Overfishing aff inherency

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Solvency Catch Shares
Studies show that every catch share program implemented has successfully reduced habitat destruction and overfishing.
Catch shares are the only way to save the fisheries, without regulation all of the fisheries will have collapsed by 2048
CS Solve Fishing Industry
Scientific consensus shows that individual fishing quotas increase economic gains of fisheries will promoting sustainability and replenishing fishing stocks
A2: No Solvency- Implementation
Tradable Catch shares increases job security, focuses on long term sustainability of the industry, and deters political lobbying, Alaska Proves

Laundry List Impacts

Overfishing threatens the economy, ecosystem, and social warfare

Freitas et al 8

Freitas, B.; Delagran, L.; Griffin, E.; Miller, K.L.; Hirshfield, M. May 2008. “Too Few Fish: A Regional Assessment of the World’s Fisheries.” Accessed 7/2/14 at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/toofewfish41.pdf

The depletion of fish stocks violates the basic conservation requirement of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as every tenet of sustainable development. It is also contrary to the principles and management provisions adopted in the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Overfishing affects the structure, functioning and resilience of the ocean ecosystem, threatens food security and economic development, and reduces long-term social welfare. Until recently, as fishermen have found new resources to exploit — either further down the food chain, further away or deeper in the ocean — an appearance of plenty has been maintained for those in developed countries. But this illusion hides the reality that the vast majority of stocks are exploited at or beyond their maximum sustainable potential. Without effective management and restraints on incentives to fish, even the few stocks with potential room for expansion are doomed to overexploitation. The need to control fishing effort and capacity is essential to achieving sustainable catches from the world’s oceans, with the resulting economic and development benefits that would follow. But global subsidies, amounting to approximately 25 percent of the landed value of fish, undermine management efforts by supporting uneconomic and unsustainable fishing activity.

Solvency

Catch Shares

CS Solve overfishing

Catch share programs have been successful- they create financial incentives for fisheries to adopt sustainable practices, and give fisheries the flexibility in their approach to fishing

Studies show that every catch share program implemented has successfully reduced habitat destruction and overfishing.

DAVID FESTA, DIANE REGAS, and JUDSON BOOMHOWER in 2013, Festa is director, Diane Regas is managing director, and Judson Boomhower is a fellow of the Oceans Program at Environmental Defense in Washington, DC, Sharing the Catch, Conserving the Fish, Issues in Science and Technology, http://issues.org/24-2/festa/

Environmental Defense recently conducted a study to examine how well catch share programs have performed in the 10 fisheries in the United States and British Columbia in which they have been implemented. (The Redstone Strategy Group performed the quantitative evaluations of the industry as a whole, as well as each existing catch share program.) The fisheries analyzed were Alaska halibut, Alaska pollock, Alaska sablefish, Alaska king crab, mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog, South Atlantic wreckfish, Pacific whiting, British Columbia sablefish, British Columbia halibut, and British Columbia groundfish caught by trawling. Our findings support earlier studies showing that catch share programs effectively end the persistent overshooting of scientific targets for safe levels of fishing while cushioning the impacts on fishermen. The study also reveals five key areas in which catch shares improve management outcomes. Overharvesting. Under traditional management, a fishery may have an official catch limit, but fishermen do not. Because they are not held directly accountable for exceeding a limit, they will fish until told to stop. Real-world time lags in reporting and enforcement lead to overages in collective catch targets. Regulators must then allow less catch the following year if the fish population is to recover. For the group of stocks analyzed, before catch shares were introduced, annual catch targets were exceeded in half of all fishing seasons. Sometimes the excess was small, but for some British Columbia groundfish species the caps were exceeded by as much as 60%. After catch shares were introduced, overages essentially disappeared. In fact, landings were, on average, about 5% below the annual cap. Bycatch and habitat destruction. The amount of nontarget species caught each year—not just fish, but sea turtles, dolphins, corals, and sponges—is staggering. Worldwide, about one-fourth of the total catch is thrown back, much of it dead or dying. Naturally, fisheries managers and fishermen themselves would like to eliminate this wasteful and costly inefficiency. However, when regulators attack the problem indirectly, the fishermen’s incentive is to obey the letter of the law but still find ways to catch as much as fast as possible. The result is continued bycatch, although sometimes of different kinds of sea life than before. When fishermen can reduce costs by avoiding bycatch or, even better, are held directly accountable for reducing bycatch, they do so. Bycatch decreased in every catch share fishery examined in the study, by 40% on average, and the programs collectively prevented the waste of enough seafood to feed 16 million people in the United States for a year. The fishermen also deployed 20% less gear to catch the same amount of fish. The incentive to reduce gear use under catch shares exists because success depends on efficiency instead of speed. To fishermen, less use of gear means less capital expenditure and lower input costs in the form of bait, lost gear, and labor. For the environment, less gear means a lower likelihood of harmful interactions with habitat and wildlife.

