Europeanism vs. Atlanticism

Europeanism vs. Atlanticism

“We will play an active role in NATO but I would not welcome the Czech Republic to be perceived as a Trojan horse of the U.S. in Europe. It does not mean the U.S. are not one of our closest allies. It simply means we are part of Europe and we should co–operate on strengthening the European defense identity.”²¹⁰

Several international events occurred which would further divide Czech politics concerning its relationship towards the USA during the period of the ČSSD government and demonstrate that the strong Atlanticism apparent in the previous government had weakened.

The first was the Kosovo crisis. In March 1999, after the failure of the Rambouillet talks to negotiate peace, NATO launched its air campaign “Allied Force”, and began bombing Kosovo. This occurred only 12 days after the accession of the Czech Republic to NATO. The Czech public had typically perceived NATO as a challenger to Russian authority, symbol of democracy and protector of human rights.²¹¹ Therefore, NATO’s decision to bomb Kosovo without a United Nations Security Council mandate was an issue of concern in the Czech Republic.²¹² The opinions of the Czech political elite were divided and sent conflicting signals as to the country’s position. Havel argued that it was necessary to defend against the gross human rights violation such as ethnic cleansing that was occurring in Kosovo and supported the air strikes.²¹³ Prime Minister Zeman, many representatives of ČSSD, and leader of the largest opposition party Václav Klaus were against the bombings. Zeman complained of a lack of information concerning the preparations for the attack and that the air strikes had begun shortly after the accession of the Czech Republic to NATO.²¹⁴ Some ČSSD delegates signed a letter of protest against the NATO air strike.²¹⁵ Klaus criticized that long-term political stability could not be achieved through the use of military force.²¹⁶ The most well-known protest was the 1999 Czech-Greek peace initiative presented by Czech Foreign Affairs Minister Jan Kavan.

The Czech-Greek initiative was a response by both countries to the NATO bombings in Kosovo. The Greek government had been against the NATO decision to bomb and the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs found an ally in his Greek counterpart, Jorgos Papandreou. ²¹⁷ The initiative, announced in Beijing, proposed a 48 hour temporary ceasefire and the departure of the majority of Serbian units from Kosovo. It would remain an autonomous region and there would be an international presence composed of UN Security Council members, including Russia and China as well as neutral countries.²¹⁸ The initiative was not welcomed by NATO leaders as some criticism concerning their choice of actions was apparent in the document. Critics of the plan said that it undermined NATO’s efforts in the region by demonstrating a split in the alliance²¹⁹ and made the Czech Republic appear as a less willing alliance member. ²²⁰ It was also described as the personal initiative of the foreign minister and his advisors who had formulated it without discussing the initiative with parliament or the president. In the end, parliamentary debate on the initiative was blocked by ČSSD.²²¹ The Czech-Greek initiative did demonstrate however, that the new ČSSD led government was not going to support all NATO operations with open arms.

Officially, the government supported the air strikes and allowed NATO access to Czech air space and transit rights, and supplied a field hospital and unarmed aircraft to Kosovo. Domestically, there was a conflict among the Czech political elite whether to support the decision made by the USA and its allies and “some Czechs questioned the wisdom of joining the alliance.”²²² The Kosovo crisis did have an effect on Czech attitudes towards the USA. Anti-Americanism increased and motivated closer relations with the EU security structures as a possible alternative.²²³ This only supported the Europeanist ideology in Czech foreign policy.

Another issue that demonstrated a weakened Atlantist trend was the US decision to invade Iraq. The Iraqi crisis in 2003 occurred during a period of domestic change for the Czech Republic. New elections had taken place in 2002. ČSSD still formed the leading coalition partner in government but the position of prime minister was filled by Vladimír Špidla. The country was on the verge of being accepted into the EU. President Havel’s term in office was coming to an end. He had remained a dependable Atlantist during his presidency and this was reflected in the strong bilateral relations between the two countries. Havel’s consistency provided a sense of continuity and coherence to Czech foreign policy. This would change in 2003 when Václav Klaus became President. The new president’s strong realism and pragmatism opposed Havel’s idealism²²⁴ and blind Atlanticism. During the first Bush administration which began in 2001, the USA maintained contact and dialogue with the Czech government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense but in general largely ignored President Klaus.²²⁵

