Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?

such reason is rooted in the fact that there are far too many pets that are brought into existence but never homed. These unwanted pets are then either killed or cast out onto the streets, where they are constantly at risk of starving, freezing, being run over, or preyed upon, among other things. For us to continue to breed pets would thus be to condemn an even larger number of these animals to short and miserable lives. Some of these additional unwanted animals would be those that are bred and then not homed.
However, our continuing to breed animals would swell the numbers of unwanted pets even if all of the bred animals were homed. This is because the human desire and need for pets would then be partially satisfied by bred pets, leaving more of those pets that are not bred by us, unadopted.
The fact that there are far too many pets that are brought into existence but never homed also provides very good reason for thinking that, where possible, we should prevent pets from breeding with one another. Our allowing them to breed, like our continuing to breed them, would mean that an even larger number of pets are condemned to short and miserable lives. However, if the pet population eventually decreased such that the demand for pets exceeded the number of pets already in existence, then there would no longer be this reason for thinking that we ought always to prevent pets from breeding with one another.
Of course, we might in those circumstances still have an obligation to prevent certain
pets from breeding with one another. Consider, for example, that since there is a high level of inbreeding within the various dog and cat breeds, diseases (and disorders) that can be inherited genetically are common in purebred dogs and cats.
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These diseases include epilepsy, cardiomyopathy, respiratory distress syndrome, hip dysplasia, and a variety of cancers. Since these diseases usually have a profoundly negative effect on the quality of life of those who suffer from them, it is not implausible to think that if we can reduce their incidence, then we ought to do so.
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Thus, it is not implausible to think that even if the demand for pets were to exceed the number pets already in existence, we might nonetheless be obligated not to breed purebreds and, perhaps, to prevent them from breeding with other purebreds from the same breed.
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However, it is much less clear that, in these circumstances, we would also be obligated to prevent non-purebred pets or, at least, those non-purebred pets that are unlikely to pass on some relatively serious (genetic) disease or disorder to their offspring, from breeding with one another. For one thing, the obligation to prevent pets from breeding with one another is sometimes not merely a negative obligation (not to encourage pets to have sex and reproduce) but also a positive one. That is to say, it is sometimes also an obligation that requires that we actually perform some action, namely that we take steps to prevent pets from having sex and reproducing. Accordingly, we need a very good reason — and one that is much stronger than that which is required for thinking that we ought to desist from breeding pets, for example — for thinking that we ought to prevent pets from breeding with one another. But, is it just not clear that we would have a sufficiently strong reason for thinking that we ought to prevent the relevant kind of non-purebred pets from breeding with one another.
In this regard, it is also worth considering that to prevent pets from breeding with one another is arguably to deny them some good. In particular, it is arguably to deny them the pleasure that can be derived from sexual intercourse. The vast majority of pets must derive some pleasure from sexual intercourse. It would otherwise be very difficult to explain why they engage in it. And, while sterilizing pets might seem to eliminate the Society for Applied Philosophy, 2015 Jessica du Toit

need to prevent them from having sexual intercourse, and thus to permit them some sexual pleasure, some forms of sterilization remove pets sex drive. Thus, although many sterilized pets do not have any sexual desires to gratify and, thus, do not feel sexually frustrated by the absence of sex, they also do not enjoy the pleasurable experience of sex.
As such, while there is a sense in which these pets would not be missing out on anything,
there is another sense in which they would be.
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In the case of purebred pets, our preventing them from breeding with other purebreds from the same breed would not necessarily mean that they have to forgo sexual pleasure.
Since we do not have an obligation to prevent purebreds from breeding with conspecifics of different breeds, purebred pets could still engage in sexual intercourse and, thus,
experience sexual pleasure. But, even if our preventing them from breeding with other purebreds from the same breed would mean that they had to forgo sexual pleasure, we might nonetheless be justified in doing so. This is because their having to forgo this kind of pleasure is outweighed by the harm that might result from their breeding with one another. In fact, since there is a very good chance that their breeding with one another will result in a significant harm, we might not merely be permitted to prevent them from breeding with one another, but also be required to do so.
