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- Be optimistic---China is undergoing progressive social change---the CP amplifies millions of Chinese voices that want their government to change
- WMD norms proves that China will say yes to the counterplan
- Trade is an area where the US can gain leverage over the Chinese to motivate improvements in human rights
- Solvency – Tech Transfer
- TPP entry should be conditioned on human rights
- Prior conditioning is key
- The US condition future investment on human rights improvements
- Solvency – Foreign Assistance General
- Solvency – Space Cooperation
- Cooperation is impossible without addressing human rights first
- US consistency on human rights key to US International prestige and power.
- China will view the perm as a hollow gesture and pocket the concession
- The permutation ignores the basic workings of international relations
- The perm doesn’t solve HR leadership or dissidents either---The perm would undermine the US leadership. It would make the US look weak.
Solvency ExtensionsChina Says YesUS Pressure Key to Improvement of Human Rights in ChinaFelice Gaer 13, Director of AJC's Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, "CHINA IN THE WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES", April 23 2013, www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/b.8745595/k.9748/China_in_the_World_Human_Rights_Challenges_and_Opportunities.htm China’s impact on International human rights standards and implementation Thank you, Mike. China's involvement with the United Nations and with the world on issues of human rights has progressed. It really has changed. A country which once followed Deng Xiaoping's advice—“calmly observe, cherish obscurity, never seek leadership”—is now often taking an active role on international human rights in the UN that no one ever imagined. This assertiveness is not necessarily positive for human rights and the UN. Significantly, China has publicly acknowledged the universality of human rights. At the same time, it actively attempts to redefine what that universality is, and contests the applicability of human rights worldwide. It's a good political lesson. We have all witnessed how China contests human rights and its binding application. Yet, when challenged, China doesn't want to be alone. China joined the world in the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in affirming that universality is absolute, while acknowledging that historical and regional and cultural and religious factors have to be taken into account. It affirmed that human rights are the first responsibility of governments, and universality must be followed. In itself, that's a really important development. China has also ratified seven of the ten major human rights treaties. Those ratifications have often been accompanied by China’s engagement to try to change, or substantially limit, the universal reach of the treaties and what are the standards involved in each. Chinese officials at the UN have always emphasized a hierarchy of rights. Specifically, China emphasizes economic, social, and cultural rights, and solidarity rights8, over civil and political rights. China argues that a country can only implement human rights when its level of development is high enough. So this economic and social rights approach limits the relevance and impact of rights, and questions universal standards of compliance. For China, human rights are therefore aspirational, rather than legally binding rights. Universal standards shift according to a state’s level of development. China thus downplays civil and political rights issues for itself and globally. China is still not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. China signed it after tremendous efforts during the tenure of John Shattuck,9 your predecessor, some 15 or more years ago. But they have not yet ratified it. They are still studying it, refining laws, and perhaps looking for somequid pro quo—when China signed the treaty, the U.S. dropped a stand-alone resolution on China it had presented annually at the UN’s Commission on Human Rights. The Chinese also emphasize collective rights over individual rights, and promote new solidarity rights as well. And in that process, they have tended not just to join with, but, in some cases, to lead together with Cuba and a number of other countries in a way that suggests a preference for weak human rights mechanisms, little or no country-specific scrutiny, and a strict limit on independent information sources used in the UN human rights system. If I could turn the tables here a little bit, Mike, may I ask you to discuss events during your term as Assistant Secretary? China stepped up in front, organized several joint statements, and led a coalition in the UN publicly identifying the limits on political protests (during the Arab Spring). Another statement was on limiting the use of the Internet, declaring it shouldn't be used for nefarious purposes like terrorism. That kind of leadership was something they didn't do previously, but they obviously felt obliged by the uncertainty of the Arab Spring, recalling Poland in 1989, to say proactively that they (China) are in this system: “We are in these treaty bodies, we are in the Human Rights Council, and we intend to shape them in the way we want.” China’s emphasis was on maintaining public order and control. My question is: why don’t more countries stand up to China’s problematic leadership in these human rights bodies? Another of your predecessors told me how the U.S.