Atlanticism vs. Europeanism

Atlanticism vs. Europeanism

The proposed radar base was one of the most controversial foreign policy initiatives since the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Prime Minister and leader of ODS Mirek Topolánek stated that apart from the issue of defense from ballistic missiles, one of the reasons for supporting the radar base is “strengthening the link to the US”.²⁸⁴ The prime minister stated four reasons why the Czech Republic should enter into negotiations with the USA. The first two arguments are based in the Atlantist ideology and Topolánek reasoned that the Czech Republic should continue to participate in joint defense and prove it is a competent ally, and it should demonstrate its will to honor its commitments made to NATO. The last two arguments concerned a geo-strategic aspect. If a defense section exists in one part of the alliance and one part is without it, then the unity of the alliance is divided into first class and second class countries. The Czech Republic would view this as a security risk and therefore one goal of the country is a comprehensive defense system within NATO that includes the Czech Republic and Poland.²⁸⁵ Lastly, the prime minister mentioned Russia as a possible threat to the security of the Czech Republic.

“Central Europe has always been an object of struggle over its powers…Russia, which is re-finding its power ambitions, despite having vacated this region. The failure of the anti-missile defense project would undoubtedly strengthen the pressure which Russia expels upon the region, and would move us closer to the sphere of Russian influence.”²⁸⁶

The apprehension of the prime minister was not completely unfounded. Criticisms and threats quickly came from Russian political and military elite. In 2007, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei B. Ivanov argued against the placement of anti-missile radars and interceptors as it would be ineffective against a missile attack from rogue states such as North Korea or Iran.²⁸⁷ General Nikolai Solovcov of Russia, commander of the Strategic Missile Force threatened to aim Russian missiles at the Czech Republic and Poland if they agreed to host the site.²⁸⁸ Putin argued that the United States was provoking a new arms race and that the radar base posed a threat to the security of Russia.²⁸⁹ Czech Foreign Minister Karl Schwarzenberg responded to these threats,

“The Czechs will now think the shield is more necessary...We have quite an experience with Russians. You have to make clear to them you won’t succumb to their blackmail. Once you give in to blackmail, there’s no going back.”²⁹⁰

The former president Havel was against conceding to any of Russia’s demands such as a permanent Russian military presence at the base.²⁹¹ Havel had remained critical of the domestic political developments in Russia and in 2007; he described the country as a post-communist, authoritarian system which uses new, more refined methods than those remembered from the communist era.²⁹² He repeated his criticisms when he visited Russia in 2007 and met with dissident leaders in there.²⁹³ Former president Havel supported the radar base and American military presence in Europe as the best guarantor of security.²⁹⁴ The difference in attitudes towards Russia is also apparent in the two Czech presidents. President Klaus maintained a conciliatory tone with Russia and referred to the country as one which the Czech Republic should focus its foreign policy on.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, the current Czech president agrees with Russia on a number of issues such as skepticism towards the EU, refusal to acknowledge Kosovo and an emphasis on resolving the conflict in Transnistria before Moldova joins the EU.²⁹⁶ During Klaus’s visit to Russia in 2007, he tried to convince President Putin that the anti-missile base in Central Europe would not threaten the security and stability of Russia as the anti-missile base is not directed at and cannot be used against the country.²⁹⁷ However, President Putin disagreed and announced that the installation of an anti-missile base represents a similar threat as the US Pershing missiles deployed in the early 1980s.²⁹⁸ In the end, the presidents agreed that the installation of an American anti-missile base would not negatively influence other areas of Czech-Russian relations, and President Putin described the Czech Republic as one of its most important European partners.²⁹⁹

While negotiations between the ODS government and Bush administration for the US radar base went relatively easily, domestically the country and parliament were divided on this issue. ODS unanimously supported the proposed radar base.³⁰⁰ The main opposition party, ČSSD, adamantly refused the placement of the radar base in the Czech Republic as did KSČM. Jiří Paroubek, leader of the opposition, and the ČSSD “shadow” Minister of Foreign Affairs Lubomír Zaorálek were the most vocal opponents who argued that the bilateral agreement will weaken NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), serve solely to defend US territory and not its allies, and would damage the Czech Republic’s relationship with Russia.³⁰¹ This is in agreement with the Europeanist stance of the ČSSD and demonstrates the preference of ČSSD for security arrangements that rely less on the USA.³⁰²

