Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
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The impression created by Bal Bhadra on his enemies was so indelible and benign that Colonel Mawbey in his final report to Lord Moira wrote: "It (the last defeat) is attributed to two causes: the first and principal of which was the heroic devotion of the enemy who persisted in manning the breach and bidding defiance to assailants … The second cause, the steep descent … Bal Budder was a brave soldier and humane enemy." Out of these and several others rose the great tradition of the Gorkhas who since 1814 have continued to hold the great title of the Bravest of the braves. Effects of Failure at Kalung At the overall tactical level, the British accepted a sense of moral ascendancy of the Gorkhas over their fighting élan. The Gorkhas could not defeat them in the true sense of the word, but they damaged their military psyche for years to come. At the strategic leval, it forced Moira to abandon the planned advance to the capital of Garhwal and instead, adopted a complementary hook in coordination with Ochterlony's to Nahan. Capture of Virat and advance to Jaithak were a part of this changed strategy. And then the caution it posed and the delay it caused to the British operations came out of it. The Divisions of Marley and Wood began to advance on 15 November but these were the advance guards alone. Their main bodies took their own time for one reason or the other. And consequently what were designed to be "Kathamandu by Christmas". became highly improbable. The overall effect of failure at Kalunga is described by the Board of East India Company, comprising G Nugent, NB Edmonstone and Arch Seton who wrote on 27 December 1814. 3. Your Humble Court will peruse with regret on account of the failure of the second attempt to carry the fort of Kalunga by assault on 27 November and of the serious loss which was sustained on the occasion. The result of the second attempt is considered by C-In-C to be so serious and to effect so deeply the public interest and the reputation of our arms. You will learn with satisfaction that three days after the assault the enemy evacuated the fort .. ..82 Atkinson summed up the British feelings with perfect and objective eulogy to Gorkhas of Bal Bhadra Kanwar as he wrote: " Whatever the nature of the Gorkhalis may have been found in other quarters. there was here no cruelty to wounded or to prisoners; no poisoned arrows were used, no wells or waters were poisoned; no poisoned arrows were used, no wells or waters poisoned; no rancorous spirit of revenge seemed to animate them, they fought us in fair conflict like men and, in the intervals of actual combat, showed us liberal courtesy worthy of more enlightened people." He further goes on to describe the humanity of the Gorkhas who, exhibited a strong sence of value of generosity and courtesy in warfare and also of his duty to his country, separating completely in his own mind private and national feelings from each other and his frank confidence in the individual of our nation, from the duty he owed his own, to fight against us, collectively. This was par excellence. No other enemy so humiliatingly defeated has raised a memorial for his nemesis. This rare honour and distinction is only for Bal Bhadra and His 600. It was qually in the words of GRC William to "palliate the disgrace" of the British reverses.83 The Memorial (Dehradun) The Memorial, now derelict, still stands on the right side of Road Dehradun-Sahasradhara. It was here that Gillespie's headquarters was located during the operations. Two white obelisks side by side crown the left bank of Raspana Ravine opposite Kalunga, one to the memory of Rollo Gillespie and those who perished with perished with him and the other a tribute to respect our gallant adversary and his brave followers. It reads: British Side Maj Gen Sir Rollo Gillespie Tps engaged Lieut O' Hara 6th NI Det Horse & Ft Arty Lieut Gosling Lt Bn 100 Men 8th,Irish Dragoons Ensign Fothergill 17th NI HM's 53rd ; 5 Lt Coys Ellis, Pioneers 1/6th NI, 1/7th NI Capt Campbell 6th NI 1/13 NI; 1/17th NI Lieut Luxford Horse Arty 7th Native Cav and Risala of Cunnigham Skinner's Horse &NCOs & Men Gorkha Side This is inscribed as a tribute of respect for our gallant adversary Bulbuddr, Commander of the fort and his brave Gorkhas who were after wards while in service of Ranjit Singh, shoot down in their ranks to the last man by Afghan Artillery. On the highest point of the hill above this tomb stood the fort of Kalunga. After two assaults on 31 October and 27the November… Operations Against