Part I: conceptualizing and justifying ip space 3


Trademarks in Canada – Overview Trademarks – Initial Hurdles and Scope



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Trademarks in Canada – Overview




Trademarks – Initial Hurdles and Scope





Why do we protect TMs?

  • Protect goodwill (reputation; ability to attract custom) embodied in the TM

    • CONSUMERS: TMs help consumers to ID a product easily and tell those consumers that it is from the same source and of the same quality as it was the last time they bought it.

    • PRODUCERS: protection encourages producers to make quality products, to keep the quality high, and to invest in marks that help to identify the products.

  • This justification informs scope of the right (as is evident in Schecter’s article)  stronger protection to fanciful or “coined” marks than to commonplace or semi-descriptive ones, because these have more “selling power”; i.e. more ability to attract and retain custom.




Schecter, “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection”, CB II p. 289

  • Traditionally, fn of TM was to identify origin or ownership of goods to which it is affixed. Owing to modern trade and product distribution, this description of fn is no longer accurate – actual source is seldom known to consumer.

  • FN of TM is not to indicate that product comes from a particular source, but to indicate that the goods emanate from the same source as certain other goods that have already satisfied the consumer and which bore that same mark. True functions of the TM are to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public; i.e. to create and retain custom

  • The TM is thus not merely a symbol of good will but also a very effective agent for the creation of goodwill. The mark imprints guarantee of satisfaction upon public mind, thus creating a desire for further satisfaction. THE MARK ACTUALLY SELLS THE GOODS.

  • Further, the more distinctive and unique the mark, the more effective is its selling power. [thus if we are protecting selling power, must give broader scope of protection to unique marks]

  • Schecter points out that traditionally, courts have not found infringement where mark is used in association with non-related goods. He argues that this is not consistent with the function of TM. Value of a TM depends on its uniqueness and distinctiveness, and the more it is used, the less unique, and therefore valuable it becomes. Its ability to attract and retain custom is thereby diluted. The more unique the mark, the more it is tied to the actual identity of the goods with which it originated. Thus, any use of it will result in loss of identity of goods and company which made them.

  • Schecter advocates differential treatment of fanciful/coined marks and common/semi-descriptive marks. The former should be more strongly protected than the latter b/c they have come to be associated in the public’s mind with the excellence of one particular product.

  • Schecter concludes by outlining the following principles:

    • The value of the modern TM lies in its selling power;

    • This selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity

    • Such uniqueness and singularity is impaired by its used upon either related or non-related goods

    • The degree of its protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different from other marks.

    • In sum, the preservation of uniqueness of a TM should constitute the only rational basis for its protection.

POINT: Stronger, more distinctive and unique marks should be more strongly protected by TM law b/c the value of a trademark lies in its “selling power” and its selling power is greater the more distinctive it is [Litman would disagree]


Initial Hurdles

Initial Hurdles to TM Protection (but will arise as defense to claim of infringement?)

  1. Mark must be a TM (see def’n in s. 2)

    1. A mark that is used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish wares or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired, or performed by him from those mfd, sold, leased, hired, or performed by others,

    2. A certification mark, (see def’n at s. 2 and rules at s. 23)

    3. A distinguishing guise (i.e. s. 2 (i) a shaping of wares or their containers, or (ii) a mode of wrapping or packaging wares the appearance of which is used to distinguish wares or services from those of others), or

    4. A proposed trademark [anticipatory protection]

  2. Mark must be distinctive: i.e. a TM that actually distinguishes the wares or services in association with which it is used by its owner from the wares or services of others or is adapted so to distinguish them.

    1. Cannot be a word that is “primarily merely the name or surname…” [s. 12(1)(a)]

    2. Cannot be “clearly descriptive or misdescriptive” [s. 12(1)(b)]

    3. Exception to a. and b.  SECONDARY MEANING [s. 12(2): A TM that is not registrable by reason of (1)(a) or (b) is registrable if it has been so used in Canada…as to have become distinctive at the date of filing an application for its registration].

    4. Cannot be the name of the wares or services [s. 12(1)(c)]

    5. Cannot be confusing with another registered mark [s. 12(1)(d)] (also test for infringement)

*Note that e. is exceptional; establishment of secondary meaning will be rare

*Note that under passing off, the name of the wares can become distinctive (e.g. Reddaway)



  1. Distinguishing guise cannot be functional (LEGO, Reckitt v. Borden). **Functionality protected by patent. [s. 13: can only register a distinguishing guise if it (a) has become so used in Canada to have become distinctive at date of filing; …; (c) the registration does not interfere with the use of any utilitarian feature embodied in the distinguishing guse]

  2. S. 9 TM Act: certain marks are excluded for public policy reasons (e.g. Red Cross)

  3. Generic marks are excluded [s. 10]


Scope  how long and how robust is the protection?

