Impacts Trade is key to China Relations – the other option is war
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been enormous changes in the configuration of international relations. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the main concern for U.S. security and political interests in global politics. Superpower rivalry was mainly concentrated in Europe. But, after the end of the Cold War, the strategic focus of the U.S. has shifted from Europe to Asia and especially in East Asia because of its growing economic importance. The fall of the former Soviet Union also took away the geo-strategic reasons to sustain cooperation between the United States and China (Suettinger, 2003; Wang, 2000). U.S. security perception has also changed due to the ideological victory of liberal democracy over communism, the decline of Russian economic and military strength, and the possibility of China’s emergence as a global economic and military power. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, more attention has been paid to China and its relations with the United States (Shambaugh, 1996). The United States is suspicious and worried about China due to its authoritarian political system, lack of transparency on military affairs, and uncertainty about future intentions and capabilities. The emergence of China has changed Asian security perceptions, trade, and the global balance of power (Shambaugh, 1996). A robust debate is underway in the U.S. about how to tackle the growing China (Shambaugh, 1996). Both liberals and conservative groups consider China as a potential threat to US interests in Asia. But liberals want “peaceful evolution” and “cooperative engagement” by trade, investment, and interdependence, while neo-conservatives want to prevent China by “pre-emptive confrontation” through diplomatic means, alliance formation, and military conflicts (Henry and Liu, 2002). Three major views have emerged in response to China’s economic growth in the last two and half decades: first, “The China threat” perspective argues that China’s growing economic power and military modernization efforts will eventually weaken the preponderant power of the United States relatively and absolutely in Asia and especially North Asia (Shambaugh, 1996). The scholars of this group (Huntington, 1996; Bernstein and Munro, 1997; Bernstein and Munro, 1998; Meirshimer, 2001) argue that a growing China will upset the world status quo and destabilize Asia as well as the whole world. Policy prescription of this group of scholars is to ‘contain’ China as quickly as possible and by any means.
Hegemony-Advantage IL-Roads
Roads are the key link to our military readiness and mobilization
FHA 02 (Federal Highway Administration, part of the US Department of Transportation “2002 Status of the Nation's Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions & Performance” 11/24/02. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2002cpr/pdf/ch12.pdf)
MTMC executes the Highways for National Defense program on behalf of USTRANSCOM. This program¶ is designed to ensure that the American road network can support military deployments. This program¶ recognizes that, first and foremost, highways are a key part of the strategic military transportation system.¶ One of the original purposes of the Interstate System was to improve the Nation’s readiness during the Cold¶ War, and highways still provide that same function.¶ The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) is critical to the Defense Department’s domestic operations.¶ STRAHNET is a 61,044-mile system of roads deemed necessary for emergency mobilization and peacetime¶ movement. Even though the U.S. Department of Defense primarily deploys heavy equipment by rail,¶ highways play a critical role.¶ Additionally, there were 102,859 bridges on the Strategic Highway Network in 2000. The next section of¶ this chapter describes bridge quality using indicators from Chapter 3 and performance measures from the FY¶ 2003 FHWA Performance Plan.¶ Exhibit 12-4 describes the condition of STRAHNET by the percent of deficient bridges on STRAHNET¶ routes. About 21.5 percent of STRAHNET bridges were deficient in 2000. About 6 percent were¶ structurally deficient, and 15.5 percent were functionally obsolete. By comparison, about 28.5 percent of all¶ bridges nationwide were deficient in¶ 2000, while roughly 14.8 percent¶ were structurally deficient and 13.8¶ percent were functionally obsolete.¶ Exhibit 12-5 shows how the percent¶ of deficient STRAHNET bridges has¶ dropped since 1995. This is a¶ performance measure in the FY 2003¶ FHWA Performance Plan. Exhibit 12-6 describes the percent of¶ deficient deck area for STRAHNET¶ bridges. In 2000, 26.7 percent of the¶ deck area on STRAHNET bridges was¶ deficient. By comparison, about 27.9¶ percent of bridge deck area nationwide¶ was considered deficient.¶ Finally, Exhibit 12-7 describes the percent¶ of STRAHNET routes under bridges with¶ vertical clearance greater than 16 feet.¶ This is a performance measure from the¶ FY 2003 FHWA Performance Plan. In¶ 2000, about 70.8 percent of STRAHNET¶ routes under bridges met this threshold, an¶ indicator that has steadily improved since 1995. This is an important measure because military convoys and¶ emergency response vehicles need to be able to clear structures on the STRAHNET system.¶ Another important element of the STRAHNET¶ system is the network of STRAHNET connectors.¶ There are 1,700 miles of STRAHNET connectors¶ that link over 200 military installations and ports to¶ the network. There are 17 key power projection¶ platforms (PPPs) in the continental United States¶ that are essential to rapid military deployment, and¶ the condition of STRAHNET connectors is as¶ important as the quality of the main STRAHNET¶ routes.
