Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
Bam Shah must share the aweful responsibility of destroying the Gorkha empire
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- The Hiradungi Cemetry
- Native Infantry The latter was killed on the evening of the April 1815 on duty as an Advanced Post in the town of Almora. The former died on the 16 th
- Jaithak: Hoping for the Best
Bam Shah must share the aweful responsibility of destroying the Gorkha empire.130 in Kumaon. On the British side there was miscarriage of justice when it came to give credit to Wolliam Gardner. The Governor General's last word on Kumaon heaped all praise on Nicolls ignoring Gardner totally. He called Nicolls " a man of judgement of unremitting activity; of gallant promptitude, against obstinate resistance of a courageous enemy ..". The British achieved their objective of obtaining a trade corridor through Kumaon, which ipso-facto was their strategic aim of the campaign. But that it would bring about a wind-fall was hardly expected. For, the cheapest victor at Almora provided them with the largest gain. It is a truism to say that while Almora became a burden of history fro the Gorkha, it paved the way to Malaun and th Treaty of Sagauli, for the British. The Hiradungi Cemetry The tombstones at the cemetery of Kirk and Tapley besides the remnants of the forts at Pithoragrah and Almoara, the terrain features alone are the war memorials and archives of this battle. 1. The tombstone of Lieutenants Kirk and Tepley Both of the 2nd Battalion 27th Regiment Native Infantry Native Infantry The latter was killed on the evening of the April 1815 on duty as an Advanced Post in the town of Almora. The former died on the 16th May following a victim to zealous and continued extension in this final operations of the campaign. 2. The writings on the Fort Nanda Devi or Malla Mahal Almora. The Fort was erected by the Chand Rajas of Kumaon and strengthened by the Gorkhas and was captured by the British under Colnel Nicholls on the 26th April 1815. The convention for the surrender and evacuation of Kumaon was signed the following day (i.e. 27th April 1815). The Coming of the Gorkhas of the Indian Army "Man is the first weapon of battle; Let us then study the soldier in battle; for, it is he who brings reality to it. Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldiers will fight in the future". -Ardent du Picq. "Militrary History is a flesh and blood affair, not a mater of diagrams and formulas and rules; not of conflicts of machines but of men." - Field Marshal AP Wavell in Soldier and Soldiering. When you look at an adversary you see him as an equal, inferior, and rarely as a superior. Looking at the adversary as an inferior has its hassles or lacunae. Under-estimation that inevitably results from looking at an adversary as an inferior, is fraught with dangers. It militates against the age old principle of war: never under-estimate your enemy, however insignificant. Putting an adversary on equal footing has its pros and cons. That puts you on guard, always. Those who over-estimate their adversaries as superior also fall in the realm of error, as they began their assumptions on a totally wrong footing and hesitate to take bold decisions. The British suffered from the myopia of under-estimating their adversary- the Gorkhas, as they had earlier done to against Hyder Ali or at Bharatpur. From 1792, when Kirkpatrick131 gave them an ideia of the combat qualities of the Gorkhas, until 1814, when they were about to engage in a clash of arms, the British saw Gorkhas in different colours and shades. But it was always as an 'inferior' who needed to be chastised for lescence of arms and equipment. Among the British there were Moorcroft, serters like O' Brian and hosts of others, who came in contact with the British and gave their impressions of the Gorkhas. As a result, the Gorkhas were seen by the British "as tough as mountain goats", "simple but dangerous" who had won their battles without single gun and so on. So, they began their wars with the airs of confidence, which transcended from Moira to last British officer who boasted of brushing-aside all opposition by the Christmas of 1814-in just two months. But as the war progressed, they began to curse themselves, their Sepoys and whole system. Ochterlony, who emerged as hero began to indirectly praise the Gorkhas as he said: "The company's Sepoys could never be brought to resist the shock of these mountaineers on their own ground."132 He had been a witness from a distance of the charge of the Gorkha Brigade under Amar Singh and Bhakti Thapa at Deonthal. And it left an indelible imprint on him. Still fresh with the memory, he wrote about it two days later: "At two thousand of the enemy on all sides of the post except Singe which more than a contest of two hours and death of Bhakti