President Havel demonstrated his solidarity with the USA in its decision to invade Iraq by signing the “Letter of Eight” published in the Wall Street Journal on January 30^th, 2003. The letter supported the US strike in Iraq and included the signatures of seven other European state representatives (Spain, Portugal, Italy, United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland and Denmark). However, it was an expression of the President’s personal opinion, three days before the end of his presidency. Prime Minister Špidla emphasized this fact and stated that the President’s opinion was not representative of the position of the Czech government.²²⁶ When Klaus succeeded in office, his opinion was not consistent with Havel’s. Klaus criticized the American action against Iraq on several levels. He felt that one of the key objectives was not to destroy weapons of mass destruction but to remove Hussein’s regime and that the use of force would not lead to lasting political change and democratization in Iraq.²²⁷ Also, it is alleged that Klaus clashed with US Ambassador Craig Stapleton over the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the inclusion of the Czech Republic on the list of the ‘coalition of the willing.’²²⁸

The difference of opinion was not only between the two presidents, Havel and Klaus, but within the coalition government as well. Coalition partners KDU-ČSL, which held the post of foreign minister, and US-DEU supported the US and war coalition. However, there were some ministers within the governing coalition who disagreed with their coalition partners and leader. ČSSD as the main party in the coalition government had the largest influence concerning the government’s position on Iraq. Prime Minister Špidla and Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdík differed in opinion with most of their parliamentary party members.²²⁹ Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Vladimír Laštůvka criticized the government for its pro-American stance and for their opinion not more closely reflecting that of France or Germany who were opposed to the operation in Iraq. Laštůvka, along with two other ČSSD members, initiated an anti-war resolution at the ČSSD congress in 2003. The complaint was that the USA, United Kingdom, and its partners in the war against Iraq were acting contrary to international law as they did not have the consent of the international community.²³⁰ The position of the government reflected the split in the main party, ČSSD. Unlike its Slovak counter-part the Czech battalion did not have a mandate to enter Iraq and its chemical contingent had to remain in Kuwait. Eventually, the Czech Republic did enter Iraq by providing a field hospital in Basra. The controversy and resulting mandate in Iraq reflected the weakened Atlantist position of the government. It was not a unanimous supporter of the US led initiative and instead definite opposition was seen towards the foreign policy initiatives of the USA.

For Europeanists, “their view of Russia is pragmatic and it focuses on the development of economic relations.”²³¹ In the Program Declaration of Zeman’s ČSSD led government, Russia is mentioned among the countries with which the Czech Republic would like to develop a closer relationship.²³² The approach of the Prime Minister Zeman and of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Kavan towards Russia differed from the Atlantist approach of President Havel. While Zeman and Kavan encouraged closer cooperation between NATO and Russia, Havel had consistently rejected a closer NATO-Russian relationship and its further institutionalization.²³³ President Havel criticized Russian military action in Chechnya during the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul arguing that Russia cannot defend the integrity of its state or fight against terrorism by the methods it has chosen.²³⁴ He had refused to visit Russia, so when the newly appointed Klaus chose to visit Moscow in 2003, the decision was appreciated by Russia.²³⁵

The ČSSD government decided to take a new approach to solving the outstanding dilemma of Russian debt to the Czech Republic. The government’s decision to sell the debt for less than its actual value to a private concern was not considered transparent. In 2001, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasynov met with Czech Prime Minister Zeman and a settlement was reached regarding Russia’s outstanding debt. Zeman’s government decided to sell two thirds of the total debt, about 2.5 billion USD to a private company Falcon Capital, for 555 million USD. Falcon Capital also received 1.2 billion USD from the Russian government for the sale.²³⁶ The remainder of the debt would be paid back by 2020 with cash, goods and partly used as a guarantee fund for Czech exports to Russia.²³⁷ The timing and method of selling the debt led to questions concerning the real motivations of groups interested in the Russian debt repayment and Czech-Russian relations.²³⁸ Critics of the deal complained that Zeman’s government had chosen an immediate source of cash instead of a long-term arrangement with Russia that would be more profitable for the Czech Republic.²³⁹ Although the Czech Republic had experienced difficulty in getting Russia to repay the debt, Russia had currency reserves of 65 billion USD and the country was not in danger of insolvency.²⁴⁰

