Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf
Contention VI – Rotational Presence/China
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Contention VI – Rotational Presence/ChinaChina can beat the US in a war now – that emboldens aggression risking warTalent, senior fellow @ AEI, 6-24-15 (Jim, and director of the National Security Project 2020 at AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, The Obama administration’s “rebalance” to the Pacific is manifestly failing to prevent Chinese expansionism. The reason is that China’s rapid military buildup is shifting the regional balance of power in their direction. Until the United States and its partners reinforce their own position in the region, China will continue its coercive tactics in the East and South China Seas, increasing the risk of armed conflict, and undermining both the rights of neighboring countries and the vital interests of the United States. The entire world has now heard of China’s actions across seven islets and reefs in the South China Sea and its ongoing conversion of those features into military installations. But that is just the latest in a series of aggressive Chinese actions over the last several years. In 2012, Chinese forces blocked off the Scarborough Shoal, eventually taking control of it from the Philippines. They are trying the same tactic now with the Second Thomas Shoal. Last summer China stationed an oil rig in waters also claimed by Vietnam. The Chinese are flooding the Senkaku Islands, which Japan administers, with paramilitary vessels, supported by China’s naval presence just over the horizon. They have declared an “Air Defense Identification Zone” over much of the East China Sea and likely will do the same soon in the South China Sea. All of these are hostile acts, and the Chinese consistently accompany them with uncompromising rhetoric: loud claims of absolute sovereignty, repudiation of negotiated solutions, and threats against other countries which fly aircraft or sail vessels within international waters or airspace that the Chinese claim as their own. Looming in the background is the vast military which China has built over the last twenty years. China has nearly 300 vessels in its increasingly modern Navy, several thousand fighter aircraft, updated intelligence and reconnaissance systems, growing anti-satellite capabilities, highly sophisticated and lethal cyber capability, and an enormous and growing inventory of increasingly longer-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles. Virtually all of this power can be concentrated on targets in the East and South China Seas. Twenty years ago the PLA Navy could put to sea little more than a coastal defense fleet. But since then China has been increasing its defense spending by double digits every year, incorporating the most sophisticated technology, much of it stolen from the United States, into its ships. They are now in serial production of entire classes of modern corvettes, frigates and destroyers, all heavily armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. Given their vast shipbuilding base, they could increase production quickly whenever they want. Withdrawl key to rotational presence – that shores up speed, flexibility, interoperability, and reduces US base vulnerability to Chinese first strikesHaddick 12 (Robert, Independent Contractor, U.S. Special Operations Command, APRIL 27, 2012, "This Week at War: NIMBYs in the South China Sea", FP, foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/27/this-week-at-war-nimbys-in-the-south-china-sea/ Planners now agree that the Marine presence on Okinawa will shrink. The 2006 version of the plan would have transferred 8,600 Marines and 9,000 dependents about 1,500 miles southeast to Guam, a move that would have required $21.1 billion in construction costs to complete. The Marine Corps presence on Okinawa has become too politically toxic for the Japanese government. In addition, some military analysts fear that in a shooting war with China, missile strikes could close U.S. air bases and ports on the island, preventing the Marine infantrymen there from getting to where they might be needed. Meanwhile, the bill for the huge buildup on Guam came in much too high and would have concentrated too many assets on one spot. Last year, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and James Webb objected to the Guam plan and demanded a rewrite. The latest plan scales back the Guam move to 4,700 Marines with 2,700 more moving to existing bases in Hawaii. That will reduce the Pentagon’s Guam construction bill. However, Levin, McCain, and Webb still want to know how the latest basing proposal, "relates to the broader strategic concept of operations in the region." Providing a forward presence in places like the South China Sea and reacting to military and humanitarian crises will be the major missions for the Marine Corps in the Pacific. How best to position Marine units to accomplish these tasks remains unsettled. Aquino seems to welcome a stepped-up U.S. military profile in his neighborhood. But that doesn’t mean he wants a return to the large and politically overbearing bases the United States operated in the Philippines until 1992, when a political consensus in the country threw the U.S. forces out. It is likely that a majority on Okinawa would follow suit, if they had the authority to do so. The political path of least resistance will be to relocate overseas units back to bases in the United States (something almost all congressmen will welcome) and then fly or sail these units back out on relatively short-term deployments and