Withdrawal KT Multilateralism

Peaceful Power Transition

American preponderance provides a remarkable geopolitical stability at the start of the twenty first century. In virtually every corner of the globe American power and purpose are central to the preservation of power. Even countries with the capability to challenge American leadership, such as Germany and Japan, choose not to do so. Its cultural reach and material preponderance quite possibly endow the United States with greater influence over global affairs than any other power in history has had. America’s unipolar moment will not last indefinitely, however. Economic output in the United States has fallen from one-half to one quarter of global product over the past five decades, and secular processes of diffusion will continue to redistribute economic and military might in the years ahead. A rising China and Europe united by a single market and a single currency are emerging counterweights to American power. Assuming the European Union (EU) succeeds in deepening its level of integration and adding new members it will soon have influence on matters of finance and trade equal to America’s. In addition, the emerging polity may well emerge a more sparing internationalism in coming years. As younger generations rise to positions of influence and constitute a larger share of the electorate, the formative experiences shaping today’s internationalism - World War II and the Cold war- will recede into the past. As the century progresses, America will not be able to sustain the global preponderance that it enjoys today. A unipolar international system will over time give way to a world of multiple centers of power. A more diffuse concentration of power could have quite diverse global consequences. Although scholars disagree about whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more stable, most agree that both are less stable than unipolar systems. A substantial literature also indicates that power transitions are usually accompanied by major war. Furthermore, the absence of a global hegemon could mean turmoil for an international economy characterized by unprecedented flows of capital and goods.

As the century progresses, America will not be able to sustain the global preponderance that it enjoys today. A unipolar international system will over time give way to a world of multiple centers of power. A more diffuse concentration of power could have quite diverse global consequences. Although scholars disagree about whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more stable, most agree that both are less stable than unipolar systems. A substantial literature also indicates that power transitions are usually accompanied by major war. Furthermore, the absence of a global hegemon could mean turmoil for an international economy characterized by unprecedented flows of capital and goods. Accordingly, the United States and the broader international community must start to address how to manage this coming transition in the international system. Instead of focusing on how to preserve and wield global primacy, US grand strategy must focus on how to preserve international stability as global power becomes more equally distributed. It is far more prudent to begin preparing for a multipolar world now, while the United States still enjoys preponderance and the influence that comes with it, than to wait until international order has already begun to unravel.

This analysis suggests that American primacy will be short lived. The power transition literature and the historical record provide good reason for concern: as unipolarity disappears, so too will the stability it has engendered. At the same time, this structural change will occur through different mechanisms than in the past, suggesting that it may be easier to manage peacefully than previous power transitions. The rising challenger is Europe not a unitary state with hegemonic ambition. Europe’s aspirations will be moderated by the self-checking mechanisms inherent in the EU and by cultural and linguistic barriers to centralization. In addition, the United States is likely to react to a more independent Europe by stepping back and making room for an EU that appears ready to be more self-reliant and more muscular. Unlike reigning hegemons in the past, the United States will not fight to the finish to maintain its primary and prevent its eclipse by a rising challenger. On the contrary, the United States is likely to cede leadership willingly as its economy slows and it grows weary of being the security guarantor of last resort. The prospect is thus not one of clashing titans, but one of no titans at all.

Beyond the exercise of strategic restraint - what I call self-binding - plays an important role in allowing trust and reciprocity to build, in turn enabling an incremental cognitive shift toward the mutual attribution of benign character. Self-binding behavior and institutions communicate benign intentions and a state’s willingness to forgo opportunities for individual gain. The assessment of benign intentions over time turns into the attribution of benign character. The process works in a self reinforcing manner, with each side becoming more willing to engage in self-binding as it attributes benign intentions and character to the other.

This analysis suggests that American primacy will be short lived. The power transition literature and the historical record provide good reason for concern: as unipolarity disappears, so too will the stability it has engendered. At the same time, this structural change will occur through different mechanisms than in the past, suggesting that it may be easier to manage peacefully than previous power transitions. The rising challenger is Europe not a unitary state with hegemonic ambition. Europe’s aspirations will be moderated by the self-checking mechanisms inherent in the EU and by cultural and linguistic barriers to centralization. In addition, the United States is likely to react to a more independent Europe by stepping back and making room for an EU that appears ready to be more self-reliant and more muscular. Unlike reigning hegemons in the past, the United States will not fight to the finish to maintain its primary and prevent its eclipse by a rising challenger. On the contrary, the United States is likely to cede leadership willingly as its economy slows and it grows weary of being the security guarantor of last resort. The prospect is thus not one of clashing titans, but one of no titans at all.

First, the most likely near term challenger to the United States is not a unitary state, but Europe in the midst of integration. For the foreseeable future, the European Union is likely to fall well short of becoming an amalgamated polity. At the same time, a single market and single currency give Europe a distinctively collective character; At least in the economic realm, the EU is already a counterweight to the United States. Whether or not the EU develops a military capability commensurate with its economic resources and whether or not authority continues to be concentrated at the supranational level, a more balanced Atlantic relationship is likely to evolve as the twenty-first century progresses - with as yet undetermined consequences for global polarity.