Japan Aff Michigan



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XT: Singapore I/L



Singapore is vulnerable to maritime terrorism absent Japanese cooperation.

Sato, 7- professor and an expert in international and comparative political economy of the Asia-Pacific region and Japanese foreign policy (Yoichiro, September, 2000, “Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation,” http://www.stormingmedia.us/66/6642/A664274.html)
Singapore’s location in the heart of the Malacca Strait and its economy’s critical dependence on entrepot trade focus its attention on maritime terrorism and piracy in the Malacca Strait, and this focus closely overlaps with Japan’s interests. Combined with long-standing mistrust of predominantly Muslim Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore’s high priority on strait security has led to seeking closer cooperation with external partners, especially the United States and Japan, sometimes beyond the comfort level of Singapore’s neighbors. On the other hand, Singapore already possesses the most capable naval and maritime security forces in Southeast Asia and does not require as much external assistance in terms of equipment and training except for joint operations. Singapore’s cooperation with Japan instead has focused on diplomatic, international-legal, and information fronts. Most notably, the two countries’ cooperation played a crucial role in setting up the ReCAAP framework. However, the combined leadership of Japan and Singapore could also be viewed negatively by other ASEAN countries (especially Malaysia and Indonesia), hindering multilateral cooperation in the region. Singaporeans perceive that the high number of Western businesses in Singapore and the country’s own adoption of some aspects of Westernization make Singapore a likely target of maritime terrorism. In the Malacca Strait, Japan’s more important East-bound traffic (of loaded oil tankers from the Middle East) sails through waters under Indonesian jurisdiction. Hence Singapore encourages multilateralized Japanese assistance to less capable littoral states (most notably Indonesia) to build their capacity for security enforcement. Regional observers say Japan’s offers of assistance are better received by ASEAN states than similar offers from the United States.

XT: Thailand I/L



Thailand looks to Japan to contribute to their security efforts.

Sato, 7- professor and an expert in international and comparative political economy of the Asia-Pacific region and Japanese foreign policy (Yoichiro, September, 2000, “Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation,” http://www.stormingmedia.us/66/6642/A664274.html)
Thailand sees Japan as an important player in its security relations. Thai desire to have and balance diverse security partners is encouraged by Japan’s recent moves to become an active regional security actor, including the ongoing discussions of constitutional revision to allow collective defense and the upgrading of the Defense Agency to the Defense Ministry in January 2007. China’s growing security cooperation with Thailand’s neighbors and coastal states of the Indian Ocean, such as Burma, Cambodia, Maldives, Pakistan, and Iran, urges Thailand to seek closer cooperation with Japan. Thai officials see a significant overlap between the maritime security interests of Thailand and Japan and argue that local Thai capacity building is in Japan’s interests. However, differences in broad strategic interests and issue priorities between the two countries set limits to their cooperation. Furthermore, the current level of cooperation has not even tested these limits due to the complexity of Thai maritime jurisdictions, lack of domestic coordination in the Thai government, and incomplete Japanese awareness of these problems.

China Relations Add-Ons



US Presence in Japan Makes China uneasy

Worden et. al. 87 [Robert, , Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan, editors. China: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the ibrary of Congress, 1987.
Japan is by far the most important to China of the nonsuperpower developed nations. Among the reasons for this are geographical proximity and historical and cultural ties, China's perception of Japan as a possible resurgent threat, Japan's close relations with the United States since the end of World War II, and Japan's role as the third-ranking industrialized power in the world. Japan's invasion and occupation of parts of China in the 1930s was a major component of the devastation China underwent during the "century of shame and humiliation." After 1949 Chinese relations with Japan changed several times, from hostility and an absence of contact to cordiality and extremely close cooperation in many fields. One recurring Chinese concern in Sino-Japanese relations has been the potential remilitarization of Japan. At the time of the founding of the People's Republic, Japan was defeated and Japanese military power dismantled, but China continued to view Japan as a potential threat because of the United States presence there. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance included the provision that each side would protect the other from an attack by "Japan or any state allied with it," and China undoubtedly viewed with alarm Japan's role as the principal United States base during the Korean War.

Property Rights Add-On



A. Closing the base would restore property freedoms

Mulgan 00 Senior Lecturer Australian Defense Force Academy University of New South Wales (Aurelia George, January 2001,

One of the major claims of Okinawans is that the constitutional rights to private property of Japanese landowners have been violated by the enforcement of leases of parcels of land for use by US forces. Article 29 of the Constitution states that ‘the right to own or to hold property is inviolable’. When Governor Ota refused to sign the documents needed to extend the forced leases of land for US bases in late 1995, he told reporters he was ‘going to insist in court that forcing them to renew violates rights of property ownership and land holding guaranteed under the Constitution’ (Nikkei Weekly 27 November 1995).8 His legal team also demanded that the court allow landowners to speak as witnesses, to give them an opportunity to explain how the US military presence was violating Okinawans’ constitutional rights.9 In his appeal to the Supreme Court that followed, Ota argued amongst other things that forced contracts violated the Japanese Constitution, which protects private property. His appeal contended that the lawsuit implied ‘issues of basic human rights such as constitutionally guaranteed property rights, people’s rights to a life in peace, and [the prefectures’] rights to home rule’ (‘The Text of Governor Ota’s Testimony’, in JPRI 1997: 4). Therefore, the Okinawa base issue was one that impinged on the basic human rights of Japanese nationals everywhere (ibid). Ota’s appeal was lost. In essence, the question of Okinawan landowners’ rights comes down to a political rather than a constitutional or legal question, insofar as Article 29 of the Constitution also provides that ‘private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefore’. This Article embodies the eminent domain powers of the state vis -à-vis private property owners. These powers are implemented through the legal provisions of the 1952 Land Acquisition Law, which gives the state the right to acquire private land for public use. The law that specifically embodies these eminent domain powers in relation to US bases in Japan is the Special Measures Law for Land Used by the American Forces. Under the law, the government can forcibly acquire title to appropriate land for USFJ facilities when the consent of landowners has not been forthcoming (Defense Agency 1997: 237).10 The state’s legal rights were, therefore, used to override local landowners’ refusal to sign renewals of land leases.
B. Invasions of freedom must be rejected

Petro 74, professor of law, Wake Forest University, (Sylvester, Spring 1974, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW, p. 480.)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value, and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.





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