training exercises in partner countries. Darwin, Australia, is already preparing to eventually host up to 2,500 Marines on six-month rotational deployments. The Philippines may soon roll out a similar welcome mat. Other countries in the region may follow. In addition to reducing the corrosiveness of large foreign bases such as those in Okinawa and formerly in the Philippines, the rotational deployment method has other benefits. It will condition U.S. military forces and planners to an expeditionary mind-set. Logisticians will further improve their already formidable skills at moving military units around the world, skills that will always be handy during crises. Military units will learn to become more nimble, adaptable, and flexible, increasing their usefulness during crises. With deployments as the standard model, U.S. military personnel will become acquainted with a wider variety of foreign partners than they would under a static basing scheme. And when units are not deployed, they will be back at bases in the United States, which will have better training facilities and better family accommodations than those overseas. The deployment approach has its risks. U.S. naval and air forces face increasing challenges from long-range, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles. The ability of some adversaries to use these missiles to impose "anti-access, area denial" measures against the movement of U.S. reinforcements into crisis areas would be especially troubling for the deployment model. From a diplomatic perspective, some will question whether a U.S. strategy that relies more on distant deployments and less on a permanent forward troop presence will be sufficiently reassuring to partners who might be under stress from a strong nearby neighbor like China. Under a growing missile threat, field commanders will likely prefer the flexibility afforded by an expeditionary approach compared to the vulnerability of fixed bases — such as Okinawa — located within easy range of Chinese missiles. The new slimmed-down relocation plan to Guam will still cost an estimated $8.6 billion, spent on elaborate barracks, family housing, and training ranges. Instead of building up another increasing vulnerable fixed base, the Pentagon should consider using that money to acquire additional Marine amphibious ships and anti-missile destroyers to protect them. That would boost forward presence and flexibility, which should be reassuring to both alliance partners and U.S. commanders in the region. Reducing presence increases interoperability and Japanese defensesSugawa, special researcher at the Office of Prime Minister, 13 (Kiyoshi, “What to Do About U.S. Marines in Japan,” Real Clear Defense, 12-6-13, DOA: 7-23-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_marines_in_japan_106992.html) Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma is surrounded by densely populated residential areas in the midst of Okinawa Island. In December 1996, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed, as a part of the realignment of US bases in Okinawa, to return it "within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilitates are completed and operational." Although Tokyo and Washington later decided to build the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, the construction has long stagnated because successive Japanese administrations have failed to persuade Okinawa Prefecture to approve the landfill. Hopes of the two governments now hinge on the approval in the next few months of the landfill plan by the Okinawa government. Regardless of the decision by the Okinawa governor, however, the fundamental question will remain. Why should we consume money and energy for unpopular, expensive, and ineffective base-moving when the security environment and fiscal condition is so severe? Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has serious flaws. The most obvious problem is political feasibility. Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever. Even if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining approval for a landfill permit from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community would eventually weaken the basis of the alliance. The financial costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in Japan also weigh heavily on Japan and the United States. The General Accounting Office reported that the costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The estimated price for the landfill and construction of the FRF is almost $4 billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled as is often the case for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the Japanese government will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a strategic point of view, the present US base realignment initiative fails to meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the rise of China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably weaken the deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately 9,000 III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are to deploy to Guam and other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened from the current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to 1,800 meters, will not be able to accommodate the same range of aircraft. Ironically, the costs of the FRF and other replacement facilities are likely to undermine the ability of the Japanese government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces to deal with China's maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States need to reset the current plan