Contention IV -- Kick Out

Contention IV -- Kick Out

Advantage two is Kick Out -

Marine presence is politically unsustainable - maintaining a large footprint sparks anti-base movements throughout Japan – that causes strategically import bases like Kadena to get kicked out – the impact is Sino-Japan war

(Okamoto, “The Okinawa Issue and East Asian Security,” http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a04502/)

The Japanese and US governments agreed in the 1990s on a plan to close down US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, a facility located in a heavily populated area on the main island of Okinawa, and move its operations to a facility to be constructed in Henoko Bay on the Pacific coast of the island. The agreement still stands, but it is unclear when, if ever, this move will be completed.

The new facility in Henoko is supposed to have a runway built on landfill covering just a third of the area of the current air station at Futenma. The noise from the aircraft using it and the danger of accidents would be shifted from a populous district to an area over the sea. Clearly this represents a major improvement over the current situation. So I originally supported the planned move. But in 2011, when I was invited to speak as a witness to the House of Representatives Budget Committee, I expressed the view that the government should stop trying to force this plan through. And I repeated my call for abandonment of the plan when I spoke before the House of Councillors Budget Committee in 2012. Why did I change my mind?

The DPJ administration’s handling of this matter was irresponsible. Finding a replacement site outside of Okinawa is not practical. The reason is simple: Ospreys, the vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft currently deployed at Futenma, serve as an essential means of transport for the US Marine Corps in Okinawa. They cannot be moved to a distant location unless the entire Marine contingent goes too. This would mean also moving the headquarters now located at Camp Foster and the training facilities at Camp Hansen and Camp Schwab.

I have seen many activists from mainland Japan taking part in the campaign against the US military bases in Okinawa. Their objective is not limited to the complete reversion of the Futenma facility. By fomenting the local anti-base movement and promoting disruption, they seek to close down all the US bases, particularly Kadena, the biggest US Air Force base in the Eastern Hemisphere. Meanwhile, the deadlock between the national government in Tokyo and the prefectural government in Naha continues to drag on. And if one of the Ospreys were to have a major accident, Okinawa could explode, much as it did back in 1956, when an “island-wide struggle” broke out against the US military administration. {Note 1}

This would have required careful bilateral deliberations with the United States over an extended period of time, meaning a delay in reversion of the Futenma facility. But considering that almost two decades had passed since the original US-Japan agreement on the matter, I felt that it was worth considering my proposal. But the government ended up sticking with the existing plan, and in December 2013 the governor of Okinawa gave his go-ahead for the landfill at Henoko, where work has now started. At this point, pushing for an alternative approach will only confuse matters. So I have regretfully decided to put my Plan B under wraps and return to supporting the move to Henoko as the best we can hope for under the current circumstances.

Deterrent Power: The Importance of Perceptions

Though the move from Futenma to Henoko may need to be implemented as a stopgap, I would like to consider the longer-term prospects. How can we achieve a major reduction in the US Marines’ presence in Okinawa without decreasing Japan’s deterrent power?

This decks deterrence in East Asia even if bases aren’t totally withdrawn

Halperin, senior adviser to the Open Society Foundations, 15

(Morton, “OPINION: Ignoring opposition in Okinawa will imperil Japan-U.S. alliance,” https://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2015/04/346639.html)

