Lawrence Peter Ampofo
Terrorist Organisations in France
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- Counter-terrorism Policies in Contemporary France
Terrorist Organisations in FranceThe French response to terrorism is strikingly different to that which occurred in Spain. France was the first European country to experience international terrorism of Middle Eastern origin. The phenomenon came to the attention of the French Government in 1980 when a car bomb was detonated in the Paris Rue de Copernic on a Jewish target, motivated by ‘foreign terrorists whose purpose was to influence French foreign policy in the Middle East’ (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003: 67). In the 1980s, France was considered by international policymakers and terrorist organisations to be a haven for international terrorist organisations, due largely to its adherence to the Sanctuary Doctrine adopted by the Government which was instituted ‘prior to the 1980s’ (Shapiro & Suzan 2003: 69). The main tenets of this doctrine centred on the belief that if terrorist organisations were given sanctuary within French borders, they would be less likely to pose a threat to French interests. While the Sanctuary Doctrine would eventually yield flaws, it was initially successful. Terrorist groups, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Factions Armées Révolutionnaires Libanaises, which had been a long-term problem in France, dramatically reduced their attacks on French interests (Garapon, 2005). The fact that the decrease of terrorist attacks was not enforced but a situation agreed upon meant that small inconsistencies in French counter-terrorism policy eventually became deep fissures. The problems inherent within the Sanctuary Doctrine were considerable and ultimately positioned France as a pariah amongst members of the international community and detractors of the terrorist groups it sheltered. Numerous states and terrorist organisations also perceived the doctrine to be a sign of weakness, a perception not lost upon certain terrorist organisations which utilised violence against French interests when they became strategically important such as the terrorist attacks of the Paris subway, trains and public buildings in 1986 by the Committee for Solidarity with Near Eastern Political Prisoners (CSPPA) (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). Although the increase in international terrorism in France was in large part ascribed to the convergence of a burgeoning Middle Eastern and North African population in combination with a permissive counter-terrorism strategy (Human Rights Watch, 2005), scholars such as Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan noted that international terrorism was widely perceived in the French Government to be the result of the country’s “colonial hangover” in North Africa. International terrorism was therefore widely considered by the French Government to be more of a diplomatic and foreign policy problem than a law enforcement problem (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). The permissiveness of the French approach to counter-terrorism during this period attracted a host of terrorist organisations to the country. The Kurdish Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (PKK)), in particular, was active in the country in the 1980s. In addition to the organisation using France as a base to conduct its operational strategies, it was also the region where the PKK generated substantial funds. The organisation allegedly controls the drug and human trafficking market in Europe, a multi-billion pound industry, the profits of which were siphoned off to the operational base in Kurdistan, Northern Iraq (Laciner, 2006, Global Security, 2011). In addition to the PKK, Hezbollah also maintained a strong presence in France, even hosting the al-Manar television station in the region through which it broadcasted its raison d’être to the Middle East and other members of the Europe-based Palestinian diaspora. The presence of Hezbollah did nothing to appease the negative perception of France held by Israel, particularly after it was made clear that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was operating within the country and yet perpetrating attacks on Israeli citizens (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). It should not be overlooked that France had to contend with a high level of ethno-nationalist terrorism. It was widely known that while ETA was conducting its campaign on Spanish territory against the Spanish Government, its base of operations was located in South-western France. The fact that ETA was allowed for a time to plan attacks in France with impunity and subsequently execute them in Spain enraged Spanish policymakers. France also had to counter the threat of ethno-nationalist terrorism from Corsica as rebel groups such as The Corsican People’s Army (APC) and the National Liberation Front of Corsica perpetrated numerous attacks on French infrastructure such as the assassination of the French Prefect Claude Erignac in 1998 in Corsica (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). France also suffered from the threat of Marxist terrorism, most prominently in the form of Action Directe, which was active until 1987. Although the group was prolific at causing widespread damage and a number of deaths (BBC News, 1986), its mantle was superseded by the presence of international terrorist organisations.