and work on a new initiative that is acceptable, affordable, and strategically effective. Four basic principles should be kept in mind. First and foremost, Japan and the United States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the Okinawan people. Withdrawing the promise or postponing the return indefinitely will make them feel betrayed and their confidence in the alliance will be lost. Furthermore, the present situation where the MCAS Futenma has potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never be justified. Second, the present realignment plan for US bases in Okinawa other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the FRF has attracted a great deal of attention, even bigger projects such as the relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current agreement. Unlike Futenma, however, these bases do not pose immediate danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the Japanese government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF weaponry. Additional funds could also be allocated to share the costs of rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa. The viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment depends on access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate the helicopters and transport aircraft they need to fulfill their missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of Marines cannot remain on Okinawa. And the reality is no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public refuses to accept any other site for the FRF in the prefecture. While smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can remain on the island, the entire division needs to relocate. Due to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back to Hawaii and California rather than relying so much on Guam. Fourth, it is important that the departure of the majority of Marines based on Okinawa not be read as a retreat or a sign of decline of the alliance. Japan and the United States can create a framework to substantially compensate for the losses of deterrent capability. As a part of such efforts, US scholars Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon have suggested a new strategy to assure the swift and robust projection of the Marine Corps across the Pacific at a significantly lower cost. We should also discuss steps to augment alliance capacity in other areas, particularly the US air and naval presence based in other parts of Japan. The existing US base at Misawa in northern Honshu, home to an F-16-equipped fighter wing, could host more advanced F-22 aircraft, for example. Expanded Military Role of Japan Equally important, the role and capability of Japan's own defense forces should be expanded. Under the present US base realignment initiative, the government of Japan is expected to pay for relocation facilities, but not to play a larger military role. This scheme contrasts with the realignment of US Forces Korea where the Republic of Korea agreed to bear more military burden. If Japan really demands a smaller presence of US forces in the current security environment, it needs to step into the gap. Japan needs to invest more resources steadily in the defense of southwest of Japan. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the SDF should establish its own naval infantry unit. Improvement in maritime and air power as well as space and cyberspace security is more urgently required. More effective coordination between the SDF and the US troops would significantly improve the capability of the alliance. One of the most serious weaknesses in the current operation of the Japan-US alliance is the ambiguity and complexity about what the SDF can do in contingencies when "Japan is not under attack, but some kind of emergency takes place around Japan." The SDF will provide logistical support to US troops in such events, but the domain of the SDF activity must be limited to the "non-combatant area" as Article 9 of Japan's Constitution prohibits the use of force unless Japan is attacked. Although talk of amending the Constitution was not realistic for a long time, the situation seems to have changed. The Abe administration is trying to change the interpretation of Article 9 to admit the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, while others believe that such a substantial change should be made through a deliberative process of formal amendment. In either case, recognition of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, as well as relaxation of constitutional restraints on collective security, will clear the way for allied forces to coordinate more closely, based on military rationales. The SDF will also be able to increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities to share various levels of intelligence with the US military. It is therefore conceivable, for instance, that the Maritime SDF will assume a larger responsibility in the East China Sea and reduce the burden for the US Navy. Expansion of Japan's military role, however, must be very carefully designed. Neighboring countries in East Asia will certainly take it as a sign of Japan's resurgence as a military power. If they respond militarily, the region will face a new arms race and we will be less secure. To avoid such a clumsy outcome, prudence is required for both Japan and the United States. For example, the larger roles and missions for the SDF may be emphasized in the realm of logistical support to the US military and multilateral missions such as peacekeeping. At the same time, Japan needs to build confidence with its neighbors to reassure them that Tokyo is