Nepal 1814-1815: The Grave- Yard Of British Generals "The British could not enter the man-made fort of Bharatpur. Our mountains are impenetrable." -Bhim Sen Thapa, Prime Minister of Nepal 1804-35. An Ode To The Generals Of Generals- the great British Generals, Martindell, John Sullivan and George Wood. Those assigned to capture Nepaul including Marley. "Why fight?", said they "What could." - best be obtained by parley Grace be to their glory, But it must be said, As if in fable and, Good interesting story. The noble Generals of the British Army, That went conquering 'Goorkas of Nepaul'. Their battering guns with brass balls, And they all etched their names into fame's hall. With men forty thousands, elephants and battering guns, They marched through the jungles and streams, Where they sat over Scotch and cream, 'Twas Jolly good picnic, 'nautch' and fun. Then they again marched to jungle and mountain tops. Marched down with lesser strength and flops, Destroying villages and abandoned forts and crops, And returned having fired great volleys and shots, Feeling glady and thoroughly gay, Firing their salvos, At poor Marquess of Hastings- Lord we pray, Who fleeced the 'Naobab Wazeir" for their pay. This is then story of these grand Generals, Fabulous who created journals, In support to protect their posterior, And history of their motives, ulterior. Strategy For Operations Against Nepal Moira devised a strategy that looked 'Continental' in Asia. He wanted to finish in one bold stroke the puny enemy as the Gorkhas were derisively called then and whom his officers and political agents used by different names: "barbarious but brave", 84 "the subject of a foreign state holding land in the dominions of the British Government",85 "an Asiatic Army with no gegular base, or transport, where each warrior carried his food, his kit (such as it is), his ammunition in this person and when he is defeated, he makes the best of his way to home and sets to tilling his filed".86 There are several aspects of the military operations that we saw in the causes of the war. They needed to be dovetailed into the overall strategy Moira evolved and the military plan he made. The assumptions that he made were based on material superiority and the British ability to disintegrate the Gorkha alliance and the overall superiority his force enjoyed visa-vis the Nepalese. His intelligence sources estimated an overall strength of the Gorkha armed men not in excess of 10,000 with flint-locked inferior weapons and a few hundred 2 inch and 3 inch cannons of doubtful capability, as against this he expected to march with about 45,000 to 50,000 regulars, with about the same number of Irregulars a cavalry that would envelop the Gorkha defences, an artillery that would hurl heavy shells and shots form distant places, a European and Native Infantry that would deliver coup de' grace in quick order. Then there would be a vast logistical base, that coped with the operations as they progressed. The economics of the war was the next, he assumed to be favouring him. There were "Treasures", as he called the Nawab of Lucknow (Oudh) and others under his protection like Raja of Patiala, who would raise the funds and 'barkandawzs' to fight the war to its end without draining the funds of the Company, or causing severe man power shortages. The Gorkhas in comparison were taken as paupers and incapable of raising more than a few thousand rupees. The game of alliance, however strange bed-fellows they made, was the next factor he assumed to swing in his balance. Though temptations, bribery, reprisals and treaties with Sikhas, hopes of restoration of Rajas and of "a noble rule of law", they, the British, had already begun to gain the favor of an ill-informed public and the selfish Rajas whose sole cause and consequence of war was their personal aggrandizement. The British understood that they had become a "biddable people", as Hamilton called them.87 The divided lots of the Durbaris in Kathmandu, the ill-tereatment Bam Shah and even Amar Singh received at the hands of the Thapas at the Durbar, the intense Thapa-Pande feuds in Kathamandu and a general state of poverty among the Gorkha troops were the next set of factors that gave convocation to Moira's assumption of prevalence of low morale amongst the Gorkha troops, that his forces would fight. He thought they would cave in by the mere size of the British juddernaut. So, therefore, he divised a military strategy of broad front, short intense war to "chastise the Gorkha" in Nepal and India by the Christmas of 1814. His plan, as we saw, was a widely separated four pronged offensive with