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The question, then, is not whether there are any reasons why we should be preventing pets from breeding, but rather whether the dependency objection provides strong enough reason for thinking that we are in fact obligated in this way.
The first thing to say in response to this question is that dependency itself is not necessarily a bad thing. Both humans and animals depend on one another fora variety of things. For example, while many of us might rely on other humans to grow food for us or to look after us when we become ill, those other humans might rely onus to teach their children. This is not to say that we would not prefer to be (more) independent of one another. But, in general, we do not think that there is anything morally troubling about the fact that we depend on one another, or that animals depend on one another fora variety of things.
But, it is only in a very small minority of cases — such as that of a blind human and his guide dog — that humans and pets can really be said to rely on one another. In the overwhelming majority of cases, human-pet relationships are extremely asymmetrical.
Or, to put the point slightly differently, it is true of the overwhelming majority of human-pet relationships that while the relevant humans depend on their pets for very little, the relevant pets are almost entirely dependent on their respective humans for the satisfaction of their fundamental needs and desires. Since this means that pets are to a very large extent at the mercy of their respective humans, this is a more troubling kind of dependency relationship.
Does the asymmetry of most human-pet relationships render them so troubling that humans are morally obligated to ensure that no more pets are brought into existence,
however? Recall that I am concerned with kind and caring pet-keepers alone. Thus,
although it is true that these pet-keepers’ pets are at their mercy, they are precisely the kind of pet-keepers who can be relied upon to satisfy their pets needs and desires. The implication of this is that if the dependency objection is to make any sense in these cases,
then it cannot be because the relevant pets needs and desires are not met. Instead, it would be because irrespective of whether pet-keepers can be relied upon to satisfy their pets needs and desires, it is morally unconscionable that pets are so dependent on their respective keepers Society for Applied Philosophy, Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
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One possible reason why, irrespective of whether pets needs and desires are met, it might bethought wrong for us to continue to allow such dependent beings to come into existence, has to do with the concept of dignity. The fact that pets are so acutely dependent on their respective humans might bethought to condemn them to lives with very little, if any, dignity.
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Proponents of this line of reasoning might therefore conclude that whether or not pets needs and desires are met, it is morally unconscionable for us to continue to allow them to come into existence.
The force of this argument clearly depends on how the notion of dignity is to be filled out. There have been some attempts to give content to this notion in this particular context.
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However, the problem is that dignity is widely thought to be a very murky concept. While the term is used extensively in a number of contexts, there is almost always disagreement about how it should be understood and, thus, about whether it is a term that can be usefully employed in these contexts.
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There is therefore little reason to expect that things will be different in the context of the dependency objection. Thus,
perhaps we ought not to rest the objection on this concept. That is, perhaps the dependency objection ought not to — or at least need not — be made in terms of dignity.
Perhaps we ought rather simply to ask why perpetual dependency might be undesirable without recourse to the concept of dignity.
The practice of having pets is so well established in our society that it would be surprising if we did not have some difficulty appreciating what, if anything, is troubling about perpetual dependency in the case of pets. Thus, it might help to take a step back and to think about the possibility of certain humans being in the same position that pets find themselves in. Thus, imagine that someone began to breed severely cognitively impaired humans that he kept around his home as pets. Is there anything wrong with this?
The vast majority of people would likely say that there is something wrong with this.
However, it is not clear whether this would be because they think that there is something inherently morally troubling about a being’s being perpetually dependent on another for the satisfaction of his fundamental needs and desires, or because they think it is wrong,
for other reasons, to breed this kind of being. They might, for example, think that it is wrong deliberately to breed humans whose mental capacities and level of dependence fall short of species-typical functioning. More specifically, they might think that it is wrong deliberately to breed severely impaired humans.
Thus, perhaps we should instead imagine a hypothetical situation in which someone began to breed genetically altered chimpanzees that are ill-suited to living in the wild, but well-suited to living with, or in very close proximity to, humans. These domesticated chimpanzees would have mental capacities equivalent to those of wild chimpanzees.
