Part I: conceptualizing and justifying ip space 3


Copyright in Canada – Initial Hurdles and Scope



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Copyright in Canada – Initial Hurdles and Scope





INITIAL HURDLES (Does CR subsist?; however, often used as a defense to claim of infringement)

  1. Must be a “work” w/in the meaning of the CR Act  architectural work, artistic work, dramatic work, musical work, literary work, compilation or computer program. Work includes title where original or distinctive. OR must be a work protected by “neighbouring rights  Broadcast, sound recording, performance

  2. The work must be original (CCH, Feist, Teledirect) [note this is often used as defense to infringement]. [SH: The original part of the work cannot be a mere idea?]

  3. Fixation – tangibility

  4. No registration necessary – though registration = presumption of validity


SCOPE OF PROTECTION (Vaver: Has CR been infringed?)

  1. What exclusive rights does a CR owner have wrt his work and a substantial part thereof [s. 3(1)]? [such that if another party does it = infringement]

**Note that infringing activities must (at least in part) take place in Canada [e.g. the infringing TV show broadcast into Canada]

    1. First public distribution

    2. Reproduction – Theberge: producing additional or new copies of the work in any material form; must multiply number of copies.

    3. Abridgment

    4. Produce, publish, etc. translation

    5. Novelization, Dramatization, Movie Adaptation

    6. Film, audio and video recording

    7. Public Pefromance

    8. Telecommunication

    9. Public exhibition of artwork

    10. Rental

    11. Authorization of any of the above rights

**SH: these are the only exclusive rights held by CR owner. Cannot expand – does encryption technologies allow CR owners to expand their rights (i.e. gives them exclusive right to use!)

  1. There is no infringement w/o ACCESS – i.e. independent creation is always a defense. Note, however, that courts might be willing to construct access (i.e. you must have heard the song b/c of who you are)

  2. Substantial infringement [user controls his/her entire work and any substantial part thereof]

    1. Initial inquiry – must take more than a particle (part means portion, not particle)

    2. What constitutes a substantial part?  quality is more important than quantity; e.g. famous hook may be small part of original but very important and recognizable part of it. SH: this can be framed as “substantial similarity,” thus ask  would members of the public recognize this as resembling the target work? Look at the importance of this part to the target/original work – is it the distinctive recognizable essential part of the work? Vaver: how would the ordinary user or viewer react to seeing the two products together? (see this in Cine-Avanti)

    3. Rogers v. Koons: the “ordinary observer test”  whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.

    4. SH: need not take a literal part of the work in order for it to be substantial but a general idea will never be a substantial part (e.g. in Nichols). CR doesn’t extend to ideas.

  3. Defenses to Infringement

    1. The work was not original or the part taken was not original (latter argument is a new one; see it however in the computer software cases)

    2. FAIR DEALING


FAIR DEALING

**Fair dealing is more than a defense; it is a user’s right (i.e. in addition to the right to use)



  1. Fair dealing under the statute:

    1. 29. fair dealing for purpose of research or private study doesn’t infringe CR

    2. 29.1 fair dealing for purpose of crit or review doesn’t infringe (if acknowledge source)

    3. 29.2 fair dealing for purpose of news reporting doesn’t infringe (if acknowledge source)

    4. Exemptions for educational institutions and libraries/museums – but nothing can be done for motive of gain [29.3(1)]

  2. Dealing must be FAIR

    1. Purpose of the dealing: will be fair if it is for allowable purpose under CA (categories closed). Generally less fair if for commercial purposes (look at motive) [e.g. is it a parody? – instrumental or weapon?]

    2. Amount of the dealing: look at quantity and quality. How much of the expression has been copied?

    3. Alternatives to the dealing (a work available in the public domain?); does ptf have monopoly?

    4. Nature of the work: is it in the public interest? More fair if work hasn’t been published

    5. Effect of dealing on the work: is reproduced work likely to compete with the market of the original work? [Koons: balance impact on owner with benefit to public  less adverse impact on owner = less public benefit need be shown]

**These criteria constitute a purposive approach to fair dealing which originates in U.S. CR law. While fair dealing provisions in 29 were drafted restrictively, court is interpreting them purposively. This is significant; expands fair dealing exemption AND makes clear that approach to CR more generally is one of balance btwn author’s rights and user’s rights. Check out Rogers v. Koons for good e.g. of criteria being used.