Catch shares promote safer fishing practices by reducing stress for a profit

EDF ’14 (Environmental Defense Fund, How catch shares work: A promising solution, EDF, http://www.edf.org/oceans/how-catch-shares-work-promising-solution, accessed: 6/30/14 GA)

Catch shares are a type of management system that dedicates a secure share of fish or fishing area, to individual fishermen, communities or fishery associations. Each year, the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) also known as a "catch limit" is set with portions of the limit divided among fishery participants. With a secure privilege of the total catch and clearly defined access to resources, fishermen have the ability to catch a certain amount of fish each year and are responsible for not exceeding that amount. And with this privilege, fishermen are afforded great flexibility in planning their business operations. They are no longer told exactly when or how to fish and are able to enjoy the freedom to do what makes sense for them. Often, fishermen have the opportunity to buy and sell shares which improves flexibility and increases economic efficiency. Fishermen are also able to coordinate harvests to meet market demands, resulting in higher prices for their catch, and overall, resulting in improved levels of the fishery’s profitability. Catch shares "right the ship." With a secure share of the catch, there is no pressure or need to race for fish. And with a clear stake in the overall health and sustainability of the fishery, fishermen’s incentives change from maximizing volume to maximizing value. Fishermen no longer become fierce competitors but are now inspired to collaborate as environmental stewards of the resource their livelihood depends on. This type of cooperation is almost unheard of in non-catch share fisheries where competition — not communication — is the rule. With more time and flexibility to fish, fishermen can more effectively plan their harvest, delivering fish when the demand is higher and staying ashore when the weather conditions are unsafe. More time to fish also allows fishermen to catch more sustainably — avoiding "bycatch," unwanted species, and reducing the amount of "discards" — fish thrown overboard often dead or dying. And with greater accountability from fishermen, regulators are able to relax many of constraints on fisheries. Evidence shows that catch shares overcome the "tragedy of the commons" by providing a clear economic rationale for conserving resources. Similar to how shareholders in a company have a stake in the success of a business, fishermen under catch share programs have a direct investment in the fish stock because as fish populations rebound, their share grows. Under these programs, there is also an increased effort to avoid unmarketable species, known as bycatch, which minimizes impacts on ecosystem health. In addition to improving safety and economic performance, catch shares have also been shown to increase environmental benefits. Catch shares give fishermen longer and more leisurely fishing seasons. With more time to fish, they are able to adjust fishing methods and increase efficiency allowing them to stay within catch limits and reduce impact on unwanted species. Reducing costs, avoiding penalties and engaging in conservation simply make good business sense. In addition, catch shares have provided more secure, full-time jobs, eliminated overcapitalization and alleviated the substantial stress and instability of short "derby" fishing seasons. Sustainable fisheries rely on a healthy ocean including a protected seafloor and estuaries, and reduced ocean impacts from climate change, among others. Catch shares provide the performance-based framework necessary for ensuring compliance with catch limits. Also, by tying together economic and conservation performance, catch shares create a constituency for addressing other challenges affecting fisheries. Different fisheries can have varying goals. For example, one fishery may want to maximize profits while another may want to preserve the current owner-operator fleet structure. Catch shares can be designed to help incorporate and balance these various goals. A number of special design features, from allocation to trading rules to new net designs, have come about from the great diversity of fisheries where catch shares have been used. As catch shares continue to be utilized around the world, the innovation will only continue. Offering flexibility and versatility, catch shares allow customized management and balance needs and goals of each fishery.

