Masaryk university
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Energy SecurityThe Czech and Slovak republics inherited from the communist period a dependency on Russian oil and gas. The influence of the communist regime on the energy sector resulted in isolation from international markets, high energy use due to the focus on the industrial sector and a dependency on oil and gas imports from Soviet states at politically regulated prices.332 The isolation from international markets was in part due to the system of transit which consisted of a network of pipelines that stretched in one direction from the mining fields in the USSR to West Europe, and secured the majority of gas supplied to Czechoslovakia.333 The exclusive import and transit of hydrocarbon fuels from the USSR was one of the instruments used to exert control over its satellite states.334 The reliance of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on Russian gas and oil stems from agreements made within the Comecon framework during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 2006, the Czech Republic relied on Russia for 74% of its gas imports and the Slovak Republic was 100% dependent on Russian gas.335 Russia’s profit from the oil sector amounts to 25% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product and for example if the cost of one barrel of oil was raised by one US dollar, then Russia would increase its profit by 1.4 billion USD.336 One priority of Russia is to maintain the cost of transit for gas and oil destined for Western markets as low as possible. Gazprom, or specifically its daughter company, Gazprom Export, is responsible for the transit of gas through the Czech and Slovak Republics. Gazprom Export pays with gas for the costs of transit and in the case of SPP these gas payments represent two thirds of gas consumption in Slovakia.337 While the Czech Republic and Slovakia are significant contributors to gas transit in Europe, their role in the transit of oil is minimal.338 Russia’s efforts have been to expand its economic reach into Central and Eastern Europe in order to oppose Western influence following NATO and EU enlargement. In order for Russia to regain its footing as a major European power, it needs the region that lies between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.339 When the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined NATO and became political and military allies of the United States, Russia was left to look for other ways to influence Central Europe. One way to exert pressure on Central and Eastern European countries is through the control of hydrocarbon supplies and their transit routes. Smith describes Russia’s “pipeline imperialism” that began in the 1990s when Russia first interrupted energy supplies to the Baltic states in order to suppress independence movements. In 1993 and 1994, Russia reduced supplies to the Ukraine in order to force the country to pay for previous gas shipments, and to pressure the country into giving Russia more control over the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Between 1998 and 2000, Russia’s Transneft oil shipment interrupted supplies nine times to Lithuania because it opposed the sale of Lithuania’s refinery, port facility and pipeline to an American company, Williams Company of Tulsa.340 These disruptions occurred before Russian President Putin assumed power in 2000. Under his leadership the energy policy of Russia became one of the main instruments in the foreign policy of Russia.341 Hirman quotes Putin who defined the main duties of Russian foreign policy in the energy sector as the “need to build on the geo-strategic interests of the Russian Federation.”342 During Putin’s presidency, interruptions in the supply of hydrocarbons continued. Belarus experienced a disruption in its supply in 2004 as part of Russia’s attempt to take over their national gas pipeline system. The disagreement between Gazprom and the Belarusian gas company Beltransgas concerned issues such as price, transit fees and a possible joint consortium for gas transit.343 In 2006, during the Russian-Ukrainian “gas war” Russia interrupted the energy supply to the Ukraine. The causes of the disruption were the demands of Gazprom for a fourfold price increase in the supply of gas to the Ukraine, the failure of a joint consortium between Gazprom and the Ukrainian oil and gas company Naftogaz Ukrainy where Gazprom wanted majority ownership,344 and sending a clear signal to the newly elected Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko that developing a closer relationship with the EU and NATO would not go unpunished.345 Poland criticized Russia’s plan to construct the pipeline Jamal II arguing that Russia only wanted to decrease the transit of gas through the Ukraine which would weaken the Ukrainian economy and increase its dependency on Russia.346 Shortly after the Czech Republic signed the missile defense agreement with the USA in 2007, Russia announced it would be forced to reduce deliveries of oil due to technical reasons and the supply of Russian crude oil decreased by 50%.347 Some have even argued that the rise in prices announced by Gazprom for many of its European customers in 2007 was politically motivated. It was interpreted as an attempt by Russia to pressure the EU’s energy sector reforms which would