Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
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英国宠物兔福利状况——我们能做些什么, 宠物动物-住房，繁殖和福利, 宠物保障计划可以增加福利, 笔记
| Conclusion In this article I have considered three objections to the practice of having pets. The first, the restriction of freedom objection, was rebutted relatively easily. The property objection also failed to show that having pets is morally impermissible. However, my consideration of this second objection did lead to the conclusion that we ought to aim at changing existing legal systems and the majority of people’s attitudes towards pets such that they (pets) are no longer considered to be the personal property of the humans in whose homes they are kept. But, while it is clear that we ought to aim at ending the practice of owning pets, it is not clear whether we ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping pets. Indeed, I was unable to reach a definitive conclusion about the cogency of the dependency objection. The lack of clarity regarding the moral permissibility of the practice of keeping pets is of little concern at this time, however. Since there are currently far too many pets that are brought into existence but never owned, and since this situation is unlikely to change in the near future, we do not need to know whether we ought to bring an end to the practice of pet-keeping at this time. Our present moral obligations are quite clear until such time as the demand for pets exceeds the number of pets already in existence, we ought to continue to care for those pets that already exist, but to desist from breeding pets and from allowing them to breed with one another. 49 Jessica du Toit, Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, 10 Center Drive, Building 10, Room C, Bethesda, MD 20892-1156, USA and Philosophy Department, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa. jess.dutoit@ gmail.com Disclaimer The views expressed are those of the author. They do not necessarily represent those of the National Institutes of Health or the Department of Health and Human Services. NOTES 1 Humans — like lions, wart frogs and brown spider monkeys — area species of animal. Thus, rather than referring to humans and animals, I ought really to refer to human animals and nonhuman animals’, respectively. However, to avoid such clumsy phrasing, I shall use humans as shorthand for human animals’, and animals as shorthand for nonhuman animals Society for Applied Philosophy, 2015 Jessica du Toit 2 Calling an animal a pet has come to suggest ownership of the relevant animal. Since this idea of ownership may well foster inappropriate attitudes towards the animal called pet, I would do well to follow the likes of Keith Burgess-Jackson (in Doing right by our companion animals in D. Benatar (ed) Ethics for Everyday (Boston, MA McGraw-Hill Education, 2002), pp. 427–449) and Gary Varner (in Pets, companion animals, and domesticated partners in D. Benatar (ed) Ethics for Everyday (Boston, MA McGraw-Hill Education, pp. 450–475), and refer to the relevant animals as companion animals or domesticated partners’, for example. However, given that some authors, including Gary Varner, distinguish between mere) pets’, ‘companion animals and domesticated partners, I shall, throughout this article, continue to refer generally to pets Although there has been relatively little philosophical attention devoted to this question, there has been some. I shall refer to the extant literature on this question in due course Of course, even kind and caring humans might be mistaken about the nature of their pets needs and desires. Thus, even these humans might fail to meet their pets needs and desires, and harm them as a result. But, since the vast majority of kind and caring humans are not mistaken about the nature of their pets (more important) needs and desires, I shall assume that the vast majority of these humans can be relied upon to satisfy their pets (more important) needs and desires In Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 13,4 (1998): 41–43. 6 In particular, she argues that for something to count as one’s pet, it must 1) bean object of one’s affection) be kept near to or around one’s home 3) lead a life that is dramatically different from one’s own and be dependent on one and have an interest in its continued existence See David DeGrazia, The ethics of confining animals From farms to zoos to human homes in T.L. Beauchamp & R.G. Frey (eds, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, (New York Oxford University Press, p. 738. 8 Ibid Some deny that animals have desires (or wants. R.G. Frey denies this in Rights, interests, desires, and beliefs in American Philosophical Quarterly 16,3 (1979): 233–239. However, since it is contrary to commonsense to deny that sentient animals have at least some desires, and since there have been some excellent responses to Frey’s denial (see, for example, David DeGrazia, The moral status of animals and their use in research A philosophical review in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1,1 (1991): 48–70; and Tom Regan, Download 484.97 Kb. Share with your friends:
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