CS Solve-Timeframe

Catch shares are the only way to save the fisheries, without regulation all of the fisheries will have collapsed by 2048

Costello et al in 2008 (Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse? Christopher Costello1,*, Steven D. Gaines2, John Lynham3,† September 19,2008http://www.sciencemag.org/content/321/5896/1678.full)

Although the potentially harmful consequences of mismanaged fisheries were forecast over 50 years ago (1, 2), evidence of global declines has only been seen quite recently. Reports show increasing human impacts (3) and global collapses in large predatory fishes (4) and other trophic levels (5) in all large marine ecosystems (LMEs) (6). It is now widely believed that these collapses are primarily the result of the mismanagement of fisheries. One explanation for the collapse of fish stocks lies in economics: Perhaps it is economically optimal to capture fish stocks now and invest the large windfall revenues in alternative assets, rather than capturing a much smaller harvest on a regular basis. Although this remains a theoretical possibility for extremely slow-growing species (7), it remains rare in reality. A recent study reports that under reasonable economic parameterization, extinction is suboptimal (even with low growth rates) and that biomass under economically optimal harvest is larger than that under maximum sustainable yield (8). If global fisheries contain large potential profits [perhaps a present value of $1 trillion (9)], yet the profits are only realized if the fisheries are managed sustainably, why are actively managed fisheries systematically overexploited? The answer lies in the misalignment of incentives. Even when management sets harvest quotas that could maximize profits, the incentives of the individual harvester are typically inconsistent with profit maximization for the fleet. Because individuals lack secure rights to part of the quota, they have a perverse motivation to “race to fish” to outcompete others. This race can lead to poor stewardship and lobbying for ever-larger harvest quotas, creating a spiral of reduced stocks, excessive harvests, and eventual collapse. Examining specific cases, Beddington et al. (10), Hilborn et al. (11), Grafton et al. (12), and Griffith (13) argue that rights-based fisheries reforms offer promising solutions. Rather than only setting industry-wide quotas, fishermen are allocated individual rights. Referred to as catch shares or dedicated access privileges, these rights can be manifest as individual (and tradable) harvest quotas, cooperatives, or exclusive spatial harvest rights; the idea is to provide—to fishermen, communities, or cooperatives—asecure asset, which confers stewardship incentives. Most readily implemented within national jurisdictions (that is, inside 200 miles), some international agreements attempt to serve a similar function in international waters. Although both theory and empirical evidence suggest a robust link between catch shares and economic performance of a fishery (14, 15), the link with ecological performance is more tenuous. Even so, Sanchirico and Wilen (16) argue that “It is widely believed and supported by anecdotal evidence that once fishers have a financial stake in the returns from sensible investment in sustainable practices, they are more easily convinced to make sacrifices required to rebuild and sustain fisheries at high levels of economic and biological productivity.” A recent report provides examples consistent with this widely held belief (17). We tested the hypothetical causal link between the global assignment of catch shares and fisheries sustainability. Whereas individual fishing rights have been implemented on small spatial scales in traditional cultures for millennia, the adoption rate in major fisheries has accelerated since the late 1970s. To test the efficacy of catch shares, we assembled a global database of 11,135 commercial fisheries and determined which fisheries had instituted catch shares from 1950 to 2003. We matched this institutional database to the same harvest database (18) used to assess fisheries collapse by Worm et al. (6). Our objective is to answer the question: Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? In their widely cited contribution, Worm et al. (6) correlate the species richness of LMEs with fisheries collapse. They define a fishery as collapsed in year t if the harvest in year t is <10% of the maximum recorded harvest up to year t. Using this definition, ∼27% of the world's fisheries were collapsed in 2003. Extrapolating this trend into the future, Worm et al. (6) find that 100% of the world's fisheries could be collapsed by 2048. Although this highly controversial projection (19) captured most of the attention from this article, a larger focus of the work was the role of ecosystem biodiversity in preventing collapse. Fisheries in more biodiverse regions were less likely to be collapsed at any given point in history. Unfortunately, however, this greater resilience to human exploitation does not change the ultimate conclusion. Biodiversity does not prevent collapse; it merely delays it. In our analysis, we expanded beyond the characteristics of the ecosystem to consider the characteristics of the regulating fisheries institutions, simultaneously controlling for the ecosystem, genus, and other covariates. To assemble our catch-share database, we searched the published literature and government reports, interviewed experts on global fisheries, and vetted our final database with a diverse array of researchers. In total, we identified 121 fisheries managed using catch shares—defined as variations on individual transferable quotas (ITQs)—by 2003 (20). These work by allocating a dedicated share of the scientifically determined total catch to fishermen, communities, or cooperatives. This provides a stewardship incentive; as the fishery is better managed, the value of the shares increases. By analyzing the data at the fishery level [rather than the aggregate level, as in (6)], we facilitate inclusion of fisheries institutions as independent variables in our model specification. We adopt the Worm et al. (6) definition of collapse. Although a better measure would be based on stock (21), no systematic database of global fish biomass exists. This collapse metric may overestimate the frequency of collapsed fisheries (22), which creates a conservative test for the benefits of catch shares. Sensitivity analyses that consider alternative thresholds for collapse and address other