Scope of Right (extent to which mark will be protected)

  1. S. 19 – literal infringement (exact mark on exact goods or services for which the TM is reg’d)

  2. S. 20 – non-literal infringement  confusion analysis (same wares, slightly different mark; different wares, same mark)

    1. Use – s. 4 + s. 2 = need use as a trademark (for the purpose of distinguishing wares or services), not merely use OF the trademark [Clairol/Michelin]

    2. Once use is established  must show confusion [s. 6(5), Pink Panther]

**Intelligence of consumer – more intelligent = lesser protection (Beebe, Litman, critical)

**Less protection = competition is encouraged



  1. S. 22 – depreciation/dilution

    1. Use – s. 2 only (+ specific section 4 criteria) = only need use OF the trademark (i.e. use in association with wares or services as per def’ns in s. 4), not AS a trademark (i.e. for purpose of distinguishing).

    2. Only triggered by commercial uses [s. 4(1) – in the “ordinary course of trade” (wares) or (2) “advertising of services”] (Clairol but not Michelin or BCAA) [SH: BCAA says straight up that only applies in commercial contexts, even if can be construed as advertising…]

    3. Depreciation – what is the standard? Is mere diversion of custom sufficient?

    4. Critical: Beebe; Litman

**increasing scope of protection (i.e. s. 19  s. 20  s. 22 [protects even non-confusing uses]

**Note what constitutes use (s. 4):

Wares  used when it appears on the goods themselves or their packages or brought to consumer’s attn at time that property in the goods is transferred or possession changes hands. Must be “in the normal course of trade”

Services  used when displayed in performing or advertising services [better to register as a service b/c use in advertising will infringe]


How might a mark be lost?

  1. Non use: s. 45(3). Where the registered trademark, either with respect to all of the wares or services specified in the registration or with respect to any of those wares or services, was not used in Canada at any time during the three year period preceding the date of notice…registration of TM is liable to be expunged or amended accordingly.

  2. Abandonment: s. 18(1)(c) – register and never use = abandoned

  3. TM becomes generic: s. 18(1)(b) – registration of TM is invalid if (b) the TM is not distinctive at the time proceedings bringing the validity of the registration into question are commenced. [i.e. so popular that it is no longer distinctive of the source but rather of the product itself]

**Note (??): registration of TM is good throughout Canada. Boundary for passing off – the area where the wares are used or marketed
How are scope and initial hurdles related to the justifications for TM protection?

Promote competition

Protecting customers from deception (and persuasion?)

Desert

Incentives – to invest in quality and to invest in marks




Vaver:

  • Use = infringement (b/c TM owner has exclusive right to use under s. 19) but only infringement where alleged infringer’s use is use as defined by s. 4 (use as a TM – i.e. in advertising services or in selling wares)

  • Parallel imports – refers to cases where products differ (as in Heinz); results like this encourage undesirable strategic behaviour. Products may be formulated differently and product get-up may be kept similar precisely to prevent parallel imports (stifles competition)

  • Dilution = mark used non-confusingly but in a way that may tarnish its image or reduce its drawing power. E.g. ROLEX marked on condoms. S. 22  depreciation of goodwill. Reputation of a TM, its persuasive effect or snob value, built up by advertising, is said to be part of its goodwill.


RELEVANT LEGISLATION:
S. 2: “use”, in relation to a trade-mark, means any use that by section 4 is deemed to be a use in association with wares or services.
S. 4: (1) A TM is deemed to be used in association with wares if, at the time of the transfer of the wares, in the normal course of the trade, it is marked on the wares themselves or on the packages…or it is in any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of the association is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is transferred. [use in advertisements not enough]

(2) A trademark is deemed to be used in association w/ services if it is used or displayed in the performance or advertising of those services. [use in advertisements is enough]


S. 19: Subject to ss. 21, 32 and 67, the registration of a TM in respect of any wares or services, unless shown to be invalid, gives to the owner of the TM the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the TM in respect of those wares or services. [Michelin/Clairol: This applies to literal infringement; requires use in association and use as a trademark (purpose of distinguishing)]
S. 20: The right of the owner of a registered TM to its exclusive use shall be deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing TM or trade-name, but no registration prevents a person from making

(a) bona fide use of his personal name as a trade name

(b) any bona fide use, other than as a TM,

(i) of the geographical name of his place of business, or

(ii) of any accurate description of the character or quality of his wares or services.