introduce laws limiting Gazprom’s participation in European markets.348 These are just some examples of the interruptions in supply that Russia carries out. In one study conducted by Robert Larrson, he found that between 1992 and 2006, Russia cut off or threatened to cut off energy supplies 55 times, mostly when Russia wanted to achieve some economic or political goal in the Baltic states or CIS countries.349 The separation of the two republics did not create any negative effects in the energy sector of the countries. This was partly due to the fact that energy policy had been generated on the republic rather than the federal level and each state had their own electricity companies, oil refineries and oil and gas distribution companies.350 Debate between the two countries concerned the control and management of the oil and gas pipelines. Transgas administered the supply of gas to Western Europe. Although attempts were made to keep Transgas as a single company, negotiations failed and the company was divided into separate. Transpetrol was in charge of the oil pipelines, pumping stations and storage units. The company was owned by the former Ministry of Economy of Czechoslovakia and met with a similar fate as Transgas.351 All of the storage facilities for oil and partly for gas were located in Slovakia which meant that the Czech Republic would have to construct its own.352 The Czech and Slovak Republics are both supplied with oil from Russia through the Družba pipeline which began operation in 1962 and later on connected to the Litvínov and Kralupy nad Vltavou refineries in the Czech Republic. Družba runs from Russia, splits into two pipelines in Belarus, one of which continues through the Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. It is 350km long in the Czech Republic and reaches a length of over 500km in Slovakia. In the south of Slovakia, Družba joins with the Adria pipeline which starts at the Croatian port of Omišalj. Adria supplied Czech and Hungarian refineries with oil mainly from Libya and Algeria. Currently, the pipeline is used only irregularly to supply Russian oil to Serbia.353 Unipetrol is the major oil refinery and petrochemical group in the Czech Republic. It was founded in 1994 as one of the gradual steps in the privatization of the Czech petrochemical industry. Until 2004, the Czech state represented by the Czech National Property Fund owned 63% of shares in the company after which the government approved the sale to Polsko Koncern Naftowy Orlen Spolka Akcyjna (PKN Orlen).354 Moravské naftové doly (MND) is responsible for the extraction and production of oil in the Czech Republic, however it is a marginal participant in the Czech energy market. Slovnaft is the leader in domestic oil refining in Slovakia. In 2000, the company entered into a strategic partnership with the Hungarian based MOL Group and by 2004, MOL owned a 98.2% stake in Slovnaft.355 In Slovakia, Transpetrol is responsible for the two oil transit pipelines, Družba and Adria. In 2002, 49% of shares were sold to Yukos which subsequently declared bankruptcy. In 2006, the Yukos shares in Transpetrol were sold to Russnaft.356 Both Slovnaft and Transpetrol operate storage facilities in Slovakia. Gas was first imported through the pipeline Bratrství into Czechoslovakia in 1967. This pipeline begins in Russia, goes through the Ukraine and Slovakia, and finishes in the Czech Republic where it is connected to the domestic gas network. In 1969, the pipeline was connected to Austria and the success of the project led to other Western European countries such as Germany, France and Italy to connect to the pipeline, reflecting the growing interest in gas from Russia.357 Slovakia became a major transit country, and after EU accession it is the main point of entry of Russian gas to Europe.358 The deliveries of gas to Germany, Austria, Italy, France and the Czech Republic, which go through Slovakia form one sixth of EU consumption.359 The responsibilities of Slovenský plynárenský priemysel (SPP) include the supply, distribution and transit of gas. 360 SPP was established in 1990 and integrated the gas sector into a state-owned monopoly. In 2002, the Slovak government sold 49% of SPP to Slovak Gas Holding B.V., a consortium of E.ON Ruhrgas and Gaz de France, and the Slovak National Property Fund retained ownership over 51%.361 The volume of gas and transit fees from Russian gas amount to 33% of SPP’s revenues, therefore any decrease in the volume of gas transited would have significant impact on the company.362 An alternative route that bypasses Slovakia and the Ukraine and that can be used to reduced the gas flow through Slovakia is the gas pipeline Jamal that goes through Belarus and Poland. The Czech Republic attaches to the Bratrství pipeline in the border town of Lanžhot where it splits into two pipelines. The first leads to Rozhadov-Waidhaus and supplies gas to Gaz de France and the German Ruhrgas. The second branch crosses the Czech-German border at Hora Sv. Kateřiny and supplies gas to the German companies Wintershall and Verbundnetz Gas AG (VNG). RWE Group of Germany is one of the main actors in the gas industry in the Czech Republic and is also responsible for the gas transit system. As part of the privatization process of the gas sector, in 2001 RWE Group paid the Czech government’s National