  1. One organization or user may be able to rely on the fair-dealing exemptions of the individuals it serves (e.g. the Law Society didn’t have to show that all its users were fair dealing; it was enough that it had established a policy which it abided by)

**DL’s examples: webCT and coursepacks (SH: s. 30?); skit night performances (likely not w/in educational exemption, parody?); weapon vs. instrumental parody
USER RIGHTS

  1. Use (tempered by moral rights of author – cannot distort or modify to prejudice of author but author doesn’t have control over destination [Theberge]

    1. SH: are users’ rights to use undermined by encryption technologies?

  2. Fair Dealing (as above)


INITIAL HURDLES
Originality and the Idea-Expression Dichotomy (SH: this confuses me greatly)

  • Pre-CCH: originality required merely that the work “originated from” the author and was not copied

  • Originality and its relationship to the idea-expression dichotomy: according to Lametti, the “idea-expression dichotomy is the larger initial hurdle.” The expression must be original but that expression cannot be merely an idea. SH: I have a different view of the fn of originality and idea-expression dichotomy. Originality is the initial hurdle – a work, considered in its entirety, must be original in order to attract protection. At the level of infringement, the Q is whether what has been taken by the alleged infringer is idea or expression. When determining whether a mere idea has been taken, the notion of “originality” in its broader and more lay-person sense becomes important. Is this something that has been “done before” (e.g. scenes a faire) or is this something wildly original? This corresponds to the approach taken by court in Nichols: we assume that the ptf’s play is altogether original…but her copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her play; its content went to some extent into the public domain. This also seems to correspond to the approach taken in the computer software cases. Altai separated idea and expression at the stage of determining whether two computer programs were substantially similar.

  • CJ in CCH: CR protects the expression of ideas, and not the ideas themselves, even if they are original. Quotes Sunny Handa: “The originality requirement must apply to the expressive element of the work and not the idea.” [SH: this doesn’t really fit with an understanding of idea-expression as continuum where lines are drawn arbitrarily based on specificity/generality].

  • Rosen’s view of the idea-expression dichotomy: he adopts the view articulated in Nichols – the “abstractions test”. There is an indefinitely large range of possible ideas of increasing specificity which can be overlaid upon a work. At some point in this range, idea is distinguishable from expression. Ideas are abstractions or generalities which will not be protected. The dichotomy is not a dichotomy at all but rather a continuum, and the court draws the line arbitrarily, at the point best suited to advancing the various goals of CR law, i.e. reward authors, provide incentives for further creation, and encourage the free-flow of and access to ideas for the benefit of the general public. DL: seems to suggest that idea/expression dichotomy might be used in this way to filter out what is actually new. Adding specificity = adding something novel.

  • DL: There is a movement between the specific and general/expression and idea/private and public domains: As author builds on general ideas, he creates more specific expression which might be protectable. The specific may, however, become general over time. An original feature of a computer program (e.g. a pull down menu) may become an industry standard. A story-line may become a scene a faire. One can analogize this to a trademark (like Xerox) becoming generic.

??Idea/expression dichotomy as an instantiation of the test of originality in the context of literary, dramatic, artistic works and computer software??


Originality and Justifications

Low standard: rewarding labour; sweat of the brow

Higher standard:


      • ensures preservation of the public domain (though must balance this with incentives to create)

      • utilitarian – perhaps fosters good art, good lit, good music

      • personhood – we protect that which is really a manifestation of the self


Originality – factual compilations and informational products

  • How do we deal with the kinds of works that consist of elements which are not protectable (e.g. judicial decisions, data, facts)? What is required to make compilations of such elements “original”


Original Anglo-Canadian standard: work must be independently produced and not copied from another person. (nod to a sweat of the brow/industriousness theory)
Feist: (alphabetical white pages) A work must be original to the author (i.e. independently created by him and not copied) and must possess at least a minimal degree of creativity, some creative spark “no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be.” Originality does not signify novelty. Wrt compilations, mujst be original selection, coordination or arrangement.

      • Standard not met b/c alphabetical by surname; garden variety white-pages; devoid of even slightest trace of creativity; not only unoriginal, practically inevitable.]


Tele-Direct: (yellow pages organized in standard categories). For a compilation of data to be original, it must be a work that was independently created by the author and which displays at least a minimal degree of skill, judgment and labour in its overall selection or arrangement.

      • Standard not met b/c the compilation at bar was of such an obvious and commonplace character. A mechanical organization of routine data.


The role of user expectations  they will change the standard almost immediately after it is set. First yellow pages which listed data in categories was original; today such organization is “obvious”, “commonplace” and “garden-variety” and “inevitable” because it has become the industry standard and accords with what users expect. Same is true for pull-down menus in computer software.