—the Bush Administration—would go forward with the China resolutions at the UN (attempts to express concern on the human rights situation) that had been dropped at the end of the Clinton Administration. And he said the Chinese would come to them and say, “If you raise this issue, you will be alone.” And your predecessor said back, “We know that and we don't really care.” And he said that drove China’s diplomats crazy, because one of their important approaches is to also work together with others, never be alone, and to build those coalitions. So what we see is China’s tendency to do everything by consensus, a tendency in the Human Rights Council and other bodies to try to build this kind of support, and a rather feeble response by what I would call the pro-human rights countries—the pro-civil and political rights countries—in saying, “Wait a minute, we won't have that.” These rights-supporting countries are willing to talk about rights abuses in private. That's what the Chinese want: to bilateralize comparisons about compliance with rights, rather than universalize them. Chinese diplomats went around Geneva, meeting with Ambassadors before the first Universal Periodic Review in 2009 (the second one's coming up in October) and said, “Please raise any issues you want to raise with us, but do it in private.” The rest of the world has basically said okay, and has engaged in dialogues and private discussions. What we aren't seeing is public opposition to rights abuses, and to weakening the human rights system, by rights-supporting governments in quite the way we would hope. The result, it seems to me, is that rights-supporting countries look weak, and China feels safe. It enables them to ignore human rights issues, ignore important cases—like Chen's nephew, like the 70 Arbitrary Detention Working Group cases that Sharon spoke about in the first panel, including cases where the Working Group has found the detentions to be in violation of international standards and norms. There seems to be an ability to just brush these things off. I think we are seeing a long-term strategy on the Chinese side of cherishing obscurity, but using visibility to weaken or limit the UN’s human rights bodies whenever needed. And we are seeing no strategy, or no visible strategy, on the other side. And you know, there is an old saying, “If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.” Is the U.S. now in that phase? I hope not. Be optimistic---China is undergoing progressive social change---the CP amplifies millions of Chinese voices that want their government to changeMichael Posner 13, Professor of Business and Society, NYU Stern School of Business, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, "Roundtable: “China in the World: Human Rights Challenges and Opportunities”", New York University School of Law & Human Rights in China, April 23 2013, www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6747 I’m just going to offer one last word, in some ways summarizing, but some ways looking forward. Jerry mentioned earlier that there is an agenda of things that perhaps are part of the future discussion of human rights, that haven’t been so much at the center. I know our own experience. I did three human rights dialogues with the Chinese. We did two legal experts dialogues—Ira and Jerry came to those. One of the things we did was to say we are going to operate on two tracks. We are going to look at what I would call a traditional agenda. We’re going to look at political prisoner cases, we’re going to look at religious freedom, we’re going to talk about Tibet and the situation with the Uyghurs. But we’re also going to have a kind of contemporary discussion, which is reflective of what Chinese are saying to each other. So I would go into those meetings, and I would have somebody on my staff look at weibo, look at Chinese social media, that morning. And I would add to the agenda the case of the labor dispute, the strike that was going on, dispute over wages, over working conditions or hours. We’d look at Internet freedom issues, the lack of access to information. We’d look at the environmental issues, or food safety. Or we’d look at these issues of abuse of power by local authorities, and the arbitrariness of the system. It seems to me that as we think about both the challenges but also the opportunities for people here and elsewhere who are trying to figure out what is it that we can do, the mantra ought to be: how do we identify those things the Chinese people are now vigorously debating within their own society? How do we amplify their voices? How do we give them international connections? And how do we reinforce the extent to which a rule-based, a law-based system, will help China, both government and Chinese people, arbitrate and resolve those differences. I’m quite optimistic about China actually. In my conversations with the government officials, they wanted to say, “Who are you to raise these issues?” And they’d say, “Oh, you’re only talking about 100 Chinese.” No. If you look at the social media, you’d recognize this is a country absolutely in change, where there is a huge amount of social churn. And I think for us to be opportunistic and to look at those areas that are affecting tens or hundreds of millions of Chinese people and try to reinforce those elements within the society, and there are many, they want to see a more rights respecting, rule-based system in the future WMD norms proves that China will say yes to the counterplanJeffrey A. Bader 16, a Brookings senior fellow affiliated with the John L. Thornton China Center. He was the first Director of the China Center, and was John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International Diplomacy from 2012 to 2015. He served in the U.S. government for 30 years in various capacities mostly dealing with U.S.