International trends in the education of students with special educational needs
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- 8.2 Contestability and Competition
- 8.3 Decentralisation/Devolution
8.1 Neoliberalism2The Marxist geographer, David Harvey (2005), has defined neoliberalism in the following terms: Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. … Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit (p.2). Harvey goes on to note that Deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been all too common. Almost all states, from those newly minted after the collapse of the Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and practices accordingly (p.3). and, further, that Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world…It holds that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market (p.3).
More recently, Milton Friedman (1980) and his colleagues from the University of Chicago advocated the liberation of the market from the state as the best way to ensure both freedom and economic growth. They argued for a ‘middle way’ between collectivism and the excesses of 19th-century laissez-faire liberalism. They pushed for market competition, privatisation, deregulation and a ‘roll-back of the State’ as being the optimal ways of organising exchanges of goods and services. Further (and of particular relevance to the present review), since individuals are seen as being solely responsible for the consequences of the choices and decisions they freely make, instances of inequality and glaring social injustice are morally acceptable, to the degree in which they could be seen as the result of freely made decisions (Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1979). In a similar vein, as pointed out by Small (2009), some neoliberal thinkers even question the view that inequality is undesirable and that equality is an inherent social good (Tooley 1996, White, 1994). Neoliberalism came to dominate the way in which many countries organised their economies and their social policies (Ballard, 2012; Krugman, 2009). Thus, as Small (2009) expressed it, ‘competitive, individualised models of social and economic organisation [replaced] social democratic ones that sought… to foster more cooperative ways of operating’ (pp.2-3). The neoliberal approach came to be seen as corresponding with the essential nature of humans, who were defined as autonomous individuals who were ‘rational utility maximisers’ (Codd, 1999, p.46). Turning now to neoliberal perspectives on education, a good starting point is Friedman’s (1955) position that the most effective way to reform American education was to expose schools to the competitive forces of the free market. Thus, he proposed that vouchers be made available to all parents, arguing that they would provide incentives for schools to be more efficient and effective. Later, Chubb & Moe (1990) concluded that opening up educational markets to competition was both a necessary and sufficient condition for reforming education. Inherent in the positions adopted by both Friedman and fellow economists Chubb & Moe was the notion that ‘choice is a panacea’ (Chubb & Moe, 1990, p.217). (The issue of choice will be further discussed in Section 8.4.). This view ultimately led to the establishment of charter schools, which function as quasi-market schools according to Whitty et al. (1998), and to high stakes testing (see also Section 8.6 below). In New Zealand, 1984 saw the rapid introduction of neo-liberal reforms to policies and practices in a number of sectors, not least in education. As noted by Morton (2015), key ideas included reducing the size of state involvement in areas such as health, education and welfare, dramatically reducing costs to the state, and expecting that the market would achieve all this while at the same time improving both quality and efficiency. Thus, ‘through the twin forces of competition and individual consumer choice, bad services would be weeded out, good services would flourish, and all consumers would be able to then choose amongst these surviving better services’ (Morton, 2015, p.199). And now to a consideration of neoliberal perspectives on the education of SWSEN. Here, the argument is that ‘market-oriented social practices should produce a surplus of special education providers, beyond state-run schools, to address the needs of parents, who are seen as the ‘consumers’ of schooling’ (Anastasiou & Kauffman 2009, p.210). Thus, ‘”Bad” schools will close, and the need for schools’ economic survival will finally result in more efficient and reponsive special education’ (p.210). Similarly, it later became assumed that high stakes testing would motivate teachers and education administrators to provide high quality instruction for all students, including SWSEN. As will be seen below, neoliberalism has not provided the panacea for improving the quality of education of SWSEN (see, for example, Ballard, 2012, Dudley-Marling & Baker, 2012, and Saggers et al., 2012). Two manifestations of neoliberalism in action will suffice at this point: vouchers and charter schools. Firstly, as noted earlier, it was assumed that if vouchers were to be made available to parents, this would provide incentives for schools to be more efficient and effective, thus improving the quality of education available for all children, including SWSEN. As Dudley-Marling & Baker, (2012) point out, however, only a limited number of voucher programmes aimed specifically at SWSEN have been implemented in the US. They cite research that indicates, in general, that there is no clear advantage in academic achievement for students attending private schools with vouchers. Further, in Milwaukee, the evidence has consistently indicated that SWSEN are significantly under-served by the district's voucher programme. For example, while students with disabilities comprised nearly 20% of the public school population in Milwaukee only 1.6% of voucher students had identified disabilities. Secondly, although charter schools in the US have expanded rapidly since the first one opened in Minnesota in 1991, in 2010 they still enrolled fewer than 3% of the total number of students in traditional public schools (Dudley-Marling & Baker, 2012). There is considerable variability in the quality of charter schools in terms of student