New Orleans Affirmative- 7ws strategy Page
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**INHERENCY**Hurricanes inevitableHurricanes are inevitable – and CO2 levels make them more dangerous Finger 2005 (Anne Society for Disability Studies Board of Directors (2004-2007)) “Hurricane Katrina, Race, Class, Tragedy, and Charity” Disability Studies Quarterly Fall 2005, Volume 25, No. 4Vol 25, No 4 http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/630/807 Herm I do think we need to rethink our use of the word "tragedy" when applied to this. While these events were undeniably tragic, they were hardly inevitable. For a start, let's think about why the levees broke in the first place. Our nation as a whole may have problems with its infrastructure, but these problems are particularly acute in poor communities. Anyone who has ever wheeled or walked along the sidewalk in an upper middle class neighborhood and also wheeled or walked along one in a poor neighborhood knows this difference in their bones. Infrastructure--from sidewalks to curb cuts to levees--is under-funded in poor communities. That a hurricane would hit New Orleans was inevitable. That the levees, which had been neglected during both Republican and Democratic administrations, were not adequately maintained was also a known fact. On another level, nearly all climatologists predict that increasing sea temperatures, as a result of global warming, will increase the ferocity of hurricanes. In the September 19, 2005 New Yorker, Elizabeth Kolbert makes a compelling case that while the question of whether Katrina's destructive power was increased by global warming is scientifically unanswerable, "climbing CO2 levels will lead to an increase in the intensity of hurricanes, though not in hurricane frequency....Meanwhile, as sea levels rise–water expands as it warms–storm surges, like the one that breached the levees in New Orleans, will inevitably become more dangerous." The question is when, not if another hurricane strikes The Telegraph 2005 (Francis Harris in Washington) “City waited for the inevitable but the cost of prevention was just too high” 01 Sep 2005 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1497397/City-waited-for-the-inevitable-but-the-cost-of-prevention-was-just-too-high.html Herm For decades, New Orleans had been "dodging the bullet" as one hurricane after another whipped in from the Gulf of Mexico. This time the bullet struck. The consequences of Hurricane Katrina's rampage are terrible, but they are not surprising. Experts had warned that the day would come when the protective levees would fail and water would cascade into the streets. Much like Los Angeles, a city built on a fault line, the question among New Orleanians was "when" not "if". Sitting at the mouth of the Mississippi River, New Orleans is what one American academic described as "an inevitable city on an impossible site". But there were few options to save it. Lying six to 20ft below sea level and protected by a system of water-blocking levees, it had faced a growing risk of disaster for years. There had been discussions of raising the levees, but that would have cost countless billions of dollars. In the end, the city had to fight with the defences it had. They weren't enough. Erosion makes even small hurricanes breach New Orleans The Telegraph 2005 (Francis Harris in Washington) “City waited for the inevitable but the cost of prevention was just too high” 01 Sep 2005 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1497397/City-waited-for-the-inevitable-but-the-cost-of-prevention-was-just-too-high.html Herm Founded by the French in 1718 on a rise among the low-lying swamplands at the mouth of the Mississippi, the city has expanded over the years. A conspiracy of circumstances has made the city's prospects ever grimmer. Coastal erosion has created "alleyways" for even weak hurricanes to roar in at New Orleans; the need for water has depleted underground aquifers and led to a further settling; and the hurricanes posed an ever-growing threat. In a chillingly prescient article three months ago, the magazine American Prospect looked at the city's chances once a big storm struck. It reported experts saying that a huge storm would strike the city, filling "the geographical 'bowl' of the Crescent City... with the waters of the lake, leaving those unable to evacuate [the area] with little option but to cluster on rooftops - terrain they would have to share with hungry rats, fire ants, snakes and perhaps alligators". Yesterday, the transformation of one of America's most distinctive cities into a ghost town was near completion. The city is now badly wounded. Some say that it faces the "Atlantis Scenario" and may vanish like the legendary civilisation. New Orleans has risen above the challenge before. Hurricanes, fires, even the threat from the British, have all been seen off. But the floods from Katrina have dealt the city a savage blow. The jasmine that gave the French Quarter its scent, the intricate wrought ironwork of the distinctive colonial buildings and the louche charm of the jazz bars - all have been swamped. remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration? You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations. You write some letters to legislators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you’re involved in a political campaign. By then you may have stopped asking why. This is how it goes: demonstrations, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends? And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebration, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends. Other means/ends. Some people ride bicycles, en masse, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstration? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. Some people have gone to Palestine in order to put their bodies between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family’s olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one’s body can be like this. To resist, to celebrate, is also to be vulnerable. The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And so you experiment. You try this and you try that. You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to keep vigilant, seeking the possibilities without scorning the realities. It’s a difficult balance. You can neglect it if you like. Many do. But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies, animate and inanimate. Whether you like it or not, whether you recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you. No transportationThe carless have no means of escape; mass transit is key. Jarzab et al 2010 (James T. Jarzab Vice-President Emtrac Systems Harvey Alexander Manager, ITS Systems Support Branch Transportation Operations Administration James R. Jarzab Assistant Planner Emtrac Systems) “Potential Use of Technology: Mitigating Disaster Evacuation” Presented at the 5th International Social Science Research Conference September 23-25, 2010 http://www.emtracsystems.com/MitigatingDisasterEvacuation.pdf Two glaring problems in the design and implementation of emergency planning contributed to logistical inefficiencies and obstacles in the evacuation: the overall minor role mass transit resources played in the evacuation and the resources committed to evacuating population segments with few transportation options. First, there was not a dedicated use of all available mass transit vehicles to help efficiently evacuate residents in the evacuation plan. Though some local jurisdictions used regional transit buses to evacuate, these plans were not coordinated with their surrounding regions and had little communication between district and jurisdictions; furthermore, there was little use of plentiful school buses. In fact, the evacuation plan for New Orleans called for the use of transit services to move population segments with few transportation options from the city but was never initiated. Instead, the Regional Transit Authority was ordered by the Mayor to evacuate residents to the established “refuges of last resort,” such as the Superdome, instead of outside the danger zones. Consequently, the residents in these refuges--the majority of which were mobility-limited or low-income residents--were not evacuated until almost three days later. The second problem--the lack of response to population segments with few transportation options--is unsurprising considering the atmosphere of evacuation planning in New Orleans. Much of theplanning that occurred before the storm to accommodate population segments with few transportation options relied heavily on “neighbor helping neighbor” policies that were of limited success. The Victoria Transport Policy Institute describes New Orleans’s public transport evacuation as follows: “…bus deployment was ad hoc, implemented by officials during the emergency without a detailed action plan… Katrina’s evacuation was relatively effective for people with automobiles but failed transit-dependent residents” 2 . Those regional evacuation plans that did contain the use of bus or transit services to move people from the city were heavily focused on local efforts and only minimally coordinated with local evacuation plans. Also, many of the local transit resources were committed to multiple groups that placed heavy strain on already heavily taxed transit resources. As a result, thousands of low mobility residents were stranded in the several refuges and not successfully evacuated until days later. The poor, disabled and carless are left behind. Public infrastructure key to evacuations. Litman 06, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf An important test of a transportation system’s effectiveness and fairness is its ability to accommodate the needs of the most vulnerable users under extreme conditions (Litman, 2004). Katrina disaster response failed in those terms. People who had resources were served relatively well because planners are familiar with their abilities and needs. People who were poor, disabled or ill were not well served, apparently because decision-makers were unfamiliar with and insensitive to their needs. The City of New Orleans does provided a section on “Emergency Guide for Citizens with Disabilities” in its Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan posted on the City’s website (New Orleans, 2005), but it contains little practical support, placing most of the responsibility for safety and evacuation on individuals. The Guide recommends that people with disabilities develop a “support system” to provide help during disasters. The “General Evacuation Guidelines” advises, “If you need a ride, try to go with a neighbor, friend, or relative,” but provides no directions for people who lack neighbors, friends or relatives who have extra capacity in their evacuation vehicles, which is likely to be common in areas were poverty is concentrated. Non-drivers include a diverse group of people who face various combinations of physical, economic and social disadvantages. A system designed for non-drivers must therefore be able to accommodate a wide range of needs, including poverty, physical and mental disabilities (Access Board, 2005), illnesses, inability to speak or read English, parents with young children, distrust of authority, frustration and anger. Many nondrivers lack convenient access to the Internet, and some lack regular telephone and mail service. Many had nowhere to stay outside of the city and no money to pay for housing, food or return transportation. Understanding and responding to these diverse needs is therefore important for effective disaster management and evacuation planning. Under emergency conditions public infrastructure may be stressed. For example, a typical bus can normally carry about 50 passengers, but in an emergency, with evacuees carrying baggage, some in wheelchairs, and communication systems overwhelmed, 30-40 passengers is a more realistic load. It will therefore be important to provide a generous amount of overcapacity and redundancy. Governments are doing nothing to help the carless evacuate. Litman et al. 08 Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy John L. Renne, Ph.D., AICP, University of New Orleans Thomas