-China relations, including as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 2009-2011, "A Framework for U.S. Policy toward China", Order from Chaos Project, Brookings, Asia Working Group, Paper 3, March 2016, www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/03/us-policy-toward-china-framework-bader/us-china-policy-framework-bader.pdf There is important historical precedent for affecting Chinese practices on similar issues. For example, beginning in the 1980s, under pressure from the United States, China began to change its behavior in the area of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transforming from one of the world’s chief problem countries to one that respected international norms. Similarly, more recently, China has altered its approach to climate change issues, aligning with the United States in bilateral and multilateral settings in taking the issue much more seriously after years of resistance. Solvency – TradeChinese trade policy is a key area for opportunity for the US to condition Chinese Human rights Sanchez 15 – Representative from CA (Loretta, “WHEN IT COMES TO FREE TRADE POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE A GAME CHANGER,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 52) In recent times, the United States has seen its interest in increased economic strength come into direct conflict with its interest in promoting human rights abroad. Those arguing for increased economic ties with human rights violators have almost invariably carried the day. Now, free trade agreements are once again on the table, as a priority of President Obama’s final years in office. Driven by domestic political priorities, politicians from both sides of the aisle will doubtless argue that U.S. economic interests must be paramount. These arguments must not eclipse human rights imperatives this time around. Human rights represent a core international and American value, and they deserve to be recognized as such. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the spread of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights promote political stability and economic growth abroad, which inevitably yield economic benefits to the United States. In effect, the United States will do well by doing good. Before Congress grants President Obama fast-track authority with respect to any future trade deal, it should mandate that any such agreement contain explicit, stringent, and enforceable requirements that counterparties respect the rights of their citizens. If these requirements are put into effect, the United States can stand, once more, as a global beacon of freedom. Trade is an area where the US can gain leverage over the Chinese to motivate improvements in human rightsHRF 12 – nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads) With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening, two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how, and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human rights, too. Solvency – Tech TransferThe US should condition technology transfer on human rightsHRF 12 – nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads) With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening, two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how, and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human rights, too. Solvency –TPPTPP entry should be conditioned on human rightsSanchez 15 – Representative from CA (Loretta, “WHEN IT COMES TO FREE TRADE POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE A GAME CHANGER,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 52) Policymakers claim time and time again that a commitment to human rights on the part of American allies and trade partners is non-negotiable,2 only to bargain away human rights commitments, in exchange for assurances of economic benefits, regional influence, or political power.3 Especially in Congress, invocation of human rights is often used as a rhetorical device to justify support for or opposition to certain policies, while rarely carrying the weight of a true “game changer.” One of the areas in which this contradiction is most evident is U.S. trade policy. As Congress debates and ultimately votes on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”),4 the United States has a singular opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to human rights and to disavow misguided policies that mortgage that commitment in exchange for empty promises of political and economic influence. This Essay begins by discussing the United States’s past practices regarding human rights, and, more specifically, regarding trade agreements. It then puts forth the United States–Vietnam free trade agreement as one example of a free trade agreement that promised too much improvement in human rights and delivered too little. Finally, this Essay concludes with a call to action: congressional approval of the TPP must be conditioned on concrete human rights commitments from our negotiating partners. The United States’s fundamental national values demand that it makes human rights central to trade policy. If prospective economic partners do not show a strong commitment to human rights, the United States must not reward them with the economic and political benefits that accompany free trade. The citizens of these countries and the American people deserve better. Prior conditioning is keySanchez 15 – Representative from CA (Loretta, “WHEN IT COMES TO FREE TRADE POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE A GAME CHANGER,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 52) Opposition to free trade agreements such as the TPP is often bipartisan, and arguments against free trade are typically based on a desire to protect American jobs.55 While there are, indeed, legitimate concerns about shipping American jobs abroad, human rights concerns constitute an additional, independent reason to oppose participation in the TPP. Before initiating or developing significant economic ties with other countries, the United States must insist that universal standards of human rights are respected and central to any agreement. Just as President Obama has for many of his second-term priorities, he must insist that human rights commitments in the TPP are not a “nice-to-have—[they’re] a must-have.”56 Trade can be used as a powerful tool to exert influence, and require that other countries take a positive position on human rights issues. This influence should be fully exerted before the agreements are signed and enter into effect lest the United States repeat the failures of the U.S.