[Michelin/Clairol: This applies to cases of non-literal infringement; requires use in association and use as a trademark; use must be confusing]
S. 22: No person shall use (verb!) a TM registered by another person in a manner that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching thereto. [Michelin/Clairol: Depreciation; requires only use OF a trademark (use in association); must however be in commercial trade; need not be confusing use]
S. 6(5) In determining whether trade-marks or trade-names are confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding circumstances including

(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which they have become known;

(b) the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use

(c) the nature of the wares, services or business

(d) the nature of the trade;

(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.



Reckitt & Colman Products v. Borden


Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc., [1990] (H.L.), CB II p. 177
Facts:

  • Rspdts sell preserved lemon juice in lemon shaped squeeze bottles under the brand name JIF

  • Aplts, a U.S. company, tried to sell lemon juice in similarly shaped containers bearing a different label

  • Rspdts brought action in passing off

  • Trial judge found that (1) purchasing public has come to associate a lemon-shaped squeeze bottle with the rspdt’s lemon juice and JIF; and (2) many members of public have brand loyalty to JIF (i.e. desire not just lemon juice but JIF lemon juice)


Issue: Is the lemon-shaped squeeze bottle so “functional” as to not be entitled to protection in passing off? Alternatively, is the lemon-shaped squeeze bottle tantamount to a “descriptive term”?
Held: No.
Reasoning:

Ptf in passing off action must prove three elements:

  1. Establish goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies such that the “get-up” [trade name or packaging] is recognized by the public as distinctive specifically of the ptf’s goods.

  2. Misrep to the public (intentional or not) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered are those of the ptfs

  3. Damage flowing from the misrep

Is the “get-up” functional?

  • Aplts argued that allowing action in passing off would be tantamount to protecting an object (the domain of patent) rather than merely protecting an insignia or trade name.

  • Court acknowledges that the bottle does serve a functional purpose in the sale of lemon juice (is a convenient size; easily squeezed; suggests nature of contents w/o need for further identification), but those purposes are served by a variety of distinctive containers of configurations other than those of a lemon-sized lemon. Given that the lemon-shaped squeeze bottle has become associated with JIF lemon juice, and that its primary characteristics are not necessarily functional, it is entitled to protection in passing off.

Is the use of the plastic lemon merely an embodiment of a descriptive term which is common to the trade?

  • The plastic lemon-shaped container has acquired secondary significance. It indicates not merely lemon juice but specifically Jif lemon juice

Have the aplts taken sufficient steps to distinguish their product from that of the rspdts?

  • No. Aplts tried to argue that a cautious and careful customer would not be deceived – they would read the labels on the packages and realize that they were not getting JIF lemon juice. Judge rejects this argument however; it cannot always be assumed that the customer is careful and literate. The nature of the customer (and thus whether or not deceived) must be determined with reference to the individual facts of each case, i.e. the type of mkt in which the goods are sold, habits and characteristics of purchasers in that market, etc.

  • In this case, trial judge found that Jif customers don’t look at the label; the crucial reference point for a person seeking to buy Jif is the lemon-shaped container. Thus, aplts have not sufficiently distinguished their goods from the rspdts’ goods.




POINTS TO TAKE OUT OF THIS CASE:

  • SH: Cautious/literate/intelligent customer vs. illiterate/careless customer  nature of customer affects scope of protection. Smarter customer = harder to establish confusion = less protection for TM/guise

  • That which is functional may still be entitled to protection if the functional purposes it serves can also be served by a variety of other get-ups.

  • Secondary meaning



LEGO Case


Kirbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. (LEGO case), [2003] F.C.A., CB II p. 211
Facts:

  • LEGO had patent on its interlocking block design. When patent expired, LEGO tried to get TM protection

  • Rspdt Ritvik makes “mega blocks” which employ similar interlocking design as LEGO (even fit w/ LEGO)

  • Aplts assert that the knob configuration of LEGO products constitutes a “distinguishing guise” and thus a TM under the Act. The TM is not registered.

  • Trial judge found that LEGO Indicia is functional in all respects, and thus could not be a “distinguishing guise” in the common law sense of that term.


Issue:

  1. Are the LEGO Indicia primarily functional?

  2. Can a mark which is primarily fn-al be a TM w/in the meaning of the TM Act (s. 7 – passing off)?


Held: No and no.
Reasoning:

[Sexton, J.A.]:

  • Trial judge’s finding that LEGO indicia is primarily fn-al was finding of fact thus cannot interfere

  • To be a valid TM w/in the TM Act, the mark cannot be primarily functional.

