AI-PS requirements in projects, from project identification through to execution, is described in “GU-648 Guide for Applying Process Safety in Projects” [Ref. 4].
This guideline extracts all the relevant information from the existing ORP documentation that is necessary to meet the AI-PS requirements at handover. It also provides further clarity with regards to the assurance processes which underpin the project team’s ability to demonstrate that AI-PS requirements are met at the end of every project phase.
The main objective of this guideline is to explain the key AI-PS objectives and deliverables throughout the project phases that demonstrate the facility is fit for the safe introduction of process fluids and that systems, processes and procedures are in place so that AI-PS can be safeguarded in the subsequent operate phase.
This will allow PDO to make the statement that “Our Asset is Safe and we know it” after each project phase.
Critical drawings are those drawings which are required to be maintained in order to support the implementation of critical tasks. Critical drawings are required to ensure that the risks from MAHs are ALARP.
A list of critical drawings shall be made for each facility. All critical drawings shall be stored in an easily accessible database to reflect the current design and status of the asset (as-built status).
This will ensure that all personnel have access to reliable and up to date information to allow accurate planning of work operations and activities, management of change and investigative activities (when an incident has occurred).
Critical drawings include, but are not limited to:
PFS
PEFS
Cause and Effect matrix
Hazardous area classification
Area Layout
Site plan (sub-field layout)
Key plan and Plot plan
Escape routes
Safety equipment layout
Critical valve list (including locked open and locked closed valves)
Fire and Gas layouts.
9HEMP
The hazards and effects management (HEMP) process identifies and asses HSE hazards, implements control and recovery measures and maintains a documented demonstration that major HSE risks have been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
HEMP shall be applied to all activities over which PDO has operational control and shall cover the entire lifecycle of the asset or operation; from concept through to decommissioning and disposal. Work undertaken by a Contractor and under the Contractor’s own management system shall have a requirement for an equivalent HEMP approach expressly stated in the contract.
HEMP is fundamental to all analysis and assessment elements of the formal HSE activities, and is at the heart of the HSE management system used in PDO. The HEMP process comprises four basic steps:
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Systematic identification of hazards, threats, unwanted events and their effects
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Assessment of the risks against screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of unwanted events and the potential severity of the consequences in terms of effects to people, assets, the environment and reputation of PDO
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Implementation of suitable risk reduction measures to control or mitigate the hazard and its effects
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Planning for recovery in the event of a loss of control leading to an unacceptable effect.
The main objective of HEMP activities is to demonstrate that hazards (and associated risks) have been identified and where the hazard cannot be eliminated the risks are controlled to a level that is tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The HEMP model is characterised by Figure 5 .
Figure 5: HEMP Model
HEMP studies shall be performed by staff who are knowledgeable about the facility and operations and who are competent in the HEMP techniques necessary. The studies shall be planned and implemented in a timely manner to enable the results to be incorporated without incurring avoidable rework and costs. The studies should be documented such that key information and decisions made are transparent and available for future reference. Recommendations arising from HEMP studies shall be recorded in an appropriate action tracking system.
9.1Hazards and Effects Register
Hazards and their effects on people, the environment, the assets and the reputation of PDO shall be systematically identified and listed for the full lifecycle of the asset and operations.
The hazards are identified in a Hazard Identification (HAZID) meeting, and the outcome of this meeting is used to develop the Hazards and Effects Register.
PDO use a checklist of potential hazards to populate the Hazards and Effects Register. It is recommended that a multi-disciplinary team facilitated by an experienced person go through the list of hazards and identify those relevant to the specific facility/asset/ operation under consideration. Ideally the team should be made up of Management, Operations, HSE, Maintenance and Engineering Disciplines (Concept, Detailed Design as appropriate) personnel.
The PDO Risk Assessment Matrix in Figure 2 shall be used to assess the hazards and their severity and frequency of occurrence. The experience of the team will be used to brainstorm hazards known to have been realised from previous experience or thinking whether it is a credible hazard that could occur within PDO operations. This is a subjective process and care must be taken not to over-complicate the process by thinking of multiple events, double jeopardy events or highly unlikely events.
Examples of credible scenarios could include major leak from oil storage tank at MAF, leak at a Booster station on the main oil line, leak from offtake tanker hose, loss of containment from on-plot processing facilities, loss of containment of H2S (affecting both onsite personnel and the general public). Consequences from such incidents usually cover injury/fatalities, fires/explosions, environmental impact, loss of facility and negative impacts on reputation.
For low and medium risk hazards, the controls for the hazards, i.e. permit to work, job safety assessment, operating procedures, competence assessments, tool box talks, etc., are discussed and then added to the Hazards and Effects Register.
Hazards that have been assessed as being a severity 5 or high risk on the risk assessment matrix are then modelled further using bow-tie methodology as described in next section.
See 23 for the full checklist of potential hazards, and an example of a Hazard and Effects Register is provided in 24.
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