–Vietnam BTA. Trade advocates correctly argue that established trade agreements can function as an enforcement mechanism for human rights in many of these countries. However, the United States must learn from the past and avoid the delusion that, if it enables countries like Vietnam to improve their economic statuses, they will stop abusing and ignoring the rights of their citizens. History has shown that increased exposure to international markets does not push countries to change their behavior regarding human rights. The TPP is an opportunity for the United States to return to its core values, uphold international human rights standards, and practice what it preaches. The United States can no longer afford to ignore illegal and immoral behavior on the part of its trading “partners” in the name of economic and political benefits. Solvency – InvestmentThe US condition future investment on human rights improvementsHRF 12 – nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads) With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening, two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how, and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human rights, too. Solvency – Foreign Assistance GeneralPrior to providing Foreign assistance the US should insist on improvement human rightsAbrams 16 – MA in IR @ LSE, JD @ Harvard, former American diplomat, lawyer and political scientist who served in foreign policy positions, first author of a letter signed by 139 signers, who are Democrats and Repubicans and have served in numerous administrations, include one name that stands out and must be noted: former Secretary of State George P. Shultz (Elliott, “Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy,” CFR, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2016/03/16/democracy-and-u-s-foreign-policy/) In recent years, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have become more repressive; they see the advance of democracy not only within their borders but in neighboring states as a threat to their monopoly on political power. A regime’s treatment of its own people often indicates how it will behave toward its neighbors and beyond. Thus, we should not be surprised that so many of the political, economic and security challenges we face emanate from places like Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, Tehran, and Damascus. Repressive regimes are inherently unstable and must rely on suppressing democratic movements and civil society to stay in power. They also are the source and exporter of massive corruption, a pervasive transnational danger to stable democratic governance throughout the world. The result is that democracy is under attack. According to Freedom House, freedom around the world has declined every year for the past decade. That heightens the imperative for the United States to work with fellow democracies to reinvigorate support for democratic reformers everywhere. Supporting freedom around the world does not mean imposing American values or staging military interventions. In non-democratic countries, it means peacefully and creatively aiding local activists who seek democratic reform and look to the United States for moral, political, diplomatic, and sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling for a more democratic society, and their resilience and courage amid such threats demand our support. Helping them upholds the principles upon which our country was founded. Supporting democracy involves partnerships between the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations that are struggling to bring freedom to their countries. Often, it means partnering as well with emerging democracies to strengthen their representative and judicial institutions. This requires resources that Congress must continue to provide, and foreign assistance must be linked to positive performance with regard to human rights and the advancement of fundamental freedoms. Solvency – Space CooperationThe US should condition US/China Space cooperation on human rights improvements.Whittington ’15 – published author, journalist (Mark R., 10-6-2015, date accessed: 7.3.16, "Let’s Invite China to Become a Partner in Space – but with Conditions," CapitalistReview, http://www.capitalistreview.com/lets-invite-china-to-become-a-partner-in-space-but-with-conditions/) To test the theory that close cooperation in space will cause China to moderate its behavior, let the United States reach out to Beijing to propose just such a regime. China would be invited to become a partner on the International Space Station, an arrangement that will include visits by Chinese astronauts, perhaps conveyed on board the Shenzhou spacecraft. China would also be invited to become a partner in future space projects, such as crewed expeditions back to the moon, voyages to Mars, and the robotic exploration of the outer planets and their moons. In return, China must make the following initiatives. First, it must negotiate and sign a treaty regarding the use of the oil and other resources in the disputed East China Sea and South China Sea. It must also sign a nonaggression treaty with Taiwan, the island nation that it regards as a breakaway province. China must also suspend the development of weapons systems designed to fight the United States in a future conflict, especially anti-satellite weapons. It needs to stop cyber-attacks on American computer networks as well as espionage operations. These measures would reduce significantly the threat of armed conflict along the eastern Pacific Rim. Second, China needs to start respecting human rights inside its own borders. It should stop persecuting political and religious dissidents. It should take down the so-called “great firewall of China” and allow its citizens free access to the Internet. By taking these initiatives, China will give the international community confidence that it is prepared to be a good world citizen.