  • Policy behind doctrine of functionality? To ensure that no one indirectly achieves status of patent holder through the guides of a TM. Would be tantamount to perpetual patent protection (b/c TM protection lasts forever). Patent protects function and design; TM must not. Extending patent via TM = “evergreening”.

  • Functionality only invalidates a TM where:

    • The functionality relates to the wares themselves (e.g. Pizza joint could TM its phone #)

    • The mark is primarily functional, not just functional in some aspect

  • Doctrine of functionality applies to registered and unregistered TMs equally

  • The LEGO indicia is thus invalid b/c it is primarily functional.


[Pelletier, J.A.]:

  • Cannot agree that aplts’ distinguishing guise, which is primarily functional, cannot be a TM capable of supporting a passing off action pursuant to ss. 7(b) of TM Act.

  • Agrees that the LEGO indicia are primarily functional; doesn’t agree that cannot be TMs for this sreason

  • Judge discusses the distinction btwn reg’d and unreg’d TMs (the latter only gives a qualified right; not a right of exclusive use) and concludes that b/c of the distinction, policy concerns raised by Sexton (re. “evergreening”) are unfounded: LEGO’s rights would be limited to ensuring that the LEGO indicia were not used in such a way that the public were deceived as to the origin of the goods (i.e. LEGO could not enjoin non-confusing use of the mark – holder of registered TM could?). This limited right on the part of the aplts doesn’t amount to “evergreening”.

  • Doctrine of functionality arises in the jurisprudence, and cases which proscribe fn-al TMs arise in the context of reg’d TMs. Since one only acquires monopoly rights by registration, there is no need to apply the policy against monopolies to unreg’d trademarks.

  • Effect of this holding is not to give greater rights to owners of unreg’d trademarks than to those who have reg’d theris. Owners of reg’d and unreg’d TMs are entitled to bring actions to enjoin confusing use of their TMs. In the case of the reg’d owner, the use of additional material to dispel confusion will not suffice to deny the ptf injunctive relief. However, this right of injunctive relief is balanced by provisions ensuring that the use of utilitarian features qua utilitarian features is not enjoined.




POINTS TO TAKE OUT OF THIS CASE:

  • Trademark which is primarily functional, whether reg’d or unreg’d, will not be valid. Policy behind this – prevent protection tantamount to perpetual patent protection by ensuring that TM protection is not extended to that which was patented, could be patented, etc.. LEGO blocks are primarily functional b/c, though other shapes are conceivable, none would work as well.

  • Result might be different where the “guise” could not be protected under patent (e.g. lemon juice container – not new or novel enough).



Pink Panther Beauty Corporation (A) v. United Artists Corporation (R)


Pink Panther Beauty Corporation v. United Artists Corporation, [1998] F.C.A., CB II page 192
Facts:

  • R’s trademark PINK PATHER has been registered for > 30 years in association with entertainment biz

  • 1986 – Aplt applied to register TM PINK PANTHER for proposed use in association with hair and beauty supplies.

  • Registrar found no likelihood of confusion. Trial judge reversed decision – since mark was very famous and thus worthy of wide ambit of protection, differences in nature of wares were less significant than they might otherwise be.


Issue:

Likelihood of confusion (in mind of average consumer) btwn marks? [Larger issue  how far TM Act will go to protect famous TMs where those marks are used in relation to completely different wares or services?]
Held: No likelihood of confusion. Appeal allowed.
Ratio:

  • Court reviews difference btwn CML tort of passing off, and statutory protection of trade-marks in the TM Act [page 195]

  • Wrt trademarks, courts have adopted a SOURCE THEORY: purpose of mark protection is to guarantee the source of the goods. Key to understanding protection of rights in TM Act – trademark must be associated in the mind of the public with the goods produced by the TM owner.

  • Ultimate job of the court in TM cases: balance right to TM owner to exclusive use of mark with right of others to compete freely in the marketplace.

  • What is the right being protected by the TM Act? Exclusive right to use the mark in association with certain products or services.

  • What constitutes infringement? S. 20: use of marks which are confusingly similar to registered TMs.

