The mental state of the principal is the one required in the code
The mental state of the assisting party is from s 21(1)(b) know that they will commit offence
R v Nixon 1990 p 543 [MR requirements are different btw principal and assister]
Officer knows that by throwing criminal into jail cell, he will get beat up
Officer has duty to protect people in their custody
Requires intent to apply force, knowing absence of consent
But for Nixon, there is NO intent to apply Force
Instead, there is KNOWLEDGE that assault will take place
R v Helsdon ONTCa p 545 [21(1)(b) imposes HIGH MR, A must know or be willfully blind
Facts: A (reporter) charged with aiding publisher in breaching publication ban by submitting story that contained name C in sexual assault case. Story subsequently published by Annex
Issue: whether appeal judge erred in finding that A had necessary MR to make him liable as an aider of abettor under ss 21(1)(b) or (c) of code to the offence of publishing article
Decision: Restore verdict of Acquittal
Reason:
S 486(5): offence does not req subjective knowledge of existence on publication ban
Crown must only establish intent to publish offending info, upon proof of failure to meet an objectively determined standard of care
Whether the MR necessary to hold A liable as aider or abetter to the offence is the same as that for the principal, or if, as A argues, is higher, requiring an element of subjective MR to the existing of the publication ban
A’s act in preparing and filing the offending article with the newspaper for publication was sufficient to constitute the AR necessary to make him an aider to Annex’s offence under s 21(1)(b)
Crown Argues:
MR for aider only objective test
If subjective MR, than all members of media would escape liability for breaching publication bans, since Crown would have to prove they knew ban was in place
Disagrees with Crown
21(1)(b) imposes HIGH MR
Objective mental element inconsistent with expressed requirement of “purpose” which = intent
Ex. R v Roach rejects that subjective recklessness was sufficient to satisfy MR for party liability
Crowns argument that when offence does not use full MR, 21(1)(b) should also not use full MR is WRONG. This would require reading down plain language of 21(1)(b)
Jackson does not stand for proposition that only Objective is necessary, only that importing objective MR element applied solely to consequences of unlawful act
21(1)(C) does not require “for the purpose” but Crown must prove that A intended his words or acts encourage the principal
Courts commonly treat MR requirement as the same
Class Notes:
Party liability requires AID or ABET for the purpose
This means WITH INTENT
Heldson: where element of offence normally objective, party guilty ony where SUBJECITVELY knew
True also of reckless elements
BUT conequens of unlawful acts treated the same way
IF if know the other person will assault, I can be guilty of manslaughter if victim dies (reasonable foresight of bodily harm) (and elements met)
EXAMPLE: If it’s a predicate offence (unlawful act with objective consequences).
A and G hate Bob. Bob sees A&G start running. A trips Bob to stop him. Greg then beats bob up. Bob dies from injuries. A says he only thought Greg was going to beat Bob up, not kill him.
Even though statute says “for the purpose”. He subjectively knew that he was helping Greg assault.
But helper should not get off bc 21(1)(b) requires subjective MR
Where a person commits an unlawful act, or assists knowing of the commission of an unlawful act, that has consequences
That person is liable so long as its reasonably foreseeable
R v Popen 1981 p 549 [Must know what is going to happen, must know that you are helping]
Wife beat newborn. Husband shocked, or otherwise unable to react. Charged as party to manslaughter.
Court held: no evidence that A had done or omitted to do anything for the purpose of aiding his wife inflict injuries on child
Even if his omission to act had effect of aiding, no evidence to prove it was for the purpose of aiding
The fact that he was shocked gets him off party liability
Where D has right to control actions of another and deliberately refrains from exercising it, his inactivity may be positive encouragement to other to perform act, and therefore as aiding and abetting
BUT A was never present during abuse of child
Could be criminally negligent for failing to protect child
Necessaries of life in s 197 = duty to protect child from harm (also echoed in CL)
R v Palombi 2007 p 550 [Must know what you are doing is going to help, and also intend to help. By omitting to help does not automatically= encourage/intending to help]
Facts: Take newborn home. Unclear who abused the child. A charged with aggravated assault
Issue: Can A be a party to the offence?
Decision: Order new trial
Reason:
Party Liability
He omitted to act while under a duty which helped his wife commit crime
A, by failing to intervene to protect child, assisted/encouraged co-accused in assault of child
Jury instructed that Palombi is guilty if “she had knowledge of the type of offence” being committed by partner
Knowledge of acts not enough
Where the point was made that knowledge of the principal offender’s acts can be cogent evidence of requisite MR,
She Must act or fail to act with intent to help
Sankoff says: she should be guilty if she knew the act was taking place, and be morally certain that her omission contributed to the act taking place.
Palombi wants subjective thought of KNOWING you are assisting, is necessary to be criminally guilty.
Palombi develops Dunlop and Sylvester. Knowing of the act is not enough. Must know you are assisting.
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