potential biases yield unchanged or stronger conclusions (23). By 2003 the fraction of ITQ-managed fisheries that were collapsed (dotted line in Fig. 1A) was about half that of non-ITQ fisheries (solid line in Fig. 1A). Accelerated adoption of ITQs began in the late 1970s (dashed line and right y axis in Fig. 1A). In the preadoption period, would-be ITQ fisheries were on trajectories toward collapse, similar to non-ITQ fisheries. In the adoption period, the two curves diverge as ITQs are increasingly adopted (24). This disparity grows over time (23). Fig. 1. View larger version: In this page In a new window Download PowerPoint Slide for Teaching Fig. 1. (A) Percent of fisheries collapsed with (dotted line) and without (solid line) ITQ management using the Worm et al. (6) collapse threshold (10% of historical maximum). The number of ITQ fisheries increases through time (right y axis and dashed line), and the rate of implementation has been accelerating. (B) Percent of fisheries collapsed with (dotted line) and without (solid line) ITQ management using more conservative collapse thresholds: 1 to 6% of historical maximum catch. Demonstrating statistically a causal linkage between rights-based management and fisheries sustainability is complicated by three competing effects. First, the number of ITQ fisheries is growing, and new ITQ fisheries are drawn from a global pool with an ever-increasing fraction of collapsed fisheries. Random selection from this global pool could mask some benefits of rights-based management. Second, the conversion of fisheries to ITQs may involve a biased selection. For example, ITQs may be implemented disproportionately in fisheries that are already less collapsed, possibly giving a misleading perception of benefits from rights-based management. Finally, there may be temporal benefits of an ITQ (for instance, the longer an ITQ is in place in a given fishery, the less likely that fishery is to collapse). All of these mechanisms would lead to differences between ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries, but only the last mechanism implies a benefit from the management change. An initial regression of the data in Fig. 1 suggests that implementing an ITQ reduces the probability of collapse by 13.7 percentage points (23). Because ITQs have been disproportionately implemented in a few global ecosystems such as Alaska, Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia (25), regional or taxonomic biases could generate misleading results. To account for potential selection bias, we used a variety of estimation strategies: (i) We restricted the sample to only those ecosystems or taxa that have experienced ITQ management. (ii) We used propensity score methods to match ITQ fisheries to appropriate control fisheries (26). (iii) We used fixed-effects estimation to identify the benefit of ITQs within each fishery. The results are remarkably similar across all specifications and estimation techniques (23). The propensity score results are summarized in Table 1. Consistent with Fig. 1, ITQ fisheries perform far better than non-ITQ fisheries. Switching to an ITQ not only slows the decline toward widespread collapse, but it actually stops this decline. Each additional year of being in an ITQ (row 2 of Table 1) offsets the global trend (0.5% increase) of increasing collapse in non-ITQ fisheries (23). Other estimation techniques suggest even larger benefits. For example, fishery fixed-effects results suggest that ITQs not only halt the trend in global collapse, but they may actually reverse it (23). View this table: In this window In a new window Table 1. Fishery-specific analyses of ITQ benefits. Each fishery is treated as a time series of collapse, with some fisheries converting to ITQ during the interval. Propensity score matching (25) controls for the effects of LME, genus, or species to further isolate biases that may arise from the particular places and fisheries where ITQs have been implemented. Columns 2 to 5 provide regression model results for four different propensity score models. Rows 2 and 3 provide the regression coefficients and SEs (in parentheses). Fisheries without ITQ management had an average annual percentage change of 0.54. For all comparisons, the annual benefit of ITQs roughly counters the current rate of decline in other fisheries (23). All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Although bioeconomic theory suggests that assigning secure rights to fishermen may align incentives and lead to significantly enhanced biological and economic performance, evidence to date has been only case- or region-specific. By examining 11,135 global fisheries, we found a strong link: By 2003, the fraction of ITQ-managed fisheries that were collapsed was about half that of non-ITQ fisheries. This result probably underestimates ITQ benefits, because most ITQ fisheries are young. The results of this analysis suggest that well-designed catch shares may prevent fishery collapse across diverse taxa and ecosystems. Although the global rate of catch-share adoption has increased since 1970, the fraction of fisheries managed with catch shares is still small. We can estimate their potential impact if we project rights-based management onto all of the world's fisheries since 1970 (Fig. 2). The percent collapsed is reduced to just 9% by 2003; this fraction remains steady thereafter. This figure is a marked reversal of the previous projections. Fig. 2. View larger version: In this page In a new window Download PowerPoint Slide for Teaching Fig. 2. Simulation of trend in fisheries collapse if all non-ITQ fisheries switched to ITQs in 1970 (dotted line), compared with the actual trend (solid line). The thought experiment assumes that the annual ITQ benefit counterbalances the global trend toward complete collapse, which is consistent with the observed trends in actual ITQs (Table 1). Fluctuations in the simulation arise from estimated interannual variability. Despite the dramatic impact catch shares have had on fishery collapse, these results should not be taken as a carte blanche endorsement. First, we have restricted attention to one class of catch shares (ITQs). Second, only by appropriately matching institutional reform with ecological, economic, and social characteristics can maximal benefits be achieved. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that as catch shares are increasingly implemented globally, fish stocks, and the profits from harvesting them, have the potential to recover substantially.