In January 2002, Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan visited Moscow and in April was followed by Prime Minister Zeman, accompanied by economic ministers and 70 Czech business leaders. The hope was to re-establish Czech participation in the Russian market. During the visit, Russia also agreed to supply the Czech Republic with over 1 billion USD worth of military equipment and nuclear fuel as part of the Russian debt settlement. ²⁴¹ The military equipment was proposed by the Czech Army and included spare parts for old helicopters, MiG fighter jets, anti-aircraft defense systems, trucks, new Mi-35 helicopters and two giant transport aircraft Antonov An-70. ²⁴² Prime Minister Zeman was satisfied with the outcome of the visit. He stated that relations between the countries are at their best since the fall of communism and the settlement of Russian debt has removed one obstacle for continued improvement.²⁴³ The problem with purchasing spare parts for military equipment from Russia was that much of the equipment was defective. For example, in the late 1990s, it was revealed that the military had for the third time bought 140 million CZK worth of faulty rotor blades from Russia for their Mi-24 helicopters. The Ministry of Defense had also received defective blades for its Mi-17 helicopters.²⁴⁴

The pragmatic emphasis on relations with Russia continued with the next ČSSD government led by Vladimír Špidla and an important facet was the economic dimension. In 2003, Špidla’s government defined the priorities of the Czech Republic towards Russia in the “Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky na léta 2003 - 2006”. The goals of the Czech Republic concerning Russia are commented on within the context of NATO and bilateral relations. The Czech government supports further NATO-Russian cooperation especially in the areas of the fight against terrorism, weapons reform, collective humanitarian operations, civil emergency planning and anti-missile planning.²⁴⁵ Within the context of bilateral relations emphasis is put on the economic facet of Czech-Russian relations. The Czech Republic will utilize its knowledge of the region, the good reputation of Czech products and existing contacts especially in regions that are economically prosperous.²⁴⁶

While the Czech Republic demonstrated signs of a weakened Atlantist approach and thus an increased Europeanist trend, Slovakia turned away from Autonomism and became a staunch Atlantist. In 1998, the anti-Mečiar opposition led by Mikuláš Dzurinda and his party SDK won the election. Dzurinda’s party had formed from five smaller parties with the intent of defeating HZDS in the elections and reorienting Slovak foreign policy towards the West. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Kukan, stated:

“Russia is and remains one of the most important trading partners, but in the foreign policy of the new government the Western vector is the dominant one which is going to affect official contacts between Bratislava and Moscow.”²⁴⁷

Similarly to Mečiar’s government, in the Program Declaration of the new government, it declared NATO and EU integration, a foreign policy priority.²⁴⁸ One of the first tasks of Dzurinda’s government was to repair the negative international reputation of Slovakia created by Mečiar’s government. Dzurinda focused foreign policy activities on gaining support for NATO, EU and OECD membership and most importantly, securing the USA as a key sponsor to Slovakia’s integration ambitions.²⁴⁹ The liquidation of SS-23 rockets, an operation financed by the USA, is an example of the Dzurinda government’s shift in foreign policy towards America. The United States had requested this since the period of Mečiar’s government but the request had fallen on deaf ears. The destruction of the SS-23 rockets cost the USA 16 million Slovak crowns and the operation was completed by October 2000.²⁵⁰ The new Slovak Minister of Defense stated that the country had made a “great political mistake” by not participating in SFOR, the only country in Central Europe to have done so and in March 1999 dispatched a 150-man engineering unit to Bosnia.²⁵¹

The will of the new government to cooperate and support the USA was first demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis. The Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Kukan stated that although Slovakia supported the rights of Kosovars and the current borders of Yugoslavia, allowing NATO transit rights through the country and refueling over Slovakia demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the alliance.²⁵² NATO’s operation in Kosovo had the support of SDK, the leading coalition party in government. The party and its leader realized the importance of proving to NATO that it could contribute to the stability and security in Europe, and that it is a reliable, beneficial partner to the alliance. However, consensus in the cabinet was not absolute. For example, not all ministers voted in favor of the air campaign or allowing NATO to fly in Slovakia’s air space. Two ministers abstained from voting and one government party, SDĽ, advised its cabinet members not to support NATO over-flights.²⁵³ Some deputies from the opposition party HZDS criticized the NATO air strikes against the former Yugoslavia as aggression on a sovereign state and labeled NATO leaders as war criminals.²⁵⁴