Thapa who led the attack, terminated in the total repulse and defeat of the enemy with very serve loss. Umer Singh in person was at musket distance with a stand of colours encouraging his men; and to mention the impetuous courage of the enemy is only to bestow the due need of praise on the conduct and valour of those who resisted on the most daring impetuous assault ever sustained."133 Ensign John Shipp of 87th HM's Regiment, himself a brave man, had found the Gorkhas of "unparalleled stadiness and bravery, who had no fear of death, though his comrades were falling thick around".134Others like Fredrick Young, who had become a prisoner of Gorkhas, was so enamoured of their bravery and gentlemanliness that he volunteered to raise the battalion of Gorkhas when the time came.135 So were William Fraser136 and Ross 137 who considered them as "the most superior soldiers of the world". Stories of their bravery, chivalry, endurance, generosity spread as they humbled the massive, formidable British Army at Kalunga, Jaithak and Jitgarh. They emerged a phenomenon, living legends whose tales spread far and wide. Their "unerring lines often, disappeared into the smoke and wrath", as Dr RL Turner observed but their glory shone.138 and whose "only means of resistance consisted in personal gallantry", as Lord Moira grudgingly observed.139 The British recognized, they stood no chance in bravery to defeat them. Their strategy of subversion, deceit, dissension that had acquired a finesse made the simple, ill-informed Gorkhas to play into their hands and some of them decided to join their enemy's service, while the war was still being fought.140 Those were very strange times and the cult of mercenary was already a practice with most of the western and the oriental armies. The German Legion, for example, were in the service of the English king. This act of changing side was not regarded as an act of treason or failure of allegiance or even a symbol of disloyalty. Some Gorkhas operating in Jubal state, Garhwal and Malaun area with still larger component of the locals began to change side, with the hope that immediately after the war they would be able to enlist in the British Army. 141 The British interest in weaning away the Gorkhas from their masters and their own officers was part of an acknowledged stratagem of this war. For, given such similar resources, the Gorkhas too would have adopted it. But strangely, there grew a special fascination among the two sets of people. Bravery of the Gorkhas, simplicity, ability to remain loyal under all circumstance, if circumstances so demanded, led the British to believe that the Gorkhas could be easily disciplined. And if it worked out, the British would get an easy substitute for the plainsmen whose fastidiousness they saw, affected their performance. Although there was no truth in this statement. The British admiration of the Grokhas had continued at every stage of battle. For instance, in the memorial they created for General Gillespie, they engraved their special tribute to "our gallant adversary". It was a typical case of human psychology …." If you can't beat an enemy you begin to love him." 142 The poker-faced Mongols who looked the same , who laughed the most in the midst of fire and whose anecdote of seeking treatment in the British camp and then returning to the Gorkha fort at Kalunga to fight the battle against t he same people, was agog in the British lines and all over the country. And then came something which is equally good about the British character best epitomized by the reply Young gave to the Gorkhas who had made him prisoner at their post. He had said: " I did not come here to run away. I came here to stop." The Gorkhas were so delighted to hear his reply that they told him: "You are a brave man we could serve under man like you." 143 Such instances created a battlefield rapport. It was also created out of their concern for each others' casualties on the battlefields, treatment in hospitals, observance of basic human rights of the prisoners and so on. Such acts by the Gorkhas were more remarkable in this war. Two brave people adopted each other as allies after having fought a fairly long war by the standards of those days in the Nineteenth Century. Although it is slight digression, but one is reminded of the famous Captain Dove s, " I was Graf Spee's Prisoner" where he quotes the German officer remarking: "You English are hard. you do not know when you are beaten. The EXETER was beaten, but you did not know it ! When you fight brave men like that, you can not feel enemity, you only want to shake hands with them." Captain Patrick Dove wrote all the above after one of the first battles of World War II, where he having become a German prisoner was greatly impressed by their chivalry. Even in World War II when general Erwin Rommel's Arika Korps played havoc