Ayer, AJ. LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC. Dover: Pubns. 1946.
Ayer, AJ. LOGICAL POSITIVISM. Free Press. 1966
Ayer, AJ. PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. Viking Press. 1991.
Ayer, AJ. PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. Vintage Books. 1984
Ayer, AJ. FREEDOM AND MORALITY AND OTHER ESSAYS. Clarendon Press. 1987.
Ayer, AJ. THE MEANING OF LIFE. Scribner. 1990.
Foster, John. AYER (ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES). Routledge, Kegan & Paul. 1985
Hahn, Lewis. THE PHILOSOPHY OF AJ AYER. THE LIVING PHILOSOPHERS VOL 21. Open Court Publishing Company. 1992.
Hanfling, Oswald. AYER: THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS. Routledge. 1999.
MacDonald, GF. PERCEPTION AND IDENTITY: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO AJ AYER WITH HIS REPLIES. Cornell University Press. New York. 1979.
Martin, Robert. ON AYER. Wadsworth Publishing. 2000
Rogers, Ben. AJ AYER: A LIFE. Grove Press. 2000.
STATEMENTS OF VALUE ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE
1. DELINIATIONS OF RIGHT AND WRONG CONTAIN NO TRUTH AND ARE MEANINGLESS
Andrew Knowlton, Professor of Philosophy at Bates College, A.J. AYER – AN END OF METAPHYSICS, 1990. p. 2.
As a result of Ayer's discussion of logical empiricism, some interesting questions are raised concerning the validity of ethics and theology. Ayer believes that statements of ethics are like those of metaphysics, factually meaningless. Take for example the statement, "Adultery is wrong." Ayer wants to argue that this statement makes only one factual, verifiable observation, "Adultery is." Wrongness, having no existence as an actual, observable phenomenon, communicates a feeling, not a fact. Ayer rejects any attempt to set up a "realm of values" over the world of experience. Adultery is wrong neither makes an empirical statement about adultery nor relates adultery to some transcendental realm. The only thing that the statement "Adultery is wrong" expresses is our feelings about adultery, our feelings of disapproval, or our attempt to persuade others not to commit adultery. In all of these cases, "Adultery is wrong" conveys no truth or information, therefore it is thought of as a meaningless statement.
2. THE ONLY WAY TO DESTABALIZE POWER RELATATIONS IS TO QUESTION KNOWLEDGE
John Ransom, Professor Of Political Science, Duke University, FOUCAULT’S DISCIPLINE, 1997. p. 23-24.
The second point that is missed by Foucault’s critics is the possibility that instead of describing an omnipotent form of power with an unbreakable hold on our subjective states, the “power-knowledge” sign marks a kind of weakness in the construction of modern power. An unnoticed consequence of Foucault’s observations on the relation between knowledge and power is the increased importance of knowledge. If power and knowledge are intertwined, it follow that one way to understand power - potentially to destabilize it or change its focus - is to take a firm hold on the knowledge that is right there at the center of its operations.
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE WHY THINGS HAPPEN
1. INABILITY TO PROVE CAUSAL CONNECTION RENDERS DISCUSSION OF WHY IRELEVENT
Kenneth Rothman, Professor, University of Massachusetts Medical School, CAUSAL INFERENCE-INFERRING CAUSAL CONNECTIONS -HABIT, FAITH, OR LOGIC, 1988. p. 6.
An understanding of the process of causal inference is often muddled by differing concepts of the term “inference” in empirical science, a problem that may reflect the uncertainty of the process itself. What passes for causal inference by scientists is often just decision - making perched upon weak criteria that lack a logical base. Many of the commonly used modes of causal inference are fallacious, their popularity not withstanding.
2. EVEN THOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EMPIRICAL TRUTH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT
Kenneth Rothman, Professor, University of Massachusetts Medical School, CAUSAL INFERENCE-INFERRING CAUSAL CONNECTIONS -HABIT, FAITH, OR LOGIC, 1988. p. 10.
Empirical knowledge, on the other hand, seems to accumulate through a different method, one that does not guarantee correct conclusions no matter how carefully it is applied. Even with multiple repetitions, the assignment of a causal interpretation or the formulation of a law of nature from the series of perceptions cannot be construed as a logical extension of the observations, despite our innate tendency to do so.
3. HUMANS CAN'T APPROPRAITE TRUTH
John Novak, Professor Colgate University “Why I am not a Russellian.” FREE INQUIRY, 1995. p. 38.
As appealing as [Russell’s] claim for foundational certainty is, there is another point of view. That is, that life is messier and that human perception does not have this privileged access to knowledge; knowledge claims regarding the empirical world are always inferential. In actuality, all knowledge is mediated, that is, constructed from some perspective within problematic situations. Thus, experience is always occurring in some context and must be filtered through some perspective to become knowledge.
CLAIMS TO UNIVERSAL TRUTH SUSTAIN NEGATIVE POWER RELATIONS
1. RELYING SOLEY ON PROOF DEVALUES OTHER FORMS OF THINKING
Charlie Brown, Assistant Professor Of Philosophy at Emporia State Univ., “Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism,” MIDWEST QUARTERLY, 1995, p. 2.
Scientific thinking has attained its form of universality, its unequaled scope of application by omitting from its discourse not only the realm of values and divergent points of view but also human feeling and sentiments. By elevating this skewed universality to a privileged position as the only valid form of thinking all other forms of thinking have been devalued.
2. FOCUSING ONLY ON WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE PROVED IGNORES THE "OTHER"
William Cornwall, Professor of Philosophy at Mary Washington College, MAKING SENSE OF THE OTHER: HUSSERL, CARNAP, HEIDEGGER, AND WITTGENSTEIN. 1999, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Comp/CompCorn.htmm Accessed June 1, 2003. p-np.
Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified.
3. ADHERENCE TO SCIENCE OVERLOOKES CRUCIAL COMPLEXITIES
Dennis O’Brien, President emeritus of the University of Rochester, “He Didn’t Add Up.” COMMONWEAL, September 28, 2001. p. 22.
Russell's exalted notion of truth was, he said, "as stern and pitiless as God." He ironically cited the pope as someone who also holds to exalted truth--though of course the pontiff had it all wrong. The issue for Russellian scientists and papal catechists is to avoid the temptation of simplifying the intricate, entangled world of concrete realities in the interest of a simplistic and thus stern and pitiless Beyond. A contemporary philosopher, Nancy Cartwright, writes powerfully against the Russellian kind of scientific simplification in favor of what she calls "the dappled world"--a phrase deliberately taken from Gerard Manley Hopkins (The Dappled World, 1999). Her concern is ultimately moral. Those who seek to simplify physical and emotional reality make a mess of the multiple multilayered nonreducible realities of human life. Bertrand Russell's life is a proof text of that assertion.
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