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Authoritarianism turn Authoritarianism 2AC



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Authoritarianism 2AC



1. High oil prices spur authoritarianism
By Megan K. Stack and Borzou Daragahi, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers July 17, 2008 “Nations with vast oil wealth gaining clout” http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-oil17-2008jul17,0,6710073.story
MOSCOW -- The boom in world oil prices is bolstering autocratic governments in a handful of petroleum-rich countries, emboldening them to challenge U.S. objectives and weakening their own democratic movements. The cost of a barrel of oil has climbed dizzyingly, from $80 in September to more than $147, before settling Wednesday at $134.60. Some analysts expect it to continue rising to $200. The effects are visible across the globe: Iraq's warring factions are scrapping for a share of the massive oil wealth. The Sudanese government has more money to spend on military equipment and the campaign against rebels in Darfur. Saudi Arabia has grown more distant from its allies in Washington. But some of the most obvious effects are in countries whose leaders are most hostile to the United States: Venezuela's populist President Hugo Chavez, Iran's stringent Islamic rulers and Russia's growing autocracy. The governments of these three countries, among the top eight in proven reserves, are demanding a greater role in world affairs while spending on domestic social programs, raising salaries and building infrastructure -- measures that help blunt concerns over a slide into greater authoritarianism. "You have no control from society or opposition or the state or anybody," said Grigory Yavlinsky, a Russian economist and leader of the opposition Yabloko party. "So it's easy to use this money to support your popularity." But vast oil wealth comes with risks. All three countries are struggling with inflation, which might slowly erode popular support. In Russia, public spending doubled from 2004 to 2007. Oil and gas revenues are expected to surpass $178 billion in 2008, nearly $33 billion more than originally projected. The International Monetary Fund, wary of inflation, has warned Russia against rampant spending. Inflation in Iran has aggravated a devaluation of the currency. Political changes wrought by the oil windfall also may backfire. Venezuela's output is declining in part because skilled engineers and foreign companies are fleeing. Analysts say sanctions, brain drain and dearth of foreign investment have badly hurt Iran's potential output because of a lack of modern techniques. For now, however, all three are riding high on oil revenue. "This is perhaps the largest shift of wealth and resources in the history of the world economy," said Andrei Illarionov, who was an economic advisor to former Russian President Vladimir Putin and is now a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "This money happens to be a kind of windfall profit for these countries, compensating for failures in other areas." A nine-year run of growing oil revenue has restored Russia to a strength it hasn't experienced since the Soviet heyday. No longer a broken country fumbling for footing, Russia is now a major player on the world stage. Ten years ago, Russia was swamped with debt. Today, it sits on the world's third-largest monetary reserves, topped only by China and Japan. The government has unveiled popular initiatives to boost pensions and improve benefits for veterans. New President Dmitry Medvedev promised to focus on socioeconomic woes that beset ordinary Russians. Meanwhile, Moscow has become increasingly aggressive toward Western-leaning former Soviet states, imposing a blockade on Georgia and engaging in a dispute with Ukraine over the pricing of natural gas. Putin has sparred with the United States over NATO expansion; U.S. plans to install missile defense radar and rockets in Poland and the Czech Republic; and recognition of Kosovo's independence. Russia has also boosted ties with Iran, building a nuclear power plant in the city of Bushehr and providing nuclear fuel -- even as Iran's nuclear program has emerged as a source of acrimony with the West. Medvedev recently charged that incompetence and arrogance by Washington and U.S. businesses have provoked a global economic crisis. "It was the disconnect between the formal role played by the United States of America in the world economic system and its actual capabilities that was one of the main reasons for the current crisis," Medvedev told political and business leaders at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

Authoritarianism 2AC



2. Russian authoritarianism spurs nuclear war
Victor Irsraelyan Soviet ambassador, diplomat, and arms control negotiator 1998 “Russia at the Crossroads: Don’t Tease a Wounded Bear” Washington Quarterly
The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a “united and undivided Russia,” radically cbange domestic and foreign policies Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside “enemy. “ Such steps would include Russia’s denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension oftbe Strategic Anns Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Cbemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the 8S-20. Some oftbese measures will demand substantial financing, wbereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations ofthose agreements. In this scenario, Russia’s military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to tbe category of countries repl’esenting a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence—and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to bave an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy, I am not so sure. Some Duma members _ such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament __are ready to follow this path to save a “united Russia.” Baburin’s “Anti-NATO” deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members, One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to “save” his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany’s economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario’s would-be authors from attempting it Baboon, for example, warned that any political leader who would “dare to encroach upon Russia” would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation “by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons.” nlO In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Westem listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe, nIl Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dmmatically reduced nuclear arsenals __and tensions—Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, “It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order’s many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together.” n12

***Authoritarianism extensions



Russia has utilized oil profits to consolidate authoritarian control
Michael A McFaul professor of political science and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University 2008 “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Foreign Affairs
Putin's real stroke of luck came in the form of rising world oil prices. Worldwide, prices began to climb in 1998, dipped again slightly from 2000 to 2002, and have continued to increase ever since, approaching $100 a barrel. Economists debate what fraction of Russia's economic growth is directly attributable to rising commodity prices, but all agree that the effect is extremely large. Growing autocracy inside Russia obviously did not cause the rise in oil and gas prices. If anything, the causality runs in the opposite direction: increased energy revenues allowed for the return to autocracy. With so much money from oil windfalls in the Kremlin's coffers, Putin could crack down on or co-opt independent sources of political power; the Kremlin had less reason to fear the negative economic consequences of seizing a company like Yukos and had ample resources to buy off or repress opponents in the media and civil society.




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