How to Undertake an ALARP Assessment

14.2How to Undertake an ALARP Assessment

14.2.1Principles of Hazard Management

Nevertheless, all hazard management controls should be considered at each stage of the development.

The strategy selected for managing a hazard will differ depending on the project phase, and this principle shall form part of the evaluation when making ALARP demonstrations.

As the opportunity for influencing the facility design is greatest during early design phases, the focus shall be on elimination or substitution of the hazards. This typically applies to Identify& Assess and Select phases of the ORP process.

As the project matures into Define and Execute, there is less opportunity to apply elimination or substitution and hence the predominant hazard management controls consist of isolation/separation and engineering solutions that can be put in place.

Once a facility becomes operational, the hazard management will largely focus on the organizational and procedural controls. PPE is generally regarded as the last principle of hazard management and therefore also the least effective.

14.2.2Good Engineering Practice

The scope for eliminating hazards and threats and reducing the scale of consequences is greatest at the beginning of the project and progressively reduces as the project develops. In part this is because the cost and difficulty of delivering a given risk reduction solution increases as the project develops. ALARP demonstrations must be robust for each of the HSE Cases as per Figure ‎3 .

CP-122 “Health, Safety and Environment Mgmt System – CoP” describes application of the AI-PSM process from CCPS RBPS within PDO to demonstrate compliance to good engineering practice and to ensure that risk levels are ALARP. This is made via demonstrating compliance against the 20 Process Elements shown in 32.

14.2.3Good Engineering Principles

Simply following standards does not in itself demonstrate ALARP, particularly for more complex or novel projects, where additional considerations shall be made.

14.2.4HEMP Studies

HEMP studies undertaken during the select, define, execute and/or operate phases of the development are used to assess risk levels and identify any further risk reduction measures.

Applicable HEMP studies for each project phase are defined in DCAF.

14.2.5ALARP Review

In assessing the risks associated with the Design or Operations HSE Case hazards, a qualitative review of the Bow-ties shall be undertaken. The review shall be led by an experienced facilitator and the review team shall be comprised of experienced staff from the following areas of expertise:

Engineering

Process

HSE

Maintenance

Operations

Management

Asset stakeholders.

Each of the threat lines in the bow-ties shall be reviewed in turn and the discussion should cover such questions such as:

Does industry best practice state what should be done or make any recommendations?

Can a benchmark exercise be undertaken against other operators and similar controls implemented?

Where are the gaps/shortfalls and what action needs to be taken to address these gaps/shortfalls? See Section 15.2.

Is there sufficient quantity and quality of barriers?

Is there anything else that can be done to further reduce the risk?

Both barrier effectiveness and the number of barriers contribute to the overall effectiveness of control, although in general, the effectiveness of individual barriers is more critical.

The number, independence and reliability of the control and recovery measures shall be commensurate with the risk.

By approaching the bow-tie review in this systematic fashion, the barriers can be challenged in terms of completeness and adequacy and gaps identified and addressed so that the review team is satisfied that the risks arereduced to ALARP.

The HSE Case process enables an ALARP argument to be formulated although in isolation, a complete ALARP argument cannot be made. The claims made against the numbers, quality, performance and location of the barriers must also be verified. This verification of the safeguards (both hardware and procedural controls) is performed via AI-PSM audit and the TR-MIE and TI-HBV processes. These processes substantiate the claims made within the Bow-Ties and MOPO in terms of barrier integrity and performance.

14.3Assessment of Complex Decisions

Demonstrating ALARP shall involve consideration of fundamentally different options to provide assurance that the Company gets the best value for money over the lifetime of the facility. The assessment of fundamentally different options normally takes place in the identify, assess and select phases.

Assessment of complex decisions requires consideration of all the hard and soft issues related to a range of options and should reflect a decision taken at the right level in the organisation with full knowledge of all the options and their associated risks and costs.

The following structure is recommended for documenting ALARP demonstration for complex project decisions:

1. 
   IDENTIFY
   
   1. 
      Problem Definition
      
   2. 
      HSE Issues and Potential Risk
      
   3. 
      HSE Standard & Tolerability Criteria
      
2. 
   ASSESS
   
   1. 
      Options Considered
      
   2. 
      Basis for Selection and Uncertainties
      
   3. 
      Justification for Chosen Option
      
3. 
   CONTROL & EVALUATION
   
   1. 
      Residual HSE Risks
      
   2. 
      Recommendation for Next Project Phase
      
   3. 
      Requirements for the Operations HSE Plan/Case
      

The ALARP demonstration for such decisions shall be signed by the person developing the demonstration as well as relevant discipline Technical Authorities.

Directory: hsems -> Documents -> Specifications
Specifications -> Health, safety and environment specification

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