Non-war-fighting tasks are irrelevant to the base and are no reason to sustain trrops.
Bandow 98 - senior fellow at Cato Instituion and special assistant to Reagan (9/1/98, Doug, “Okinawa: Liberating Washington's East Asian Military Colony” Policy Analysis no. 314)
Next, the Marines point tonew, non-war-fighting tasks. They state, "Our missions span the operation continuum from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance through non-combat evacuation and peacekeeping."63 Some of those tasks are of dubious benefit--especially American involvement in UN peacekeeping or nation building.64 Others may diminish the Marine Corps' ability to carry out its most important task (humanitarian operations, for exam- ple, tend to degrade war-fighting capabilities). Even those tasks with value--rescuing American civilians from an imploding country, for instance--do not warrant the cost, to both the United States and Okinawa, of the existing force and base structure. The American presence on the island during the Cold War could at least be defended as serving a serious end: the defense of East Asia against a hegemonic totalitarian threat. Being ready to help Japan in the event of another Kobe-magnitude earthquake, which the Marines point to as an example of a worthwhile noncombat mission, or to extract American businessmen who have voluntarily ventured into nations with volatile political environments, is far less important. Moreover, such tasks have little to do with Okinawa. Observes Miki, "When we go to the U.S., people say, 'we are trying to protect you, why do you complain?' But today the 3rd MEF has virtually nothing to do with defending the Okinawans. It is one thing to impose U.S. military installations on a reluctant population when Washington is actually protecting those people. It is quite another to perpetuate that burden to advance purely American interests. (Without embarrassment, the Marine Corps says that "hosting the U.S. Marine Corps [in Okinawa] is by no accident."66 That is true--Washington simply placed the bases where it desired in an occupied province of a defeated nation.)
AT: Japanese Rearm
No chance of Japanese militarism/rearm – Free trade is too important
Evans, 98 (Daniel T., December 1998, “MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS: TOWARD A LIMITED FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY”)
An ideology that must be overcome in U.S. foreign policy, and in the foreign policies of Japan's neighbors, if collective security is to work in Asia is the fear of the revival of Japanese militarism. These notions are simply outdated. Imperial Japan's expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s, as horrible as it was, arose from a specific set of conditions that bore little resemblance to the current or any reasonably foreseeable situation. The insecurities of pre-World War II Japan stemmed from the fact that they were a burgeoning world power without the natural resources to sustain such aspirations. Thus they set out with expansionist foreign policy to accrue these natural resources and ensure their place among the world's great powers. Modern Japan is a completely different state. Japan already is one of the world's great powers and global economic interdependence provides Japan with her necessary resources. Japan would have nothing to gain from the use of military action to overturn the present world order. Perhaps more than any other nation, Japan benefits from international trade and neither needs nor has the incentive to attempt to alter this ideal situation through the use of military force
AT: Japan Militarization
Japan Won’t Go Nuclear
Kazi 9 Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi [Reshmi, July 31, Fellows' Seminar Discussants: J Madan Mohan and Sitakanta Mishr, http://www.idsa.in/event/WillJapanGoNuclear_rkazi_310709; WBTR]
The Japanese position on the nuclear weapons option has been ambivalent. Japan has never made any official decision on whether or not to exercise the nuclear option. Still its pacifist constitution clearly deters the state from maintaining land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential. The right of state belligerency too has been denied in the Japanese constitution. The constitution’s stance on nuclear arms, however, remains ambiguous and it has led many pro-nuclear advocates to debate the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Although the Constitution may be interpreted to allow for possession of nuclear weapons, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 clearly emphasizes the essence of Japan’s policy in maintaining a peaceful, transparent nuclear programme. Besides, Japan has also adopted the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ expressing the policy of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This position was reiterated in 1976 when it ratified the NPT and committed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. However, though the validity of these principles has been upheld by successive cabinets, the degree of restraint that these principles place on Japan’s nuclear policy remains uncertain. Most importantly, they do not represent a legal restraint, because Diet resolutions are passed as an expression of the will of the chamber and are non-binding. Further, over the years, allegations have been made regarding the violation of the third principle of the three non-nuclear principles right from the Cold War period. Still, the support for a robust nuclear weapon policy has not gained enough momentum and Japan continues to remain committed to an anti-nuclear policy. Japan will only Develop Nukes With US Presence
