Introduction To Criminal Procedure Three major topics
Person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that
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Person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that: He has right to remain silent Anything he says can be used against him in court He has right to presence of attorney If he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him if he so desires. Waiver of Miranda Rights Waiver ö Knowingly and intelligently burden on govt to prove waiver After warnings given and such opportunity afforded him, he may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against him. The Case Facts: Four cases, heard to determine the admissibility of statements obtained from D, who was subjected to custodial police interrogation, and the necessity for procedures assuring that defendant was accorded his 5th Amend. privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Ds were not given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation. Incommunicado interrogations of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. Held: In all cases here, the statements were obtained from D under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege. 5th Amend. privilege against self-incrimination not secured, and thus statements may not have been product of free choice. Misc. Miranda Miranda warnings need not be verbatim, as long as substance of warning is there. No need to repeat warnings merely b/c of break in interrogation unless the time lapse has been so long that a failure to do so would seem like an attempt to take advantage of D’s ignorance of his rights. Voluntariness not a factor – Miranda does not ask if confession was voluntary or involuntary If Miranda is complied with, increases chances that confession and waiver are voluntary Repeals McNabb–Mallory rule (confessions admissible unless involuntary) Miranda only applies in narrow category ö only in custodial interrogations Miranda right to counsel only applies in context of custody – after person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Court concerned about coercive nature of custodial interrogation, but don’t want to get rid of it completely. Constitutional Basis of Miranda Political Background Miranda is constitutional decision and Congress cannot eliminate Miranda requirements by statute. Miranda based on requirements of 5th Amend. as made application to states through 14th Amend. Thus it may not be overruled by act of Congress. Dickerson (2000) – Invalidated federal statute that purportedly eliminated Miranda’s requirements that persons in custody and being interrogated be informed of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Congress may not legislatively supercede the Court’s decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. After Miranda, Congress enacted statute that in effect overruled Miranda, claiming that Marbury v. Madison allowed them to do so b/c Miranda was not a constitutional decision. Statute, 18 USC § 3501, was in effect for 30 years but was not really enforced, so didn’t come up until 2000. Miranda rejected the totality test; Section 3501 reinstates the totality test as sufficient; thus 3501 cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law. Court declines to overrule Miranda. Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Post-Miranda Developments: Limiting Exclusionary Rule (watering down Miranda) Generally, evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is inadmissible at trial. BUT fruits derived from statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be admissible in certain circumstances despite exclusionary rule. Impeachment Confession obtained in violation of Miranda but otherwise voluntary may be used to impeach D’s testimony if he takes the stand at trial even though such a confession is inadmissible in the state’s case in chief as evidence of guilt. – Harris But, a truly involuntary confession is inadmissible for any purpose. – Portash Prosecutor may not use D’s silence after receiving Miranda warnings to counter D’s insanity defense. – Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986) If D requests counsel, all questioning must cease unless counsel is present or D initiates a resumption of questioning. If police initiate further questioning, D’s statements cannot be used in govt’s case in chief but can be used to impeach D’s trial testimony, as long as court finds that D voluntarily and intelligently waived right to counsel. – Harvey (1990) But, such illegally obtained evidence cannot be used to impeach trial testimony of witnesses other than D. – James v. Illinois Harris (1971) – confession taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach D’s testimony if he testified in his defense at trial. Exclusionary rule does not kick out all use of Miranda, can be brought in to impeach D, even though statement violated Miranda. Portash (1979) – Compelled confessions cannot be used for any purpose. D’s compelled statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testimonial use against him in a criminal trial. Fruit of Poisonous Tree Fruits derived from statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be admissible in certain circumstances despite exclusionary rule. Violation of Miranda did not constitute a violation of the underlying 5th Amend. right itself. Tucker (1974) – Only harm here was that the police conduct departed from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard the 5th