Solvency – RelationsCounterplan is key to US-China relations Columbia University 09 (Columbia University “Asia for Teachers”, 2009, accessed: 7/1/16 http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm ) The Human Rights Issue One of the most contentious issues in the U.S.-China relationship is human rights. American N.G.O.’s, media, and the government are critical of Chinese government treatment of dissidents, religious groups, ethnic minorities, workers, accused criminals, prisoners, and married people contemplating having more than one child, among other issues. Many Americans claim that Chinese government policies in these areas violate internationally recognized human rights. Ironically, this issue did not come to the fore during the Mao era, when China’s human rights situation was at its worst. It took on saliency after China opened to the West, an event which happened more or less to coincide with the rise of the human rights movement and human rights diplomacy in the West. The event that fixed human rights as a core U.S.-China issue was the violent crackdown against student demonstrators in Beijing on June 4, 1989 – the so-called Tiananmen Incident. Since then, the United States has been on the offensive at both the non-governmental and governmental levels in criticizing Chinese human rights violations. Policy instruments included public shaming (e.g., issuing reports), quiet diplomacy (intervention on particular cases at high levels), threats of trade sanctions (such as the threat not to renew the annual tariff privileges known as Most Favored Nation privileges or Normal Trading Relations), and efforts to have China criticized at the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. China has countered energetically, arguing, first of all, that its domestic policies are no concern of other governments and secondly, that its human rights record is admirable because of progress made in feeding, clothing, educating, and giving medical care to its vast and previously poverty-stricken population. In 2000, the U.S. House (expected soon to be followed by the Senate) approved Permanent Normal Trading Relations for China in order to allow China to enter the World Trade Organization. This for all practical purposes removes the option of threatening trade sanctions in connection with human rights abuses. The same year, China administered a strong defeat to American diplomatic efforts at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, so it remains an open question whether the U.S. can use that policy instrument in the future. The US must insist on improvements in Chinese human rights. Failure to do so wreckis relations in the long term. Even if China and the US squabble over the counterplan it is better for relations in the long termFriedberg 11 – PhD @ Harvard, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (Aaron, “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” p. 57) Today's Sino-American rivalry is rooted in deep ideological differences and in the stubborn realities of power politics. At least for the moment, how- ever, these forces are counterbalanced and, to a degree, offset by othérs that tend to promote cooperation and a measure of stability. Of these the presumed benefits of economic interdependence and the likely costs of conflict are the most powerful. The supposed cooperation-inducing effects of institutions and common threats appear, by contrast, to have been greatly overstated. For as long as they remain as strong as they are today, the fear of war and the hope of continued gains from trade may be enough to make both the United States and China extremely cautious about using force directly against one another, taking steps that could lead to the use of force, or initiating policies that would greatly increase the risk of a breakdown in relations. Whether by themselves or in combination with others, however, these factors will not be sufficient to fundamentally transform the U.S.- China relationship. For that, a change in China's domestic regime will be necessary. While they might induce some initial instability, liberalizing reforms would eventually ease or eliminate ideology as a driver of competition, enhance the prospects for cooperation in dealing with a variety of issues, from trade to proliferation, and reduce the risk that future disputes might escalate to war. The balance that exists at present between the forces favoring competi- tion and those tending toward cooperation is fragile. While it is possible to imagine circumstances in which relations between China and America could move suddenly in a more positive direction (e.g., the emergence of a Gorbachev-style reformer in Beijing), sharp shifts toward more open rivalry (due to a clash over Taiwan, or Korea, or events in South Asia or off the coasts of Japan) are also conceivable. Barring such dramatic events, if China's power continues to grow while its regime remains essentially unchanged, the competitive aspects of the Sino-American relationship will increase in importance and intensity. Cooperation may persist, but it is likely to become more limited and more difficult, while the relationship as a whole becomes increasingly brittle. Cooperation is impossible without addressing human rights firstSchell 15 - Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society (Oliver, “How to Improve U.S.-China Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044) As U.S. and Chinese heads of state gather for another summit, the vexing question of human rights looms larger than ever. The issue plagues the overall health of the bilateral relationship like a low-grade infection. U.S. displeasure with China’s rights record is only matched by Beijing’s displeasure with Washington’s judgmental attitude. This standoff has created an increasing sourness in relations that have made it difficult leaders from both countries to feel at ease with one another. The result is that the two countries have struggled to establish the élan and comfort level required for solving problems where real common interest is shared. The United States and China have fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. Disagreement over human rights grows out of a more divisive problem that sits unacknowledged like the proverbial elephant in the room. Because nobody quite knows what to do, we are hardly inclined to recognize, much less discuss it: the United States and China have fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. If we want to get anything done, we must pretend that the elephant isn’t there. President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that his China is not heading in any teleological direction congruent with Western hopes. Xi seems to suggest that China has its