Neoliberalism K—UMich 2013 neg 1NCs 1NC: Generic

1NC: Critical Version

American economic engagement strategies are distinctly neoliberal and subscribe to exceptionalist theories

Neoliberalism and violence are inextricably intertwined—violence is a reflection and expression of capitalism

Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS

The existing relationship between neoliberalism and violence is directly related to the system of rule that neoliberalism constructs, justifies and defends in advancing its hegemonies of ideology, of policy and programme, of state form, of governmentality and ultimately of discourse. Neoliberalism is a context in which the establishment, maintenance and extension of hierarchical orderings of social relations are re-created, sustained and intensified. Accordingly, neoliberalisation must be considered as an integral part of the moment of violence in its capacity to create social divisions within the constellations of experiences that delineate place and across the stories-so-far of space (Massey 2005). Violence has a distinctive ‘reciprocity of reinforcement’ (Iadicola and Shupe 2003, 375), where not only may inequality lead to violence, but so too may violence result in inequality. In this light, we can regard a concern for understanding the causality of violence as being a consideration that posits where neoliberalism might make its entry into this bolstering systematic exchange between inequality and violence. The empirical record demonstrates a marked increase in inequality under neoliberalism (Wade 2003), encouraging Harvey (2005) to regard this as neoliberalism's primary substantive achievement. Yet to ask the particular question ‘does neoliberalism cause violence?’ is, upon further reflection, somewhat irrelevant. Inequality alone is about the metrics and measuring of disparity, however qualified, while the link between inequality and violence is typically treated as an assessment of the ‘validity’ of a causal relationship, where the link may or may not be understood to take on multiple dimensions (including temporally, spatiality, economics, politics, culture, etc.). However, the point is that inequality and violence are mutually constitutive, which is precisely what Galtung (1969) had in mind when he coined the term ‘structural violence’. Inequality begets violence, and violence produces further inequalities. Therefore, if we want to disempower the abhorrent and alienating effects of either and rescind the domination they both encourage, we need to drop the calculative approaches and consider violence and inequality together as an enclosed and resonating system, that is, as a particular moment. As Hartsock argues [t]hinking in terms of moments can allow the theorist to take account of discontinuities and incommensurabilities without losing sight of the presence of a social system within which these features are embedded. (2006, 176) Although the enduring phenomenon of violence is riven by tensions, vagaries and vicissitudes as part of its fundamental nature, within the current moment of neoliberalism, violence is all too frequently a reflection of the turbulent landscapes of globalised capitalism. Capitalism at different moments creates particular kinds of agents who become capable of certain kinds of violence dependent upon both their distinctive geohistorical milieu and their situation within its hierarchy. It is in this distinction that future critical inquiries could productively locate their concerns for understanding the associations between violence and neoliberalism. By examining the contingent histories and unique geographies that define individual neoliberalisations, geographers can begin to interpret and dissect the kaleidoscope of violence that is intercalated within neoliberalism's broader rationality of power. It is critically important to recognise and start working through how the moment of violence and the moment of neoliberalism coalesce, to which I now turn my attention.

We must recognize that we have a choice in order to dismantle neoliberalism—public debate is a critical arena

Hay, Professor of Political Analysis at the University of Sheffield04 (Colin, “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of neoliberalism”, Economy and Society 33:4, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS

Accordingly, however depoliticized and normalized neoliberalism has become, it remains a political and economic choice, not a simple necessity. This brings us naturally to the question of alternatives. A number of points might here be made which follow fairly directly from the above analysis. First, our ability to offer alternatives to neoliberalism rests now on our ability to identify that there is a choice in such matters and, in so doing, to demystify and deconstruct the rationalist premises upon which its public legitimation has been predicated. This, it would seem, is a condition of the return of a more normative and engaging form of politics in which more is at stake than the personnel to administer a largely agreed and ostensibly technical neoliberal reform agenda. Second, the present custodians of neoliberalism are, in many cases, reluctant converts, whose accommodation to neoliberalism is essentially borne of perceived pragmatism and necessity rather than out of any deep 522 Economy and Society Downloaded by [Emory University] at 12:12 28 June 2013 normative commitment to the sanctity of the market. Thus, rather than defend neoliberalism publicly and in its own terms, they have sought instead to appeal to the absence of a choice which might be defended in such terms. Consequently, political discourse is technocratic rather than political. Furthermore, as Peter Burnham has recently noted, neoliberalism is itself a deeply depoliticizing paradigm (2001), whose effect is to subordinate social and political priorities, such as might arise from a more dialogic, responsive and democratic politics, to perceived economic imperatives and to the ruthless efficiency of the market. As I have sought to demonstrate, this antipathy to ‘politics’ is a direct correlate of public choice theory’s projection of its most cherished assumption of instrumental rationality onto public officials. This is an important point, for it suggests the crucial role played by stylized rationalist assumptions, particularly (as in the overload thesis, public choice theory more generally and even the time-inconsistency thesis) those which relate to the rational conduct of public officials, in contributing to the depoliticizing dynamics now reflected in political disaffection and disengagement. As this perhaps serves to indicate, seemingly innocent assumptions may have alarmingly cumulative consequences. Indeed, the internalization of a neoliberalism predicated on rationalist assumptions may well serve to render the so-called ‘rational voter paradox’ something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.12 The rational voter paradox _/ that in a democratic polity in which parties behave in a ‘rational’ manner it is irrational for citizens to vote (since the chances of the vote they cast proving decisive are negligible) _/ has always been seen as the central weakness of rational choice theory as a set of analytical techniques for exploring electoral competition. Yet, as the above analysis suggests, in a world constructed in the image of rationalist assumptions, it may become depressingly accurate. Political parties behaving in a narrowly ‘rational’ manner, assuming others (electors and market participants) to behave in a similarly ‘rational’ fashion will contribute to a dynamic which sees real electors (rational or otherwise) disengage in increasing numbers from the facade of electoral competition. That this is so is only reinforced by a final factor. The institutionalization and normalization of neoliberalism in many advanced liberal democracies in recent years have been defended in largely technical and rationalist terms and in a manner almost entirely inaccessible to public political scrutiny, contestation and debate. The electorate, in recent years, has not been invited to choose between competing programmatic mandates to be delivered in office, but to pass a judgement on the credibility and competence of the respective candidates for high office to behave in the appropriate (technical) manner in response to contingent external stimuli. Is it any wonder that they have chosen, in increa increasing numbers, not to exercise any such judgement at all at the ballot box?

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