STRAHNET is key to national defense- key to military readiness
NCHRP 2006 (National Cooperative Highway Research Program, part of the Administration of Highway and Transportation Agencies “The Interstate and National Highway System- A Brief History and Lessons” June 13 2006 http://www.interstate50th.org/docs/techmemo1.pdf)
The concept of STRAHNET, a system of roads important to national defense, goes back to ¶ World War I when trucks of newly standardized designs destined for France were driven ¶ overland from Ohio to New York City and Baltimore because of congestion on the railroads. ¶ Over 30,000 trucks traveled east via designated truck routes, each loaded with 3 tons or more ¶ of spare parts and munitions, releasing over 17,000 railcars for other work. During the WW I ¶ transportation crisis the federal government had seized the railroads and the newly formed ¶ state highway departments cooperated with the War Department to bring road resources to ¶ bear on the problem. ¶ Following the war the “Pershing Map” of 1922 defining military needs was produced in ¶ anticipation of the defining of first 7 percent highway system required by the Federal Highway ¶ Act of 1921. All of the routes on the Pershing map were incorporated into the first Federal-aid ¶ system. In 1935 BPR and the War Department restudied military highway needs working with ¶ the states. These updated needs were important in the selection of the 26,700 mile system ¶ recommended in the 1939 report Toll Roads and Free Roads. ¶ At the start of WW II the War Department brought the total mileage it considered important up ¶ to 74,600 miles of which 29,000 were considered critical. Bridges unable to support heavy ¶ military loads were of particular concern. The Defense Highway Act of 1941 provided some ¶ funds for military related highway needs and work on the 1400 mile Alaska Highway was ¶ begun. The war efforts resulted in serious deterioration of the nation’s highways. At the same ¶ time normal road programs ground to a halt with gas rationing drying up revenues and war ¶ efforts getting priorities for cement, steel and related materials. ¶ The same 1941 Defense Act provided $10 million for post war planning and it was this money ¶ that led to the Interregional Highways report of 1944 which recommended an “optimum” ¶ system of 33,920 miles or about 1 percent of the then total road and street mileage. (Note the ¶ precision!) The postwar highway bill that was enacted after 9 months of debate authorized a ¶ 40,000 mile National System of Interstate Highways. ¶ Military requirements have changed over the years. They have moved from the need for a ¶ paved load bearing system that accessed military facilities and ports, to a system that would ¶ transport the missiles of the Cold War era to finally today to the rapid deployment needs of the ¶ Iraq wars which stress high volume movements between bases, equipment and munitions ¶ manufacturers, and ports and airports.
Highways are k2 national defense- links military bases and allows defense mobilization
Cocker 02 ( Janine, Marketing Coordinator for McMachon in Motion, a transportation newsletter, “Defense Mobilization: Ensured¶ through the Strategic Highway¶ Network” Vol 6 No 2. Winter/Spring 2002
Our nation's highways link U.S. military¶ bases with rail, seaports, and airports, making the 161,000-mile National Highway¶ System (NHS) a key component in national¶ defense mobility. The Federal Highway¶ Administration (FHWA), in association¶ with the U.S. Department of Defense,¶ Homeland Security Council, and the states,¶ is committed to ensuring defense mobilization by improving the condition of the¶ Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET)¶ and its connectors, a 61,000-mile subset of¶ the NHS.¶ The Federal Highway¶ Administration leads the way¶ When the federal government needs to¶ respond to a threat or a natural disaster, our¶ highways must be ready. The FHWA coordinates emergency preparedness meetings¶ with military and state officials to address¶ issues associated with military deployment¶ during national emergencies. The FHWA¶ also coordinates with the Federal Emergency¶ Management Agency (FEMA) and the¶ Office of Emergency Transportation in ¶ planning and implementing the hurricane¶ evacuation liaison program, which provides¶ traffic information during major ¶ evacuations.
Transporation is key to civilian military mobility.
Cocker 02 ( Janine, Marketing Coordinator for McMachon in Motion, a transportation newsletter, “Defense Mobilization: Ensured¶ through the Strategic Highway¶ Network” Vol 6 No 2. Winter/Spring 2002
Surface transportation continues¶ to be an important service facility¶ for civilian and militar y use.¶ During a threat or a natural disaster, commercial bus carriers and¶ rail lines can move military personnel using the highway and rail¶ transportation system. The FHWA¶ takes the lead by inviting all¶ involved agencies to coordinate¶ with the military base personnel to¶ develop strategic plans and procedures to ensure prompt and¶ efficient military responses.
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