Property Fund 4.1 billion Euros, for total ownership in Transgas, the company previously responsible for gas transport through the country, and shares in eight other local distribution companies.363 In 2005, gas transit through the Czech Republic represented 25% of Gazprom exports to the EU.364 The Czech Republic is an especially important transit country for Germany as 40% of Russian gas marked for Germany first passes through Czech territory.365 The Czech Republic took a different approach from Slovakia to solving energy security in the early 1990s and began to diversify. Energy diversification is an important step in the development of a sovereign foreign policy. Williams Martin, former US deputy secretary of energy stated: “It's very important that the Czech Republic - in fact, any nation - diversify its energy resources, so that no one source or no one fuel dominates the economy because once a country owns, basically, 50 or 60 percent of the market, they can either use that for political purposes against you, or they can raise the price — indiscriminately because you have no alternatives.”366 Following the “Velvet Divorce”, both the instability stemming from Russia and the developments in Slovakia were perceived as a threat. In 1993, during a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Czech ambassador to Slovakia Filip Šedivý remarked that it would be better for the Czech Republic once the pipeline in Inglostadt was in operation.367 Currently, oil is imported into the Czech Republic through two pipelines, Družba and Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvínov (IKL). The second, smaller oil pipeline, IKL began operating in 1996 and connects in Germany to the Transalpine pipeline. The Transalpine pipeline finishes in the Italian port city Trieste. The Czech Republic must import 96% of its oil requirements and until 1996; it relied almost solely on Russian imports. The introduction of the IKL pipeline allowed the Czech Republic to connect to Western European transport networks and the international market, and gave it access to higher quality of crude oil.368 Russia’s share in the supply of imported oil dropped from 92.8% in 1996 to 64.1% in 2002 and the following four largest suppliers after Russia were Azerbaijan, Syria, Libya and Norway.369 Since the opening of the IKL pipeline between 1996 and 2007, 91 different types of oil have passed through the pipeline from diverse sources such as the North Sea to the Persian Gulf supplied by countries such as Indonesia, Columbia, Venezuela and Syria.370 In 2007, after the Czech government came to an agreement with the USA concerning the radar base and the subsequent reduction in oil supply from Russia, it was in part due to this pipeline that the disruption did not greatly impact the Czech economy. Dana Dvořáková, Unipetrol Corporate Communication Director, stated: “At this moment our production continues without any changes. The reason is that we are using crude oil from the state material reserves and at the same time we cooperate with MERO, a company managing the international pipeline. We are trying to increase the crude oil volume from Mediterranean Sea, supplied by the Ingolstadt pipeline. We are not completely dependent on Russian Druzhba pipeline… At this moment, there is still a supply of Russian crude oil. It was reduced roughly by 50 percent. But even if we had no oil from Russia we would still be able to manage for one month with state reserves and in the meantime secure more oil from the Ingolstadt pipeline.”371 Václav Bartuška the Czech ambassador at large for energy security also described the situation as a disadvantage more for Russia than for the Czech Republic. “…it’s unpleasant to have oil deliveries via the Druzhba cut by 50 percent unexpectedly and without much reason. At the same time, I do believe that this is more of a problem for the Russian Federation than for us. It took us 24 hours to find other oil supplies. It will take Russia much longer time to make other [countries that rely on its oil] forget about this experience.”372 In 1994, Czech refineries diversified their Russian suppliers and closed contracts with several different Russian companies. Due to this diversification, between 1998 and 2000, there were no interruptions in the supply of oil to the region and the agreements allowed Czech refineries access to a higher quality of crude oil in newly developed oil fields.373 In 1997, Norway began to provide gas through the Netra pipeline to the Czech Republic.374 Due to the operation of this pipeline, Gazprom lost approximately 200 million USD in yearly revenue from the Czech market and the Czech-Norway agreement represented the first significant trade defeat of Gazprom in Central Europe.375 Currently, the Czech Republic along with France is the one country in the EU that still exports electricity and remains self-sufficient in coal.376 Although in the 1990s the Czech government was reluctant to establish a joint venture with Gazprom,377 there is now a Russian presence in the Czech gas market, represented by Vemex, a subsidiary of Gazprom created in 2001. In 2006, RWE Transgas closed an agreement with Gazprom which extended the transit gas contract to 2035.378 Despite the fact that RWE Transgas and Vemex are supplied by Gazprom Export, Vemex offers cheaper gas and is the second largest