The proposed radar base demonstrated the clear Atlantist orientation of the ODS led government. It strongly supported a US military presence in Europe as a provider of stability and security, and the government perceived Russia as the main threat to the sovereignty of the Czech Republic. In the end, the radar base would form part of a multilateral NATO framework which supports an Internationalist ideology in foreign policy and not the original bilateral concept presented by the USA,³⁰³ which would have strengthened Atlanticism. This stemmed from the need to find consensus among the coalition partners, two parties considered internationalists KDU-ČSL and SZ.³⁰⁴ The resulting orientation is sufficiently distinct from Atlanticism or Europeanism for Drulák to identify the ODS government coalition as Atlantic Internationalists.³⁰⁵

In Slovakia, the left-wing party SMER had won the elections and formed government. Similarly to their partner ČSSD, SMER has demonstrated an Europeanist preference in Slovak foreign policy. Prime Minister Fico strongly opposed several US foreign policy initiatives and an Europeanist trend became apparent in the Slovak government.

The 2006 Program Declaration of Fico’s newly elected government assured a level of continuity to foreign policy by stating that it will respect and honor its commitments as a NATO member and support strategic cooperation with the alliance.³⁰⁶ To an extent, a degree of continuity could be anticipated as the obligations from membership in such organizations as NATO, EU, OECD, Council of Europe and the United Nations limit radical changes.³⁰⁷ However, Robert Fico, leader of SMER, had long criticized Dzurinda’s government for its close relationship with America. Boris Zala, vice-chairman of SMER and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee stated his preference for a “European, rather than American” style of foreign policy.³⁰⁸ SMER also criticized the Dzurinda’s government for its single minded focus on the USA and for rudely ignoring Slovakia’s relationship with Russia.³⁰⁹ The 2006 election program of SMER, “Smerom k ľuďom” states that the compass had four points and therefore the foreign policy of SMER will be oriented to the west and likewise also to the east, south and north.³¹⁰ Fico objected to Dzurinda’s government Atlantist approach and argued that it was making Slovakia an “American island of influence in the centre of Europe.”³¹¹

Prime Minister Robert Fico viewed the US led military operation in Iraq as a violation of international law and a dangerous precedent.³¹² Initially, it appeared that Fico demanded the immediate removal of Slovak units from Iraq. When it became clear that this proposal would not be supported by the President or most political parties, the government opted for a gradual withdrawal.³¹³ Slovak soldiers began to pull out in the beginning of 2007 as was originally scheduled. This was just the first step in the reorientation of Slovak’s foreign policies.

Robert Fico also opposed the decision of his NATO allies, the neighboring Czech Republic and Poland, to allow the United States to construct an anti-missile base on their territory. In 2007, Fico repeatedly objected to the proposed radar base saying that such a base or rockets would never be installed in Slovakia and it would not improve Europe’s security situation.³¹⁴

“As for the Slovak Republic, I speak now for the Slovak government, I would not consider it right to agree to deploying such elements in Europe.”³¹⁵

Fico displayed his solidarity with Russia, who was strongly opposed to the radar base.

“I understand that there is a great worry there, but who would not be afraid when some missile or radar bases are starting to be built in his close vicinity?"³¹⁶

However, this opinion was not shared by members of his cabinet. Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš supported the radar base in Czech Republic arguing that it would contribute to the security of Europe.³¹⁷ By opposing the radar base, Fico not only contradicted the opinion of his foreign minister, appointed by his own party, but also disregarded the proposed NATO strategy for strengthening the security of alliance members.

Fico soon after winning the elections announced the intention of his government to intensify relations with Russia as his government had assessed it as “undervalued” by Dzurinda’s government.³¹⁸ His government stated that it would encourage the economic dimension of foreign policy and relations with countries such as Russia, the Ukraine and China.³¹⁹ Supporting the economic dimension was an issue that both the prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ján Kubiš agreed on, and Kubiš stated:

“Slovakia has not only the opportunity but also the obligation to deepen its relations with Russia in the economic sphere for the benefit of both countries and to open the door to the large Russian market for Slovakia's entrepreneurs and investors.”³²⁰

