceful reintegration into their societies with a minimum risk was lost. Many academics and observers, including the author, have repeatedly warned that the benefits of effective de-radicalisation policies go beyond prison bars to affect the whole community from whence the detainees came. No heed was paid. The upshot has been the kind of attacks that we recently experienced in Paris and Copenhagen, both of which were accomplished by former un-rehabilitated convicts.

Europe and America however showed more interest in counter radicalisation policies that seek to stem the rise of violent extremism at a societal level. Such policies included, among others, community engagement and community policing. Rather than “winning hearts and minds” by solving problems and showing interest, these were intelligence-led, causing them to be perceived by most Muslims as no more than spying-tools targeting their communities. This undermined trust between Muslim communities and the police, a prerequisite for successful collaboration and effective community engagement in countering radicalisation in society.

As a report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission Research concluded, counter radicalisation measures have turned “Muslims [into] . . . the new suspect community.” This, the report added, has stigmatised whole Muslim communities, fuelled resentment and even bolstered “support for terrorist movements.”

It is against this background that the recent rise in Islamophobia in Europe and North America should be understood. Islamophobia is reflected in an alarming increase in anti-Islamism in Western societies and rise in fatal attacks against Muslims, which hardly receive the attention they deserve from the Western media, and state officials, especially when compared to incidents when the victims are Westerners and the perpetrators are “Muslims”.

In sum, despite the much talked about role of “soft” counter de-radicalisation policies in countering violent extremism, such policies have never been given a genuine opportunity to succeed. It is not surprising therefore that the main aim of the current White House summit, which is taking place in Washington DC between 18-20 March, is to combat violent extremism through the “search for strategies that go beyond only military action for countering terrorists”. Let’s hope that the summit will provide an opportunity to reverse our misguided military approach to countering the phenomenon of “terrorism”. Although it is doubtful.