Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
Download 484.97 Kb. View original pdf
|
英国宠物兔福利状况——我们能做些什么, 宠物动物-住房，繁殖和福利, 宠物保障计划可以增加福利, 笔记
| Abolition of Animal Exploitation, (New York Columbia University Press, 2008). 27 Ibid To say that humans are morally obligated to continue to care for those pets that already exist is ambiguous between saying that 1) those who already have pets are obligated to continue caring for their pets and that) those who do not already have pets are obligated to adopt and care for pets. While Gary Francione might be making both of these claims, it is by no means clear that he is Francione 2008 op. cit, p. 13; ‘ Pets The inherent problems of domestication, in Animal Rights The Abolitionist Approach, 31 July 2012. Online at http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/pets-the-inherent- problems-of-domestication/ (accessed 21 October 2012). 30 Bok op. cit, p. 775. 31 See Cass Sunstein, Slaughterhouse jive, The New Republic, 40,29 January (2001): 40–45. Online at: http://tnr.com/print/article/books_and_arts/slaughterhouse_jive (accessed 21 October 2012). 32 Ibid Bok op. cit, p. 776. 33 While it would be very helpful to be able to say exactly what it means to categorize something or being as property, I have not been successful in finding or coming up with a plausible and sufficiently sophisticated account of what it means to categorize something or being as property. Fortunately, however, the provision of such an account is not crucial to my argument Francione Pets 2012 op. cit Ibid Ibid In Pets Francione says, But if there were two dogs left in the universe and it were up to us as to whether they were allowed to breed so that we could continue to live with dogs . . . I would not hesitate fora second to bring the whole institution of [pet-keeping] to an end EA. Ostrander, Both ends of the leash The human links to good dogs with bad genes, The New England Journal of Medicine, 367,7 (2012): 637–638. 39 While a discussion of the co-called non-identity problem would be relevant here (see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, such a discussion would take me well beyond the scope of this article. Thus, I shall not discuss this problem here When it is suggested that we ought to prevent the births of those humans who are likely to suffer from relatively serious (genetic) diseases or disorders, some people respond by raising the expressivist objection. According to this objection, to prevent the births of such humans is to express a discriminatory or negative attitude towards those people currently suffering from the relevant diseases or disorders. I shall not evaluate this objection here. Nor shall I consider its applicability to animals The discussion in this paragraph raises a number of questions, such as whether it is preferable that sterilization not remove the sex drive of pets, and whether responsible pet custodians should provide sex partners for their sterilized pets. While these questions are interesting, they are not central to my discussion Society for Applied Philosophy, 2015 Jessica du Toit in this section. Thus, I shall say no more about them than that I think that it is preferable that sterilization not remove the sex drive of pets (if this is possible, and that responsible pet custodians should perhaps provide sex partners for their sterilized pets The non-identity problem is relevant here too. But, as I mentioned in an earlier note, since a discussion of this problem would take me well beyond the scope of this article, I shall not discuss it here either Thus, Alasdair Cochrane’s argument in Born in chains The ethics of animal domestication, in L. Gruen (ed.) The Ethics of Captivity, (New York Oxford University Press, 2014), is not relevant to the version of the dependency objection that I am considering here. This is because, according to Cochrane, the dependency objection should be rejected because while the domestication of domesticated animals does lead those animals to being dependent on humans, their dependence does not necessarily lead to their being harmed In Animal Ethics in Context (New York Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 126), Clare Palmer recognises that there might be something wrong with creating animals to have particular relations of vulnerability to and dependence on humans, and that this might be the case even if such relations did not negatively affect animals experiential wellbeing. 45 Both of the following consider the argument from dignity Alasdair Cochrane, Animal entertainment in his Download 484.97 Kb. Share with your friends:
|