Mattis, Jamestown Foundation China Program fellow, 2015
Download 0.59 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Information sharing creating transparency and predictability in the relationship.
SolvencyEngagement Best OptionEngagement best strategy to avert a cyber Cold WarLewis, CSIS senior fellow, 2015 (James, “Moving Forward with the Obama-Xi Cybersecurity Agreement”, 10-21, http://csis.org/publication/moving-forward-obama-xi-cybersecurity-agreement) The United States had unique leverage at the Summit and with the Summit over, White House officials expect some backsliding. Even with the best intentions, it will be hard for Xi to deliver on his promises. This means we should expect more tension over cybersecurity in the future, not less. Sanctions are “still on the table” as one U.S. negotiator put it, and Chinese hacking is so extensive it cannot be turned off overnight. The United States may decide that a few timely sanctions against private Chinese individuals and companies who have benefited from cyberespionage can reinforce agreement. Like any serious agreement, the language is imprecise and there is wiggle room. Trade agreements define processes and penalties for noncompliance, but this kind of strategic understanding usually does not. So it is not a useful criticism to point out the absence of such measures in the Xi - Obama agreement. There will be backsliding and the Chinese will watch how we respond. This informal process of action and response will define the boundaries for compliance. Agreements of this kind are always met with complaints that the other side will cheat. Cheating has been a problem in every arms control agreement since the 1922 Washington Naval Convention. Ikle's piece remains the best discussion of this. When democracies negotiate with authoritarians, the other side usually cheats. There is always a risk of cheating, and it is no brilliant insight to point this out, nor is it a reason not to move forward. An agreement is the first chapter and the following chapters are about compliance and consequences if the agreement is not observed. The White House says the United States is prepared to act if China does not observe its agreement on cyber espionage. The questions for this next chapter are what level of noncompliance justifies a punitive response, what format should that response take, how do we avoid delays in responding, and what actions would reinforce the agreement. In considering the latter, we need to say where we are willing to make concessions, a difficult topic but one that is being discussed when it comes to norms. This may not be enough to only think about norms, as we may have to consider constraints on U.S. action, but this is a larger debate. Other parts of the agreement also mean continued tension. Negotiations in the UN are difficult. The United States and its allies face strong opposition from China and Russia over rules for cyber war and the place of human rights in cybersecurity. The Russia-China partnership is no love match, but the two countries unite in opposition to America, and the Chinese are skilful in playing Russia against the U.S. in law enforcement cooperation. In 2013, the FBI made eleven requests for aid to China’s Ministry of Public Security. China responded to only two. When asked for help with the Sony hack, the Chinese said they had no information, even though North Korea uses known front companies in China for hacking. China might turn the tables by requesting assistance it knows it will not get against dissidents living in the United States. But it is misleading to emphasize the difficulties. There is no credible alternative to the agreement. Sermons and chest-beating, while pleasing to a domestic audience, do not work. Some say better cyber defenses – we’ve been saying that for twenty years and it hasn’t worked because the internet cannot be made defensible. Building a Maginot line in cyberspace is pointless. Some say we should deter China - another failed approach, in good measure because espionage isn’t deterreable. We couldn’t deter Soviet espionage with the threat of nuclear war and we should not expect to deter China with comparatively puny cyber threats. We are not going to start a war with China over cyber espionage - as with the Iran deal, there is no serious military option. Covert action requires a different discussion of risk. These answers might not please everyone, but when Washington politics and international realities collide, reality wins. There are dangers with the current course, but these are manageable. We need to see what comes of the bilateral talks on norms and law enforcement before we succumb to more hand wringing. An outcome to avoid is a debate that encourages hesitation or timidity. Cooperating between the United States and China on cybersecurity will be difficult. The Americans knew this going into the agreement and the Chinese probably knew it as well. Like any agreement between two powers suspicious of each other, implementation is complicated, verification is essential, and there must be consequences for noncompliance. The agreement on cybersecurity is the first agreement in a new U.S.-China relationship shaped by competition, even hostility. We are not friends, nor should we expect to be friends any time soon. There are deep tensions between one party rule and democracy, and between a would-be regional hegemon and a global superpower. Strategic competition does not mean, however, that we cannot cooperate. The summit showed that while there are serious differences, there are also common interests. The United States can build on these common interests to get a relationship that is more stable if not more friendly. This relationship will not be a Cold War, nor an alliance, but something new, where both countries will have to feel their way forward with cautious steps. Agreement on cybersecurity agreement is the first step. The new relationship is not a Cold War, nor is it an alliance, but something new where both countries will have to feel their way forward with cautious steps, and agreement on cybersecurity is the first. Information sharing creating transparency and predictability in the relationship.Austin and Gady, EastWest Institute professorial fellow and foreign policy analyst, 2012 (Greg and Franz-Stefan, “Cyber Detente Between The United States And China: Shaping The Agenda”, http://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/ideas-files/detente.pdf) Third, cyber espionage, especially against intellectual property and critical infrastructure, is now too big a problem to ignore or to dismiss as a necessary evil. The U.S. and China need to take stock of the negative impacts and establish some limits. Both countries need some common understanding of the limits of cyber espionage. There are two main problems to be dealt with on that third point. The first is the blurred boundaries between national security espionage and theft of intellectually property for commercial gain. The second involves the often equally blurred distinctions between critical infrastructure of an exclusively civilian or humanitarian character and that of a military or strategic one. But to deal with such issues officials from each side would require more information-sharing than their government has so far been willing to permit. Quite understandably, both sides feel that they can’t discuss anything that is secret without breaking their own laws. A first step may be to create a new domestic legal foundation to allow authorities in both countries to share information and to conduct joint assessments of that part of the problem that lies clearly in the intellectual property domain or civil domain.40 Most Western governments underestimate China’s stakes in international collaboration that derive from its vulnerability to large-scale disruptions and crime in cyberspace. Speaking about the United States, Admiral Mike McCullen observed in 2010: “We now need a dialogue among business, civil society and government on the challenges we face in cyberspace—spanning international law, privacy and civil liberties, security and the architecture of the Internet. The results should shape our cybersecurity strategy.”41 This approach is now also needed at the international level. So far, in U.S.-China relations, the conversations are still in their infancy and are characterized as strongly adversarial. The challenge is to deepen the conversations and reduce mistrust through enhanced transparency and predictability. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> sites sites -> 587 Return function, r i(X) r i(0) r i(1) r i(2) r i(3) 1 0 2 4 6 Thermal Station, I 2 0 1 5 6 3 0 3 5 6 10 sites -> Medical Radiography Program sites -> Background on the Haitian Earthquake sites -> Desk review yemen sites -> Safe Transitions for the Elderly Patient (step) sites -> District profile Haripur Introduction sites -> Germanie VanTrease and Tyler Tetzloff sites -> For more information sites -> To be completed by the cerf secretariat. Type of submission sites -> Sponsor Content Above the Clutter with Pete Krainik Download 0.59 Mb. Share with your friends:
|