Masarykova univerzita v Brně Filozofická fakulta Katedra anglistiky a amerikanistiky Bakalářská diplomová práce

V. The Freedom Ballot

John Lewis echoed the belief of many activists when asking, “I want to know: which side is the federal government on?”³⁷ In order to induce large federal intervention, COFO’s veterans turned to public opinion, easily the most convincing of the available resources. According to McMillen, their maneuvers more resembled guerilla theater than guerilla warfare. Actual registration became secondary to the exposure of the hazards of it. (364)

After some consideration, the movement’s leaders abandoned the idea of organizing a general strike. Shortly, they agreed that Mississippi, the most ardent in the segregationist camp, would be the best target. More, the campaign was hoped to bring the ever-quarreling civil rights groups closer together. (However, the basic disagreements – mostly between the NAACP and SNCC – had remained.) The campaign would take a form of a mock election and coincide with the Mississippi 1963 gubernatorial race. (Sinsheimer: 219-220)

Why not have a day of voting?

Once again, SNCC proved to be the vital contributor of the whole Freedom Vote (also Freedom Election in McMillen or Freedom Ballot in Zinn), not least because it was directed by Bob Moses. The creative genius was provided by Allard K. Lowenstein, Yale Law School graduate, whose was the original proposal that blacks should cast protest votes on the election day. For his suggestion, he drew inspiration from his earlier experience in South Africa.³⁸ “The people who run Mississippi today […] cannot allow free elections, because if they did, they wouldn’t run Mississippi,” he reasoned. (Sinsheimer; qtd. in Williams: 228)

SNCC was able to quickly mobilize about a thousand unregistered blacks around Jackson, Greenwood and several other areas. The idea of casting protest ballots was first tested in August during the Democratic primary. A participation of over 27,000 drove COFO to campaign in still more communities. This was a sign for SNCC that the tactic was right: massive involvement proved strongly to everyone that blacks were neither apathetic nor ignorant – that is that they would vote, if allowed to. More than just that, Moses perceived the Freedom Vote as an endeavor to redefine the concept of legitimacy.³⁹ Rather than rely on the white power structure, a parallel mock election gave blacks a chance to assert their own legitimacy, in other words “to create new social identities.” (Sinsheimer: 223-225)

Preparations for the November “one man, one vote” election got underway. It was designed to let the people elect candidates from their own communities. The candidate for governor would be Aaron Henry, the NAACP leader. This choice had many purposes, but most obviously he was the one recognizable figure in Mississippi. Some in SNCC saw Henry’s nomination chiefly as an act of concession to the NAACP.⁴⁰ In addition, Bob Moses managed to persuade young Reverend R. Edwin “Ed” King (chaplain of Tougaloo College, involved in the Jackson movement) to run for lieutenant governor. It was indeed an important signal: the top candidates were both natives of Mississippi, one black and one white. (Sinsheimer: 225-227)

“We’re not fighting for the freedom of the Negro alone”⁴¹

Many Committee staff members argued that for the federal government to intervene in the South, something had to happen to someone white. Thus, in order to stir the nation as well as to expand the project in size, Al Lowenstein invited white students from Yale and Stanford to be involved in the campaign. The issue was not one easily agreed on in SNCC, though. A part of the Mississippi staff strongly opposed the idea. Some argued that white students were not suitable for communicating with the locals who were often afraid of whites approaching them. The volunteers would also expose themselves to increased (and unnecessary) danger. At last, Lowenstein was given the green light and started recruitment operations.⁴² (Sinsheimer)

The students (their number totaled about sixty) would by and large stay for one week and then were replaced by another wave. Despite jailings, beatings and shootings, they carried on.⁴³ The schools raised considerable money for the Freedom Vote – Yale, Stanford and the University of the Pacific contributed over $10,000. Norman Thomas, a former presidential candidate, came and addressed several conferences throughout the state in late October. However, COFO officials were disappointed with the press coverage that the campaign was receiving, and no reaction whatsoever was coming from the Kennedy administration, too. (Sinsheimer: 231-232, 238-239)

The Freedom Vote was planned for November 2-4, preceding the official election on November 5. Special ballots with the names of candidates were printed. The degree of harassment rose as the date of the mock election was nearing. The streets were full of cops. In the most dangerous parts of the land, “votemobiles” (ballot boxes carried in cars) were used. The intimidation, however, did not discourage the black community. Approximately 80,000 Afro-Americans cast their ballots, most of them on Sunday, November 3.⁴⁴ The Henry-King ticket received 99 percent of the vote. The project leaders cheered over the figures. “Now all America must know it,” said Moses, meaning of course that it was this mock election that doubtlessly expressed the desire of Mississippi’s black population to vote. (Sinsheimer: 240-242)

For many, the campaign had been an invaluable lesson in statewide organization. It laid foundations for the even more ambitious projects that were to come in the following year.