J m barber: What lessons can evaluation of support for Innovation under erdf learn from experience of National Innovation Policies?



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Programme efficiency
66. If a programme is both appropriate and achieving its objectives then efficiency will depend on:


  • How far the amount spent on grants or subsidies has been kept to a minimum for the results achieved (deadweight kept to a minimum);

  • How far administration and management (operational) costs have been kept to a minimum for the results achieved.

Note that there is a trade-off between these two. Minimising operational input will mean that selection between applications will be rough and ready, that there will a lower proportion of selected projects exhibiting high additionality and excellent value for money, and that the proportion of deadweight will be high. In addition programme managers will have less resources to devote to in-flight monitoring and guidance and there will be a greater risk of supported projects going off the rails. Increasing the amount spent on operating the programme will initially offer marginal high returns but as the amount of operational expenditure increases relative to the size of the programme the marginal return will fall away until it may become negative. One reason for this is that an overly selective and heavily managed programme is likely to deter potential applicants because the application procedures are seen as too onerous and the chances of success too low.


67. Generally speaking the more selective is public support for innovation and technology development the lower will be deadweight and the higher will be the costs of administration and the costs to firms of applying. Evaluation should try to assess all three though the estimation of benefits will implicitly take account of the effects of deadweight. However if an evaluation discovered that most of the benefits of a programme came from a very small proportion of projects then in principle consideration should given to making it more selective16.

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68. Economies of scale offer one potential route to efficiency. Having fewer large all-purpose innovation support schemes can lower administration costs, simplify marketing and is more easily understood by outside stakeholders including politicians. However given the highly differentiated innovation characteristics of different sectors and sizes of firms they are less likely to provide the right kind of support in the correct manner to any particular firm. They therefore tend to be less appropriate than a larger number of more specialised programmes and achieve less good value for money. Again ex-post evaluation needs to try and determine whether the correct balance has been struck.


SOME FURTHER EVALUATION ISSUES
Technology and Knowledge Transfer
69. Many of the schemes supported under ERDF are concerned with the transfer/diffusion of technology or business knowledge to firms usually SMEs. In the late 1980s the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) evaluated four Inward Technology Transfer Schemes. In order to help us analyse these schemes we developed with the help of Professor Peter Swann now of Nottingham University a simple framework explaining technology transfer. It is set out in tabular form on the following page. This model has proved its worth both in policy and programme design and in subsequent evaluations. It is not unique, similar frameworks have been developed in the course of academic research.
70. The process is broken down into five phases. In the first phase – Awareness 1- the firm first becomes aware of a technology which might help its business. In the second phase - Awareness 2 - the firm considers in detail the benefits which might flow from using the technology in its business. In the third phase the technology is transferred from the identified external source to the firm. The fourth phase the time takes steps to absorb and incorporate the technology into all relevant aspects of this business. However this last process is only complete when the firm starts to use the technology. Indeed it may only discover how to make best use of the technology after it has been using it for some considerable time.
71. The absorption phase can involve considerable input of resources for two reasons:

  • Technology is usually sector specific and often firm specific. The technology as acquired may need significant adaptation before it can be used by the receiving firm. This will be least true where the technology is relatively mature and acquired via well established supply chain. Where the technology acquired is only part of an overall technology solution e.g. a specific piece of technological information, it will need to be integrated with the other components.

  • Reports, licenses, instruction manuals etc may not specify the technology in full. Also there may be a significant component of tacit knowledge. Again the problem will be much less in the case of relative mature technologies.


The Process of Technology (or knowledge) Transfer

Awareness Phase 1→

Awareness Phase 2

Transfer

Absorption

Exploitation

The firm first becomes aware of a technology which might enhance the performance of its business.

The potential of the technology for the firm’s business is investigated in more detail and its potential contribution is defined in more detail. This is the business planning or project definition stage.

A source for the technology is identified (this may have already been done in the awareness phase) and steps taken to acquire it from that source. Transfer may be in the form of the purchase of a report, machine, component or licence, hiring of staff with new skills, outsourcing of R&D, external consultancy etc.