  • What is confusion? Confusion of goods or services from one source as being from another source [S. 6 TM Act] [i.e. not confusion of marks themselves]. Thus, marks which rely on geographic or descriptive words (e.g. Pacific, Premium) are not afforded a wide ambit of protection [public not likely to assume that two “Pacific” products necessarily come from same source] [SH: relate to Schecter]

  • Confusion analysis  S. 6(5) TMA enumerates six factors:

  1. Strength of the Mark  inherent distinctiveness AND acquired distinctiveness (extent to which has become known)

    • Mark inherently distinctive when nothing about it refers consumer to a multitude of sources. Where name is unique and invented – may be extended greater scope of protection

    • Mark w/o inherent distinctiveness may acquire distinctiveness through continual use in the mkt-place

  1. Length of Time in Use

  2. Nature of wares, services or business

    • Similar TMs AND similar wares/services = likelihood of confusion is greater.

    • Relevant factors include general class of goods AND quality and price of goods [less likelihood of confusion wrt very expensive goods such as cars, b/c consumer likely to make very judicious inquiry]. May also look at overlaps btwn clientele who buy the parties’ goods.

    • Q to ask: Would members of the public infer that the parties’ wares were produced or mktd by the same co?

  1. Nature of trade

    • Distributed in same types of stores or of same general class of goods = confusion greater

    • Consider type of trading environment [retail vs. wholesale]

  1. Similarity in appearance, sound and idea suggested

    • e.g. IKEA vs. IDEA [court found that though similar phonetically, no likelihood of confusion]

  1. All the surrounding circumstances

    • e.g. any evidence of actual confusion

    • e.g. presentation of the TM in the context of the product itself – greater likelihood of confusion if parties’ wares have a similar “get-up” (i.e. presentation/packaging).

  • Fame of mark is not determinative [cannot be used as a trump card to obliterate all other factors]. Wide scope of protection afforded by the fame of the aplt’s mark only becomes relevant when applying it to a connection btwn the parties’ trade and services. I.e. strength [fame] of mark cannot be so important as to make the differences in wares and services irrelevant. [SH: will test for confusion be easier to satisfy where mark is stronger/more famous?]Fame is not everything…It is possible to use a famous mark for a different product in a different context without infringing.

  • Application to facts: No likelihood of confusion as to the source of the products. Key reason for this – gaping divergence in the nature of the wares and in the nature of the trade. Not just a fissure; a chasm. Where no connection btwn the goods exists, a finding of confusion will be rare. [Judge gives other, less important, reasons for this conclusion  aplt uses “Pink Panther” and not “The Pink Panther”; much of the fame which is attached to the rspdt’s mark stems not from words but from the associated image and music]

[Macdonald, J.A., dissenting]:

  • Agrees with trial judge – given degree of resemblance and widespread use of the mark, the ordinary consumer would believe that the wares of the aplt and those of rspdt originate from same person/org [CONFUSION]. Cites Polysar case for assertion that when dealing with a widespread, distinctive trade-mark, it is not always necessary that the mark in Q be used for similar wares or in a similar industry for confusion to exist.

  • Aplt’s decision to use Pink Panther name was not unrelated to mark’s fame – name was chosen b/c of the fame and goodwill associated with it. [SH: but this doesn’t seem to be the test for infringement  supposed to be ascertained from perspective of consumer].

  • [WORDS VS. IMAGES]: the distinction made by majority is arbitrary.

  • Conclusion of majority tips the balance too far in favour of the copycat artist seeking to profit financially from someone else’s creative fortune. Decision launches TM protection down a slippery slope.

  • Given the popularity of the rspdt’s mark, the extent to which it has prevailed in the Cdn market over 30 years and its widespread diversification (from comic books to Fibreglass), allowing the aplt to use the name PP will almost certainly be confusing for the average consumer. The average consumer is likely to believe that there is an association with the beauty products sold by the aplt and the rspdt’s mark to the extent that the products are being sold by, approved by or endorsed by the respondent.




POINTS TO TAKE OUT OF THIS CASE:

  • Criteria for determining confusion: s. 6(5) of TM Act

  • TMs protect not only consumer choice – also protect weight of the mark, distinctive appeal, popularity, etc. [DL: the popularity of the mark is very difficult to quantify in the confusion analysis] [see Schecter]

  • SH: Confusion results not only where customer might be led to believe that product comes from same source, but also where consumer is led to believe that there is an association btwn the products which suggests that the products are being sold, approved by or endorsed by the rspdt.



Litman, “Breakfast with Batman”


Jessica Litman, “Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age”, CB II, p. 275

  • Ralph Brown: trade symbols’ legal protection should be limited to cases of likely consumer confusion. Protection of advertising’s persuasive function would yield no benefit to consumers and would disserve the public interest from shielding consumers from healthy competition.