POINT: the content of the standard is shifting and depends a great deal on user expectations.



      • SH: perhaps suggests that factual compilations will rarely meet the standard of originality. Compilations are most useful when they accord with user expectations/industry standard. Moreover, even if someone comes up with an original organization, it might become industry standard and thus compilation will no longer be protected


CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada (editorially enhanced judicial decisions; headnotes; etc.)
Trial: “imagination” or “creative spark” is essential to a finding of originality. The materials should be measured by a standard of intellect and creativity in determining whether they gave rise to CR. Held: none of the products are original.
Court of Appeal: Held: all of the products are original. Test is minimal degree of skill, judgment and labour. No requirement of imagination and creative spark. Rejects higher standard b/c it will make court appraiser of merit rather than mere arbiter of originality. Will result in substantial uncertainty.
Supreme Court: Correct standard of originality stands between the extremes of sweat of the brow and creative spark. Work is original where it originates from the author, is not a mere copy, and is the product of the exercise of skill and judgment that is not trivial (i.e. not a purely mechanical exercise). [note: provides def’n of skill and judgment] [Note also that this standard appears to apply to all works b/c is formulated w/ reference to S. 5, which provides that copyright subsists in all original works].

      • Is this a workable middle ground? Should “creative” have been left in there? Perhaps leaving out requirement of creativity makes standard more workable and legalistic, easier for the courts to handle.

      • Is this standard applicable “across the board”? CJ seems to suggest that it is. But…paintings done by DL’s 3-year old definitely don’t evince an exercise of skill and judgment, though they are creative!

      • Perhaps this standard merely suggests that sweat of the brow is not enough. Something more is required. The question then becomes what constitutes that “something more.” There is room for a contextual interpretation of originality wrt different types of works (recall that DL believes that the resource shapes the contours of property rights and obligations and the legal rules by which that resource is governed). Works which are in and of themselves creative may meet the standard. Compilations, on the other hand  skill and judgment will be necessary.

      • SH: perhaps the confusion and debate that has been generated about standards of originality has arisen only because we are currently asking copyright to do too much. It was conceived of to protect literary works primarily (and perhaps artistic and musical ones as well). But we agree it is a stretch to use it as the primary governance tool for data compilations, computer software, etc.


SCOPE OF PROTECTION

  • See criteria for infringement, defences and fair dealing above


The parody example:

  • Should parody come w/in the scope of the fair dealing exemptions?

  • Spence distinguishes btwn two types of parody  weapon parody (humourous imitation of a work in order to comment on work itself); instrumental parody (humourous imitation or a work in order to comment upon something else; e.g. Cine-Avanti; Rogers v. Koons and DL’s skit night example).

  • The problem with parody is that at it MUST copy the work (i.e. infringe) in order to be successful. The genre depends on the viewer, reader, etc. being able to identify the imitated work.

  • Weapon parody would likely come w/in the scope of criticism and review but creator would have to acknowledge source in order for it be fair dealing (might be difficult).

  • Instrumental parody on the other hand may be more difficult to bring w/in the scope of fair dealing. In Cine-Avanti, the court rejects the “parody defense” reasoning that the alleged “parody” merely copied the work in order to exploit the commercial success and popularity of the work on which it was based.

  • Court in Cine-Avanti opened door to parody defense by examining American statute and literature on how parody should be treated (Spence). The court in CCH blew the door wide open by effectively adopting as law those purposive considerations which appear in the American statute. SH: the question seems then to be whether court would be willing to find fair dealing outside of the specific categories enumerated (perhaps analogous categories – e.g. news reporting in the public interest; parody might also be). Spence endorses, however, an interpretation of CR law which is consistent with free speech, and thereby allows for weapon parody but not instrumental parody.

  • Note that parody may bring to mind other IP governance tools. TM (would parody of a TM constitute deprecation?); Moral rights (is derogatory treatment of a work modification which is prejudicial to the author?)

  • Rogers v. Koons: sculpture which imitated CRed photo in order to comment upon the banality of society held not to be a fair use. DL doesn’t agree with decision. The sculpture likely did not affect the market for the photo. Also, post-modern art is based on appropriation.


Other fair use issues

  • Course packs and webCT

  • webCT with a general disclaimer/warning/policy

  • research in a for-profit setting?  Does it come under the exemption? Probably depends how closely the profit is tied to the research and what public interest the research might serve (e.g. of lawyers)





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