Lawrence Peter Ampofo
The Development of Cybercrime vs. Cyberterrorism in Spain
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The Development of Cybercrime vs. Cyberterrorism in SpainWhile the general stated raison d'être of terrorist organisations is to achieve political change, the problem of financing high-risk and expensive operations, compounded with the obvious need to ensure the continuation of the organisation at large, are ever-present concerns. The main aim of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom organisation (ETA) is for a fully independent state, separate from Spain. During the Cold War era, terrorist organisations in Spain generated funds in a number of ways. From 1950 to 1990, ETA was adroit at carrying out such actions as extortion, kidnappings and assassinations as part of its collection of tactics designed to terrorise the Spanish Government and its people into accepting an independent Basque state (Buesa, 2011). With the ending of the Cold War, the onset of globalisation greatly facilitated ETA’s access to global flows of information, ideas, and capital, impacting the terrorist organisation profoundly. Ready access to high technology, the opportunity to trade and share information globally and the freedom to travel between national borders, particularly the European Union, meant that ETA could obtain other sources of funding which they had hitherto been unable to access. As a result, ETA operated heavily in areas such as the drug trade and arms trading in Spain as well as training other terrorist organisations in other parts of the world such as Colombia (Buesa, 2011, Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). Similarly, groups related to al-Qaeda in Spain became adept at taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by globalisation to generate further funds. For example, the organisation became involved in the cannabis trade that operated in Ceuta, Melilla and other southern Spanish regions (Úbeda-Portugués, 2010). It has been argued that, since the 1990s, terrorist organisations have engaged in activities that were normally the reserve of organised crime syndicates as a source of revenue. Tamara Makarenko contended that the 1990s saw the development of a crime-terror nexus in which there was a proclivity for terrorist organisations to engage in activities that were normally the reserve of organised crime syndicates and vice versa. Makarenko outlined this argument in a crime-terror continuum model, which depicted the relationships that exist between contemporary terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates. Figure Twenty-One: Crime – Terror Nexus Model 
Source: Tamara Makarenko, 2004 Makarenko claimed that the relationships between the two organisations, as presented in Figure Twenty-One above, could be depicted along the same plane, on which organised crime is at one end and terrorist organisations are at the other. Using statistical evidence on rates of terrorism and incidents of crime from governments, in addition to media content and reviews of scholarly literature, Makarenko outlined that a point exists on the crime-terror continuum in which the two entities converge, or individual organisations adopt the characteristics of both elements i.e. the ‘Black Hole syndrome’ (Makarenko, 2004). Hence, she argued: ‘[T]he 1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime–terror nexus was consolidated [in a similar way to commensuration]: the rise of transnational organised crime and the changing nature of terrorism mean that two traditionally separate phenomena have begun to reveal many operational and organisational similarities. Indeed, criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other’s successes and failures, meaning that it is necessary to acknowledge, and to understand the crime–terror continuum to formulate effective state responses to these evolving, and periodically converging, threats’ (Makarenko, 2004: 42). The argument that terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates operate in a similar fashion and, indeed learn from each other, is indicative of an apparent shift in strategic thinking from terrorist organisations; that economic power has become a more powerful lever of political change than violence. The onset of globalisation had an effect on terrorist organisations operating in Spain as it allowed them to use international markets to attract greater levels of finance. Philip Bobbitt posited this assertion again in Terror and Consent: Wars for the 21st Century in which he claimed that market state terrorists are much better funded than nation state terrorists. This is because they can rely ‘on a wider variety of sources for funding...terrorist organisations are broadening their reach in gathering financial resources to fund their operations…Websites are also important vehicles for raising funds’ (Bobbitt, 2008: 49). Makarenko added to Bobbitt’s argument that globalisation had significantly altered the dynamic of the traditional terrorist organisation, making them much more of a threat to governments: ‘Growing reliance on cross-border criminal activities—facilitated by open borders, weak states, immigration flows, financial technology, and a highly intricate and accessible global transportation infrastructure—and an associated interest in establishing political control in order to consolidate and secure future operations, have all contributed to the rise of the crime–terror nexus…The realisation that economic and political power enhance one another, suggests that more and more groups will become hybrid organisations by nature. This is enhanced by the fact that criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other’s successes and failures’ (Makarenko, 2004: 141). Following on from Makarenko’s argument above, Xavier Raufer was more synoptic in his appraisal of the globalisation, crime and terrorism nexus, claiming that ‘[g]rabbing control of financial institutions can both bring home the cash and advance political ambitions. Many groups, of course, will retain narrow portfolios of objectives, targets, and methods; others are becoming conglomerates of causes’ (Makarenko, 2004: 134). As the widespread adoption of increasingly sophisticated internet and Web technologies were adopted into the strategic operations of terrorist organisations, it became increasingly apparent that cybercrime emerged as an excellent method of generating funds (Palicio, 2010). Spain, as has been outlined, has become a “breeding ground” for cybercrime and, as a result, terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates have flourished81. This chapter will now analyse the range of understandings that existed in online discussion concerning cybercrime, technology, terrorism and counter-terrorism related to the 11 March 2004 attacks, in order to provide a greater degree of richness to the conclusions from the semi-structured interviews conducted on the topic; it will now explore whether citizens, journalists and others understood the two as one nexus. Directory: portal -> files -> 4733003 files -> Impact case study (ref3b) files -> Ethics and Factual Television: a short history files -> P. O. Box 27, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland tel. 358-9-191 58080 / 22216; fax 358-9-191 58096 / 23008 files -> The impact of a pledge campaign and the promise of publicity: a randomized controlled trial of charitable donations files -> Diversity and Voice: the Political Participation of Young People in the European Union files -> Chapter 15 a voice in Decision Making: young children in Denmark Stig Broström Introduction Download 1.29 Mb. Share with your friends:
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