  • Litman discusses expansion of trade symbol law over past 50 years

    • More generous interpretation of what constitutes confusion

    • Intro of dilution law - protects non-confusing uses of “famous marks” which cause dilution of the famous marks’ distinctive quality.

    • Today’s expansive law of trade symbols allows protection of “persuasive fn of trade symbols”

  • Litman discusses modern-day merchandising tactics – concludes that the worth of valuable trade symbols lies less in their designation of product source than in their power to imbue a product line w/ desirable atmospherics [e.g. Batman on the cereal screams BUY ME! b/c kid wants to eat B-fast with Batman]. Today, trade symbols often come before the product.

  • Litman reviews various justifications for protecting trade symbols in order to ascertain whether protection of persuasive value can be justified. If competition is the American way, need to justify stifling it:

    • Protecting consumers from deception – doesn’t justify protection outside of confusion

    • Incentive to invest in item getting the protection – would still have lots of good commercials if not every single thing in the ad was protected

    • Desert – producers have invested in their trade symbols…but so have members of the public! – trade symbols acquire intrinsic value b/c consumers have invested them with value for which they are willing to pay real money. Value of persuasive trade symbols arises from mutual investment.

  • Litman argues that independent value of trade symbols and advertising atmospherics (i.e. consumers attach value to them – they buy products b/c of them!) does not supply reasons for protecting them under TM laws. Legal protection for trade symbols, in the absence of confusion, disserves competition and thus the consumer. It arrogates to the producer the entire value of cultural icons that we should more appropriately treat as collectively owned.

  • Note that underlying Litman’s analysis is idea that the basis for protecting trade symbols is promotion of competition. If we did not want to encourage competition, then wouldn’t need to protect trade symbols at all.


POINT: Should not protect trademarks in the absence of likely consumer confusion. To do otherwise would be to protect the persuasive function of advertising and thereby stifle competition, and undermine the contribution/investment which consumers make to persuasive trade symbols.
SH Public interest is two-pronged: (1) promotion of competition (= lower prices and maximum choice) + (2) prevention of deception and confusion; TMs must be effective at identifying products with same source so that we can make choices based on prior satisfaction. Corollary of this is that where producers marks are protected from confusing uses = incentive to continue producing quality products.

SH  under Litman’s view, shouldn’t have dilution/depreciation provisions at all AND confusion should be interpreted strictly (give customers the benefit of the doubt)



Beebe, “Search and Persuasion in TM Law”


Barton Beebe, “Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law” (2003), CB II p. 2

  • The consumer is the measure of all things in TM law

  • TM law is firmly rooted in the concept of the sovereign consumer, though restrictionist TM commentary suggests that the consumer is not so much the sovereign as the fool.

  • Beebe points out an irony in the arguments made by TM restrictionists and apologists

    • The “sovereign customer” serves the apologist in disputes over the basis of TM protection (i.e. TM protection justified b/c of informational content) and the restrictionist in disputes over the scope of protection (i.e. narrow scope b/c consumers are smart and can discern).

    • Reverse is also true: the “fool” serves the restrictionist in disputes over basis of protection (susceptibility to persuasive content undermines TM protection) and apologist in disputes over scope (lack of discernment = wide scope of protection is necessary).

  • The confusion lies in treating consumer sophistication as one issue. Beebe tries to clear up some of this confusion by suggesting that there are two types of sophistication:

    • Search sophistication: capacity of consumer to distinguish during search btwn similar but not identical TMs

    • Persuasion sophistication: capacity of consumers during search to resist the “selling power” of distinctive TMs.

  • Scope of protection the law will afford to a TM is inversely related to the law’s estimation of the relative sophistication of the consumers of the goods to which the TM is affixed.

    • I think Beebe identifies a problem here – only search sophistication is taken into account – it is argued that the greater the ability to discern (i.e. greater search sophistication), lesser scope of protection should be afforded

    • One result of this is that very strong and distinctive marks are given a wide scope of protection b/c “the more distinctive a mark is, the more likely it is that consumers will confuse other marks with it.” It is said that increased consumer awareness of the mark = more consumers with relatively low levels of search sophistication as to that mark are factored into the analysis. [SH: this is similar to Schecter’s argument – protect marks based on uniqueness b/c they are more valuable].

    • Problem is that this view doesn’t account for persuasion sophistication – how can we justify the expanded protection of strong marks when these strong marks are harder for less sophisticated consumers to resist (i.e. are more likely to alter preferences)?

    • Beebe: “Because the search view of the law naively refuses to acknowledge the concept of persuasion, it has never challenged this expansion. The best it can do is rationalize this expansion as an enhancement of the sovereignty of the consumer…In the name of the sovereign consumer, the trademark has itself been made sovereign.”