flanking operations. Marley's Quest For Watered Down Operations And his Desertion The operations in the west were marked with a high degree of zeal in collecting intelligence, subverting the loyalty of old rulers and Quislings like Harsh Dev Joshi, bribery and hollow promises to the locals. They had employed every source to gain intelligence to the maximum. It was a splendidly stage- managed show. And also, the objectives in the west were modest, well-measured and easily achievable. In the east, on the other hand, the objectives envisaged were ambitious, for whom intelligence were sadly lacking. The British had neither acquired good terrain going maps nor employed any worthwhile effort in feeding intelligence even when the operations got going. The agencies that the British trusted were shaky and they abandoned them at the slightest pretext. Information based on the reports of Colonel Kirkpatrick, though two decades old were tightly controlled and in any case, obsolescent and the British were much at loss to correctly evaluate the Gorkha strength in Nepal and their likely reactions. So confused were the British about the Gorkha capabilities that Moira's directions to the Divisional commanders and the two flanking operational commanders i.e., Gardner (Kumaon) and Latter (Sikkim) were only general in nature. What, however, took precedence over strategic intelligence and operational requirements were the political arrangements which might or might not support the military operations. Undue importance was given to solicit support of " Raja Udai Practap Sigh, ex Raja of Makwanpur, Raja Tej Pratap Singh of Tanhue"; "endeavour to effect the overthrow of the power of Bhim Sen Thapa and deposition of the Raja of Nepal "; and, "subversion of Gorkhas in Nagri (Sikkim)" 88 Such arrangements therefore, lacked the hard and reliable information for planning ground operations by both Wood and Marley. Their plans were, at best, based on hearsay, speculations and little wonder, they went attacking in the euphemistic thin air. Marley's task was to occupy Hetouda (or, Hetoura) and capture the forts of Hariharpur and Makwanpur before proceeding to Kathmandu. He was given wide flexibility on his axis of advance between Rivers Rapti and Bagmati a 30-40 miles wide corridor, at its narrow limits. His force comprising the Indian and the European artillery (868), HM's 24th/41st Wales (907), the three Indian battalion (1/8 NI, 1/12 NI, 1/25 NI, and two Granadiers and Light Companies alongwith a Pionner Company (276) totaled 7,989. An array of guns, howitzers and mortars made the ordnance that would support his operations and included 2, 18 pounder battering guns; 4, 6 piunders; 8, 42/5 Howitzers; 4, 3 piunders; and 2, 42/5 inch Mortars, 51/2 inch Mortars and 8 inch Howitzers each. (figures in bracket showing the strength)89 While issuing out directions to Marley on 6, November 1814 the commander-in-Chief had emphasized: "The service now entrusted to you is of particularly important nature. We are now about to engage in hostilities with a new power whose insolence and aggression have defied us to arms. The maintenance of the established renown of our country in Asia, the future wars of similar character will greatly depend on a speedy and successful issue to the approaching conest. Of all the operation in progress against Napaul none can more effectually contribute towards bringing such an issue than the accomplishment of important honorable part assigned to you in the general plan…. The expectation which the C-in-C and the Government entertain of success is high; an expectation which HE feels confident will not be disappointed"90 It was also said that the C-in-C had formed the highest expectation of a brilliant and rapid termination of war from Marley's operations. The rest of the instructions played on his 'elan, dash and ability to manage the war. As the C-in-C felt that the Nepalese had sought the Chinese assistance, Marley was instructed that he should not suspend the operation; "whatever opposes you in the field must be considered as a Gorkha force…". and if confronted by the Chinese they could be told that the British were on "punitive other than acquisitive," mission in Nepal.91 Marley planned to raise an Irregular battalion but could not muster one in time. His planning involved movement upto the Nepal border on the terrain by a force strong enough to drive in the Gorkhas operating in the area north to Tirhut to the border and then make a determined advance to Makwanpur-Hariharpur. It involved establishing a large firm base on the home side of the border and thence advancing astride