Jackson Vanik will pass – bipartisan support of congress and interest groups gives momentum
U.S. Economy Impact-Link Extension
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- A2: Accession Hurts U.S.
- A2: No War
- Disregard ev that doesn’t assume the current crisis-foreign powers are stoked for adventurism making war uniquely likely
U.S. Economy Impact-Link ExtensionRepeal key to multiple important sectors of the U.S. economy and doubling of exportsStephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, 11/10 (Impact of Russia's WTO Entry on U.S., www.cfr.org/russian-fed/impact-russias-wto-entry-us/p26473) Which economic sectors in the United States would benefit the most?The United States has always exported a lot of chicken and pork, and Russian regulation of those exports was one of the difficult issues to be resolved in reaching an agreement on the WTO. The Russians will now have less basis to complain about the chemicals put into American food products, and so those exports have more of an opportunity to grow.In general, Russia will be obliged to reduce its agricultural subsidies over the next several years; to reduce its import duties on consumer goods; to reduce tariffs on heavy equipment for agriculture, construction, scientific purposes; and to reduce tariffs on pharmaceuticals, and to make it easier for foreigners to own Russian banks and insurance companies. The United States has an interest in all of these areas and an opportunity to expand its trade and investment in Russia because obstacles will have to be reduced. So the economic benefits for the United States are real here.There are credible estimates that trade between the United States and Russia could double over the next five years. I should say it doubled between 2005 and 2010 but did take a hit in response to the international economic crisis. It's still not very big, but we have a $20 billion trade deficit with Russia, which we have a chance of closing because WTO accession will give us access to the Russian market. A2: Accession Hurts U.S.Cushion provisions in Congress on WTO accession shield businesses from the turn-the internal is unidirectionalCRS Report 2008 (January 7, Russia's Accession to the WTO, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31979.pdf) For U.S. exporters and investors, Russia’s accession to the WTO may improvethe business climate in Russia which has been unpredictable. The U.S. businesscommunity often cites poor intellectual property rights protection, inconsistent andopaque customs regulations, inconsistent enforcement of the regulations, an irrational SPS and technical trade barriers as among the impediments to trade andinvestment. Accession could bring more stability and openness in the businessclimate since Russia would have to adhere to WTO rules that promote theseconditions.The volume of U.S. imports from Russia has been low primarily becauseRussia’s limited export-base. Nevertheless, some U.S. import-sensitive industries,for example steel, may face increased competition from Russian producers. Theseindustries may press U.S. negotiators to include as part of the terms and conditionsfor Russia’s accession, a special safeguard provision, beyond that provided in theWTO agreements, that would cushion the potentially adverse impact of a largeincrease in Russian imports upon accession. Such a provision was included in theconditions for China’s accession to the WTO and was codified in U.S. law as Section421 of the Trade Act of 1974. A2: No WarEconomic collapse precipitates great power warsWalter Mead, CFR, 4 February 2009 (Only Makes you stronger: Why the recession bolstered America, http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts) History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support proves, and their defense doesn’t account for global crisesJedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214) Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectations of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between international conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, the linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Disregard ev that doesn’t assume the current crisis-foreign powers are stoked for adventurism making war uniquely likelyMandelbaum 2010 (Michael, Professor Foreign Policy-Johns Hopkins University, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era, p. 105-8) It is the dominance of peace, democracy, and free markets, supplemented and bolstered by the reassurance that the United States supplies, that have made the twenty-first century a peaceful period—so far. But their domination, and the global peace they underpin, are not necessarily destined to last forever; and the recent turmoil in the global economy does raise the possibility that their era of dominance will turn out to be a short one. The severe global economic downturn that the financial collapse of September 15, 2008, catalyzed threatens not only the American role in helping to maintain peace in the world but also the foundations of the stable twenty-first-century global security itself. The international economic and security systems are not, after all, hermetically sealed off one from the other. To the contrary, each affects the other, and in the 1930s economics had a profound—and profoundly malignant—effect on politics. The crisis of the global economy led to the outbreak of the bloodiest episode in the history of international security, World War II, by bringing to power in Germany and Japan the brutal governments that started that dreadful conflict. In the 1930s the financial crash and the high unemployment that followed all over the world discredited the shaky democratic governments in place in Germany and Japan, which fell from power. The fascist regimes that replaced them proclaimed themselves models of governance for the rest of the world and did win admirers and imitators in other countries. These regimes disdained democratic politics and practices extensive (although not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, total) government control of economic affairs. Far from believing in peace, the two enthusiastically embraced aggressive war for the purpose of expanding the territories under their sway and subjugating—even, in some cases, attempting to exterminate—the people living there. Japan launched a brutal campaign of conquest in China in 1931; in 1939 Germany embarked on the murderous acquisition of an Eastern European empire and in the process conquered much of Western Europe as well. The two countries forged a nominal alliance that included fascist Italy as well. During World War II they were known as the Axis powers. Japan subdued much of Asia and Germany because the master of most of Europe before the two were finally beaten, at great cost in blood and treasure, in 1945. Could anything like the ghastly experience of the 1930s and 1940s occur in the twenty-first century? The precipitating event did, after all, repeat itself after a fashion: the economic slump that began in 2008 became, by most accounts the most severe since the 1930s. And while Germany and Japan have long since become firmly democratic in their politics and quasi-pacifist in their foreign policies, two other countries could conceivably play the roles that the fascist powers assumed in the interwar period. Those two countries are China and Russia. Each was, as the first decade of the new century ended, a large and military formidable country that had the potential to upset existing political and economic arrangements in East Asia and Europe, respectively. For much of the second half of the twentieth century the two had been governed by communist regimes that aspired to spread their form of government, by force when necessary. In the first decade of the twenty-first century neither had discarded all the trappings of its former communist identity: a communist party still ruled China, and Russians harbored nostalgia for the disbanded communist empire of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s, in no small part of resentment at the dominant global role of the United States, the two formed what they called a “strategic partnership.” In that term could be heard, however, faintly, the echo of the Axis alliance of World War II. China and Russia became charter members, along with five Central Asian countries, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 2001, one of whose apparent purposes was to offset American power. Like virtually every country, China and Russia each suffered, as had Germany and Japan in the 1930s, from the financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting economic distress. And the risk of war is a function of our internal link’s strength-the more we win the economy will be hurt, the more likely war isMandelbaum 2010 (Michael, Professor Foreign Policy-Johns Hopkins University, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era, p. 111-2) The unlikelihood of a full recurrence of all the horrors of the 1930s and 1940s does not, however, mean that the global security order is certain to remain entirely free from threats of war in the years ahead. Avoiding the worst of all possible futures does not guarantee the best of them. Even if China and Russia do not unleash murderous campaigns of conquest, this does not mean that each will settle comfortably into a twenty-first-century routine as a staunch supporter of the post-Cold War security and economic orders. Each has grievances, actual and potential, against the existing order of things. The extent to which either or both choose to act on these grievances will matter a great deal. Those choices, in turn, will depend in part on the strength of the American position in their respective regions, East Asia and Europe; and the economic constraints on the United States will weaken that position in both places. 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