not embarking on a dangerous course. The Japanese government should express more candid reflection on its responsibility for the war in the Pacific, while China and South Korea could reciprocate with acceptance of genuine Japanese gestures of contrition. Japan should also construct a comprehensive China strategy that emphasizes not only deterrence but also proactive engagement. Military to military cooperation between the SDF and People's Liberation Army, including joint training or even coordinated activities in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, should be pursued as well. Faced with new realities, Japan and the US can no longer settle for a policy that merely clings to the existing plan. The leaders of the two countries should take this opportunity to demonstrate the viability and resilience of our precious alliance, yet again. Japanese Leadership—Japan would solidfy a network of regional allies which prevents them from bandwagoning with ChinaPaul J. Leaf, worked for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and is an Associate in the Labor & Employment and Commercial Litigation Departments of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Sept 4 2014, "Promise and Potential Peril: Japan’s Military Normalization", The Diplomat, thediplomat.com/2014/09/promise-and-potential-peril-japans-military-normalization/ However, the security environment has deteriorated in recent years due to growing threats and at least the perception of eroding U.S. defense commitments. Since 2006, North Korea has tested three nuclear weapons, potentially developed nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking Japan, and has killed South Korean troops and civilians. Meanwhile, Beijing’s declared military budget grew fourfold over the last decade (now at nearly $132 billion), whereas Tokyo’s military funding declined almost every year over that period (now approaching $49 billion). China spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam combined. Having developed stronger offensive military capabilities, China is aggressively asserting control of (among other areas) the East China Sea, where islands administered by Tokyo are subject to competing Japanese and Chinese claims and where rich fishing grounds, potential oil and gas deposits, and important trade routes lie. Take the following examples. In January 2013, Chinese warships in those waters locked their weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese helicopter and naval destroyer. In November 2013, Beijing enlarged its air defense identification zone to cover a broad portion of the East China Sea claimed by Tokyo. China demands that aircraft entering the zone identify themselves and divulge flight data, or face “defensive emergency measures.” In the year ending in March 2014, Japan scrambled fighter jets 415 times (a high that is up 36 percent from the previous year) to intercept Chinese aircraft encroaching its claimed airspace. In May and June 2014, Chinese fighter jets intercepted Japanese surveillance planes in contested skies, nearly causing collisions. And throughout this period, China conducted military exercises that the U.S. Navy calls preparation for a “short, sharp war” to seize disputed islands from Japan. As Japan’s neighborhood has become less safe, its doubts about U.S. security guarantees have grown. Tokyo has studied America’s shrinking military budget, war-weary voters, and expanding list of crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East that reduce resources the U.S. can devote to Asia. Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad survived U.S. President Barack Obama’s threat that he must “step aside” and then crossed Obama’s “red line” against gassing his people, Russia annexed Crimea and its proxies shot down a civilian plane, and China is forcibly expanding, including by expelling (with civilian vessels) the Philippines from the contested Scarborough Shoal and sinking (with a fishing vessel) a Vietnamese boat in its bid to find oil in Hanoi’s exclusive economic zone. But the U.S. has responded with little more than routine verbal condemnations and incremental, pinprick sanctions. Japan sees a detached American president loathe to meet serious threats with serious responses, so it questions whether the U.S. will meaningfully back it in a confrontation with China. Given these dynamics, calls for Japan to field a more flexible military and to forge stronger alliances have increased. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is normalizing Japan’s military. First, in 2013, Japan increased its military budget for the first time in eleven years. Second, in December 2013, Japan created a National Security Council and issued its first strategy paper, which focuses on countering China and beefing up Japan’s military. Third, in April 2014, Tokyo ended its ban on weapons exports and announced that it would jointly develop weapons with other countries in addition to the U.S. Fourth, in July 2014, Japan’s cabinet reinterpreted Article 9 of the country’s constitution to allow it to engage in collective self-defense. The move lays the groundwork for the Self-Defense Forces to use force abroad to defend it allies even if Japan has not been attacked. This military normalization can help to check China’s increasingly hostile rise. First, Japan’s military growth may offer new methods to oppose Chinese adventurism. China incrementally presses its territorial claims generally through low-level civilian provocations (such as using its civilian ships to patrol, blockade or expel). Last year, to support this strategy, China placed