One area where Dzurinda’s government managed to gain the USA as a sponsor for was in Slovakia’s bid for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) membership. The US Department of the Treasury had expressed apprehension concerning the economic situation in Slovakia and the ability of Slovakia to assume the responsibilities of OECD membership. The intensified diplomatic efforts of Dzurinda’s government and the pressure of other European countries finally convinced the USA to support membership. Slovakia joined the organization in 2000.²⁵⁵

The response of Dzurinda’s government to the 9/11 terrorist attacks also displayed elements of Atlanticism and its solidarity with America. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Kukan stated that the Slovak Republic would offer all assistance in the fight against terrorism that would be requested by the USA.²⁵⁶ The chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Slovak parliament, Peter Weiss also asserted that Slovakia should react as a country that is already an ally of the US and member of NATO.²⁵⁷ On September 17, Prime Minister Dzurinda also announced that Slovakia would react to the attack as if it was already a NATO member and a few days later granted US aircraft permission to fly over, land and refuel in Slovakia. The country cooperated with the USA in its operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan by deploying an engineering unit consisting of 40 soldiers assigned with the task of repairing the Baghram airport used as a logistic base by coalition forces.²⁵⁸

Dzurinda’s second government, led by SDKÚ, began with NATO’s invitation to start accession negotiations at the Prague summit. When compared to Mečiar’s period, bilateral relations between the Slovak Republic and the USA had improved and by Dzurinda’s second term in government, relations were at a level unsurpassed since Slovakia’s independence.²⁵⁹ The only political party in parliament that openly rejected Slovakia’s membership in NATO was the extreme right-wing SNS, otherwise all relevant parties in parliament supported NATO and EU membership. By 2001, even HZDS had articulated its support for NATO accession.²⁶⁰ SDKÚ, the leading party in the government coalition, stated in its election program of 2002 its support for a permanent US engagement in the European security structure.²⁶¹

Similarly to the Czech Republic, the Iraqi crisis was a controversial issue that divided the government and parliament in Slovakia. The proposal to send troops to Iraq had the support of three out of the four ruling coalition parties. SDKÚ, SMK and ANO unanimously supported the military intervention in Iraq. Only two members of the parliamentary caucus out of 15 from KDH voted in favor of the motion.²⁶² One member of the government coalition KDH opposed the deployment of Slovak soldiers to Iraq and criticized the decision of the USA to invade the country. Two members of the cabinet, both from the KDH, opposed the decision to allow American convoys access to Slovakian roads and railways.²⁶³ SMER, one of the main opposition parties led by Robert Fico, adamantly refused military intervention in Iraq right from the beginning, and accused Dzurinda’s government of servility to the USA.²⁶⁴ However, despite these criticisms from the opposition and within the government coalition itself, Prime Minister Dzurinda demonstrated his support for the “coalition of the willing” in the “Vilnius Letter”. The letter was signed by 10 countries who accepted evidence provided by the USA to the UN Security Council of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and declared their willingness to participate in joint operations aimed at dismantling Hussein’s regime.

Slovakia’s decision to assist the USA during the period of the Iraqi War was perhaps influenced by its pending NATO accession, but in any case the country supplied an engineering company of 85 troops which it enlarged to 105 when the Czechs left in 2004.²⁶⁵ The positive stance of the Slovak government was met with appreciation by American diplomatic representatives and became part of the discussions in the US Senate on NATO enlargement.²⁶⁶ The support for the military intervention in Iraq strengthened bilateral relations between the two countries and high level representatives such as US State Secretary Colin Powell and President George Bush expressed appreciation of position of the government in light of the strong public and parliamentary opposition.²⁶⁷

The decision in 2005 for Bratislava to host the Bush-Putin Summit was the feather in the cap of the pro-American Slovak government. Ivo Samsom, senior researcher at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, stated three reasons why the USA chose Slovakia to host the summit:

“First, a good personal relationship - chemistry - exists between the US president and Slovak Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda. Second, the US wanted to show a sign of appreciation toward Slovak efforts in its economic reforms. Third, the support Slovakia has expressed for US policy in the greater Middle East, especially in Iraq, seems to have made an impact on the US.”²⁶⁸