into the British Eighth Army and tossed it between Egypt and Tunisia, a harried and normally anti-German-Churchill had praised Rommel. In one of the failures which, he was reporting to the Houe of Commons, he remarked of Rommel : " We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us and may I say, across the havoc of war, a great general." Earlier he had even cursed him by saying, "Rommel Rommel … is he an enigma ?" There was thus no malice but mutual admiration, which climaxed on the occasion of Lord Moira allowing an otherwise defeated Amar Singh march out with his colours, bands playing and other honour. The mutual admiration of the Gorkha for the British also arose from their common character qualities one of which being cheerfulness in adverse circumstance. Both are a happy breed of men, which William Shakespeare had attributed to the British (because he had not known the Gorkha) and CE Lucas Phillips had done so to the Gorkhas after compiling his list of Victoria Cross Winners.144 Human fascination apart, the British were shrewd and in their uncanny sense of statesmanship, vision of future strategy, they could see beyond their nose. When the war ended in India in May 1815, Amar Singh signed the Convention only in the most frustrating condition. The British could see that, though they had won the battle yet they had so far not won the war convincingly. Though it deprived the Gorkhas of their large tracts of territory in India, it had left no visible dent on the Gorkha psyche of honour or pride. Even Amar Singh told them so. And the short shrift of an operation at Makwanpur was regarded by the Nepalese government as an avenue for re-conciliation. The Nepalese government under Bhim Sen Thapa grew conscious of the challenge, and it began to repair the damage through added militarization. Deeply concerned about the feelings of the independence and remorselessness that prevailed in Nepal after the signing of Treaty of Saguali, Campbell reported: " Her chiefs are not dependent on us, nor is she bound to ask, or we to give counsel and advice on any subject whatever. In short, Nepal is a free and independent state not according to the sprits of treaties which in India had an existence in name, but she is virtually and morally independent of the British power."145 Much of the worry of the British after the 1814-1816 wars was, therefore to devise the "measures to draw off the Gorkha militancy". Having seen the martial qualities in the Gorkhas and the determination of Bhim Sen Thapa and his government to continue to build the Nepalese Army, the British feverishly tried to explore various measures to contain the so called Nepalese militarism while, paradoxically they continued to bolster their own. Amongst the several measures, Sir Edward Paget, the C-in-C, saw this in "augmenting the Gorkha battalions in the British service by recruiting from the Nepal dominion".146 How he could have called Nepal as Dominion is difficult to ascribe except this being etymological error. Accordingly, Gardner was asked to examine the proposal. He promptly suggested to "admit the Gorkhas into the ranks of our regulars of their being framed into separate corps". Such developments continued but of immediate significance in May 1815, after the signing of Convention of Rajgarh was to utilize the services of the Gorkhas who had aided the British achieve their aims. In vindication, Moira wrote that "the whole of the Gorkha garrison of Maloun and Jeytuck, with the exception of those who marched away with Ummer Singh and his son, have taken service with the British Government and have since been joined by the garrisons of most of the forts of the interior. The total number amounts to less than 5,000 men. They have been formed into a corps fro service of hill territory, to be retained under our protection…..".147 In subsequent Paras he indicated that he had sanctioned the formation of three battalions of Gorkhas and certain numbers in Kumaon besides two Pioneer companies. This, he said he had done as, he apprehended that in case of his failure to employ them, they would "cast adrift, they having not either habits or means of industry, must through necessity repair to standards and range themselves in arms against us." Thus were raised under the Governer General's Orders of 24 April 1815 the following battalions with designations:148 First Nasiri Battalion under command Lieut Ross. Also called as the Malaun Battalion. It became the foundation of the First Gorkha Regiment of the India Army. The Sirmur Battalion under Lieut Fredrick Young. It became forerunner to the Second King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles. The Second Nasiri Battalion under command of Lieut Macharg. Also called Malaun Battalion; this Battalion was disbanded in 1929 and all its Gorkhas over 6 year service were drafted into First