Amend. privilege. Fruit of poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to a Miranda violation; it does apply to 4th Amend. violation. – Patane (1994) D made statement w/o Miranda warnings, in his statement he said there was gun in house; police found gun; Court held confession was inadmissible b/c Miranda violation but gun was admissible. If police fail to give Miranda warnings and during interrogation D gives police information that leads to nontestimonial evidence, it is unclear whether the nontestimonial evidence must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful interrogation. Although no majority opinion on this point, 5 justices held that suppression of this nontestimonial evidence (gun) was not necessary. Miranda: Custody Whether a person is in custody depends on whether person’s freedom of action is denied in a significant way. The more a setting resembles a traditional arrest (i.e. the more constrained D feels), the more likely the Court will consider it to be custody. If detention is voluntary, it is not custody. – Mathiason If detention is long and is involuntary (e.g. D is in jail on another charge), it will likely be held to constitute custody. – Mathas Objective test – Berkemer Custodial interrogation: (Mathiason) questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Custodial interrogation ö Custody factors location e.g. police station vs. D’s home interrogations in home not same coercive environment as in police station generally not custody BUT if D is handcuffed, or police presence very strong, D was told he’s under arrest – these factors could constitute custodial interrogation even though in home coerciveness of the environment, not reasons why D is there interrogations by non-law enforcement figures (i.e. administrators) case by case determination – could trigger Miranda Generally Miranda only applies to interrogations by police – does not apply where interrogation is by an informant who D does not know is working for police Custodial interrogation ö Interrogation factors questions asked by law enforcement officers small room per Miranda, but not required any words or actions on part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect – Innis Mathiason (1977) – Custodial interrogation = Restraint on D, not necessarily physically; doesn’t matter whether or not the focus is on the accused; just look at the restraints at the time of questioning. Miranda warnings required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” Here, D was not “in custody” – there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where his freedom to depart was restricted in any way; no custodial interrogation. Anyone in police custody and accused of a crime, no matter how minor a crime, must be given Miranda warnings prior to investigation by the police. – Berkemer (1984) Person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of Miranda’s procedural safeguards, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested. Thus, even D accused of a misdemeanor traffic offense must be Mirandized. BUT routine traffic stops generally NOT custodial thus Miranda warnings normally not needed Routine traffic stop curtails motorist’s freedom of movement, but it is presumptively temporary and brief, and motorist knows that he typically will soon be on his way, thus he should not feel unduly coerced. Berkemer – Officer stopped D for weaving in and out of traffic. When O noticed D had trouble standing, he performed field sobriety test, which D failed. Without giving Miranda warnings, O asked D if he had been drinking, which D admitted. Admissible. Objective test – Berkemer Initial determination of whether person is in custody depends on objective circumstances of interrogation, not on subjective views of interrogating officers or D Only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in D’s position would have understood his situation – would he have believed that he could have left during the questioning? The more it looks like a formal arrest, more likely it will be a custodial interrogation e.g. if D handcuffed and put in police car Examples: Officer’s belief that person being questioned is not a suspect cannot bear on custody issue unless that view is somehow manifested. – Stansbury (1994) Consideration of suspect’s age and inexperience is inappropriate (b/c subjective factors) – Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) Keohane Test Circumstances surrounding the interrogation: phsyical atmosphere duration what happened – e.g. threats or police guns drawn how many officers present how did D get there – e.g. did he drive himself or taken in police car Given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? – Keohane (1995) Miranda: Interrogation Custodial interrogation ö Interrogation factors questions asked by law enforcement officers small room per Miranda, but not required any words or actions on part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect – Innis Interrogation refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on part of police that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from D. – Innis focuses primarily on perceptions of suspect rather than intent of police BUT, Miranda does not apply to: spontaneous statements not made in response to interrogation, although officers must give the warnings before any follow-up questioning. routine booking questions – e.g. name, address, age – even when process being taped and may be used as