SMER did not represent the only political party within the coalition government that wanted to strengthen Slovak-Russian relations. Chairman of SNS, Ján Slota at a meeting of Slovak and Russian businessmen in Žilina announced that he sees the strategic development of the Slovak economy directed towards the East.³²¹ Fico made good on his promise to strengthen the economic dimension of Slovak-Russian relations and negotiated several projects with Russia during his 2007 visit to Moscow including cooperation in the nuclear energy sphere, and the development, production and sale of weapons. Fico and Putin agreed that Russia should not only supply the nuclear fuel for Slovakia but also share in the modernization process of their nuclear reactors. Fico stated Slovakia’s interest in allowing the Russian company Atomstrojexport to construct two reactors in Mochovce.³²² During the visit, Fico stated that he considers Russia a strategic partner and when there are no politically sensitive issues between the two countries, they can focus on trade.³²³ Fico also renewed the project of widening train rails to a new broad gauge one similar to Russian rails. This would allow Russian trains to travel in Slovakia and provide a link between Russia and the Danube as well as to Central Europe. Fico has stated that such a project would be an important factor in strengthening economic relations between the two countries. ³²⁴ Leader of the opposition party SDKÚ, Mikuláš Dzurinda argued against the project as it would promote the imbalance between east and west Slovakia and the regional government of Košice also criticized the proposal.³²⁵

Fico’s government opposed the foreign policy initiatives of the United States such as the invasion of Iraq or the proposed radar base and instead, it turned its focus on Russia. Slovakia also supported strengthening Europe by stating its adherence to a European type of foreign policy. The Czech Republic had the opposite position as an Atlantist. It perceived Russia as hostile and strived to deepen Czech-US relations and security structures.

This comparison will conclude with some general observations. When a centre-right or right-wing party is the leading political party in government, examples in the Czech Republic are the 1992-1998 ODS government and the 2006-2009 ODS-led coalition government, and in Slovakia the 1998-2006 SDK(Ú) led government, the countries exhibit Atlantist tendencies in their foreign policies. When a left-wing political party leads government, in the Czech Republic from 1998-2006 with ČSSD, and in Slovakia from 2006 with the SMER coalition government, foreign policy will demonstrate Europeanist characteristics. Neither country has supported an Internationalist ideology within their foreign policies. However, all Czech governments have been coalition governments or “pseudo-coalition”³²⁶ (Zeman 1998-2002) and the result is that the manifestations of the various ideologies are weaker, as the political parties need to find consensus within government. For this reason, Drulák has described the recent ODS government (2006-2009) as Atlantist Internationalist.³²⁷ It is difficult to fit Slovakian governments into these ideologies as a result of the close relationship the country has had with Russia, which does not always correspond to the interpretations of Russia presented in the distinct foreign policy ideologies. While Atlantists in the Czech Republic have generally perceived Russia as a potential threat and have been hesitant in forming bilateral relations, Slovak Atlantists were not as reluctant and maintained at least close economic contacts.

Overall, the combined attitudes of the past Czech governments towards Russia has been described by Leonard and Popescu as “frosty pragmatism” which means that although the country attempts to strengthen the economic dimension in its relationship towards Russia, it is not reluctant to criticize Russia concerning human rights violations and other issues. Frosty pragmatists are willing to challenge Russia when their own commercial interests are at stake. Slovak governments, taken as a whole, by maintaining a close relationship with Russia, and putting their economic interests above their political ones adhere to an ideology called “friendly pragmatism.”³²⁸ Countries belonging to the group of “friendly pragmatists” are hesitant to criticize Russia on controversial policies and tend to focus on the economic aspect of the relationship. The dominance of economics above politics apparent in Slovak relations with Russia³²⁹ and the lack of a close economic relationship of the Czech Republic with Russia is illustrated in their approach to solving the energy security question. One reason for this difference could be that Slovakia is completely dependent on Russia for its energy supplies and the economic benefits it gains from the transit of energy through its territory. While the Czech Republic began to diversify in the early 1990s, Slovakia signed the “gas agreements” with Russian Prime Minister Černomyrdin which only furthered Slovakia’s dependency on Russian energy sources and close economic connections. During Dzurinda’s government, Transpetrol was sold to the Russian company Yukos, furthering Slovakia’s dependency on Russian energy. This decision was met with criticism as it threatened the plans of diversification of energy sources in Slovakia.³³⁰ When the Czech Republic was negotiating the radar base with the United States, Fico sided with Putin and signed agreements assuring Russia as the sole supplier of nuclear fuel to Slovakia. These two different approaches to solving this problem have put the countries in two different camps regarding Russia and their reactions to the issue of energy security. In a speech at the EU-USA Summit in April 2009, the Czech Prime Minister Topolánek warned of the danger that energy dependency has on the sovereignty of a country and stated:

“If we do not succeed in ensuring energy sources, our political freedom will become a mere illusion. In the same vein, energy dependency has become nearly the same as power dependency.”³³¹

This statement only supports the claim that energy dependency limits the ability of a state to form its own independent foreign policy initiatives while Russia uses energy in order to influence its own program in Europe.

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