W. Sanchez, Ph.D., University of Utah Institute National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review http://planning.uno.edu/docs/CarlessEvacuationPlanning.pdf The objective of this study is to research how state departments of transportation (state DOTs), metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), transit agencies, and local governments are considering, in the context of their emergency preparedness planning, the unique needs of minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and limited English proficient (LEP) persons, especially for households without vehicles (referred to as “carless” in this report). The evacuations of New Orleans and Houston in fall 2005 due to hurricanes Katrina and Rita were two of the largest evacuations in U.S. history. One of the main shortcomings was the lack of planning to evacuate carless residents, particularly minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and LEP persons. In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Homeland Security revealed that [m]ethods for communicating evacuation options by modes other than personal vehicles are not well developed in most cases. A number of jurisdictions indicate locations where public transportation may be obtained, but many have no specific services identified to assist persons in getting to those designated locations. This situation is a particular problem for people with various disabilities (U.S. Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, p. ES - 5) Evacuation policy fails for those without cars; there is no effective mass transit Jarzab et al 10 (James T. Jarzab Vice-President Emtrac Systems Harvey Alexander Manager, ITS Systems Support Branch Transportation Operations Administration James R. Jarzab Assistant Planner Emtrac Systems) “Potential Use of Technology: Mitigating Disaster Evacuation” Presented at the 5th International Social Science Research Conference September 23-25, 2010 http://www.emtracsystems.com/MitigatingDisasterEvacuation.pdf Two glaring problems in the design and implementation of emergency planning contributed to logistical inefficiencies and obstacles in the evacuation: the overall minor role mass transit resources played in the evacuation and the resources committed to evacuating population segments with few transportation options. First, there was not a dedicated use of all available mass transit vehicles to help efficiently evacuate residents in the evacuation plan. Though some local jurisdictions used regional transit buses to evacuate, these plans were not coordinated with their surrounding regions and had little communication between district and jurisdictions; furthermore, there was little use of plentiful school buses. In fact, the evacuation plan for New Orleans called for the use of transit services to move population segments with few transportation options from the city but was never initiated. Instead, the Regional Transit Authority was ordered by the Mayor to evacuate residents to the established “refuges of last resort,” such as the Superdome, instead of outside the danger zones. Consequently, the residents in these refuges--the majority of which were mobility-limited or low-income residents--were not evacuated until almost three days later. The second problem--the lack of response to population segments with few transportation options--is unsurprising considering the atmosphere of evacuation planning in New Orleans. Much of the planning that occurred before the storm to accommodate population segments with few transportation options relied heavily on “neighbor helping neighbor” policies that were of limited success. The Victoria Transport Policy Institute describes New Orleans’s public transport evacuation as follows: “…bus deployment was ad hoc, implemented by officials during the emergency without a detailed action plan… Katrina’s evacuation was relatively effective for people with automobiles but failed transit-dependent residents” 2 . Those regional evacuation plans that did contain the use of bus or transit services to move people from the city were heavily focused on local efforts and only minimally coordinated with local evacuation plans. Also, many of the local transit resources were committed to multiple groups that placed heavy strain on already heavily taxed transit resources. As a result, thousands of low mobility residents were stranded in the several refuges and not successfully evacuated until days later. Despite widespread awareness that people lacking automobiles could not escape New Orleans, nothing was done – this lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis Litman 06, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf This indicates that public officials were aware of and willing to accept significant risk to hundreds of thousands of residents unable to evacuate because they lacked transportation. The little effort that was made to assist non-drivers was careless and incompetent. Public officials provided little guidance or assistance to people who lacked automobiles (Renne, 2005). The city established ten pickup locations where city buses were to take people to emergency shelters, but the service was unreliable. Transit dependent people were directed to the Superdome, although it had insufficient water, food, medical care and security. This lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. New Orleans officials were aware of the risks facing transit-dependent residents. These had been described in recent articles in Scientific American (Fischett, 2001) and National Geographic (Bourne, 2004) magazines, and from previous experience (see box on the next page). A July 2004 simulation of a Category 3 “Hurricane Pam” on the southern Louisiana coast by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), projected 61,290 dead and 384,257 injured or sick in a catastrophic flood of New Orleans. City and regional emergency plans describe likely problems in detail (Louisiana, 2000; New Orleans, 2005) Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.03 Mb. Share with your friends:
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