Critical History Of Values

Critical History Of Values

History, for Nietzsche, teaches us more than simple philosophical analysis ever can. Through tracing the history of how words have fanned ideas, and how words and ideas have been used, we can note their gradual distortion and concealment in what many thinkers believe is the “progress” of humanity. Take, for example, the concept of “goodness.” Although now we associate “being good” with one’s consistent adherence to a particular value system, originally, “good” denoted the activities of the most powerful actors in society: A warrior was “good” if he was ruthless and without pity for his enemies; the aristocracy defined goodness through their actions which were held up as the most noble of activities.

Relying on a historical trajectory, Nietzsche argued, allows us to see that what happened was a fall from genuine human nature, indeed the genuine nature of all living things, who by the very essence of life itself should conquer weaker living things. It is only through seeing how things were and how they changed that one can see where we are now. Humans talk of being meek only when trying to hide their dangerous strengths, or in order to give excuses for not being strong when it is warranted. Humans talk of “love,”

whether for another person, or activity, or thing, when we really mean that we enjoy those people or activities or things and want to use them for our own enjoyment and personal fulfillment.
Why, Nietzsche asks, are we so afraid to face our selfishness? Because, he answers, facing such a nature we would also be forced to confront the fact that not everyone is equally powerful; not everyone can succeed, and that the natural order of things demands that one person’s well-being often comes at the expense of someone else’s. Even though this is a brute and indisputable fact of life, Nietzsche argued that it has become covered up because so many people fear being placed on the bottom of the natural hierarchy, and so they invent lies to hide the hierarchy itself, or call it evil.
So an understanding of the history of ideas forces us to be honest with ourselves about how we use those ideas. But more is needed. Nietzsche is not prescribing that we give up our values; instead, he sees this happening naturally as the hypocrisy of modern institutions is increasingly revealed and exposed. At the end of the Nineteenth Century, European civilization, as Nietzsche saw it, was poised to give up its values entirely. The question was now: What will we put in their place?

The Transvaluation Of Values

Perhaps only metaphorically (since he was not a social scientist), Nietzsche saw a ‘new human” on the horizon: A human whose honesty matched his power, whose authenticity would guide the way into a rejection of the weaknesses of democracy, utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and other values which went against the natural, will-to-power processes of life. In short, Nietzsche issued a challenge, and while he offered no comprehensive answer or instructions for meeting the challenge, he clearly had in mind a return to the values of the Greeks and Romans. Heroes need not apologize for their behavior, they can be excused in their excesses precisely because those excesses are honest and authentic. Again, no prescription is necessary; rather, Nietzsche asks: Where will an authentic and honest life lead us? Let us experiment, he asks, and see where we end up.

How Accurate Is Nietzsche’s Assessment?

Critics have pointed out a few problems in Nietzsche’s diagnosis and subsequent suggestions. To begin with, it is not altogether clear whether his pronouncement that all conscious activity is merely a manifestation of the will to power is not merely itself a metaphysical assertion of the type that he holds in contempt. It is certainly possible that Nietzsche merely chose to interpret the data of human history with his conclusion already in mind, and this is a questionable way to do philosophy. But it isn’t merely a

methodological flaw which disturbs people about Nietzsche’s assertion. His conclusion carries with it obvious ethical implications.
Most obviously, feminist thinkers have major qualms with Nietzsche. His views on women were explicitly negative: He called them inferior almost as a matter of habit. But more dangerous than his dismissal of women’s intellect is his extremely male-centered concept of true virtue: Nietzsche’s world of muscle-bound heroes hacking their way through humanity reads like an adolescent pipe dream, feminists say. Do all humans really want to take over the world, to exploit, to forge new paths of adventure and wallow in bloody glory? Or is this simply testosterone?
Christian ethicists have more trouble with Nietzsche. On the one hand, they respect his exposure of institutional religious hypocrisy and fully admit that the ethics of compassion have often been distorted by power-hungry priests and complacent clerics. But does this, in itself, prove that the virtue of compassion, and the belief in a higher power, are weak or simple-minded? These ethicists don’t think so. Rather, they see compassion, albeit a compassion informed by an awareness of humanity’s tendency to transgress, as an essential response to the condition in which we find ourselves. Instead of saying it is natural to make war, why not try to change human tendencies? Instead of ridiculing the practice of turning the other cheek, why not point out how it results in more peaceful resolution of disputes? Christian ethicists appreciate being challenged, but they wish people would not be so quick to dismiss virtues such as humility and peacemaking.
Finally, progressive thinkers of all stripes frequently answer Nietzsche by pointing out that humanity as a species will be stronger through the building of communal, democratic values than through authoritarianism. They accurately point out that Hitler used many of Nietzsche’s ideas, albeit in a distorted fashion, to build the ideology of German National Socialism. Since Nazism was both morally outrageous and politically self-destructive, progressives believe that some of the “values” Nietzsche supposedly despised may actually be signs of strength rather than weakness.
But through all this criticism, most of Nietzsche’s core project remains unchallenged: Why not be more honest with ourselves about our motives and concerns? Why do we hold values up, often at the expense of the very human beings who invented such values? And is it possible that abandoning metaphysics might actually lead us to think more clearly? In a way, Nietzsche did nothing but ask questions and issue challenges; the history of the Twentieth Century seems to validate most, if not all, of his queries.

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