Philosopher views

RAWLSIAN JUSTICE IS IMMORAL

1. THE ORIGINAL POSITION ENTRENCHES SELFISH INDIVIDUALISM

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 73.

In Rousseau’s state of nature, there is a genuine bond cemented by the feeling of compassion between the individual and the other, between the stranger and the sufferer. There is no compassion in the Rawlsian original position. When the Rawlsian parties look at the most disadvantaged they do not see others; they see themselves, and they try to ameliorate their potential predicament as far as possible. It could not be otherwise since, in the original position, they are choosing principles of justice in a situation of “great uncertainty;” they are trying “to acknowledge principles which advance their system of ends as far as possible;” and they are “allowed only enough knowledge to make a rational choice to protect their interest.”

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 73.

In other words, the parties are committed to advancing their interests, but since they do not know the specific content of those interests, they are unable to assess their moral character. They know that they have a capacity for a conception of the good, but since they lack knowledge of that conception, they are unable to judge the moral character or lack of it which their ideas of the good may have. They possess general knowledge of the facts of life, but they do not know their psychological propensities, so they are unable to determine whether they will care, and in what degree, about moral ends.
3. RAWLS IS GROSSLY UTILITARIAN

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 74.

The difference principle, then, does not rely on identification with the interests of others expressed in sympathy or benevolence. Neither does it depend on altruism. It hinges on reciprocal advantages. “The principle of utility,” Rawls says, “seems to require a greater identification with the interests of others than the two principles of justice. Thus the latter will be a more stable conception to the extent that this identification is difficult to achieve.” Rawls argues, however, that in the original position the parties are forced to take into account the good of others. But one is hard pressed to find how could this be the case.
4. RAWLS IGNORES ALTRUISM AND ENTRENCHES SELFISHNESS

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, pp. 74-5.

To sum up: in the original position, there is no place for sympathy; no need for benevolence; no role for altruism; and, Rawls’s claim to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no space for a concern for others. The parties are trying “to advance their conception of the good as best they can,” and “in attempting to do this they are not bound by prior moral ties to each other.” Nor are they bound by “extensive ties of natural sentiments,” something that a conception of justice “should not presuppose.” The principles of justice are supported because each party is concerned with his own good and wants to advance his own interests, and those interests are bereft of any moral content.

RAWLSIAN JUSTICE DOES NOT EMANCIPATE THE POOR AND DISADVANTAGED

1. RAWLS’S SOCIAL PRINCIPLES ARE AN EXCUSE FOR THE RICH TO BUY OFF THE POOR

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 78.

The better-off benefit from inequalities, and, to justify those inequalities and still have social cooperation, they must provide the greatest benefits to the most disadvantaged. They have to buy the compliance of the least fortunate members of society by providing them with the greatest benefits. We have seen that Rawls explicitly rejects sympathy as a ground of justice, and he eschews altruism in favor of the “more realistic idea” of mutual advantages. If this is so, the willingness of the better-off to pay for the greatest benefits arises not from a sense of morality which leads them to identify with the interests of others, but from their own very real interest in gaining the collaboration of the most disadvantaged and preserving an unequal status from which they derive benefits.

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 79

The privileged status of the better-off is compounded by the Rawlsian requirement of universal improvement, which appears predominantly in the first chapter of Theory and then seems to be replaced by the long-term expectations of the most disadvantaged. “The general conception of justice,” Rawls writes, “imposes no restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible; it only requires that everyone’s position be improved. This formulation can be interpreted in two different ways: 1) The advantages the better-off already have will constitute the improvements they should expect from Rawlsian justice, or 2) the advantaged position they already hold should improve even further. Rawls’s argument is problematic on both counts but is particularly striking on the second. Members of the better-off might see the financial contributions Rawlsian justice demands as a denial of what they understand as improvement. The possible reply that improvement is defined by the public system of rules—by public functionaries—is hardly a consolation. The second interpretation might strike many citizens as unreasonable. If the better-off already have social and economic advantages, why must their situation be enhanced even further? Of course, it improves in the sense of obtaining legitimacy and the benefits of cooperation: this is what Rawls probably intends, but it is not what his text necessarily states.
3. RAWLS DOES NOT PROMOTE EQUALITY

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 81.

The better-off have no moral reason to support the greatest benefits to the most disadvantaged. Neither do the most disadvantaged have moral ground to demand the greatest benefits from the better-off. Those greatest benefits are the price tag they put on their acceptance of inequalities. It is also the price society pays through its public institutions to retain the cooperation and support of the least fortunate members, who are willing to accept that their worth of liberty is unequal and to accept their status as the most disadvantaged as long as society gives them the greatest benefits. Rawlsian justice becomes a prudential assessment of the costs required to maintain legitimacy for the better-off and stability for the social order. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the greatest benefits do not necessarily lift the worse-off up from their status, nor are they meant to.
4. RAWLSIAN THEORY IS ONLY A PALLIATIVE FOR THE DISADVANTAGED

Robert Alejandro, professor of philosophy at Smith College, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, 1998, p. 85.

In Rawlsian theory, by contrast, even though the just character of society is determined by the status of the most disadvantaged (whether their expectations are rising and whether they are receiving the greatest benefits), this group is not responsible for improving their own condition or changing it altogether. That is the exclusive task of the Rawlsian state. The Marxist paradigm seeks to abolish the status of the workers; the Rawlsian paradigm seeks to render more palatable the status of the most disadvantaged.