The political and operational fragility of the Sanctuary Doctrine was eventually exposed following the 1986 Paris subway attacks. The attacks, which severely affected the subway, killed 11 people and injured more than 220, and spurred the French Government into a complete revision of its counter-terrorist policy, conceding that the Sanctuary Doctrine was in fact detrimental to French interests. To this end, it bestowed far-reaching powers upon its judicial system, granting it the authority to implement legislative changes quickly and without obstacle from central or local government (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). In addition to this, the national police force, the Gendarmerie, and the military were given extra mandates that they were also to be used in counter-terrorism operations. In this way, the Gendarmerie was to be used in a similar manner to that of Spain’s Guardia Civil, to assist the efforts of the revamped judicial service and the newly created counter-terrorism departments (Ballesteros, 2005). It also sought to remedy the problem of miscommunication amongst the security services and as a result created the Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT), and the Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (SCLAT), which eventually became the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) in 2006, and then merged with the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux to become the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur in 2008. As a result of this restructuring, France witnessed a significant decline in the number of terrorist incidents and terrorist organisations it had hitherto provided refuge as part of its Sanctuary Doctrine (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). The effect of this policy is represented below: Figure Six: Number of National and International Terrorist Incidents in France from 1970 to 2008 
Source: Global Terrorism Database From the perspective of Barnett’s theory, that global political, economic and military integration is a panacea for the cessation of political violence, the Sanctuary Doctrine demonstrated that in the long term it was abject at discouraging terrorist violence. The policy was myopic as it simply sought to preserve the interests and security of the French State, with no concern for that of other States. In addition, the Sanctuary Doctrine did little to include states from the non-Integrating Gap into global processes and therefore left France vulnerable to reprisal attacks by other rival terrorist organisations. From the perspective of Barnett’s theory, the Sanctuary Doctrine would only have invited violence upon French interests, as it did nothing to ensure region-wide security and prosperity by considering the interests of other states in its counter-terrorist policy. Rather it sought to maintain its own security, independent of other states, by indulging the demands of terrorist organisations. The fact that the structure of France’s new counter-terrorism system was more akin to the network structure of the terrorist organisations it faced was an erudite posture to adopt for a number of reasons. The Government became strongly cognisant of the changing nature of terrorism as the country became more integrated in global political and economic structures. The drastic change in counter-terrorism policy is suggestive of an increase in awareness at the highest levels of Government that international terrorism in the region would not abate unless a more effective system was created that could mirror the organisations against which it was positioning itself. Such a significant change in outlook for combatting terrorism also validates Bobbitt’s theory that radical change in conventional counter-terrorist strategies is needed in order to mitigate contemporary political violence as nation states evolve into market states because; ‘Market state terrorism is global terrorism. Markets, unlike nations, are often global. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that al-Qaeda is not only a reaction to globalisation, but a manifestation and exploitation of globalisation. To see that is also to see that market state terrorism is an unintended side-effect of the globalisation of international communications (including travel), rapid computation, and radical weapons development of the late twentieth century, which is to say the very strategic developments that are bringing into being the constitutional innovations of the market state. This suggests that al-Qaeda will be copied by other globally networked infrastructures engendered by the emergence of market states’ (Bobbitt, 2008: 83). It also appears that in the past the French Government thought it more useful to adopt a counter-terrorism system that allowed terrorist organisations to operate as long as French interests were not targeted. This decision closely follows Bobbitt’s assertion that in order to effectively combat market or networked forms of terrorism, emerging market states need to adopt market-style structures and solutions. Directory: portal -> files -> 4733003 files -> Impact case study (ref3b) files -> Ethics and Factual Television: a short history files -> P. O. Box 27, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland tel. 358-9-191 58080 / 22216; fax 358-9-191 58096 / 23008 files -> The impact of a pledge campaign and the promise of publicity: a randomized controlled trial of charitable donations files -> Diversity and Voice: the Political Participation of Young People in the European Union files -> Chapter 15 a voice in Decision Making: young children in Denmark Stig Broström Introduction Download 1.29 Mb. Share with your friends:
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