Nasiri Battalion and the Sirmur Battalion. The Kumaon Provincial Battalion. It came to be known as Kumaon Battalion and its First Commanding Officer was Baronet, Sir Robert Colquhoun. Later records also show it as Nazamat Battalion whose senior most Gorkha employee, was Jaikrishna Upreti. It eventually became the fore-runner to the present day Third Gorkha Rifles. By 1817, the foundation of the present Ninth Gorkha Rifles was also laid at Farukhabad. It however, underwent mind-boggling changes in designation and organization, as indeed all over Gorkha Regiments went through. The first active campaign the Nasiris and Sirmuris were engaged was in Bharatpur in 1825-26. It became their battle honour, though awarded only after 40 years. But the Nepal Durbar did not accede to the British request of formally recruiting the Gorkhas in the British Army. The British, nonetheless continued to draw on the men who were smuggled into India by the recruiting parties. It is one of the reasons, that the Gorkhas remained as mercenaries as fear lingered on in the British mind whether they would be able to win over the confidence of the Nepalese Government. Edward Gardner, the Political Agent in Kathmandu aired his views : " .. Even on entering our service the Gorkhas would not separate themselves entirely from their native country however faithfully they might conduct." He visualized a "likely rupture in the Anglo-British relation" and suggested to tide over the problem by enrolling them as " mercenaries". It was the inspiration he was drawing from the contemporary arrangements already existing for the Gorkhas now in service with Ranjit Singh and with the state of Jammu and Kasmir. Although GGO of 24 April 1815 had accepted the formation of the Nasiris and others, establishment was accepted only through the 7th October 1815 letter and from Bengal GOVP of 24 August 1815. It was formalized as under. Carrol's Bengal Military Regulations Vol II, 1817 Infantry, European and native. Chap XII GOVP 24th August 1815 284. The Right Honorable the Governor General having determined to embody and form into Battalions for the Service of the conquered Territories in the Hills, the Goorkha Troops, who came over to the British Arms, during the course of the Western Campaign; and having issued the necessary orders to that effect to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; resolved, that the following Establishment of these Corps, as approved by the Governor General, be published in General Orders, together with the Regulations for their formation and organization. His Excellency the Governor General also determined and ordered that a Local Corps should be raised and formed for the service of the Province of Kemaoon, re-solved, that the Establishment of that Corps, as approved by His Excellency, be published in General Orders. 285. That the nusseree Goorkha, and those serving under Lieutenant Young, at Nahun, be formed into three Battalions of eight Companies, each Company of the strength hereafter detailed, the Battalions to be numbered and named as follows: 286. The Nusseres Goorkhahs to be formed into two Battalions and to be denominated the 1st and 2nd Nusseree Battalions. The Goorkhas under lieutenant Young, to form a third Battalion, and to be denominated the Sirmoor Battaion. 287. The Establishment of the Kemaoon Battalion to consist also of 8 Companies, each of the same strength and Establishment in every respect as that hereafter fixed for the Nusseree and Sirmoor Battalions, and to be composed of the Goorkha Corps, late under the command of Soubah Jyekishen, Natives of Kemaoon, and other classes of Hill men. The establishment provided for the battalion headquarters included an European Commanding Officer, European Adjutant, two Surgeons, Sergeant Major, Quarter Master Sergeant, Drill Havildar and Drill Naik, Buggle Major and two Indian Doctors. The Company was commanded by a Subedar and had four Jemadars, 16 Havildars and Naiks, One pay Havildar and 120 Sepoys, thus giving a total of 141 Other Ranks. A band consisting of 19 Pippawallahs and musicians and 5 Artificers were also included. In essence it retained the shape of a company of the Gorkhas of the Nepalese Army than of the Indian.149 It took the Nasiris and Kumaon and Sirmur Battalions to convert themselves from the mercenary status to Green Jackets almost half a century and they were made regular Gorkha Battalions only after the Anglo-Sikh War. The original three Gorkha Units were brought into the line in March in 1850, stemming from the recommendation made by Sir Charles Napier, C-in-C in October 1849. The Nasiri Battalion actually took the place of the 'insubordinate' or, mutinous 66th Bengal Native Infantry but the Sirmur and Kumaon Battalions kept their titles and were not allotted a number which was the usual practice of bringing a local or Irregular