CS Solve Fishing Industry

Catch share policies boost economic gains of fisheries- they increase efficiency and allow fishermen flexibility that boosts profits 80%

Economics. Typical business conditions in a traditionally managed fishery consist of a boom time during the initial years, followed by economic dislocation as fishing capacity is drawn into the fishery, the stock is overfished, and managers restrict fishing operations and lower total allowable catches. Most U.S. fisheries are overcapitalized: There is too much fish-capturing ability (vessels and gear) to efficiently harvest the level of allowable catch. The fishermen are then caught in a catch-22. A fisherman might be using only, say, half of his fishing capacity and would prefer to downsize his boat or gear, thus saving money on boat financing and operating costs while catching the same amount of fish. But if other fishermen in the fleet do not do the same, their bigger capacity will scoop up the fish faster than he can in the race against the clock. The result is that our fisherman makes the best choice under a tough set of circumstances and stays in the race. To make matters worse, when the entire annual supply of fish comes to market over a short period, buyers can offer low prices. Additionally, the intense competition to land fish quickly makes it impossible for fishermen to pursue quality-oriented instead of quantity-oriented business models. When the regulatory driver of overcapacity is removed, revenues per boat increased 80% on average in the fisheries studied. Although the total number of hours worked remained steady, there was a move from a part-time labor market to more stable full-time fishing jobs, and fishermen reported greater satisfaction with the quality of employment. Consumers also benefited from greater availability of fresh fish.

Scientific consensus shows that individual fishing quotas increase economic gains of fisheries will promoting sustainability and replenishing fishing stocks

Trevor A Branch in 2009, School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, Box 355020, University of Washington, Seattle, How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems? , Fish and Fisheries Volume 10, Issue 1, pages 39–57, March 2009

Individual transferable quotas can create incentives for fishers to adopt sustainable fishing practices (Branch et al. 2006a; Grafton et al. 2006). In practice, they solve many of the economic problems of fisheries, while greatly changing social relationships (Grafton 1996; Squires et al. 1995; McCay 1995). Based on the reviewed literature, the observed ecological effects of ITQs on target species are largely positive provided the TAC is set at a precautionary level and is rigorously enforced, but their overall effect on other fisheries and on the environment is mixed or unknown. There are many positive ecological benefits of ITQs. Primarily, they encourage stewardship towards the resource by linking the value of quota shares to the future stream of income from the fishery. For a wide range of species, quota share value is maximized at higher stock sizes and lower catches than the maximum sustainable biological yield (Grafton et al. 2007a). In consequence, ITQ stakeholders may request TAC cuts to ensure sustainability and improve profitability, providing a stark contrast to the usual clamour for TAC increases in other fisheries. In nearly all ITQ fisheries, fishers demonstrate an improved ability to constrain catches to the TAC and reduce incidental mortality from ghost fishing, while in many ITQ fisheries there is a reduction in high-grading and discarding. The net result is that fisheries are expected to be more sustainable under ITQs, although there is no definitive study comparing the status of many fisheries over time under different management systems. Some fisheries do not benefit from ITQs. There are glaring examples of ITQ fisheries that have failed altogether, from which there are important ‘autopsy’ lessons to learn (Smith and Link 2005). These lessons are that ITQs cannot prevent fisheries collapse if the TAC is set too high (Sinclair et al. 1999), or if there is insufficient enforcement to prevent massive overcatching of the TAC (Chávez et al. 2008; Ecotrust, 2004). Important prerequisites for the success of ITQs are a stable political system and reliable scientific advice to ensure that TACs are sustainable (Walters and Pearse 1996), and a fishery that can be monitored easily – implying manageable numbers of participants, few landing sites, and an easily regulated processing industry. In general, ITQs ease enforcement because there are fewer participants, fewer at-sea regulations to police, and because fishers have a collective interest in controlling illegal fishing to protect the value of their quota.