its civilian maritime forces, including its coast guard, fishing, and surveillance elements, under the control of a single, more powerful non-military agency. To prevent a serious U.S. response, China avoids high-intensity conflicts (like invading a country) and mostly keeps its military forces intimidatingly close but not directly involved in its low-level provocations. The U.S. and its partners are scrambling to meet this strategy as fear of escalation makes the U.S. unwilling to respond forcefully to such moves and the targets of China’s aggression are usually too weak to resist its incursions. Indeed, China’s battlefield, which includes nearly 1.9 million square miles of ocean and airspace encompassing the East and South China Seas, necessitates the wide dispersal of those countries’ limited military resources. But when Beijing picks a fight, it usually overwhelms its targets through sheer numbers. Japan’s military maturation may be the answer because it can enhance individual and collective military capacities such that America’s regional partners handle China’s low-level provocations without U.S. involvement while the U.S. focuses on China’s high-level threats. According to Zachary Keck, countering Beijing’s low-level provocations requires countries skirmishing with China to acquire “greater quantities of lower-end platforms” to “maintain a larger presence throughout the massive waters of the South and East China Seas. These capabilities don’t need to be especially high-end since China relies heavily on Coast Guard and other civilian vessels . . . . But they do need to be in the areas that China is contesting, preferably beforehand to deter Beijing from trying to contest them in the first place.” As Keck points out, limited defense budgets will bar some of China’s competitors from procuring a sufficient number of even lower-end platforms. Thus, other force multipliers, such as Washington and Tokyo donating decommissioned military equipment to and coordinated defense efforts among Beijing’s adversaries, are needed. To realize this strategy, Japan’s military must be given wider operating parameters and field stronger aerial, amphibious, maritime, and surveillance capabilities to defend (and perhaps recapture) its islands and assist its neighbors. Even so, Japan must not procure too many big-ticket weapons that overstretch its military budget given its contracting economy or that leave it vulnerable to asymmetric, dispersed or sizeable attacks. To those ends, Japan expects to acquire by 2019 six more submarines, three reconnaissance drones, seventeen Osprey aircraft, fifty-two amphibious landing vehicles, four more refueling tankers, seven additional naval destroyers, four more maritime patrol aircraft, and twenty-eight F-35 jet fighters, and it is repositioning its military resources further south to be closer to areas contested by China. Also, Tokyo must train Beijing’s rivals and provide them with military and maritime law enforcement hardware, including patrol and surveillance equipment. Japan should not arm its neighbors with only military vessels, because if those units are used for maritime law enforcement purposes (because of a shortage of civilian coast guard vessels), they undermine the narrative of unilateral Chinese aggression and give Beijing an excuse to “defensively escalate” by calling in its own warships. To make its technology more affordable, Japan should centralize its weapons development, procurement, and exports systems into a single agency and expand its arms sales to spread costs. Second, Japan’s military normalization portends the creation of a new alliance system in Asia. Peace in that region has been secured primarily through bilateral relationships between the U.S. on the one hand and Japan and South Korea on the other. The U.S. could rely on these narrow alliances instead of cultivating multilateral relationships because it has been significantly more powerful than China. But if Beijing nears surpassing Washington in Asia, the weaker countries surrounding China will be tempted to acquiesce to its hegemonic ambitions. Still, these countries may oppose Chinese ascendancy if a waning U.S. has sufficient support, such as a stronger and more flexible Japan anchoring multilateral alliances in Asia. Washington and many of Tokyo’s neighbors, including Australia, India, the Philippines and Vietnam, support Japan’s military normalization. Indeed, high-ranking government officials from nearly all of these countries have openly praised Japan’s actions. And during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s push to reinterpret Article 9, military cooperation between Japan and each of these countries has increased, including military training and aid, joint weapons development, and arms sales. Even Taiwan, which shares China’s territorial claims and was occupied by Japan, appears receptive. Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui stated that Japan exercising collective self-defense will make the region safer. And Taipei appears to have not publicly protested Tokyo’s construction of a radar station and forthcoming deployment of troops on Yonaguni Island, which is 67 miles from Taiwan and 93 miles from islands claimed by Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei. If Japan fails to live up to its grand announcements about assuming a larger military role, however, it is unlikely to inspire a following. It is thus troubling that since stating last year that it would supply Vietnam with used coast guard boats, Japan has delayed the transfer because its substantial patrol duties leave it with insufficient spare vessels and it is debating whether it is legally barred from sharing those boats with Vietnam. US China war goes nuclearAyson, Professor of Strategic Studies @ Victoria University, 14 (Robert, “Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia,” http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf) China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But knowing the resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7 Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves, become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific: China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR systems including America’s satellite capabilities. In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to a much more serious and damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early resort to anti-satellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that nuclear escalation is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the great equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese) conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and sea based nuclear systems. This is also a perverse incentive to nuclear escalation. The SCS is key to global econ and tradeTerri Moon Cronk, Reporter for DOD News, July 24, 2015, "Pacom Chief: China’s Land Reclamation Has Broad Consequences", www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/612689/pacom-chief-chinas-land-reclamation-has-broad-consequences China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea could have far-reaching U.S. security and economic consequences by disrupting international rules and norms that have supported the global community for decades, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command said today. In a security forum panel discussion in Aspen, Colorado, Navy Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr. said China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is an issue the American public must know about and the United States must address. “While Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan have also conducted land reclamation in the South China Sea, their total -- approximately 100 acres over 45 years -- is dwarfed by the size, scope and scale of China’s massive buildup,” Harris said. “In only 18 months, China has reclaimed almost 3,000 acres.” Each year, he noted, more than $5.3 trillion in global sea-based trade relies on unimpeded sea lanes through the South China Sea, adding that the Strait of Malacca alone sees more than 25 percent of oil shipments and 50 percent of all natural gas transits each day. This is made possible through the regional countries’ adherence to longstanding customary international law, which protects freedom of navigation, he added. Fundamental to Global Economy International recognition and protection of freedom of navigation are fundamental to the global economy and the U.S. way of life, Harris said, and unilateral attempts by any nation to disrupt freedom of navigation place the international system and global economy at risk. “The South China Sea is front and center in the tug-of-war between the majority of regional nations that want to maintain the status quo and China that wants to change it to suit its narrow self-interest,” he said. “This is why Deputy Secretary of State Blinken recently compared the aggressive actions of China in the South China Sea to Russia’s actions in Crimea. They both demonstrate desire by individual actors to change the status quo.” Economic disruptions have a high propensity to spillover and escalateJames, Princeton history professor, 2014 (Harold, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?”, 7-2, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/) Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging. Then an economically declining power, Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against its larger and faster growing competitors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China – according to some calculations, set to become the world’s largest economy in 2014. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction, but also as potential instruments for the application of national power. In managing the 2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on U.S. dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. The United States provided that support to some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the “Dollar Trap.” Geo-politics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to build up the renminbi as a major international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias of the existing (American-based) agencies. The next stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. The test is in the Western imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s calculation in response is that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious about the financial war. It would turn into a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of Europe and America. The threat of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty, one that mirrors the decisive feature of the crisis of the summer of 1914. At that time, no one could really know whether clashes would escalate or not. That feature contrasts remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the 1960s, when the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction left no doubt that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate. The idea of network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage by surprise, and to win at no or low cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others might, but also might not be able to, mount the same sort of operation. Just as in 1914, there is an enhanced temptation to roll the dice, even though the game may be fatal. Goes globalMerlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11 [Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130] Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.