the axes leading on to Makwanpur-Hariharpur. The operations are explained on the sketch. An initial firm base was planned and was obtained under Lieut Colonel Paris Bradshaw, the Political Agent and Major Roughedge, who moved with a considerable force of more than 1,500 including a squadron of Gardner's Irregular's Cavalry and 3,6 pounders, By November-end, posts had been established from Prasa in the west to Bharharwa, the second after a bitter clash with the Nepalese commander Paras Ram Thapa. It resulted in the Nepalese losing 78 killed and 28 prisoners along with their Vakil Chandra Sekhar Upadhyaya. Marley moved slowly to forward assembly area south of Bharharwa and waited for the battering train of the 18 pounders that had been ordered from Kanpur. They built up only a week before the Christmas. The battering train arrived at Lauton about the time when the Gorkhas were planning a reposte on the build up of the British. On the ground, however the junior leaders (Captains Sibley and Blakney) assigned with the task of expanding the firm base had moved with boldness. With a disdain for the Gorkha capability which had been inspired from the easy success at Bharharwa under Major Roughedge, Captains Sibley and Blackey failed to adopt adequate defensive measures at Parsa and Samanpur, which they had occupied without resistance. On December 31 and January 1, the attack developed against them as given in the sketch. IN the din of the confusion there were only two gunners Lieut Matheson and Matross William Levy who fought till end. The History of Bengal Artillery records their bravery: "Lieut Matheson fought his one gun as long as he had ammunition. Matross William Levy, who, though wounded by a musket shot through one leg and one arm, yet gallantly continued to keep his station till the priming pouch was blown from his side, and his wounds. becoming too painful to endure, obliged him to sit down; and Silari, a gun lascar of the 42nd Company, who though wounded in both hand and foot continued along to assist Lieut Matheson to the last, and who seized and carried away with a silver spear, which the enemy planted close to the gun." 92 The casualties suffered by these two posts i.e., Parsa and Samanpur rose to 383-almost those suffered at the capture of Malaun. These shook Marley. The Nepalese commander who swept these two posts also carried toe guns which continue to be displayed in the Royal Museum at Kathmandu.93 The events of failure in the west had also begun to influence the judgement of the commanders of the east. If Ochterlony could get over the inertia that had set in at Nehr in December, it was the energetic hands of his allies, the compactness of the area of his operation and the most reliable intelligence of Amar Singh he built through the intercepted mail. The Irregulars too helped him. In the case of Marley and as we will see even of Wood It was not so. The area of operation and the most reliable intelligence of Amar Singh he built through the intercepted mail. The Irregulars too helped him. In the case of Marley and as we eill see even of Wood it was not so. The area of operation law over a vast track over a terrain easily described as difficult, whose every mile would be contested by the Gorkhas for the defence of their country. Marley was watching it and became extra-cautious. The events of the New Year furter dampened his sprits. The Gorkhas had selected their time of counter-attack ideally as during tthat period the British were known to be busy with their Christmas and New-Year celebrations. They expected lesser degree of vigilance in the forward posts. And it proved correct, as on 31 December when Shamsher Rana and Sarbjit Thapa attacked, they found both the posts lightly manned and their reactions sluggish. They were routed. Its result was not only to effect Marley but those who had become allies of convenience, and strange bed-fellows. Raja of Bettiah's 1,000 Irregulars, who had been raised with difficulty, revolted .The Zamindars of the area, aware of the Gorkha wrath, until now sitting on the fence, weaned off their support, at least temporarily.94 The second effect which plagued Marley under the circumstance could portend self-imposed otacle to offensive. Like all his counter-partsm not sure of outcome of their operations, he began to "over-estimate" the Gorkha strength and capabilities opposite him; it had grown over the period of confrontation, about ten times more than earlier predicted. Despite this swollen strength of 10,000, he argued, his fighting strength was "inadequate" to beat the enemy. He demanded a reasonable supporting ration of