importer of gas into the Czech Republic controlling one tenth of the Czech gas market.379 In 2008, Vemex signed a deal with Moravské naftové doly (MND) which allows the Russian company to buy all the gas extracted in the Czech Republic by MND. At the end of 2008, Gazprom signed a deal with Moravské naftové doly concerning the construction of a new gas storage facility in eastern Czech Republic.380 In terms of energy mix, currently most of the Czech Republic’s electricity is supplied by coal.381 Due to this fact, the Czech Republic can boast of one of the lowest energy import dependencies in the EU because it is able to domestically produce solid fuels, namely coal. In 2004, the Czech Republic relied on solid fuels for 42% of its primary energy supply while oil and gas were at 20% and 17% respectively, and nuclear power contributed to 15% of the primary energy supply.382 Due to its energy mix, the energy dependency of the Czech Republic is lower than the EU average and is limited to oil and gas.383 There was also a push during the 2006-2009 ODS led government to focus on developing nuclear energy as a viable energy source for the future. Prime Minister Topolánek stated: “…in the Czech Republic, the direction of the next development in energy for at least the basic burden of producing electrical power will be atomic energy, whether some like it or not.”384 Czech President Klaus agreed with the Prime Minister in remarks made to the newspaper Hospodarsky noviny, “I cannot imagine the development of our country without nuclear energy.”385 Slovakia inherited a similar dependency on Russian energy sources but unlike the Czech Republic did not attempt to diversify its energy mix or transit system since the separation. In adhering to this strategy it stands alone among the Visegrad 4 countries as the only country completely dependent on the supply of Russian oil, gas and nuclear energy.386 The Slovak Republic has not attempted to diversify its energy sources even though this policy forms a part of the energy security policies of NATO, the EU and the OECD, all organizations in which Slovakia is a member.387 Instead, Slovak governments worked to cooperate closer with the Russian government and energy companies. Slovakia also is one of the main transit countries for Russian gas to Europe and during the 1990s approximately 80% of all Russian gas destined for Western Europe passed through Slovakia making it one of the most significant transit countries in the world.388 Instead of attempting to diversify from other energy sources, the actions of the various governments only cemented this dependency. In 1997, under Mečiar’s government, the state owned SPP formed a joint venture with Gazprom called Slovrusgas. The goal of this enterprise was to import Russian gas through Slovakian pipelines for domestic needs and export to third countries. This agreement guaranteed the supply of gas to Slovakia until the year 2008, which only reinforced the Slovak Republic’s dependency on gas. Opposition criticized the deal, and complained of the dependency of Slovakia on Russian gas. The Former Minister of Privatization of the Slovak Federal Republic, Ivan Mikloš stated: “Slovakia will have only one supplier in the future, and that is a completely different situation (from other European countries)… It is very simple: Slovakia's source of gas is another unstable country with unpredictable political and economic developments. Every dependence is bad, especially for the weaker partner, and Russia is the stronger partner with a really unpredictable future.”389 The General Manager of SPP, Ján Ducký was convinced that the agreements would be beneficial for Slovakia as the transit fees paid by Gazprom assure cheap gas prices for Slovak customers and brushed off the criticisms from Mikloš: “The joint-venture accord in no way represents an increase in Slovakia's economic or political dependence on Russia. Such a scenario is a phantasmagoria.”390 Ducký justified why Slovakia did not attempt to diversify its energy sources as did the Czech Republic and instead remained dependent on sources from Russia. “If it was Norwegian gas, we would have to pay the price determined at the Norway - Holland border, plus transit through Holland, Germany and Austria...We could buy it, but someone would have to pay."391 Russian Prime Minister Černomyrdin stated the exceptionality of the agreements in that Russia usually does not sign contracts for such a long period and Slovakia had assured the supply of gas for its state until 2008.392 The main benefits of the agreement for Slovakia were basic capital of one million USD, equal share of stock in the joint venture and the deal allowed for Slovakia to pay up to 40% of the gas purchased through the export of Slovak goods to Russia. The last condition aimed to weaken the strong trade deficit that Slovakia had with Russia which reached 1.5 billion USD in 1996 and its reduction was one of the foreign policy goals of Mečiar’s government.393 The next agreement that deepened Slovakia’s dependency on Russian energy imports was the sale of Transpetrol to Russian based Yukos in 2002. Yukos bought a 49% stake and management control in the company, while the other 51% remained under ownership of the Slovak Republic through the Ministry of Economy. When Yukos declared bankruptcy in 2004, two problems