Voluntary confessions in violation of Miranda An otherwise voluntary confession taken in violation of Miranda is admissible for impeachment purposes – Harris v. NY (1971)
A truly involuntary confession is not admissible for any purpose – Mincey v. AZ (1978)
Fruit of Illegal Searches Prosecution may use evidence obtained from illegal search that is inadmissible in its direct case to impeach D’s statements made in response to proper cross-exam reasonably suggested by D’s direct exam – Havens (1980)
But such illegally obtained evidence cannot be used to impeach the trial testimony of witnesses other than the D – James
Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule – Leon E.R. does not apply when police act in reliance in good faith on a defective search warrant. – Leon
If good faith reliance present, fruits of a illegal search are admissible against D Finding that warrant was invalid b/c it was not supported by PC will not entitle D to exclude the evidence obtained under the warrant. (Leon)
Evidence obtained by police in reasonable reliance on facially valid warrant may be used by prosecution, despite an ultimate finding that the warrant was not supported by PC.
Leon’s 3 Requirements for E.R. not to apply: Officer’s good faith reliance on the warrant must be objectively reasonable
Must not be obtained by the police’s perjury or recklessness for the truth.
Magistrate can not abandon duties and make a legitimate good faith determination of probable cause (without Magistrate failing to uphold its own duties)
Rationale: One of main purposes of E.R. is to deter improper police conduct, and this purpose cannot be served where police are acting in good faith.
BUT – exceptions to good faith reliance on search warrant (Leon & Sheppard) – Police officer cannot rely on defective search warrant in good faith if:
affidavit underlying warrant is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable police officer would have relied on it;
warrant is defective on its face (e.g. fails to state w/ particularity the place to be searched or things to be seized)
Official obtaining warrant lied to or misled the magistrate
Magistrate has wholly abandoned his judicial role.
United States v. Leon (1984) – Before they searched D’s house, the police were very careful about obtaining the warrant. The warrant application was reviewed by many lawyers who believed the warrant was adequate, it was submitted before the judge and the judge issued a warrant. Govt did not argue that there was probable cause – argued that there is an exception to the exclusionary rule for good faith reliance on a warrant. Court agreed. Held: When certain requirements are met, if police get a warrant, there is no exclusionary rule, even if the warrant is bad. A warrant, even a BAD one, isolates the activity from the exclusionary rule. Fruits of this bad search are thus admissible.
Reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief. Weighed costs and benefits of suppressing that evidence.
This case eliminates Aguilar, Spinelli, and Gates cases by suggesting that as long as the warrant is present, the search may be bad, but there is no exclusionary rule.
Leon case is ONLY about the remedy, not about whether or not there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Leon does not make the warrant VALID, it just says that there is no remedy for it.
Reliance on Statutes and Judicial Decisions E.R. does not apply when police act in good faith based on:
case law later changed by another judicial opinion – Peltier (1975)
a facially valid statute or ordinance as it then exists, even if the law is declared unconstitutional or the law is changed by court decision – DeFeillippo (1979)
a clerical error not made by police – AZ v. Evans (1995)
E.R. does not apply to evidence obtained during an arrest made on the basis of a computer report that, due to clerical errors not made by police, indicated that there was an arrest warrant outstanding against the D.
Rationale: One of main purposes of E.R. is to deter improper police conduct, and this purpose cannot be served where police are acting in good faith.
Fruit of Poisonous Tree Intro. Generally, illegally obtained evidence must be excluded, but also all evidence obtained or derived from exploitation of that evidence the latter is the tainted fruit of the poisonous tree (tainted fruit of the illegally obtained evidence). – Nardone (1939) and Wong Sun (1963)
Evidence acquired that violates the 4th Amendment shall not be used in court against the defendant (exclusionary rule) – Silverthorne Lumber Co. (1920)
Exception – Breaking the Causal Chain Under fruit of poisonous tree doctrine, E.R. can be very broadly applied.
Recently Court has begun to narrow its scope by balancing: its purpose – deterrence of govt misconduct, against
its costs – exclusion of probative evidence
Court generally will NOT apply E.R. when it will not likely deter govt misconduct If there is weak link between govt misconduct and the evidence (i.e. it is not likely that the misconduct caused the evidence to be obtained), Court will probably not exclude the evidence.