SDKÚ and Dzurinda’s term in government can be viewed as successful regarding the realization of its foreign policy goals. In 2004, within eight years, Slovakia had achieved NATO and EU membership due to the diplomatic endeavors of Dzurinda’s government. The re-election of the government in 2002 contributed to continuity in foreign policy by consistently supporting a central role for NATO in European security structures and American presence in Europe.²⁶⁹

The change in attitude of the Slovak government was also reflected in its relations towards Russia. The first task of the new government was to repair the negative image of Slovakia in international relations created by Mečiar’s coalition and begin a process of foreign and economic reforms with the goal of catching up to its Visegrad neighbors in the integration process.²⁷⁰ With the marked increase of interest in the West, an equally marked decrease of interest in the East was apparent.²⁷¹ The newly elected government had three goals regarding Slovakia’s relationship with Russia; to convince key western partners that Russia does not represent an alternative foreign policy for Slovakia, revise the contracts signed from 1994-1998 and increase transparency in the Russian debt settlement.²⁷² While Dzurinda’s government realized the first goal, it failed during its term to renegotiate the contracts and to rid Russian debt settlement of corruption and cronyism.²⁷³

During the first two years of Dzurinda’s government, little progress was made towards Russian debt settlement. In 1999, Slovakia had expected that it would receive 150 million USD from Russia but ended up with only 13 million USD.²⁷⁴ While there were some external reasons for the lack of progress regarding the Russian debt such as the successful negotiations of Russia with London’s Club concerning the restructuring of the debt, some domestic reasons included the lack of a signed protocol between the Slovak and Russian ministers of finance, the refusal to import the S-300, which Russia had reacted negatively to, and the approach of Dzurinda’s government towards Slovak-Russian nuclear project.²⁷⁵ Therefore, in 2001 when the government announced the plan to lower the debt from 1.2 billion USD to 300 million USD during the year 2002, the move was unexpected and raised questions concerning the effectiveness and transparency of Russian debt repayment.²⁷⁶ The government argued that the chance of full repayment of the debt was unlikely and it would be better for Slovakia to accept 30% of the total debt in cash even though de-blocking smaller amounts through the import of material goods over a period of 20 years would have been more profitable. The agreement and the process of debt settlement were viewed by many as non-transparent and again through private institutions although Devin Bank had gone bankrupt. The questionable settlement of Russian debt is considered by critics the weakest area of Dzurinda’s government during 1998-2002 ²⁷⁷

After Slovakia’s accession to NATO in 2002 and its noticeable efforts to join the EU, the last area where Russia could continue to influence the country was through energy-economic pressure.²⁷⁸ The sale of Slovak strategic energy companies to the Russian Yukos and a consortium which included Gazprom was seen as a step that supported these efforts. Critics of the sale complained that it only increased the dependency of Slovakia on Russian gas and threatened the diversification plans of Slovakia. Representatives of Yukos countered these arguments as politically motivated and anti-Russian.²⁷⁹ One of the reasons Yukos had won the privatization tender was that it committed itself to using the oil pipeline Družba at 100% capacity. Instead, the transited volume of Transpetrol decreased by 1.1% in 2002 due to the increase in transit through Hungary. In light of the fact that transit of oil through the Družba pipeline has a capacity of 21 million tons and in 2002 the transited volume amounted to 9.5 million tons, it seemed doubtful that Yukos could fulfill the conditions stated in the privatization agreement.²⁸⁰ After the bankruptcy of Yukos in 2004, the fate of the 49% of Transpetrol, a company of strategic importance to the state of Slovakia, was now unclear. During his 2005 visit to Bratislava, Russian President Vladimir Putin assured Prime Minister Dzurinda that the shares would be resolved in accordance with the privatization contract and with regard to the interests of Slovakia.²⁸¹

Throughout Dzurinda’s government, relations between Slovakia and Russia were pragmatic without any attempt to attach greater focus on their importance.²⁸² Although not as hostile towards Russia as the Czech Atlantists, there was an effort by Dzurinda’s government to minimize relations with Russia and focus on solving Russian debt and other economic issues. The stress on the economic dimension by Slovakia while minimizing the political one is more characteristic of the Europeanism trend towards Russia than the perception by Czech Atlantists of Russia as a potential threat. However, the strong pro-American tendency is characteristic of Atlanticism and during Dzurinda’s government a close relationship between Slovakia and America formed the foundations of Slovak foreign policy.²⁸³