emerged for the Slovak government. The first was that it left the fate of the shares of a strategically important company for the Slovak Republic unclear. After the bankruptcy, the shares in Transpetrol were transferred to a Dutch foundation Stichting Administratiekantoor Yukos International. In 2006, after two years of negotiations, the shares in Transpetrol were sold to Russian company Russneft.394 The sale was criticized as Russian ownership in the Družba pipeline would create obstacles in transporting Caspian oil to the West through the pipeline as the EU would like and instead Transpetrol would continue to transit only Russian oil.395 It would also give Russneft a dominating position on the European energy market.396 Secondly, when Russia began to dismantle and takeover Yukos it caused a disruption in the supply of oil to Slovakia and the main refinery Slovnaft. This occurred in spite of a long term agreement signed in 2003, and a second agreement between Slovakian and Russian governments which should have guaranteed the supply of oil until 2014. Under the long-term contract, Yukos had agreed to supply Slovnaft with 60% of its crude oil. 397 Slovnaft reduced its refining operations until Lukoil replaced the supply with a new long-term contract. Ľubomír Jahnátek, the current Slovak Minister of Economy, judged the methods of his predecessor Dzurinda: “From 2001 to 2004 the former government of Prime Minister Dzurinda sold off 49 percent minority stakes in Slovakia's energy giants, including electricity distributors and the gas utility… This was very disadvantageous, as the former government at the same time committed to obeying the EU's strategy for energy self-sufficiency and energy security. Slovakia is now in a very difficult position, because we no longer have a way to influence decisions at these companies that have been privatized, while at the same time the Slovak government's obligations to the EU remain.”398 Although the new Minister of Economy openly criticized the previous government, the situation under Fico’s government did not improve energy security and in 2007 Prime Minister Fico acknowledged that the Slovak government would not block the purchase of the shares in Yukos by a Russian company.399 Furthermore, in 2008, the Slovenské elektrárne, an energy utility, signed a long-term deal with the Russian TVEL Corporation which secured the supply of nuclear fuel for all Slovak facilities, even those currently under construction, until 2015.400 Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Russian Rosatom Nuclear Energy State Corporation announced after the agreement was reached that Russia had “completely reclaimed Central and East European markets”401 Prime Minister Fico has stated that energy trade will form an important part of Slovak-Russian relations and that his aim is to cultivate the economic dimension of bilateral relations with Russia.402 Fico’s government, while criticizing the previous energy policies of Dzurinda’s government, has not altered the policies towards Russia. In terms of its energy mix, Slovakia has an above average energy import dependency compared to other EU Member States. In 2004 gas amounted to 29% of Slovakia’s primary energy supply and oil totaled 19%. Solid fuels place second making up 23% of the country’s primary energy supply. Nuclear energy is the main domestic produced source of energy and consists of 23% of Slovakia’s total primary energy supply.403 In 2003, Slovakia was 100% dependent on nuclear fuel imports, 99% in oil, 97% for gas and 80% in solid fuels.404 Nuclear, gas and oil resources come exclusively from Russia while only 35% of Slovakia’s coal supply originates in Russia.405 Not only is Slovakia completely dependent on Russia for some sources, but added to the security risk is the dependency on one supply route which opens a security threat in that supply can be easily disrupted either for technical or geopolitical reasons.406 However, Slovak governments view this risk as acceptable and argue that the reliance of Russia and the Ukraine on the revenues from the sale and transit of gas is mutual.407 For example, Gazprom sends 85% of its exports to Western Europe through the Ukraine and Slovakia and this forms 70% of its revenues.408 Besides the interruptions in the supply of energy to Slovakia that have occurred, there are a number of warning signals that Slovakia should take heed of. Most importantly, since the year 2000, the importance of Slovakia as a transit country has been weakening. The pipeline Jamal-Europa which connected Russia with Germany via Belarus and Poland opened. This resulted in a decline of transited gas through Slovakia from 88.3 billion m3 to 79.2 billion m3.409 Since all gas that passes through Slovakia must cross the Ukraine, any pipeline that bypasses that country will decrease the amount of gas transited through Slovakia.410 In 2000, President Putin met with the deputy chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors who informed him that the strategic aim of Gazprom is to lower one-way transit by 30-40%, by decreasing the volume of gas transported through the Ukraine by two thirds within six to eight years. This would be accomplished by increasing transit of energy through the pipelines Jamal-Europe, Blue Stream, Nord Stream and South Stream. The pipeline Blue Stream transfers Russian gas to Turkey under the Black Sea while avoiding transit through third countries such as the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria.411 The pipeline Nord Stream would pass via the Baltic Sea to Germany and would also threaten the profit Slovakia gains from gas transit.412 This pipeline would stretch from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea and supply Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, and Denmark among others. The pipeline should be in operation by 2011. 