CANNOT SILENCE INDIVIDUAL VOICES

CANNOT SILENCE INDIVIDUAL VOICES

1. CANNOT SILENCE INDIVIDUAL VOICES

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 23.

But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 70.

In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation if language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offense, from which they hardly ever deviate even m a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other; and, for example if it were necessary to choose, there would be much mare need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion.
3. INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE CAN ONLY INCREASE IN A FREE SOCIETY

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 83-84.

Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people--less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of molds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character.
4. SOCIETY CAN NOT RESTRICT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 96.

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation.
5. IT IS UNJUST TO TAKE AWAY MORAL RIGHTS

John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 203.

When, however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is unjust, namely by infringing somebody’s right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.

JUSTICE IS THE HIGHEST VALUE

1. JUSTICE IS THE PREEMINENT VALUE

John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 222.

Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.

John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 204.

Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favor or preference to one person over another, in matters to which favor and preference to not properly apply. Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is admitted that favor and preference are not always censurable, and indeed the cases in which they are condemned are rather the exception than the nile.
3. VALUE OF JUSTICE IS ITS OWN METHOD OF ENFORCEMENT

John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 214.

To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who enforce the rule.

JUST SOCIETIES CAN REGULATE BEHAVIOR

1. JUST SOCIETIES CAN RESTRAIN ACTIONS THAT HARM OTHERS

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 72-73.

Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost.

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 97.

As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room far entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding).
3. JUSTICE ALLOWS FOR INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTIVITY

John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in John M. Robson (Ed.). JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS, 1966, p. 224-225.

Most of the maxims of justice current in the world, and commonly appealed to in its transactions, are simply instrumental to carrying into effect the principles of justice which we have now spoken of. That a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily, or could voluntarily have avoided; that it is unjust to condemn any person unheard; that the punishment ought to be proportioned to the offense and the like, are maxims intended to prevent the just principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the infliction of evil without that justification. The greater part of these common maxims have come into use from the practice of courts of justice, which have been naturally led to a more complete recognition and elaboration than was likely to suggest itself to others, of the rules necessary to enable them to fulfill their double function, of inflicting punishment when due, and of awarding to each person his right.