The firm takes steps to incorporate the new technology into its products and processes. This will involve innovation at least in terms of being new to the firm. It may involve R&D, engineering development, retraining of staff, re-organisation of production etc.

Firms typically learn much more about a new technology in this phase simply by using it and trying it out with customers. Oversights during the previous phases may be corrected but if previous planning has been very poor the firm may simply give up at this stage.

72. Learning by doing can be a major feature of the exploitation phase particularly in the case of novel technologies. Where the technology is mature and the firm has carried out the previous four phases in a systematic and effective fashion, including using the best external advice, then implementation should be much more straightforward. Firms which have been slapdash and/or ill-informed in the earlier phases may be in for unpleasant surprises in this phase and some may abandon the adopted technology as a mistake.

73. Firms who are experienced at technological innovation and who have strong in-house technological capability will not usually need much help with the first two phases (some new small high-tech firms may need help on adoption of new business processes). They may however need help in identifying suitable novel technologies and where these might be sourced17.

74. Innovation support schemes may address one, several or even all of the stages set out in this model. However technology and knowledge transfer must be considered as a holistic process. All the stages must be completed before the economic (and social) benefits of technology transfer are obtain and, being a chain, the process of technology transfer is only as effective as its weakest link. When evaluating a technology or knowledge transfer programme which covers only some of the phases of the framework process it is important to check that the other phases will be carried out on way or another.

75. For example if an campaign is mounted to make SME in the more traditional sectors in a region more aware of a new technology whose adoption might improve their performance then those firms whose interest is aroused must have somewhere to turn for advice and help to acquire, absorb and exploit the technology. Assistance from purely commercial sources may not be appropriate because SMEs may want to proceed cautiously without commitment until they are sure about what they want to do while the consultant etc. will not wish to devote significant resources to a project definition phase if there is a high probability that the potential customer will not continue to full implementation. Surveying the target population of firms should tell evaluators whether or not the firms themselves find a technology transfer programme helpful and expect to benefit but only analysis using a framework like the one proposed here can explain why this the case. For example if a programme attempts to transfer advanced technology or the results of scientific research to SMEs in a mature sector who can neither absorb or exploit it in its native form then it is likely to fail unless an intermediary adapts the technology or science into a form which can be absorbed and exploited by the firms. For example in the UK Birmingham University used the mathematics of chaos to develop a new more effective process for testing industrial springs in a form which the spring producers could use. Subsequent evaluation of the UK Carrier Technology Programme of which it was part highlighted it as a prominent success.



Delivering programmes

76. The success of public support for innovation will depend on the effectiveness of the means by which it is delivered. Regional innovation programmes may be delivered by central or regional government departments, by public agencies, by universities, by consultants etc. One of the purposes of evaluation should be to assess the effectiveness of the delivery mechanism, what lessons have been learnt for the future and far these have been absorbed by the organisation managing the programme. Ability to manage and deliver programmes can only be built up over time and organisations will only invest in the relevant capabilities if there is an expectation that they can expect to be asked to do so for a longish period.


77. Programme evaluation should consider not only the effectiveness with which it was delivered but also the impact on the capabilities and knowledge base of the delivery organisation. This is particularly true of applied research institutes or centres of excellence where it important that they have the core funding to extract, codify and develop the lessons learnt from their contract work and to do research of their own choosing. Evaluation evidence suggests that neither100 per cent core funding or 100 per cent contract funding is satisfactory for very long. The first makes the institute or centre unresponsive to the needs of its business clientele, the second encourages it to seek funding from wherever it is to be obtained thus operating more like a commercial consultant chasing business and paying less attention to those who need help most.
78. A consistent approach to innovation policy enables those delivering programmes to

accumulate knowledge and expertise. Not only that but frequent changes in policy reduce the capacity to learn from evaluation and inhibits learning by policy-makers. Policy experiments have their place but frequent chopping and changing confuses firms and other likely participants resulting in a fall-off in demand. It was a feature of UK innovation policy that new programmes were often undersubscribed but in time applications grew and the designated budget seemed likely to be overwhelmed.