413 Another Gazprom project in cooperation with Italian Eni is the South Stream pipeline that will run under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria and provide an alternative to going through the Ukraine and Slovakia. From these four examples, it is obvious that Russia plans to avoid transit through third countries. Exporting gas and oil through the Baltic and Black Sea will effectively bypass the Ukraine and Slovakia, decreasing their profits from the transit of gas and weakening their position as an important transit country for European gas. Despite the fact that Slovakia has been negatively affected by the sale of its strategically important energy companies, despite disruptions in the supply of gas and oil, and despite its significance as a transit country is weakening, it still remains a loyal customer and partner to Russia. Lastly, as demonstrated by the pipeline Jamal II when the Slovak government failed to consult the Russian proposal with its neighbors, Slovakia showed that regional solidarity is not an important issue for the country and it is more interested in maintaining and increasing transit revenue.414 Slovakia has maintained that Russia is a reliable, economically beneficial and strategically important partner for the country even if experience would suggest otherwise. Slovakia has done so partly, as Fico stated, because it does not have any historical aversion to Russia or outstanding unresolved political issues. Another more plausible reason is the revenue the country earns from the transit of gas through its territory. Leonard and Popescu argue that Slovakia as a “friendly pragmatist” opposes actions that it fears would aggravate Russia. Examples are Fico’s solidarity with Russia regarding the radar base and the country’s willingness to take full advantage of Russia’s economic growth. This willingness is particularly apparent in the Slovak government’s energy security policies and role as a transit country. Executives in Slovakia’s gas transmission company have boasted of the country’s role as a “highway for Russian gas”415 and Slovakia sometimes supports Russian positions towards issues in the EU such as opposing the unbundling of EU energy companies.416 Czech and Slovak governments have reacted to the endeavors of Russian politicians and energy companies to influence domestic economies and politics differently. The Czech Republic belongs to a group of Central and East European states described as “strategic thinkers”417 in their approach towards energy security and their dependence on Russia. The country tries to diminish Russian monopoly through diversification of its energy mix and was one of the first in the Central and Eastern European countries to begin to diversify its energy sources with shipments from Germany and Norway in the 1990s. Slovakia adheres to a conceptual energy strategy called “commercial opportunism”. Slovak governments tend to sign long-term partnerships with Russian firms and undermine the work of strategic thinkers by supporting a greater presence for Russia in the European energy market.418 The dominance of Russian energy sources in these two countries could leave them reluctant to side with the USA on certain international issues419 which would decrease an Atlantist ideology in their foreign policies. Slovakia and the Czech Republic as countries that are part of “new Europe” have voiced their support for US foreign policy initiatives more than countries such as France and Germany which form “old Europe”. This was illustrated by the support of the Czech and Slovak governments during the Iraqi crisis or their encouragement to extend the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to countries such as the Ukraine or Georgia, an issue which has so far met with reservation from France and Germany.420 The different approaches of the Czech Republic and Slovakia towards energy security are influenced by the diversifications of their energy mix and suppliers which result in the distinct attitudes of each country towards Russia. As the Czech Republic has a low dependency level on the import of energy supplies, it has greater negotiating leverage than Slovakia which does not have a diversified energy mix and is largely dependent on the import of Russian gas and oil, through only one supply route. Václav Bartuška, Czech ambassador at large for energy security summed up the risks of negotiating a country’s foreign policy using Slovakia’s method. “It’s just a logical approach. If I start discussions with anyone by saying that I’m totally in his debt and I beg this partner just to talk to me, my chances of success are close to nil. If I start talking as a partner, I might actually get something. This applies everywhere, from life to politics and diplomacy.”421
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