evidence Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) – Police comments about danger a gun would present to handicapped children, which resulted in robbery suspect’s leading them to weapon, was not interrogation when officers were not aware that suspect was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience. Break in interrogation–questioning by different police agencies When second police agency continues to question D at a point when first police dept. terminates its questioning, the impact of an earlier denial of rights by first dept. carries over into questioning by second agency. – Westover (1966) Miranda: Waiver Suspect may waive Miranda rights. Waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent – Butler Govt must show valid waive by preponderance of evidence (not heavy burden) Presumption against waiver – if govt wants to argue waiver, it has b/p Court will look to totality of circumstances. Subjective test – D must waive his own rights. – Butler Misc. Waiver: D need not be informed of all subjects of an interrogation to effect a valid waiver Waiver => 5th and 6th Amend. right If D given Miranda warnings and then confesses ö NO waiver Usually 2-step process – orally and written Waiver can occur from actions suggesting waiver, not just orally or written. – Butler D can waive without expressly waiving. Silence Waiver will not be presumed from D’s mere silence after warnings are given or from the fact that a confession was eventually obtained. Must look to totality of circumstances. D’s refusal to sign a written waiver when requested to do so is not conclusive as to the absence of waiver. North Carolina v. Butler (1979) – Miranda held that an express statement can constitute a waiver and that silence alone after such warnings cannot do so, but did not hold that such an express statement is indispensable to a finding of waiver. Miranda: Invocation of Counsel Miranda: An accused has 5th and 14th Amend. right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. 5th Amend. right to counsel under Miranda applies whenever there is custodial interrogation. D may terminate interrogation by invoking his right to counsel. At any time prior to or during interrogation D may invoke his Miranda (5th Am.) right to counsel If D invokes this right, all questioning must cease until: D is provided w/ attny or D initiates further questioning himself. – Edwards Edwards v. Arizona (1981) Having exercised his right on the first day to have counsel present during interrogation, D did not validly waive that right on the second day. His statement made w/o having access to counsel on second day did not amount to a valid waiver and was inadmissible. When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. Does not matter if D, after asks for attny, talks to attny and thereafter leaves – police still cannot go back and try to interrogate D again, even if they read him Miranda rights again and he waives them at that second time Edwards rule now extends to interrogation even on new crime. Break in Custody Cases If D asked for counsel at interrogation his first crime, then there is a big break and he is arrested for second crime, this must be treated as new – D’s asking for counsel first time does not transfer over to his second later crime – he must ask for counsel again after second crime. Police may not resume questioning about any crime Once D invokes right to counsel under Miranda, all questioning must cease – police may not even question D about a totally unrelated crime. – AZ v. Roberson (1988) Compare: they can were the accused merely invokes right to remain silent Rationale: Right to counsel under Miranda is prophylactic right designed by Court to prevent police from badgering D into talking without aid of counsel, and this purpose served only if all questioning ceases – McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) But, D may initiate resumption of questioning D may waive his right to counsel after invoking the right, and thus initiate resumption of questioning. – OR v. Bradshaw (1983) Request for an counsel must be specific and unambiguous. – Barrett and Davis (1994) Request must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer in the same situation would understand the statement to be a request for counsel. Examples: Request by the accused to see his probation officer is not tantamount to a request for an attorney, so that waiver of the right to counsel may still be found. – Fare Statement by D: “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” is not an unambiguous request for counsel, and so does not prevent further questioning. Limited request for counsel accompanied by a willingness to speak without counsel is a valid waiver of the right to have counsel present during interrogation. – Barrett Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> womenandlaw uploads -> For want of a nail uploads -> Police Militarization uploads -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 uploads -> 2017 afoCo Landmark Scholarship Program uploads -> Instructions for the Preparation of Camera-Ready Contributions to the Conference Proceedings uploads -> Medical Radiography Program uploads -> Ihbb asian Championships 2014 middle school bowl Round 4 First Quarter uploads -> Ihbb european Championships 2014 Bowl Round 4 First Quarter womenandlaw -> Introduction – Chapter 1 (p. 2) and Chapter 2 (p. 13) womenandlaw -> Strict liability Download 1 Mb. Share with your friends:
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