POINT: TM confusion analysis has taken account only of search sophistication and not of persuasion sophistication (ability to resist selling power of strong marks). Low search sophistication (i.e. less ability to discern) justifies greater protection of marks. Where marks are very strong and distinctive, more consumers are aware of it, thus more consumers with low search sophistication are factored into the analysis = stronger protection of strong marks. BUT…these strong marks are harder for less sophisticated consumers to resist!



Michelin v. CAW


Michelin v. Canadian Autoworkers Union, [1996] F.C.T.D., CB II p. 234
Facts:

  • CAW tried to unionize Michelin employees

  • Distributed leaflets, posters and info sheets that reproduced the word Michelin and the Michelin man logo

  • Ptf Michelin holds TM and CR in both and thus sought damages and injunction


Issue:

Does CAW”s use of the TM constitute infringement under s. 20 and/or depreciation under s. 22?




Held:

No
Ratio:



  • Court reviews Clairol decision which held:

    • S. 19  cases in which infringer uses a mark identical to reg’d mark for same wares or services

    • S. 20  exclusive right est in s. 19 infringed by use of confusing TM

    • S. 22  no ref to right of exclusive use in s. 19 therefore emphasis on infringer’s own use in manner likely to depreciate the goodwill associated with the mark

  • Def’n of “use” under Clairol

    • Test for “use” in s. 20: (based on ss. 2 and 4)  (1) did the dfts associate their services with the ptfs trade-marks? (2) Did the dfts use the mark as a trademark for the purpose of distinguishing or identifying the dfts’ services in connection w/ the ptfs wares or services? This test is formulated so as not to catch common instances of the use of trademarks in the course of trading, such as comparative advertising.

    • Test for “use” in s. 22: only requires proof of use in association with wares or services. No need to prove use as a TM.

  • Application to facts of this case

    • “Use in association test” (s. 20 and s. 22): There can be no use in association with wares b/c the def’n of wares under 4(1) requires association during the ordinary course of trade. [commercial use!]. Handing out leaflets and pamphlets to recruit members doesn’t qualify under that test as commercial activity or “advertising”. The CAW was not advertising its services to make profit (dues are not profit). Also, a person receiving the pamphlet would not make an association btwn use of the TMs and Michelin

    • Use as a TM test (s. 20): the dfts weren’t using the mark to suggest that Michelin was the source of the pamphlets; they were using the mark as a campaign tool, not as a TM.

  • Secondary elements of proof (Confusion [s. 20] and likely to depreciate the GW [s. 22])

    • Confusion: Given the differences in the nature of the wares and services [s. 6(5)], there is little likelihood of confusion over the source of the CAW leaflets and info bulletins. Also, menacing pose of Michelin Man + prominence of CAW logos suggests that use of TMs not likely to confuse avg consumer

    • Likely to depreciate the goodwill: Requires taking away the whole or some portion of the custom attached to the wares and services associated with the TM. No likelihood of depreciation here b/c CAW wasn’t distributing materials to potential customer but rather to Michelin’s employees.

  • Note that court found that use of Michelin man constituted a copyright infringement (SH: fair use – criticism and review)




POINTS TO TAKE OUT OF THIS CASE

  • S. 19 (literal infringement)

  • S. 20 (enjoins confusing uses – confusion goes to source, not mark) – need use in association with wares or services and use AS a TM (i.e. to distinguish those wares and services from those of others)

  • S. 22 (deprecation of goodwill)- need only use in association with wares or services and NOT use AS a TM. Commercial element is necessary.

  • Depreciation = taking away the whole or some portion of the custom attached to the wares and services associated with the TM. DL: Is this enough?



BCAA v. Office and Prof Employees’ Union


BCAA v. Office and Professional Employees’ International Union, [2001], BCSC
Issue: Does s. 22 [with respect to services in s. 4(2)] require that the allegedly infringing conduct have a commercial element? Will a non-commercial activity support a claim for depreciation of goodwill?

Held: Commercial element required. The statute requires that the offending use be a use in association with wares and services, and that contemplates an element of commercial use.
Issue: what constitutes depreciation of goodwill?

Held: Attempting to persuade members of the public not to do business with the company by convincing the public that any positive feeling they have about the other company should apply to it too. [Future Shop  if purpose of using TM is to stress the similarities, the value of the GW associated with the TM is appropriated in a manner contrary to the intent of s. 22. If use stresses the difference, then the use is for the purpose of distancing the trade marked ware or service and s. 22 is not offended].