When constructing a military base in a democratic country, the popular will of local citizens who bear the burden of the military presence should be carefully considered. Their voice is entitled to serious consideration and if it is not heard, the base may not be able to have a stable future. When a military base is located on foreign soil, it is even more important to take the opinion of local citizens into account. Without such effort, protests from the local community could threaten the future of the presence of the base, which could eventually lead to a major diplomatic issue between the two countries. Public opinion on the relocation of the Futenma air base to the Henoko area has been clear. Recent election results, including those from the Nago mayoral election, Okinawa gubernatorial election and general election, have indicated clear opposition of the local citizens against the relocation. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the American and Japanese government should abandon the effort to relocate the Futenma air base to the Henoko area. If opposition from Okinawa residents further spreads, it would affect public opinion towards other U.S. bases in Okinawa, including the Kadena air base. It would most certainly damage U.S.-Japan relations. Furthermore, U.S. military personnel stationed in the bases in Okinawa will find it very difficult to operate surrounded by the public opinion hostile to the U.S. military presence. I visited Okinawa and toured around the area where the base is to be built in September last year. I witnessed the Okinawans' desire for peace, which is deeply rooted in their harrowing experience of the past: the Battle of Okinawa. On a boat in the sea off the Henoko area, I was truly impressed by the beautiful ocean and the voices of the local residents. They are fighting to protect the environment and pass it on to next generations. The Japanese government has simply ignored popular opinion and put concrete blocks into the beautiful ocean. If the democratic process -- of which Americans are so proud of -- is boldly disparaged in this way, it would be far from the best decision for both the U.S. and Japan. In addition, current debate over the relocation of the Futenma air base is proceeding without a new assessment on the need for the USMC (U.S. Marine Corps) presence in Okinawa. The American military needs to seriously consider what the other options are for basing the Marines in the region or on bases in the United States and assess the implications of alternative possibilities from the viewpoint of deterrence, as well as conducting military operations. Okinawa may not be the only option for the U.S. Marine base. American and Japanese governments assessing the issue need serious deliberation before starting any work on the new base construction, especially when many experts of both countries propose alternative options.

And, controversy is heating up despite China’s rise – reducing the footprint is key – relocation won’t placate the locals

Lind, associate professor of government @ Dartmouth, 4-2-15

(Jennifer, “Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3)

Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the past few years, as Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abe’s government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawa’s bases acquire even more significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawa’s anti-base movement has accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex political environment. In fact, just a few days after the symposium, Okinawa’s governor, Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue back into the headlines. Japan’s Defense Ministry had begun preliminary exploration and drilling on a facility that would replace the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to create a sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially dangerous urban location. But Okinawans didn’t want the facility moved to a different part of Okinawa—they wanted it off the island completely, and elected Governor Onaga on that platform. On March 22 he issued a deadline of one week to stop the drilling, or lose the permit. Tokyo ignored him, describing his demand as “very regrettable,” and suspending the governor’s work stoppage order. Onaga responded by vowing, “I will knuckle down and respond to this in keeping with the will of the Okinawans.” What happens next? “Once again,” wrote DC scribe Chris Nelson, “the base relocation issue threatens to blow up in our face.” The Okinawans are, in Carol Fulp’s words, becoming visible. They’re shouting louder and louder—and want to be onstage too. Averting an alliance crisis over Okinawa was Reischauer and Kennedy’s challenge. Averting another one is ours.

Marines are not necessary for deterrence – but the political backlash they cause leads to the disruption of vital air and naval facilities that are actually key to prevent hotspot escalation

Ennis, Japan Relations Analyst, 10

(Peter, served on two Council on Foreign Relations task forces regarding Japan, regularly participates in the Pacific Forum’s annual conference on US-Japan defense relations, has spoken at numerous universities, “Mike Green hit critics of Obama Futenma policy,” http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2010/06/jeff-bader-mike-green-hit-critics-of-obama-futenma-policy.html)

