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No Russian Accidental Launch
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No Russian Accidental LaunchNo accidental launch -Early warning systems solveBailey 98 [Kathleen, Snr Fellow @ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August, NIPP, http://www.nipp.org/5.php] The United States and Russia have satellite- and ground-based systems to detect and track the launch of ballistic missiles toward their territories, as well as some capabilities to warn of approaching aircraft. Additionally, both nations have communications established that enable them to raise questions and seek clarification should there be unexplained activity that appears threatening. Critics who favor de-alerting cite an incident in January 1995 as evidence that early warning in Russia is inadequate and could lead to hasty Russian nuclear use. The incident involved a Russian alert response to a research rocket fired from Norway. But, while some people viewed President Yeltsin's order for an alert as excessively dangerous, others noted that it was actually an example of the system working as it should: a missile firing was observed and the leadership stepped up readiness in event that it was actually an attack. Numerous checks and balancesBailey 98 [Kathleen, Snr Fellow @ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August, NIPP, http://www.nipp.org/5.php] Neither U.S. nor Russian nuclear weapons can be fired accidentally, nor can an illegitimate order to fire be acted upon. There are numerous checks and balances to assure a very high level of control over weapons (see Table 2). Nuclear weapons require a series of steps not only to issue the order to fire (and for the recipient to authenticate the order once received), but also to execute the order. For example, instruction codes to issue a command to fire U.S. nuclear weapons are kept in a safe. To open the safe requires that an order from the commander-in-chief (or his successor) be received and de-coded. Two individuals, each with complementary components of the combination or key to the safe must then participate in opening it. (In Russia, there are three individuals.) A single person cannot do the action, nor can it be done by only the two people with the key; others must be aware and complicit in the action. The weapons themselves also have codes and/or mechanical devices, which must be implemented or activated correctly to enable the weapon to be fired. Alt cause – high alertDDI 2 [Defense Daily International, 2-8, Lexis] According to experts, Russia and the United States each currently possess about 6,000 strategic weapons, a significant portion of which are continuously maintained on high alert, the report said. And, it added, the total number of warheads maintained on high alert by both the Russian and the United States equals 3,500-4,000. "The launch-on-warning concept, coupled with a flawed early warning systems (EWS), increases the probability of an accidental nuclear war," the report warned. "Simulations of a nuclear attack have shown that the political leadership of the country, in order to prevent the loss of their own offensive arms, will be forced to make the decision to deliver a retaliatory strike within an extremely short period of time, three to four minutes." Further, they said, the high alert status of nuclear weapons increases the risk of an accidental nuclear war for a number of reasons including: data processing and combat command and control systems errors; technical faults and failures of combat systems; inadequate evaluation of the evolving situation by the top political and military command, resulting in erroneous decision making; and erroneous or unauthorized actions as well as mental breakdowns of the attending military personnel in charge of the nuclear weapons. No escalationKislov 93 [Alexander K., Professor and Director of Peace and Research Institute, Inadvertent Nuclear War, p. 239-240] A deliberate nuclear war between East and West is out of the question; but what about a war caused by chance factors? An accidental or unauthorized launching of a missile or even of several missiles (in itself highly improbable) is unlikely to bring about a full-scale nuclear war when neither side has any incentive for it. We assume a very small probability of a very limited (“automatic” or unauthorized) reaction and a close-to-zero probability of a very limited authorized ‘retaliation’; this is the maximal assumption that is possible if we want to remain realistic. Deterrence checksWaltz 95 [Kenneth, Professor of Political Science – University of California Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, p. 111] Deterrence is also a considerable guarantee against accidents, since it causes countries to take good care of their weapons, and against anonymous use, since those firing the weapons can neither know that they will be undetected nor what form of punishment detection might bring. In life, uncertainties abound. In a conventional world, they more easily lead to war because less is at stake. Even so, it is difficult to think of wars that have started by accident even before nuclear weapons were invented. It is hard to believe that nuclear war may begin accidentally, when less frightening conventional wars have rarely done so. 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