Bilateral Relations with Russia Czech-Russian relations

Bilateral Relations with Russia

Czech-Russian relations

In 1990, the main foreign policy goals of Czechoslovakia concerning Russia were the expulsion of the Soviet army, the dissolution of the Soviet led Warsaw Pact and Comecon which were all achieved in 1991.⁸⁸ After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic focused on a “Return to Europe” and strengthening relations with the West while decreasing their dependency on Russia and post-Soviet states.⁸⁹ Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, Central Europe also lost its importance to Russia. The region became part of Russian foreign policy concerning “Far Abroad Countries” as opposed to “Near Abroad countries” of post-Soviet republics which remained an area of interest partly due to the large number of Russian minorities living there.⁹⁰ Russia was also more concerned with global issues concerning its new international position.⁹¹ During 1992-1993, Russia signed a number of treaties with Central European countries where it distanced itself from the policies of the USSR and stated an interest in economic cooperation. However, the Central European region was not a foreign policy priority for Russia and the newly accessible, lucrative Western markets were more important for all involved. ⁹²

The Central European region took on new significance for Russia when NATO began to seriously plan eastern enlargement. Russia opposed NATO enlargement towards the east and attempted to block the efforts of the Czech Republic to join the alliance. In 1993, Russian President Yeltsin wrote a letter to the USA, United Kingdom, France and Germany in which Russia objects to NATO enlargement. The letter also suggested that NATO and Russia would provide security for Central European countries under a joint guarantee.⁹³ President Havel expressed his concern that Russia was trying to “dictate to other countries which alliances they can belong to”.⁹⁴ In 1995, a senior officer on the Russian General Staff stated that if the Czech Republic and Poland were admitted to NATO “the coordinates of targets located on Czech and Polish territory will be entered into the flight plans of Russian long-range nuclear missiles.”⁹⁵ NATO maintained a pragmatic approach towards Russia and was sensitive to their objections.⁹⁶ Although the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russia, signed in 1997, should have helped to alleviate some apprehension of enlargement, a warming of bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Russia did not follow. The same year, Russian ambassadors to the Czech Republic and Slovakia threatened that the economic dimension of their relationship would deteriorate if the countries would continue in their efforts for NATO expansion.⁹⁷

During Klaus’s coalition government, the two main foreign policy goals of the Czech Republic towards Russia were to secure a stable supply of energy through diversification by integrating into western European energy structures, and the settlement of Russian debt. The Czech Republic was almost completely dependent on Russia for some energy sources. The government viewed this as a security risk and strived to construct infrastructure which in the time of crisis, would guarantee a supply of oil and gas from providers other than Russia.⁹⁸ In the 1993 Program Declaration of the Klaus government, it states the intention of the government to connect to European energy networks and the construction of the pipeline Ingolstadt-Kralupy.⁹⁹ In 1995, the pipeline Norddeutsche Erdgas Transversale (NETRA) was opened which allowed the Czech Republic to begin importing gas from Norway. In December, the Czech Republic secured a supply of oil from Germany which led to a decrease in dependency on Russian supplies. In 1997, the Czech Republic had decreased its dependency on Russian gas by 20%.¹⁰⁰ By 2003, Russia supplied 63% of Czech oil and 73% of gas.¹⁰¹

During the 1990s, Gazprom controlled 94% of Russian gas exploitation and commanded a monopoly in the export and transit of gas.¹⁰² Duleba quoted Rutland who states, “it is not quite clear where Gazprom ends and where Russia begins”¹⁰³ During the 1990s, while most other European countries established joint ventures with Gazprom, the Czech Republic was the one country in Central Europe where such an initiative did not succeed and due to diversification, Gazprom recorded a substantial decrease in the energy market in the country.¹⁰⁴

Another significant issue in Czech-Russian relations was the settlement of Russian debt to the Czech Republic. The Soviet debt to Czechoslovakia was the highest of the Comecon countries and reached 5 billion USD. After the “Velvet Divorce” the Czech and Slovak republics agreed to split the property of the former state, in a 2:1 proportion, including all foreign assets and liabilities. Russia owed around 3.4 billion USD to the Czech Republic and approximately 1.6. billion USD to Slovakia.¹⁰⁵ The debt represented an obstacle to improving the relationship between both countries.

In 1998, Miloš Zeman and ČSSD won the elections and formed government. President Boris Yeltsin resigned in 1999 and Vladimir Putin assumed power. Partly as a result of these changes, Czech-Russian relations began to improve although political dialogue was still limited in 2000.¹⁰⁶ During this period, the main themes in Czech-Russian relations were the implementation of visa requirements, debt settlement and in general to improve dialogue between both countries. In 2000, the Czech government abolished the visa-free regime for Russians. This was due to the preparations of the Czech Republic to EU accessions. Russia’s response was to enact a visa requirement for Czechs travelling to Russia.¹⁰⁷ However, there were some positive effects regarding this issue as it forced the Czech Republic and Russia to communicate with each other and to negotiate a solution that would respect the requirements of the EU, and where the implementation of visa requirements would have as little negative impact on bilateral relations as possible.¹⁰⁸

The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that 2001 was marked by a significant increase in contacts between the two countries. This began with the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Prague. It was the first visit of a Russian foreign minister in seven years.¹⁰⁹ In the same year, the issue of the Russian debt to the Czech Republic was partly solved. As the Czech government was faced with the problem that Russia might not be able to repay the debt as the country was experiencing an economic, the government decided to sell the outstanding debt, 2.5 billion to a private company Falcon Capital.¹¹⁰ This would solve one of the obstacles to creating a warmer climate for bilateral relations.

In 2006, the election of an ODS led government marked a shift in bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Russia. While economic relations between the two countries flourished in the year 2007, political relations cooled.¹¹¹ In April 2007, President Klaus visited Moscow along with the Minister of Finance Miroslav Kalousek, the Minister of Industry and Trade Martin Říman and a delegation of around 100 Czech entrepreneurs. The President had two issues on his agenda; to strengthen economic relations and to discuss the anti-missile base. His aim was to separate the two issues from the context of Czech-Russian relations as a whole in order to maintain elements of partnership in the relations especially in the economic sphere.¹¹² During the visit, Czech firms signed an unprecedented number of contracts worth 45 billion Czech crowns.¹¹³ Some of the more significant agreements made were for example between the Czech foreign trade company Alta and Russian Uralvagonzavod for one billion Euros and Czech CEZ closed a strategic partnership with the Russian producer of electrical energy TGK-4.¹¹⁴ In 2007, a third intergovernmental commission which should strengthen economic, industrial and technological cooperation between Russia and the Czech Republic met, and an agreement was signed between Moravské naftové doly and Prominvest which granted the right of the Czech company to drill oil in the Uljanovske region.¹¹⁵

The political aspect of Czech-Russian relations definitely took a turn for the worse under the ODS government and its decision to allow the installation of a NATO radar base in the Czech Republic. The position of Russia regarding the radar base went from absolute refusal, including threats, to a position where Russia was willing to consider a mutual compromise to the issue.¹¹⁶

Bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Russia were cool after the separation of Czechoslovakia. Neither side encouraged the development of relations. Under Zeman’s government, the Czech Republic began to focus on the economic aspect of the relationship although political contact remained low. With the election of Topolánek’s government and its subsequent decision to negotiate locating a radar base in the Czech Republic with the USA, relations cooled and the presidents of both countries agreed to focus on the economic dimension.