These two facilities are the absolute key to the US forward-deployed ability to project power in East Asia, along with the 8th Army and related air and sea units in South Korea, and the huge air, Marine, and naval buildup underway on Guam. Given this vast array of indispensable US power projection capabilities in the region, it was perfectly reasonable to ask just why the Futenma replacement facility is so vital. The US is already redeploying 8,000 ground troops out of South Korea, has moved many units further south to make them into a more flexible regional force, and has turned over to South Korea operational control of its own armed forces. Yet the current structure of the Marine presence on Okinawa remained curiously beyond the realm of acceptable discussion, at the insistence of Obama administration officials. Throughout the entire discussion, the Administration has painfully been unable to answer a simple question: Just what indispensable contribution to deterrence in East Asia do the Marines on Okinawa make that they could not make if based elsewhere? The Marines are not indispensable quelling any potential North Korean assault on the South. ROK ground forces alone number more than the combined personnel of the US Army and US Marine Corps, worldwide. The main US role in a Korean Peninsula contingency would be air and naval, largely based out of Kadena and Yokosuka. The job of seizing North Korean ports to facilitate humanitarian relief operations in a crisis, or the job of locating and securing North Korean nuclear materials, could all be conducted by Marines brought into Japan for those purposes, utilizing prepositioned supplies and equipment located on bases agreed to by Tokyo. As it is, a good number of the US Marines nominally based on Okinawa for deterrence in East Asia are often deployed elsewhere, including Afghanistan. Nor are the Marines on Okinawa to somehow deter China, a job done most effectively, once again, by the US air and naval forces based at Kadena and Yokosuka respectively. Are the US Marines vital to stability in East Asia? Absolutely. But nowhere is it written in strategic stone that they have to be based on Okinawa. The need for the Henoko project to replace Futenma largely boils down to one factor: The Marines want to introduce to Okinawa in the coming years the V-22 Osprey, a tiltrotor aircraft capable of both vertical and conventional takeoffs and landings. Why is a new runway needed at Henoko, designated site for the Futenma replacement facility, if the Osprey has vertical capability? Because the aircraft is notoriously unreliable, and the Marines say they need a runway in the event the shift from turboprop to helicopter capability fails. Ironically, the State Department’s Kurt Campbell, who fought so hard for the Futenma project in recent months, was strongly opposed to further development of the Osprey while he worked at the Pentagon over a decade ago. Beyond the Osprey requirements, the Marines also defend their status on Okinawa because of the heavy funding provided by Japan as base support. All things being equal, Okinawa is a highly advantageous location for the US Marines to be based. But all things are not equal, given that 20% of the entirety of Okinawa island’s land mass is taken up by US military facilities. The heavy concentration on Okinawa of US Forces in Japan is a political disaster just waiting to happen. Anyone truly interested in the political sustainability of vital US air and naval bases in Japan should be worried about the pent-up animosity all-too-evident on Okinawa.

The US will be kicked out of Kadena – that will make deterring war with China/North Korea impossible

Axe, defense analyst @ the Diplomat, 10

(David, “Why Allies Need US Base,” http://thediplomat.com/2010/06/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/?allpages=yes)