Kazi 9 Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi [Reshmi, July 31, Fellows' Seminar Discussants: J Madan Mohan and Sitakanta Mishr, http://www.idsa.in/event/WillJapanGoNuclear_rkazi_310709; WBTR]
If Japan decides to go nuclear, it has to deal with two main hurdles: i) it has to revise domestic laws and conventions related to Japan’s stance on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which is going to be quite complicated; ii) it also has to withdraw from the NPT, a step which will definitely be against Japan’s national interest. There has occurred an attitudinal shift in the current nuclear debate in Japan. Although the Japanese population is considered to be suffering from the so-called ‘nuclear allergy’, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has called for active discussion of possible nuclear weapons option. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which is projected to be the virtual winner of the upcoming August 30 general election in Japan, has also talked about a ‘radical revision’ of the Japan-U.S. Security alliance and advocated an independent security policy for Japan. Even if Japan decides to pursue the nuclear option, it will probably do so with the tacit support of the U.S. The U.S. will inevitably reduce its involvement in Asia over the longer term. It will eventually lead Japan to think seriously about its nuclear option for national security. Engagement in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan won’t make the U.S. compromise its security pact with Japan. It is true that Japan has not gone nuclear yet. However, the real question is how long Japan can prevent itself from going nuclear.In the near future, Japan will probably decide to keep its nuclear option ambiguous, as it will enhance its bargaining power with the West, particularly the U.S.
Chances of Japan with Nukes are Exaggerated
Kazi 9 Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi [Reshmi, July 31, Fellows' Seminar Discussants: J Madan Mohan and Sitakanta Mishr, http://www.idsa.in/event/WillJapanGoNuclear_rkazi_310709; WBTR]
Yukiya Amano of Japan is the new chief of the IAEA. His election will probably intensify the gap between Japan’s ardent support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on the one hand, and Japan’s aspiration to go nuclear for national security reasons on the other hand. In terms of method and theory, the paper could be expanded in scope. Instead of a one-dimensional approach, it should adopt a multidimensional approach in drawing the scenarios. In the paper, the author has identified the scenarios assuming that Japan will go nuclear in the near future. Instead, she should build scenarios keeping in mind different possibilities in terms of outcomes. Most of the scenarios drawn by the author are not realistic enough. The bilateral security arrangement between Japan and the U.S. is still going strong. China has been a security threat to Japan throughout its history. Contrary to assumptions made by security analysts regarding the nuclear issue of North Korea provoking Japan to go nuclear, the North is still not considered such a big threat by most Japanese. Only the hawks in Japan offer the excuse of China and North Korea to discuss Japan’s nuclear option. Instead ofoffering ten different scenarios, most of which are not ‘realistic’ enough, the author should concentrate on four or five ‘most probable’ scenarios. The paper is very light with respect to the implications for India. The author needs to take into account the contributions of the strong anti-nuclear movements (especially the hibakusha movements) within Japan. In the paper, the author mentions that the constitution of Japan does not talk about nuclear weapons. However, Japan’s Defence White Paper 2008 interprets that the constitution bans possessions of WMDs, ICBMs and fighter bombers. No chance of Japanese militarism/rearm.
Evans, 98 (Daniel T., December 1998, “MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS: TOWARD A LIMITED FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY”)
An ideology that must be overcome in U.S. foreign policy, and in the foreign policies of Japan's neighbors, if collective security is to work in Asia is the fear of the revival of Japanese militarism. These notions are simply outdated. Imperial Japan's expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s, as horrible as it was, arose from a specific set of conditions that bore little resemblance to the current or any reasonably foreseeable situation. The insecurities of pre-World War II Japan stemmed from the fact that they were a burgeoning world power without the natural resources to sustain such aspirations. Thus they set out with expansionist foreign policy to accrue these natural resources and ensure their place among the world's great powers. Modern Japan is a completely different state. Japan already is one of the world's great powers and global economic interdependence provides Japan with her necessary resources. Japan would have nothing to gain from the use of military action to overturn the present world order. Perhaps more than any other nation, Japan benefits from international trade and neither needs nor has the incentive to attempt to alter this ideal situation through the use of military force