achievement: they run the gamut from excellent to poor with many in between. This is borne out in a study of student achievement in charter schools by the Center for Education Reform (2010). This longitudinal study, which included over 70% of students enrolled in charter schools in the US, found that 17% of them provided superior education for their students compared to traditional public schools. However, 46% produced achievement scores that were no different from local public schools and 37% produced results that were significantly worse. Of significance for the present review, Dudley-Marling & Baker (2012) cite evidence that, in charter schools, SWSEN, who are more expensive to educate and who tend to produce lower test scores than students without disabilities, are among the most likely to be excluded, along with English-language learners and students from poor backgrounds. They point to New Orleans as offering a compelling example of the under-representation of students with disabilities in charter schools. Dudley-Marling & Baker claim that the apparent success of New Orleans charter schools can be attributed, at least in part, to the disproportionately low percentage of the most difficult to educate students served by these schools. This has been achieved by high numbers of SWSEN students being suspended for disciplinary reasons. Dudley-Marling & Baker note that similar patterns have been found in other school districts across the US. Data from Boston, for example, reveal that more than half of the city's charter schools enroll fewer than 15% of students with special needs compared to the district average of 21%. In urban schools districts across Massachusetts, special education enrollment is 10% or lower at about a third of the charter schools in the state. 8.2 Contestability and CompetitionAs suggested in the previous section, it is frequently assumed that the adoption of marketisation approaches to education will lead to excellence. However, most writers would agree with Blackmore’s (2000) perception that marketisation and the associated competitive relationships between schools and students have negative impacts on SWSEN. Such students, she argued, are seen as ‘non-marketable commodities’ (p.381). Several writers have taken up this point. Thus, Dyson (2005) noted that since low-attaining students are likely to depress schools’ performance scores, they are wary about accepting such students, or will place them in one of the multiple forms of segregated grouping, or seek to have them assessed as having special educational needs. According to Rouse & Florian (1997), too, the main features of market-oriented reforms taking place in the UK and in many other countries include the pursuit of academic excellence, choice and competition. They claimed that in such a climate, SWSEN are particularly vulnerable and inclusive education is jeopardised. For example, some schools, given increased autonomy, discriminate against students with disabilities while trying to attract greater numbers of high-achieving students. Furthermore, Rouse & Florian noted, local education authorities have only limited ability to guide school policies; and many parents of such students do not have the knowledge, skills and contacts to comprehend an increasingly deregulated system. In a similar vein, Barton (1999), another English writer, wrote that ‘the impact of market ideologies on the governance, process and outcomes of education has been to establish a more hierarchical, status-ridden and selective system in which exclusionary policies and practices have become more prominent’ (p.54). These ideologies, he claimed, exacerbate the deep structural socio-economic conditions in society that serve to maintain inequalities, discrimination and exclusionary practices. Similar concerns have been expressed in Europe, where Meijer et al. (2003) noted that ‘schools are most likely to favour pupils who contribute to higher outputs’ and that ‘pupils with special needs not only contribute to more variance within the class but also lower average achievements’ (p.15). Similarly, Slee (2005) writing from an Australian perspective, noted that the intensification of competition between schools, resulting from parents choosing schools based on student results, amplifies and reinforces social division. This is compounded when schools are given permission through a quasi-market to become selective of their student cohort. Slee felt that the implications of this for students who are likely to jeopardise school results on academic performance league tables, and therefore for notions of inclusive education, are stark. In Singapore, too, where there is increasing stress on competition, with schools being ranked annually, the capacity of some schools to be selective provides them with an incentive for attracting students who are likely to be assets and, conversely, deters them from accepting students who might depress their scores (Mitchell & Desai, 2005). If the foregoing risks to the education of SWSEN, particularly inclusive education, are to be avoided or ameliorated, there is an obligation on the state to intervene. As Blackmore (2000) argued, ‘The first condition for quality education for all students is a reassertion of the value of a strong state supporting public education systems’ (p.383). Dyson (2005) took a similar tack, recommending that the operation of the market be supplemented with vigorous state intervention to ensure that its more perverse consequences are avoided. In particular, there is a need to ensure that those who are vulnerable in the market place are not so much protected as ‘empowered to succeed’. This may require appropriate legislation or regulation and close monitoring of schools’ behaviour. Thus, in her recent review for the European Union, Riddell (2012) noted that inclusive education implies that all schools will include a diverse pupil population, but that ‘it is very difficult to achieve this outcome within systems which are driven by the market rather than social justice concerns’ (p.26). Thus, she recommended that the European Commission ‘should encourage countries to monitor the impact of devolved governance and marketisation on children with special educational needs, ensuring that these global trends are not detrimental to inclusive practices’ (p.76).