DL: What constitutes depreciation? Is mere diversion of custom enough? Isn’t that what capitalism is all about? (i.e. selling more products than the person next to you) Why can’t a producer use a TM to divert custom provided that he/she is not misleading or confusing the public?

Perhaps goal of s. 22 is to, as much as possible, keep the diffusion of the mark under the control of the TM’s owner such that its strength is not watered down.



The view that one adopts depends on view of justifications for TM rights. If TM is awarded merely to protect customers/allow them to ID source, then there is no need to protect persuasive value (i.e. via depreciation provisions). But if trademark protects the value and strength and selling power of a mark (per Schecter), then depreciation provisions are necessary.
Parallel (“Gray”) Importing

Breck’s Sporting Goods Co. v. Magder


Breck’s Sporting Goods Co. v. Magder, [1976] S.C.C., CB II p. 263
Facts:

  • Mepps, a French co., licensed American co. exclusive rights to sell Mepps lures

  • American co. gave Breck’s exclusive license to distribute Mepps lures in Canada

  • Magder bought lures from Mepps and sold them in Canada for a lower price than Breck’s

  • Breck’s claimed that Magder was infringing on the TM which it had an exclusive license to use


Held: No TM infringement
Ratio:

  • Mark not distinctive (as per s. 2 and s. 18) = not valid = no TM infringement.

  • Followed F.C.A.: at the time the actions in Q were instituted, the TM “Mepps” did not actually distinguish wares in association with which it was used by Breck’s from wares of persons other than the Breck’s. In particular, didn’t distinguish goods from the goods of the French mfr. Consumers don’t associate Mepp’s lures with Breck’s [the Cdn licensee].




POINT: Wrong on TM law – a TM need not distinguish the specific source from which a good derives (i.e. Cdn licensee vs. American vs. ultimate mfr); need only indicate that ware/service is from the same legitimate source. Right result? Disallowing parallel importing on TM grounds stifles competition (=higher price to consumer). *If Breck’s has a beef, it should be with Mepps (private ordering, not IP law).



Heinz Canada v. Edan


H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada v. Edan Foods Sales Inc., [1991] F.C.T.D.
Facts:

  • Heinz U.S. had a Cdn subsidiary. Heinz U.S. assigned all its Canadian reg’d TMs to Heinz Canada

  • Heinz Canada developed new recipe for ketchup based on Cdn tastes and sold that newly formulated ketchup in Canadian stores.

  • Edan Foods bought American Heinz ketchup, marked it as “imported” and sold it in Canada for a lower price than Heinz Canada

  • Heinz Canada claimed that Edan had infringed its TM


Held: TM infringement
Ratio:

  • s. 19 gives Heinz Canada (owner of reg’d TM) the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada (in respect of certain wares).

  • Infringement under s. 20 where a party sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing TM or trade name.

  • In this case there is clearly a likelihood of confusion btwn the two products (i.e. the Cdn product marked Heinz and the imported product marked Heinz): TM is well known and has been in use in Canada for most of past century. Products in Q are of different composition but are extremely similar in appearance, and will likely be sold side by side in the same retail outlets. Also, the TMs used by the dft are virtually identical. [SH: even need confusion when identical??]

  • It is not necessary that the products in Q be mfd in Canada to constitute infringement so long as they are sold in Canada in association with a confusing trademark. [SH: even if American parent company had sold ketchup in Canada in association with a confusing TM – would have been infringement]




POINT: Parallel importing (e.g. importing US ketchup into Canada and selling it under TM that is identical to, or merely confusing with, the reg’d TM owned by the Canadian company) can lead to TM infringement. EXCLUSIVE USE OF TM IN CANADA = ANOTHER WHO USES IT (OR CONFUSING MARK) IN CANADA INFRINGES. DL: Right on TM law…but wrong in policy? Do decisions like these stifle competition? There are now plenty of decisions in US and Europe that go the other way.

SH: I think Heinz and Breck’s are different – licensed TM vs. assigned TM; also Heinz Canada was selling a different product which conformed to Cdn tastes; consumers who bought the imported product wouldn’t get what they were expecting. Unlike in Mepps case, where all fishing lures came from Mepps and were the same, in this case not all the ketchup was the same.



**DL: Parallel importing now seen as competitive practice in global context and one that ought to be encouraged. If TM law is about distinctive source and product quality, it probably doesn’t have much to say about parallel importing. If Breck’s has beef, take it up with Mepps (i.e. if you sign a K with Mepps, make sure Mepps aggress to take action wrt their other licensees (e.g. if distributor’s products slip into Canada)



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