A2: No Solvency- Implementation

Implementation can happen- only outdated views hold back coordination

Both theoretically and empirically, catch share programs improve management outcomes in ending overfishing and raising the economic prospects of fishermen. But although the idea behind catch shares is a simple one, developing and implementing such a program in a given fishery involve complicated policy choices. Regulators must tackle issues such as how to cost-effectively monitor individual catches, how to weigh the interests of historically fishing-dependent communities, and how to allocate catch privileges among fishermen. In fact, these issues can be and increasingly have been dealt with effectively, especially in newer catch share programs, during the policy design process at the individual fishery level. Still, outdated criticisms sometimes scare fishermen and regulators away from exploring catch shares in their fisheries. This is especially unfortunate because fishermen in fisheries where catch share programs have been implemented report strongly positive experiences with the shift. Experience with catch share programs reveals some important lessons about how contentious issues can best be addressed in the policy design process.

Catch Shares good

Tradable Catch shares increases job security, focuses on long term sustainability of the industry, and deters political lobbying, Alaska Proves

Safina 13, Safina, Carl, founding president of the Blue Ocean Institute and writes extensively on the changing oceans. "A Future for U.S. Fisheries." Issues in Science and Technology. University of Texas at Dallas, 27 Nov. 2013. http://issues.org/25-4/safina-4/ Web. 01 July 2014. CS

Moving to a new era of fisheries management will require revising some conventional tools that are functioning below par and adopting an array of new “smart tools.” Regulations that set time frames for overfishing and recovery can play a valuable role, if properly interpreted. For example, traditional catch quotas must be based firmly on scientific knowledge about fish stocks, and they must be enforced with an eye toward protecting the resource. Newer tools, adapted to specific environments and needs, would include: Tradable catch shares. In this approach, now being used in some regions in varying degrees, fishery managers allot to fishers specific shares of the total allowable catch and give them the flexibility and the accountability for reaching their shares. Thus, fishers do not own the fish; rather, they own a percentage of the total allowed catch, which may fluctuate from year to year if management agencies adjust it up or down. In expanding the use of such programs, managers must establish the shares based on the advice of independent scientists who are insulated from industry lobbying. Managers also should allot shares only to working fishers, not to corporations or processors. Of course, finding equitable ways of determining which fishers get catch shares will be critical. Methods of allocating shares may vary from location to location, but the key is ensuring an open process that accounts for fishers’ legitimate interests and maintains conservation incentives. In many cases, fewer fishers will be eligible to keep fishing. But those not selected would likely have been forced out of business anyway by the combination of pressure from more successful fishers and reduced fish stocks. By significantly reducing competition that breeds a race for fish, this approach offers several benefits. For one, it makes for safer fishing. Fishers who own shares know that they have the whole season to fill their quota regardless of what other boats are catching, so they are less likely to feel forced to head out in dangerous weather. In addition, owning a share helps ensure (other factors permitting) that a fisher can earn a decent living, so local, state, or regional politicians will feel less pressure to protect their fishing constituents and push for higher catch quotas. At the same time, marginal operators granted shares would no longer feel trapped, because they would have something to sell if they wished to exit the fishery. By promoting longer-term thinking among fishers and politicians alike, catch-share programs help foster a sense of future investment in which quota holders will benefit from high or recovered fish populations. The impact of tradable catch shares can be seen in experiences in several regions. In Alaska, where fisheries managers once kept a tight cap on the halibut catch, the fishing season shrank to two days annually because there were so many competing boats. After managers introduced tradable catch shares, the number of boats fell precipitously and the season effectively expanded to whenever the fishers wanted to work toward filling their shares. Safety improved markedly, and the halibut population remained robust. In New England, where the industry resisted tradable shares, the story ended differently. Managers allotted individual fishers a shrinking number of days at sea, which progressively crippled their economic viability, gave them no option to exit the fishery short of foreclosure, and kept fishing pressure so high that the fish stocks never recovered.

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