two, if not three, to assure success. He did not, however give up the mission; he only suggested a " Watering down" of his objective. Not Kathmandu. He told the Governor General to limit his final objective to Makwanpur. Alongwith that also went the demand for additional troops.95 Moira had already denuded all his cantonments in Bihar and Bengal of their strengths and built up Marley's force to a staggering strength of 12,000. The accretion to Marley's Division was brought about by diverting HM's 17th from the Gorkhpur Division, which gave him two Eurepean Infantry battalions, ten companies of Grenadiers and an extra battalion of Native Infantry from Tirhut. He also asked the British settler in the area to help Marley. Earlier, a large column of elephants had been coerced to be provided by the Wizir of Oudh to supports his logistic. But there was that great but-bear, the dread of the Gorkhas which made him drag his feet. The History of Bengal Artillery records it: "Though reinforced to a strength of 12,000 men and urged to action by the frequent letters of his Commander-in-Chief, he could come to no decision in his own mind but one, that he carried out … Histories tell of armies running away from their General's but there is on record of a General running away from his army, as General Marley did.. Oppressed by a sense of responsibility which he could not bear, he left camp (located at Binjara Pokhara) before daylight on the 10th February without notifying his intention, or making over his office to any one".96 Moira himself recorded his personal disgust of Marley; his report of 2 August 1815: 256. Marley uniformly formed the resolution of not advancing until he should be joined by the battering train which could not reach Bettiah until December. 257. It is impossible for me to acquit Marley of the gross neglect of taking measures of reducing the strength of them (Parsa and Samanpur..) 262. The number of enemy's strength calculated and easily blowed far excess of the enemy's population. Moira's dream of taking his battle into the heart of Nepal failed by the abortive action of Marley. Colonel Sandes remarked of Marley's operation and his sack from command: "It was pitiful exhibition of irresolution and incompetence… under him fire-eating leaders (were) forced to remain inactive.."97 Captain B Latter who provided the eastern flank protection to Marley's operations by advancing to Morung and inciting uprisings against the Gorkha in Sikkim, felt dejected. In his 4 February 1815 letter he wrote: "It is subject of great regret to me that retrograde movement of General Marley's Amry renders it totally impracticable to afford any assistance to Sikkim Raja in his attempt on Nagree. Poor Marley ! Most historians wanted to strip him off his insignia of General's rank, some out of disdain, others for the heck of it. Francis Tuker in Gokrha: The sotry of the Gurkhas of Nepal (PP 80-81) found him 'compressed' under the weight of responsibility. And yet, despite his failure and desertion Marley was allowed to remain in service as Commandant of the Allahabad garrison. He died as a full General at Barrackpure on 14 June 1842-full 27 years later. His one time Gorkha opponent, Bhagat Sigh, according to the British sources The History of Artillery PP 29 foot note) with similar acts of inertia, was said to have been paraded in petticoat in the Durbar ! The fact of Marley's removal need nevertheless to be put in right perspective. Moira, was not happy in sending him as a force commander, in the first instance. He had Major General George Wood, Marley's junior, in mind of the task but could not afford to supersede him for a field command. And when he came up with the suggested 'watered down' objective, he , at once decided to replace him before it was too late. It is only to be inferred that Marley left his command under total depression caused by his inability to accept the challenge of command and mobilize it more vigorously form attack on Nepal. To top it up, the news of his replacement obviously must have further depressed him. The British history is silent in putting on record the version of Marley anywhere which could clarify the position. Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. What is a Register Of Merit docs -> Protecting the rights of the child in the context of migration docs -> United Nations E/C. 12/Esp/5 docs -> 9th May 1950 the schuman declaration docs -> Getting To Outcomes® in Services for Homeless Veterans 10 Steps for Achieving Accountability Download 0.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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