They would, however, be much less aggressive and more docile, for example, than their wild relatives. Since they would therefore be unable to live independently of humans in the human world, the domesticated chimpanzees would, unlike their wild relatives, be perpetually dependent on humans for the satisfaction of their fundamental needs and desires. Is there something morally problematic about creating a breed of such chimpanzees?
While some might see nothing wrong with breeding these chimpanzees, others might have the intuition that it is morally problematic to choose to bring into existence a creature that will be perpetually dependent on another for the satisfaction of its fundamental needs and desires. Those who think that there would be nothing wrong with Society for Applied Philosophy, 2015 Jessica du Toit

breeding domesticated chimpanzees might say that insofar as humans satisfy the needs and desires of these perpetually dependent chimpanzees, there are no grounds for saying that the perpetual dependency is troubling. However, those who think that there is something morally problematic about breeding such dependent creatures might have the intuition that the creation of such beings is morally problematic even if they are well cared for. They might, for example, think that there is something morally amiss about creating unnecessary dependency and, thus, vulnerability in these beings, even if all of their needs and desires are satisfied.
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However, some might claim that there is a difference between creating anew kind of being that will be perpetually dependent on humans, and creating anew member of an established species of beings that are deeply dependent on humans. That is to say, some might think that even if there is something morally amiss about breeding domesticated chimpanzees, it does not necessarily follow that it is morally unconscionable to continue to bring dogs and cats, for example, into existence. These people might argue that although bringing anew member of an established species of dependent beings into existence involves the deliberate creation of a dependent and vulnerable being, it is not possible to create anew member of such a species without its being dependent and vulnerable. Thus, the creation of the dependency and vulnerability in that being is not unnecessary in the same way that it is in the chimpanzee case. In the chimpanzee case,
one is deliberately creating a dependency and vulnerability where no such dependency or vulnerability existed previously, and where no such dependency or vulnerability need exist.
But, it is just not clear that this purported difference really does the moral work that these people claim it does. Thus, we are left with a clash of intuitions while some will think that there is nothing morally problematic about perpetual dependency so long as humans satisfy the needs and desires of the relevant beings, others will think that there is something morally objectionable about perpetual dependency, even if the relevant being is well cared for.
What can be said in the face of these conflicting intuitions and the absence of any clearway of choosing between them Some might argue that since proponents of the dependency objection are making the claim that certain actions are wrong and wish to change people’s practices, they must bear the burden of proof. Since they have not been able to provide a compelling argument, however, it might bethought that we are entitled to dismiss the dependency objection.
However, what if one rejects the idea that proponents of the dependency objection bear the burden of proof In this case, the clash of intuitions that we are faced with would imply that the cogency of the dependency objection simply cannot be evaluated.
Although it would be preferable to resolve this matter, it is entirely possible that there is no resolution available (at least at present. If that is the case, then we should not artificially impose or stipulate one. Thus, it is just not clear whether it is wrong to continue to breed pets and allow new members of those species to come into existence.
While we have been unsuccessful in evaluating the cogency of the dependency objection, this is not of practical concern given the current state of the world. Recall that there are currently far too many pets that are brought into existence but never homed. These unwanted pets are either killed or cast out onto the streets where they run a very high risk of serious injury or death. Thus, for us to continue to breed pets or allow them to breed with one another is to condemn an even larger number of animals to short and miserable Society for Applied Philosophy, Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
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lives. The implication of this is that however strong or weak one takes the dependency objection to be, there are very good independent reasons for thinking that we ought not to breed pets or allow them to breed with one another. Our failure to evaluate the cogency of the dependency objection will thus be of concern only if we ever reach a point at which the pet population had decreased so much that the demand for pets exceeded the number of pets already in existence. However, since our reaching this point is such a remote possibility, we ought not to be too troubled by the lack of certainty regarding the force of the dependency objection nothing practical rests on the matter at this time.

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