(Van, “Will Asia's Peace Last?,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-asias-peace-last/, theo cut this card) Will Asia’s peace endure? The answer depends on how policymakers cope with growing structural pressures that increasingly encourage miscalculations, arms races, and reckless foreign policies. A number of well-known yet largely overlooked regional trends make conflict more likely than in the past: mistrust; uncertainty; and widespread military modernization. The greater risk of conflict over time comes from the convergence of these trends with Asia’s longstanding flashpoints. Now more than ever, Asian states express twin uncertainties about the intentions of a rising and increasingly assertive China on the one hand, and the willingness of the United States to maintain its stabilizing role in the region on the other. Apart from great power uncertainties, Asian states are wary about each other’s long-term capabilities and intentions as well — especially as much of the region undergoes a transition to larger and diverse militaries with more advanced capabilities. All of these insecurities become compounded by the limited ability of Asian states to forge deep security cooperation because of enduring mistrust of one another. Binding agreements are incompatible with the prevailing regional norm of consensus-based cooperation, yet even non-binding but transparent and predictable patterns of behavior are also largely absent from the regional security landscape. These trends feed security dilemma dynamics among states purely interested in stability and the status quo, but they also risk impeding cooperation in the face of aggression. Bonding together over a common threat is much harder when rules and norms of cooperation are fragmented, mistrust pervasive, and uncertainty about the look and feel of the future regional order rampant. This is a principal danger of a more multipolar Asia, and is arguably what we see today with multiple South China Sea claimants facing growing Chinese assertiveness — the structural conditions of the security environment, exacerbated by domestic political antagonisms toward regional neighbors, create barriers to regional coalescence against a more aggressive party. From Korea to the East and South China Seas, Asia is home to many familiar flashpoints that have somehow avoided triggering war for decades. It may be tempting to conclude that since these disputes have not yet destabilized the region, they are unlikely to do so in the future. For some, there are plenty of reasons for optimism. Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, believes that the region is headed for a “golden age” because Asian policy elites share a consensus that economic development and modernization are more important than conflict. David Kang of Dartmouth College has argued that a China-centered regional order has historically been peaceful, which helps bolster his claim that Asian states are not balancing China (circa 2007). And Alastair Iain Johnston of Harvard University argues that, contra Washington’s claims, China’s behavior in its many territorial disputes is not particularly new or assertive. Asia’s national economies, moreover, are becoming increasingly interdependent; the costs of conflict would surely outweigh any conceivable benefits. But even putting aside the accuracy of these characterizations of contemporary Asia, which are themselves highly debatable, there are a number of reasons why such rosy outlooks offer little cause for optimism. First, economic development is valuable to Asian policy elites because it strengthens domestic legitimacy, but channeling nationalist passions still remains key to the legitimacy of most Asian governments. Under the wrong conditions, whipping up nationalist sentiment against neighbors can trump economic development. Second, militaries across Asia are building their capacity to not only provide for internal security, but to project power outside their borders while denying other militaries the ability to do the same. Many small-scale disputes have erupted between low-capacity Asian militaries in the past 30 years of relative peace. It is conceivable that as military capacities increase so too will the likelihood of small-scale conflicts becoming larger scale ones. Third, economic interdependence increases the stakes of conflict but does not necessarily prevent it, or even increase the cost of it. Many middle powers operate their economic and political policies on separate tracks — Japan’s Shinzo Abe has been explicit about this in Japan’s policy toward China and ASEAN nations have deliberately done this as part of a complex strategy to navigate the great powers peacefully. Finally, and most importantly, none of the optimistic characterizations of Asia engage with the realities of current trends — mistrust, multiple types of uncertainty, and military modernization. If all is well, why is the region militarizing? Why aren’t stronger norms of cooperation in place? Any explanation of why Asia will remain peaceful must account for the prevalence — and potentially perverse effects — of these attributes of the Asian security environment, but none do. 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