Attenuation Attenuation ö intervening act of free will
An intervening act of free will by D will break the causal chain between the evidence and the original illegality and thus remove the taint.
Attenuation test: Whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Wong Sun (1963) – D was released on his own recognizance after an illegal arrest (without probable cause or reasonable grounds) but later returned to the station to confess. This voluntary act of free will removed any taint from the confession – the connection between the initial arrest and the statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Thus the confession could be used at trial against D.
Independent Source Evidence is admissible if prosecution can show that it was obtained from a source independent of the original illegality. IS doctrine applies so long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier tainted one.
General sense of IS doctrine identifies all evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity.
Murray v. U.S. (1988) – Police illegally search warehouse and find drugs, but do not seize them. Police later return to warehouse w/ valid search warrant based on information totally unrelated to the first illegal search. If police seize the drugs pursuant to the valid warrant, drugs are admissible.
Inevitable Discovery If prosecution can show that police would have discovered the evidence whether or not they had acted unconstitutionally, evidence is admissible. – Nix (1984)
Where officers improperly arrest D at home (w/ P.C. but w/o warrant), D confesses, then confesses again at police station, the home confession is inadmissible but the station house confession is admissible b/c it’s not the fruit of the unlawful arrest. NY v. Harris (1990) – Police have probable cause to arrest D. Go to D’s home and improperly arrest him w/o a warrant. D confesses at home, and police take him to station. D confesses again at station.
The home confession must be excluded from evidence since it is the fruit of the illegal arrest, but station house confession is admissible b/c it is not the fruit of the unlawful arrest.
B/c police had probable cause to arrest D, they did not gain anything from the unlawful arrest–they could have lawfully arrested D the moment he stepped outside of his home and then brought him to the station house for his confession.
Thus, the station house confession was not an exploitation of the police misconduct – it was not the fruit of the fact that D was arrested at home as opposed to somewhere else.
Where officers violate the knock and announce rule, exclusionary rule will not be applied to exclude evidence resulting from the search. – Hudson (2006)
Rationale: Exclusionary remedy is too attenuated from purposes of knock and announce rule of protecting human life and limb, property, privacy and dignity.
Cost of excluding relevant evidence b/c of claims that the knock and announce rule was violated is too high when compared to the deterrence benefit that will be gained.
There are other deterrents to prevent officers from violating the rule, such as civil suits and internal police disciplinary sanctions.
INTERROGATIONS (14th D.P., 5TH AND 6TH AMENDMENTS)
Introduction Considerations Due process – 14th Amend.
protects against involuntary confessions
4th Amend.
search and seizure limitations
5th Amend.
gives D rights against testimonial self-incrimination
6th Amend.
gives D rights re: assistance of counsel
Application of Exclusionary Rule GR = exclusionary rule applies to confessions obtained in violation of Constitution
Interrogations ö confessions
Due Process Limits: Torture and Less Obvious Methods of Coercion Intro. For confessions to be admissible, must be voluntary ö 14th Am. Due Process req.
Voluntariness determined w/ totality of circumstances, including: (Spano)
D’s age, education, mental and physical condition
setting, duration, and manner of interrogation
Spano v. NY (1959) – D turned himself in, attny told him not to answer questions while in custody then left D there; police began questioning persistently and continuously, D refused to answer. Denied his request to see attny. Questioned for 5 hours, dinner at 11, at midnight transferred to other police station, questioning continued. After refusing to talk, brought his good friend in ordered him to play on D’s sympathies for confession, talked about how this was bad for friend’s wife and kids etc. D was born in Italy, had jr. high education.
D’s conviction reversed because his confessions were unlawfully coerced. D’s will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused (when they made his friend who was police officer go in and try to convince him to confess b/c it would be better for the friend and his family etc.).
Must look at intent of police officers while questioning a D. If their intent is to procure a statement from D on which they could convict him, the confession obtained must be examined with the most careful scrutiny to ensure D’s due process rights were not violated.
Confession involuntary if obtained by physically beating D, torture, or coercion (if coercion so egregious). – Brown Brown v. Miss. (1936) – Extreme torture of D to get him to confess – hung him from tree by rope, beat him etc. Confessions obtained by torture during interrogation were coerced, due process was violated, and inadmissible. Due process requires procedures must comply w/ fundamental fairness, fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Due process is violated by coercion; when coercion is so egregious, the resulting confessions are inadmissible. Court applied due process exclusionary rule to states.