own model of development, one that might be described as “Leninist capitalism,” with rather limited protection of individual rights. This is a model with so-called “Chinese characteristics,” which, in the world of human rights, means that China will emphasize collective “welfare rights,” such as the right to a better standard of living, a job, and a freer lifestyle, rather than emphasizing individual rights like freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion. But if this is the model, then the United States and China are heading in divergent historical directions. A host of new friction points now center around the abridgement of individual rights in China: arrests of human rights lawyers, growing restrictions on civil society activities, new controls on academic freedom, a more heavily censored media, more limited public dialogue, visas denied to foreign press, and domestic journalists and foreign correspondents suffering more burdensome forms of harassment. These trends grow out of differences in our systems of governance and values. Whether we should confront these differences head on or seek some artful way to set them aside so the two countries can get on with other serious issues of common interest is a question we have hardly dared even think about. The elephant is still in the room, and the fact that no one knows quite how to address it lays at the root of our human rights disagreements. These differences often gain such an antagonistic dimension that they not only inhibit our ability to make progress on the rights front, but also undermine the rest of the U.S.-China relationship. HegemonyUS consistency on human rights key to US International prestige and power.Lagon 11 [Mark P. Lagon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights October 2011, “Promoting Human Rights: Is U.S. Consistency Desirable or Possible?”, http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/promoting-human-rights-us-consistency-desirable-possible/p26228 ] This seemingly serpentine path on human rights between and within presidencies actually reflects much continuity and convergence. Presidents Carter and Reagan were both moralistic in tone and each pressed allies to reform. President Obama was no more willing or able proactively to shutter the Guantanamo Bay detention facility than his predecessor. All recent presidents have been tough on Myanmar's leaders and cautious in pressuring China's. What kind of consistency would be desirable and achievable? Four precepts would help. First, despite how a human rights emphasis at times clashes with important priorities in bilateral relationships (e.g., trade, counterterrorism, and military bases), it is important not to assume that human rights always intrinsically contradict U.S. interests. For instance, repression of expression and real-time information may only retard economic growth and turn regimes into pressure cookers ready to blow. Second, it is false to suggest that the greater a country's relative power, the less the U.S. can afford to confront its human rights failings. Addressing liberties in Russia and China is all the more important due to their geopolitical weight. Indeed, if it is too inflexible in absorbing societal demands, China's autocracy could face a rupture threatening global stability. Third, governments that regularly deny a large category of their citizens equal access to justice are not only violating universal rights, but also squandering assets. For example, the United States could advance a quiet, sustained dialogue with India about the national government's role in transcending cultural practices of discrimination against broad social groups that relegate valuable human capital to squalid lives. Persistent bonded labor of disadvantaged castes despite a 1976 ban and remedy law in India is not unlike segregation persisting in the American South until U.S. national authorities—in another federal system—pushed states to implement laws. Most of all, countries that deny women and girls property and inheritance rights, free expression, and political participation are forsaking enormous assets for civic conciliation and economic dynamism—which is neither in their interests nor those of the United States. Fourth, the Middle East should not be seen as an exception. It is a bigotry of low expectations to think Muslims and Arabs are incapable of exercising universal rights. That said, there are those who would use newly won tools of freedom to institutionalize repression (as some elected Islamists might). Without covertly handpicking winners, the United States should offer a range of actors who appear authentically committed to pluralism and peaceful contestation help to develop their capacity to compete for power and to govern. So where does this leave the United States in specific cases? Take Iran. Its pursuit of a nuclear capability; its regional influence, particularly with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan; and its role in global terrorism are all issues of critical importance to the United States, but they do not call for downplaying human rights. Precisely because Iran is such a heavyweight regional power, human rights are important. The Iranian government's treatment of women and religious minorities limits them as societal and economic assets. The Green Movement and the teeming vitality of civil society show that Iranians long for fundamental freedoms. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is right to have joined the United Kingdom and Canada in imposing visa restrictions on Iranian officials implicated in rights violations. Bahrain is a striking case of the appearance of inconsistency by the United States compared to the ultimate U.S. embrace of dissent and change in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. A Human Rights Watch report documented Bahrain's “punitive and vindictive campaign of violent repression” via arbitrary arrests, hidden detention, torture, biased military court trials, and the sacking of protest sympathizers from jobs. The United States stood largely silent as Saudi Arabia supplied forces to help Bahrain put down dissent. The United States ought to view its important naval base in Bahrain as a reason to discourage repression, which could make that nation less stable. Bahrain limits the freedom of women, foreign workers, and political opposition. The United States is capable of deftly asserting more pressure on this small power to avoid counterproductive suppression of dissent (helped by the Saudis no less), without losing access to a strategic base. While it is neither wise nor feasible to have identical policies for all nations, more consistency based on these precepts will better serve U.S. and global interests. AT: PermutationsOffering the plan without conditions ensures China will not modify Human Rights Behavior Schulz 9 - Senior Fellow in human rights policy at the Center for American Progress, served as Executive Director of Amnesty International USA from 1994 to 2006 (William F., January 2009, Strategic Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China, Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/china_human_rights.pdf) The key to U.S. efforts to promote human rights in China is to take a pragmatic, non-ideological approach that goes beyond easy rhetoric, taking advantage of strategic openings yet recognizing the value of persistence. Ultimately, China must be persuaded that greater democracy and human rights are in its own best interests, integral to its becoming the highly respected global leader it aspires to be. Here, then, are a set of principles or operating assumptions that should guide U.S. human rights policy toward China. Calibrate our strategy to China’s unique circumstances The same human rights standards apply to every country in the world. Under international law, torture is torture whether it is committed in Lhasa or Abu Ghraib, and it must be condemned. But smart strategists always take into account the relative strengths and weaknesses of their targets and calibrate their strategies accordingly. It is savvy, not hypocritical, to take a different approach to bringing about improved human rights in a nuclear power with worldwide economic clout such as China than we do in a Belarus or Sudan. Saber-rattling or global economic sanctions are not feasible with China. Harsh public attacks detached from concrete consequences have repeatedly proven counter-productive. And doing nothing while hoping for the best—relying upon economic growth to bring about human rights enlightenment—has not gotten us very far. Whatever human rights strategy we pursue must be sophisticated, not ham-handed, taking into account the host of other issues about which China and the United States are engaged with one another. The Permuation ensures Chinese backlash against those pushing for Human Rights Reform. Bequelin 13 – East Asia Director at Amnesty International (Nicholas, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/) But such progress comes at a high price, especially for activists, and the question that U.S. policy makers face is whether the U.S. should stand by Chinese people who are pushing their government to pay more respect to fundamental rights and freedoms, or whether it should ignore them. It seems to me, irrespective of the issue of moral imperatives, that it is clearly in the U.S. national interest that China inches towards a more open and less repressive system of government than it has at present. The other approach, a form of engagement that mutes human rights, clearly has failed to yield any results in the past two and a half decades. While this approach styled itself as being "realist" (as opposed to the supposed "idealism" of human rights proponents) it is fairly clear today that the actual realists were those who predicted that such a low level of human rights engagement would yield nothing and even encourage the Chinese government in its repressive ways. The keys to effective promotion of the human rights agenda in the U.S.-China relationship are relatively straightforward: First, what is most important is for the United States to set the best possible example. The past few years have been problematic in this respect, with issues ranging from the legality of the Iraq war to Abu Ghraib to the C.I.A. renditions. Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights. This undermines the universality of human rights. Third, the U.S. must mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police. China will view the perm as a hollow gesture and pocket the concessionSmall 12 - Transatlantic Fellow, Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States (Andrew, "China's Response to the US 'Return to Asia' Tour," The EU-China Relationship, p. 131-132) To describe the UIS as ‘returning to Asia therefore seems misplaced, and it is notable that it is a term most actively used by commentators and officials in China, who are keen to imply that the US role is fickle, provisional and unnatural. But the Obama administration was not above using a little of that rhetoric itself in dramatising some of its early moves. Both the Secretary of State and the President made symbolic early trips to the region. Washington took steps to address perceptions that the UIS was unwilling to put in summit face-time and unsupportive of the emerging multilateral architecture, most importantly by signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and seeking membership of the East Asian Summit (EAS). It consolidated initiatives such as the India partnership that some feared may prove to be a one-administration shot. And it expanded the US focus on Southeast Asia, the source of most of the complaints about Washington 'neglecting the region. Much of this was occluded in public perceptions, however, by the other major focus of the Obama administration in Asia; upgrading bilateral relations with China. The view of some US policy makers was that by forging consensus with Beijing on areas of global concern and taking a relatively conciliatory stance on areas of Chinese sensitivity, it may be possible to erode the pervasive mistrust in the relationship. Meetings with the Dalai Lama and arms sales to Taiwan appeared to be slow-pedalled, attempts to find signature cooperation projects on climate change were launched, and US officials gave speeches on the subject of 'strategic reassurance'. The highpoint was supposed to be President Obama's first visit to China in November 2009, which saw the release of an unusually extensive joint statement spelling out an agenda for bilateral cooperation. Speculation about a new 'G2' in global affairs reached its peak. Whether this approach would have worked in other circumstances is a moot point. With the economic crisis as a backdrop, China, rather than seeing US gestures as farsighted and magnanimous, treated them as symptoms of weakness and decline. Chinese assertiveness had already been fanned by the financial crisis, out of which it seemed to emerge as a relative ‘winner'. The first year of the new administration confirmed an emerging view in Beijing that its strengthened position entitled it to demand more of other countries. The final months of 2009 acted as the denouement for this period in the US-China relationship. President Obama's visit to China played poorly in the US press, which contended that he had not been extended privileges that his predecessors received. Beijing seemed to pocket concessions from Washington while offering