79. A survey, carried out some years ago, of technology transfer organisations in the West Midlands Region of England indentified over 400 most of which had enjoyed a period of public funding to start them on their way. Since then they had survived by seeking funding or other means of existence from wherever it could be found. The result was a technology transfer infrastructure too fragmented to meet the needs of local SMEs. Similarly other technology transfer organisation in the UK obtained successive tranches of support from different sources and with different objectives attached. The result is organisations without a single clear mission statements and objectives against which an informative evaluation could be undertaken.
The Transition to a Knowledge Based Economy
80. A key component of modern innovation policy is the transition to the knowledge based economy but it important to be clear what this really means. A knowledge-based economy is not a new phenomenon – the hunter-gatherers in the Amazon Jungle have little else but knowledge to aid them in their struggle for survival. The importance of knowledge in firms' competitiveness and economic activity is not new either. The craftsmen's guilds of medieval Europe placed great importance on the 'mysteries of their trade' which they were very concerned to protect. However those changes which are making up the transition to a 'knowledge based economy' are greatly increasing the importance of knowledge in economic activity and the competitiveness of firms. They are also changing the kinds of the knowledge which firms need to possess, the way that knowledge is acquired and managed, the way firms are organised and the kinds of knowledge and skills required of their employees.
81. The implicit assumption is that the transition to a knowledge-based economy (KBE) is a transition to an economy based on scientific knowledge. This is at best only partly true, at worst it is seriously misleading. The main elements making up the KBE are as follows:


  • First, there is a continuing increase in the relative importance of intangible or knowledge assets;

  • Second, the stock of scientific and technological knowledge is expanding at a rapid rate thereby creating many more opportunities for expanding this stock of knowledge even further through activities such as R&D;

  • Third, developments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have revolutionised the storage, transmission, processing and analysis of content, information and data;

  • Fourth, the number of technologies used in the production of a given product or service is increasing and firms need expertise in a greater range of technologies than before.

The key thing to remember is that the knowledge based society is not just about scientific knowledge but all forms of knowledge including knowledge about businesses practices, consumer tastes and behaviour, market developments, online and broadcast content etc. Any programme which improves the generation of knowledge of whatever type, its dissemination and exploitation contributes to the establishment of the KBE and should be judged and evaluated as such.


CONCLUSIONS
82. The most important conclusions to be drawn from this paper are:


  1. Innovation is a complex interactive process which differs considerable across firms & sectors;

  2. There are many forms of public support for innovation most of which can be used or delivered at the regional level;

  3. Evaluation consists of ex-ante appraisal, in-flight monitoring & ex-post evaluation. These should be undertaken as part of an integrated process running from the initial conception of the programme or policy though to the final verdict on its performance which should inform next round of the policy process;

  4. Both the design & ex-post evaluation of a programme (or policy) should be based on a thorough analysis of the innovation processes it is trying to influence & on the functioning of the relevant elements of the innovation system;

  5. Ex-post evaluation should consider whether a programme was appropriate (addressed a significant feature of innovation performance & fitted the needs of those it was trying to help), whether it met its objectives, whether it offered value for money & whether it was operated efficiently;

  6. Ex-post evaluation should also consider how a programme was delivered & the impact on the capabilities & knowledge of the delivery organisation(s).

  7. Evaluation of programmes which support aspects of technology & knowledge transfer should analyse their operation in the context of a model of the overall process.

26th December 2009

1 See “Foundations of Corporate Success – How business strategies add value”, John Kay, Oxford University Press, 1993.

2 The overall guidance for evaluation of policies, programmes and projects in the UK public sector is the Treasury Green Book in which the policy cycle represented by ROAMEF still figures prominently.

3 I am using the terms results and impact objectives in the way that, as I understand it, is standard practice within ERDF. Please note that in many other areas of innovation evaluation impact is used instead of results and a high level or ultimate instead of impact.


4 In July 2007 DTI was abolished. The support for innovation and technology development provided by DTI during the between about 1983 and the early 2000s is now divided between the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS), the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). Each is now developing its own evaluation procedures in line with ROAMEF and the Treasury Green Book.