In most countries, the direction of the shifts in administration has been centrifugal (i.e., away from the centre), but in some it has been centripetal (towards the centre), and in still others there have been fluctuations in the balance as new settlements are reached (Dyson, 1997). In any case, it is not an either/or issue, for as Bray (1991) has argued, in his general analysis of centralisation and decentralisation in educational administration, It is misleading to present centralization versus decentralization as a simple dichotomy. Many alternative patterns may be devised, and systems may be centralized in some respects and decentralized in others. Appropriate balances depend strongly on the political values of particular societies and the influence of specific contextual conditions (p.384).
It is more accurate ... to envisage a series of continua, one for each relevant criterion, rather than a single one. It then becomes possible to understand how, in many countries, ... 'centralisation' and 'decentralisation' appear to be occurring simultaneously (p.90). Before proceeding, it might be helpful to distinguish between two forms of the centrifugal shift: 'decentralisation' and 'devolution'. These two concepts should not be seen as synonymous. The political science literature usually defines decentralisation, on the one hand, as involving the transfer of responsibility from the centre, or higher level of government, to an agency at a lower level - a position taken by Rondinelli (1981) when he defined it as ‘the transfer of authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions’ (p.137). Devolution, on the other hand, involves a more genuine transfer of power from the centre. As noted in the previous section, the issue of decentralisation (or devolution) raises the question of how far can special education policies, as well as management decisions, be devolved to the local level? Elsewhere, the author (Mitchell, 1996; Mitchell, 1997) has argued there is a risk that unless there are strong safeguards at the centre, individual schools could pursue their own idiosyncratic policies with respect to students with special education needs. This could very well result in marginalisation of such students (Dyson, 1997), a lack of equity and an incoherent pattern of service provision across the country. Such undesirable consequences can be avoided by requiring that schools continue to conform to ‘hard-wired’ central legislation and policy guidelines, with clear accountability procedures. Perhaps the major unresolved issue is how accountability mechanisms can be introduced without unduly threatening the centripetal/centrifugal balance of responsibility. Sweden is a particularly interesting case. As described by Riddell et al. (2006), education in Sweden has traditionally been organised within the public sector, with a highly centralised regime of governance. Through legislation, regulations and specified curricula, the state issued detailed instructions and rules on educational activities and the allocation of funds. The development of a comprehensive system of education under the guiding principle of a ‘school for all’ (Persson, 2000) was a central pillar in Sweden’s efforts to shape a welfare system founded on democratic representation, social redistribution, and the public provision of services. For this reason, equal educational opportunities were viewed as an essential element of democratic rights. This central state control included tight regulations and checks over the form and content of schooling by the National Agency for Education (Riddell et al., 2006). More recently, however, the education system underwent reforms that led to a change in the role of the state, with far more delegation of decision-making to the local level and more emphasis on competition and individual choice. Indeed, over the course of a few years Sweden went from having one of the most centralised to one of the most decentralised education systems in the Western world (Lundahl, 2002). Under the decentralised regime, for example, the state leaves decisions on the allocation of additional resources to municipalities and schools. Consequently, there is no guarantee that SWSEN in a mainstream setting will attract additional funding; as a result some mainstream schools have become increasingly reluctant to accept some children with special educational needs. Riddell et al., considers that these reforms arose partly from political pressures, including the political dominance of right-wing parties during the 1990s, which promoted a neoliberal market-based agenda in education. However, towards the end of the decade, there was a return to more centralised controls in an attempt to secure greater social inclusion and equality of experience across what had become a very decentralised system. According to Riddell et al. (2006), ‘the legacy of these educational reforms is a model of governance employing central steering through target-setting and audit, alongside decentralised responsibilities for delivery mechanisms’ (p.40). Inevitably, with responsibility for education split (or shared, to employ a more generous term), this can give rise to tensions. In Canada, for example, McLaughlin & Jordan (2005) referred to a ‘disjunction between the federal and provincial political contexts that sets the stage for the push and pull for and against inclusive education‘ (p.91). Such tensions are further exacerbated when they are combined with the diffusion of responsibility for special needs education among different ministries and, in some countries among various NGOs. Meijer et al. (2003) cited France and Portugal as clear European examples of countries where responsibility for educational provisions for SWSEN is divided among different ministries. 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