Corps into the regular line. A new Nasiri Battalion was raised to replace the one which had become the 66th Bengal Native Infantry. The asli Gorkhas, the genuine, came into service from 1850s.150 According to Napier the Gorkhas remained 'bravest of Native troops, they at the battles on the Sutledge displayed such conspicuous gallantry as to place them for courage on a level with our Europeans; and certainly they have a high military sprit, are fierce in war, of unsurpassed activity and possess great powers of enduring fatigue'. And continuing with the praise of the Gorkhas and their needs over the Sepoys, he further wrote: "If we are to adopt the Goorkha regiments into the line, abolish their limitation of service to the hills and give them pay and allowance as Sepoys. Now, said I, the time is come to win the Goorkha's heart by money and the red uniform which he longs to wear: and not alone the hearts of our Goorka soldiers, but those of all the Nepaulese soldiery, so that in a war with that dangerous power, the enemy's Army will likely come over to us. However Goorkhas will fight Goorkhas readily. "No pay no Goorkha, and "the King of the Nepaul cannot, as to money, compete with the Company. We may thus set the Sepoys at defiance, if he behaves ill. The Goorkha will be faithful, and for low pay we can enlist a large body of soldiers whom our best officers consider equal in courage to European troops."151 Such feelings, as they came before the 1857 served the cause of Mutiny. However, to the Gorkhas it was a bonus. Their soldierly qualities added what the British called, friendliness, cheeriness and adaptability.152 As one concludes one is tempted to quote Florence Nightingale who wrote : "It has been said by officers, enthusiastic in their professions that there are three are three causes which make a soldier enlist viz, being out of work, in a state of intoxication, or jilted by a sweet heart."153 In the case of Gorkhas of Nepal, it has been the sound of the distant drums, the stories of Laures, the dreams of seeing the 'Seven Seas' in uniform and occasionally being in the din of war. And above all, having served a soldier's colourful life, to return to his mountains with large bundles of money a pension and a dignity which his profession alone gave him. His dignity ofter arose from what Subedar Prem Bahadur Thapa of 1st Nasiri told his Company Commander Captain John Burges after the Battle of Bharatpur in 1827: "The English are as brave as lions; they are splendid Sepoys and are very-nearly equal to us." I have heard the same thing told to me and my breed of Indian officers " If you prepare yourself well, train hard and lead us, we will accept you as our brave leader." Soldiery and bravery are in the Gorkha blood, however mercenary he may be at heart. Jaithak: Hoping for the Best By 1 December 1814 the Dun Valley was silent and the Gorkha had moved out to the Hills. At the other extremity lay Kyarda, the gate-way to Nahan or the Sirmur State. But the area of Kalsi and the heights of Virat, with its prominent Fort, dominating it, also had to be cleared. The British moved cautiously and with the help of th local Jaunsaris, managed to evacuate the fort of Virat. Colonel Carpenter, who had been left behind to clear the two Valleys, wrote to Moira on the state of affairs after the Fort was cleared: "The inner fort is in very good repairs, of sufficient height to cover all sides … I think it extremely fortunate that the enemy quitted the place as we would have found greatest difficulty to bring on mortars from Calsie … ".154 It could we have turned out to be another Kalunga but for the decision of the Gorkhas to withdraw the garrison. The uprising of the local Jaunsaris and the order by Ranjore had made the Gorkha Subedar vacate it well in time, to fall back on Jaithak, or even Srinagar . The Jaunsaris were bribed Rs 700 fro their local resistance and refusal to supply the Gorkha garrison. The Fort which had been renovated around AD 1000, was in excellent shape with a felt lining of two layers of stone walling, and a water filled moat. In 1993, when the author visited the site, he found it rather in a dilapidated condition. Mythologically Virat was ruled by King Virat and the legendary Pandav brothers with their common wife Drupadi and mother Kunti had stayed in disguise, in the capital Virat during their exile. The story goes that it was this formidable fort which prevented the Kauravs from defeating he King of Virat, when the secret of Pandav's whereabout was known. The formidability of this fort, was fully appreciated by Colonel Carpenter who was to clear it off the Gorkhas. He used the local dissenters among Garhwalis-Jaunsaris to cause a small but sizeable rebellion. by bribing them. Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. 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