5 There are computer based interactive resource allocation procedures based on subjective assessment of programme effectiveness by experts. These are time-consuming social processes and are not very suitable for the participation of Ministers and other very senior policy makers. In 1995 The UK National Audit Office (NAO) undertook a comparison of a number of DTI Innovation Programmes using pre-existing evaluation results within a decision theory framework devised by Professor L D Phillips of the London School of Economics. This produced some interesting results but demonstrated the difficulties of comparing programmes which have rather different objectives. See Professor Phillips’s web site http://www.lawrencephillips.net/Home.html

6 For a discussion of top down versus bottom-up innovation policy making see “Innovation Policy and Performance – A Cross-Country Comparison, OECD, 2005.

7 See “Making Silicon Valley: Innovation & the Growth of High Tech, 1930 – 1970”, Christophe Lecuyer, 2006, MIT Press, particularly chapter 7.

8 The original evaluation of Alvey was published in 1991 “Evaluation of the Alvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology – A report by SPRU, University of Manchester & PREST, University of Manchester, published by HMSO, ISBN 0 11 515281 4. The belief that the benefits of Alvey are still coming through emerged in a recent conversation between the two leading Alvey evaluators at which the author of this paper was present.

9 The Inmos Transputer is an example of this. See the article from Electronics Weekly at http://www.electronicsweekly.com/Articles/2008/07/24/44193/no-end-in-sight-for-transputer-architecture.htm

10 For a relatively brief discussion of this issue see 6CP Workshop: New Grounds for Innovation Policy, Bilbao 13-14 September 2009, Setting the Scene by John Barber. See http://www.6cp.net/pages/workshops.html



11 A very recent study of behavioural additionality is “Behavioural additionality of R&D subsidies: a learning perspective” by Bart Clarysse, Mike Wright & Philippe Mustar, pages 1517-1533, Research Policy December 2009, Volume 36, Issue 10.

12 If there are no constraints on the ability of the firm to expand then it will undertake all projects which earn a return which is at least equal to the going cost of capital. In this case one can assume that any displaced projects are marginal projects which are worth no more than the market value of the resources they use up. In practice the size of the firm and the amount of investment in innovation which it is able to undertake is limited by supply constraints on firm specific knowledge and capabilities and by issues of financial risk. Thus it is quite possible that the firm may face a choice between two projects which both have a prospective return above the going cost of capital.

13 Professor Paul David has pointed that different technological/innovation trajectories involve different learning outcomes which constrain the choices available to the firm, sector, region or country in the future in different ways. Thus the growth of the firm etc tends therefore to be path dependent.

14 For five years I acted as an assessor for the UK Queen’s Award for Technology. Firms which submitted new technology which they recently developed for an award were asked for estimates of the extra sales which had resulted from the new technology. Many of them appeared to find this difficult. In practice they submitted total sales of products incorporating or produced by the new technology but did not deduct the sales of the unimproved product which they might otherwise have achieved.

15 It enables the country concerned to run its economy at a higher average pressure of demand which increases GDP.

16 Innovation activities vary a great deal in their degree of risk and uncertainty. A development project designed to upgrade an already established product will probably have a high chance of success and one would expect that a programme designed to support such projects would have a relatively high percentage of projects which at least covered their costs in the market place. By contrast the outcome of long-term research is often highly uncertain and both firms and governments should investigate a portfolio of possible approaches on the understanding that only a small proportion may be really successful. The success rate of venture capitalists – 1or 2 projects out of ten – is indicative of the kind of success rate which can be expected. However while the knowledge gained from failed projects may be of limited value to the individual venture capitalist it may prove much more useful to society (or very large firms) in the long term.

17 According to a former Comptroller & Chief Executive of UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) the IPO was approached by a firm asking whether they could find a technology which would solve a particular problem. When the IPO found a technology which could do this the firm asked who owned the patent. “You do” the firm was told! Increasingly such technology search services are being provided on a commercial basis.



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