almost nothing in return. From bilateral economic issues to Iran sanctions, China rebuffed US requests virtually across the board. The culmination was the COP15 talks in Copenhagen, where Beijing managed to raise hackles not just with the substance of its position at the talks but with its almost insulting manner, which seemed to portend an ugly period of Chinese assertiveness ahead. The permutation ignores the basic workings of international relationsDueck 15 – PhD, Professor of Policy, Government and International Affairs @ GMU (Colin, “The Obama Doctrine,” p. 105) A similar problem exists in relation to Obama's deeply held assumption that international cooperation will necessarily follow from American accommodation. As a general rule, foreign governments or transnational actors do not feel obliged to alter their basic policy preferences or to make unwanted concessions of their own simply because an American president is accommodating, restrained, or articulate. This is not how international politics works. If the interests, goals, and priorities of other national governments align with those of the United States on specific issues, then those governments will cooperate with Washington on those issues, If not, they won't. Either way, whether we like it or not, the goals and priorities of foreign governments are defined by those governments, and not by the president of the United States. Any American president can alter the costs and benefits for other countries to cooperate with the United States on specific matters, by offering specific incentives or disincentives, but he cannot literally redefine how other governments view their own vital interests, and it is delusional to think that he can. If Washington offers a particular policy concession to another government in exchange for some concrete, reciprocal concession of real interest to the United States, then that is one thing. Such negotiations are at the heart of international diplomacy, But to make the concession beforehand—unilaterally, as it were—or to offer it up broadly to the entire planet as a whole in the hopes of unspecified reciprocity from particular countries, is to ignore the normal workings of international relations. The perm doesn’t solve HR leadership or dissidents either---The perm would undermine the US leadership. It would make the US look weak.Friedberg 11 – PhD @ Harvard, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (Aaron, “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” p. 267-272) Washington also needs to rethink what it says and does about the Chinese governments continuing refusal to grant basic political freedoms and civil liberties to its citizens. In place of the existing grab bag of initiatives, reports, and speeches, Washington needs a more deliberate and well- integrated approach to this problem. The place to start, once again, is with a healthy dose of reality. Despite the fond hopes of theorists and policy makers, economic growth has not yet led to political reform in China, nor are there any signs that it is about to. What the world has learned over past two decades is that in the face of determined and clever opposition, the link between economic change and political progress is not as direct, nor as strong, as was once assumed. American officials should be candid in acknowledging this fact, but they should present it as a challenge rather than an unalterable truth. The question is not whether the United States should continue trying to encourage political reform in China, but how it can do so more effectively. The answer must inevitably involve a mix of words and deeds. Public hectoring may be useless or even counterproductive, but silence would send a resounding signal of resignation and retreat. As its wealth and influ- ence have grown, Beijing has been increasingly successful in using threats of economic retaliation to intimidate other governments into toning down or abandoning their criticisms of its abysmal human rights record. Chinese authorities would like nothing more than to bend Washington to their will similar fashion. United States can be induced to back further away from its earlier, outspoken stance, will only confirm what Beijing has said all along: that America's alleged concern for democracy and personal liberties is a cynical sham, designed to serve its own selfish interests while humiliating China and holding it down. The Americans talk a good game, but now that there is a price be paid for their outspokenness, they turn out to be no different, and certainly not more principled, than anyone else. Questions of sincerity aside, a shift in policy that is widely seen as a response to China's growing stature can only serve to weaken America's long-term position in Asia. If Washington has to trim its sails and watch its words, others will be forced to draw the logical conclusions, not only regarding their own stance on human rights, but also about the shifting balance of power. In the face of what it can only regard as a signal of dwin- dling American strength, Beijing will no doubt do the same. Soft-pedaling talk of freedom will not reassure China's leaders as much as it will embolden them, and it will be deeply demoralizing to those in China (like the brave signatories of the recent "Charter 08" document) who continue to believe in, and to take risks for, real reform.2 Whatever it says publicly about general principles and specific abuses, the U.S. government should be looking for ways to help these people. Most will not even have an explicitly political agenda. Groups that campaign against corrup tion and the continued destruction of the natural environment, or forold- pensions, improved health care, worker's rights, impartial courts, and freedom of worship will be able to do more in the near term to push China toward responsive and accountable government than those who advocate a multiparty political system or a free press. The U.S government, non- governmental organizations, universities, churches, and private founda- tions can all play a part in assisting these advocates of social change. To say, as some Western analysts do, that reform is ultimately the responsibility of the Chinese people is both obvious and deeply disingenuous. No outside power could impose alien and unwelcome institutions on a nation of 1.3 billion souls, nor is any sane person advocating s.1Ch a policy. But the great bulk of China's population has few rights, little power, and no say in their country's future. To suggest that when they are ready, these people can simply choose democracy gravely understates the obstacles and dangers they face, while conveniently absolving outsiders of any obligation to try to help them. 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