An explosive political drama that reached its climax earlier this month underscored the importance of Kadena and the surrounding bases. On June 2, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stepped down after weeks of tumbling public support for his administration. The reason—the ongoing uncertainty over the future of US forces in Japan. During the general election campaign last year, Hatoyama had vowed to reconsider a 2006 deal over the relocation of US Marines from the Futenma Air Station, a smaller base just south of Kadena. After strongly hinting that he would abandon the 2006 deal, Hatoyama announced in late May his continued support for the existing agreement reached under the previous Liberal Democratic Party administration. Under this agreement, the Marines would eventually relocate their airstrip to a less-populated part of the island prefecture. But many Okinawans oppose any US military presence there at all. US bases—and Futenma, especially—have generally been unpopular among the now largely pacifist Japanese public, particularly Okinawans. In 1995, three US servicemen from Futenma abducted and raped a local schoolgirl, further stoking opposition to the base. And aircraft crashes are another safety concern, especially as Kadena and Futenma have between them several hundred US military aircraft permanently based at facilities surrounded by densely populated residential neighbourhoods. The decision to stick with the 2006 deal represented the belated recognition on Hatoyama’s part that ‘there was no other good option’ for the strategically-vital Marine presence and for the US-Japanese alliance in general, according to Michael Auslin, an Asia expert with the American Enterprise Institute. In that context, the prime minister’s vague election promise to Okinawan base-detractors was a ‘miscalculation.’ So, will the Futenma dispute also prove the undoing of Hatoyama’s successor, Naoto Kan, who has so far stayed quiet on the base issue? If anything, the crisis over Futenma underscored the lasting, even growing, importance of US military facilities in Okinawa—not only for the United States, but also for Japan and other US allies. As China’s economic and military rise continues and tensions mount over North Korea’s nuclear programme and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, the US and its Asian allies need Okinawa more than ever. ‘The US, South Korea and Australia have been very vocal to Japan, saying, “Hey, be careful what you’re doing,”’ Sheila Smith, an analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations, says. ‘This isn’t a good moment to be taking large numbers of US forces out of Japan.’ Aside from US forces in South Korea (which are exclusively focused on the North Korean land threat) there are just two significant concentrations of US troops in East Asia: in Okinawa and on the Pacific island of Guam. Okinawa lies just an hour’s flight time from both the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; Guam, by contrast, is 1000 miles from any potential theatre of war. ‘It may be easier for us to be there [in Guam], as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned,’ says Air Force spokesman John Monroe. ‘But if we’re in Guam, we’re out of the fight’ due to the distance. For combat forces to be capable of reacting quickly to the most likely crises, Okinawa is the only realistic option. Without its 2 Okinawan air bases and their 3 roughly 10,000-foot runways, the US military—and by extension, US allies—would depend almost entirely on a handful of US aircraft carriers for bringing to bear aerial firepower in East Asia. That might be a realistic option, except that China has lately deployed several new classes of anti-ship weaponry specifically meant for sinking US carriers, including the widely-feared DF-21 ballistic missile and a flotilla of stealthy fast-attack vessels. In recognition of Okinawa’s growing importance, the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars in the past decade modernizing forces and facilities on the island. The US Army deployed Patriot air-defence missiles capable of shooting down enemy aircraft as well as ballistic missiles, a favourite weapon of both China and North Korea. Kadena got extensive new storage bunkers for bombs, missiles and spare parts, allowing the base to support potentially hundreds of aircraft flown in from the United States during an emergency. In 2007, the US Air Force began stationing Global Hawk long-range spy drones and F-22 Raptor stealth fighters at Kadena. The Raptors represent perhaps the greatest improvement. Indeed, in the minds of US planners, in many ways Okinawa’s most important function is to support the F-22s. In a 2009 study examining a simulated air war pitting the United States and Taiwan against China, the California-based think-tank RAND concluded that a wing of F-22s could shoot down 27 Chinese fighters for every Raptor lost in the air. F-22s flying from Okinawa could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in China or North Korea, according to Lieutenant Colonel Wade Tolliver, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron, an F-22 unit based in Virginia that routinely sends Raptors to Kadena. ‘There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defence systems,’ Tolliver says. ‘What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilities…and we need to roll back those integrated air defence systems so we can bring in our joint forces.’ The base’s ability to host F-22s and follow-on aircraft is ‘probably the most important thing about Kadena,’ Monroe says. ‘Because of our capability to stage forces out of here—this is a huge runway—we do believe we have unmatched air power.’ All this planning for air wars with China and North Korea doesn’t mean that planners in the United States, Japan or anywhere else believe such conflict is inevitable. Pyongyang remains predictable only in its volatility, but Washington, Tokyo and Beijing are all working hard to forge peaceful and lasting ties. The strategic uncertainty is in the margins. ‘There’s no question you want to engage China, but (we should) hedge against an uncertain future,’ Nicholas Szechenyi of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says. It’s as a hedge that Okinawa remains indispensable to the US and its allies—so much so that the shared international need for the island’s bases must trump any Japanese domestic political calculations. Hatoyama ignored that truth at the expense of his job. The question now is will Kan?

North Korea war goes nuclear

Metz, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 2013 (Steven, 3/13/13, “Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war)

Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so, though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons, but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The second Korean War would force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia. Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the result could easily be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued

Sino-Japan war goes nuclear – deterrence is key

Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies @ Victoria University, 14

(Robert, “Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia,” http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf)

China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But knowing the resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7 Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves, become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific: China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR systems including America’s satellite capabilities. In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to a much more serious and damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early resort to anti-satellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that nuclear escalation is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the great equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese) conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and sea based nuclear systems. This is also a perverse incentive to nuclear escalation.

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