Look at every due process confession case on the merits, on case by case basis. Factors:
police conduct
incl. manner of interrogation
incl. D’s age, education, mental and physical condition
Fykes v. Alabama (1957)
Where a prisoner, held incommunicado, is subjected to questioning by officers for long periods, and deprived of the advice of counsel, the court will scrutinize the record with care to determine whether by the use of his confession, he is deprived of liberty or life through tyrannical or oppressive means. Case by case basis. – Lisenba
Police Interrogation Without Torture Police officer’s illegal conduct, w/ prolonged questioning of prisoner before arraignment in absence of counsel did not coerce D’s confessions. Police conduct was not enough to constitute coercion and not no due process violation. – Lisenba v. California (1941)
D had no formal education but was man of intelligence and business experience. Interrogation was long, no sleep but gave him meals. He was not threatened or mistreated by officers questioning him. (But D claims he was slapped once.)
Confession was involuntary and coerced when fellow inmate and FBI informant told D he would protect him in prison if he told him more the crime, etc. and D confessed. This was more of psychological coercion, confession involuntary, and due process violated. – Fulminante (1991)
Psychological coercion ö often due process violation, but not always
Only official compulsion will render confession involuntary for 14th Am. purposes.
Confession not involuntary merely b/c it is product of mental disease that prevents the confession from being of D’s free will.
Connelly (1986) – D confessed committing murder to police officer after being commanded by God to do so (he was schizophrenic); confession was voluntary and due process not violated. There was no police misconduct – there must be govt misconduct before due process can be violated.
Conviction will not necessarily be overturned if involuntary confession was erroneously admitted into evidence. Harmless error test applies, and conviction will not be overturned if govt can show that there was other overwhelming evidence of guilt. – Fulminante
Finding of voluntariness by trial court does not preclude D from introducing evidence to jury of circumstances of confession in order to cast doubt on its credibility. – Crane v. Kentucky (1986)
Self-Incrimination (5th Amendment) Limits Introduction 5th Amend ö gives D rights against testimonial self-incrimination
No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself
Person shall not be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony
Applicable to states via 14th Amend.
Exclusionary rule and Miranda violations Fruit of poisonous tree is not extended to Miranda violations
Thus fruits derived from statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be admissible despite exclusionary rule
It is extended to due process; fruit of poisonous tree theory applies only to 4th Amend. violations, not Miranda
McNabb–Mallory Rule: Confessions are admissible unless they’re involuntary.
Violation of the statute w/o unnecessary delay created an exclusionary rule for its violation. (This is not constitutional and not binding on states).
Rule superceded by statute ö 6 hour safe harbor rule:
confession made w/in 6 hours of arrest is presumed voluntary
Massiah (1964) [6th Amend. case] – D has 6th Amend. right to counsel where adversary judicial proceedings have begun – e.g. formal charges have been filed.
Thus, once D is indicted, he has right to counsel and cannot be interrogated in the absence of counsel.
Thus, 6th Amend. right to counsel does not apply in precharge custodial interrogations
Abandonment of voluntary-involuntary test – Foreshadow of Miranda Escobedo (1964) [6th Amend. case]
Held: Where investigation is no longer general inquiry into unsolved crime but begins to focus on particular suspect, who is in police custody and makes incriminating statements during interrogation, and who requested and was denied an attny, received no warning of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, he has been denied assistance of counsel and self-incrimination rights violated, both in violation of 6th Amend. [narrow holding]. Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its facts.
D not yet indicted, but 6th Amend. still applied. Confession was inadmissible for 6th Amend. violation. Foreshadowing of Miranda (right to counsel requirement)
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
The Holding: 5th Amend. privilege against compelled self-incrimination became basis for ruling upon admissibility of a confession.
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver are prerequisites to admissibility of any statement made by the accused during custodial interrogation.
Anyone in police custody and accused of a crime, no matter how minor a crime, must be given Miranda warnings prior to interrogation by police. – Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)
Miranda warnings provide procedural safeguards to:
secure privilege against self-incrimination and
ensure that the statements were truly the product of free choice
Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the D unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.